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Summary 
This thesis presents Giovanni Gentile’s actual idealism as a radical constructivist 
doctrine for use in moral theory. The first half describes the moral theory that Gentile 
explicitly identifies with actual idealism, according to which all thinking, rather than an 
exclusive domain of ‘practical reason,’ has a moral character. It is argued that after 
Gentile’s turn to Fascism in the early 1920s, this theory is increasingly conflated with his 
political doctrine. This entails several major changes that cannot be squared with the 
underlying metaphysics. The second half of the thesis develops a more plausible 
account of Gentilean moral constructivism based on the pre-Fascist idea of reasoning as 
an internal dialogue. Comparisons and contrasts are drawn with contemporary 
constructivist doctrines, as well as theories employing dialogical conceptions of reason. 
The internal dialogue is presented as a device enabling the thinking subject to make 
objective judgements about real-world problems despite the impossibility of her 
occupying a fully objective standpoint. Thus actual idealist moral theory is offered as an 
example of constructivism at its most radical, inviting advocates of less radical varieties 
to re-assess the foundations on which their theories are built. 
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0.1 Introduction 
 
1. Overview of aims 
This thesis describes and develops the moral theory of Giovanni Gentile (1875-
1944), the Sicilian philosopher most often remembered for his contributions to the 
Italian Fascist regime, first as Minister of Public Instruction, later as a Senator and head 
of the Institute of Fascist Culture, and in general as one of the Party’s most vocal and 
erudite spokesmen. Despite Gentile’s colourful biography and the various controversies 
with which his political career links him, I have little to say about his life or the history 
and ideology of Fascism. Those I leave for historians to interpret. My interests are 
narrowly philosophical.  
I argue that Gentile’s ‘actual idealism’ is an unusually ambitious constructivist 
doctrine, comprising sophisticated conceptions of the person and society, truth and 
reason, and the way all of these are joined in moral enterprise. His constructivism is 
different from those described by Kant or any other post-Kantian philosopher, and 
grounded on metaphysical foundations that, beneath recondite technical vocabulary, are 
both familiar and credible. I argue that this moral theory is worthy of rehabilitation even 
if the political theory extending from it is not. To show this I must separate Gentile’s 
ethics from his work (and, more pressingly, his enduring reputation) as ‘the philosopher 
of Fascism.’ There is a healthy flow of work on that topic already. A systematic 
treatment of actual idealism’s implications for contemporary moral constructivism is 
noticeably absent from the secondary literature. In correcting this paucity I mean to 
present a Gentilean theory that shares its major aims with the better-known versions of 
constructivism in recent Anglo-American philosophy, though reaching them by a 
distinctively different route. In order to meet the standards for analytic ethics, this 
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Gentilean doctrine must be shown to be both workable and well poised to counter the 
chief objections to those theories. 
 
2. On scope and originality 
One of the central claims of the thesis is that there are good reasons in favour 
of choosing a moral theory based on carefully selected features of actual idealism, 
whose creator was, among other things, a card-carrying Fascist.1 It might be thought 
that to defend this theory is to defend Fascism, if only indirectly. However, for the 
purposes of this work I have no real interest in Gentile’s personality, motives, and 
allegiances, nor in the moral problems that go with his complicity, at first active and 
later passive, in a political experiment that began and ended in violence. I treat his work 
as a series of arguments, and aim at the rational re-construction of his ideas, assembling 
a composite doctrine from those that are persuasive and rejecting those that are faulty. 
By operating at this carefully-maintained level of abstraction I mean to keep the thesis 
firmly within the realm of moral philosophy and divorced as cleanly as possible from 
the soul-searching intellectual biographies that have dominated the literature elsewhere. 
That Gentile was a Fascist is an undeniable fact about him. But this does not make all 
of his ideas Fascist ideas. To reject a theory unseen because we do not approve of its 
author is argumentum ad hominem, and in what follows I mean to show that actual idealist 
moral theory is perfectly comprehensible irrespective of the dubious political context 
from which it arose. 
Part of the thesis’s originality is in its attempt to treat actual idealist moral theory 
strictly as philosophy, not as a window onto its author, an era or some larger concept 
                                                          
1 When Gentile served as education minister in the Fascist government of 1922, he initially did so 
as a Nationalist and Liberal. He applied for membership in the PNF in May 1923, albeit while 
describing himself in his letter of application as ‘liberal by deep and firm conviction[.]’ The letter 
is re-printed in Giuseppe Calandra (1987) Gentile e il fascismo. Bari: Laterza [8]. See also Gregor 
(2001) Giovanni Gentile: Philosopher of Fascism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction [2] 
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like modernity or Italian culture. Although I often mention Gentile’s name, for the most 
part this can be understood as shorthand for ‘someone accepting the central tenets of 
actual idealism.’ I refer to the historical figure only where this is necessary to understand 
why particular arguments are made in quite the ways they are – why, in other words, 
Gentile sometimes deviates from the sober logic of his theory to reach unexpected 
conclusions. My approach would be orthodox in analytic moral philosophy, but it is 
uncharacteristic of the existing literature on Gentile and actual idealism.2 To explain 
previous authors’ unwillingness to distinguish theory from theorist, I will briefly defer 
my philosophical investigations in favour of some story-telling.  
 
2i. The death of the author 
On 15th April, 1944, Giovanni Gentile was assassinated outside the gates of his 
villa on the outskirts of Florence. The city was then in the short-lived Italian Social 
(‘Salò’) Republic, formed in 1943 after the Kingdom of Italy’s surrender to the invading 
Allies. The Republic comprised only the northernmost parts of the country, and stood 
as the last bastion of the Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF; National Fascist Party), 
supported by German resources and personnel in anticipation of the Allied advance. 
Between 1922 and 1943 the PNF had been the dominant force in Italian politics, 
suppressing opposition and trying to realise its stated goal of totalitarianism, whereby the 
state and its citizens share a unified identity and will.  By April 1944, its powers were 
severely depleted. Mussolini himself, as well as prominent loyalists like Gentile, had 
moved north to receive the protection of the Nazis. The Republic was politically 
                                                          
2 Martin Heidegger’s famously brief summary of Aristotle’s biography is instructive here: ‘He was 
born on such-and-such a date, he worked, and he died.’ I do not go quite so far as Heidegger in 
setting the theorist outside theory’s ambit of inquiry, but with him I agree that biography, 
however interesting it may be, is not philosophy. See Heidegger (2002) Gesamtausgabe II, 
Vorlesungen 1919-1944. Band 8: Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann. [5] (Thanks to Sabine Schulz for her advice regarding this translation 
in December 2012.) 
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volatile, with the on-going struggle between pro- and anti-Fascist groups spilling into 
something approaching a civil war, and frequent tit-for-tat killings of activists on both 
sides. 
Gentile was well known as a member of the Party. His political influence had 
been greatest in the 1920s, when he had established his place as the PNF’s foremost 
theorist, responsible for both the Manifesto degli intellettuali fascisti (Manifesto of the 
Fascist Intellectuals) and the Origini e dottrina del fascismo (Origins and Doctrine of 
Fascism). As an ideologue and spokesman, he promoted some of the Party’s most 
controversial policies and ideas. Among these were the concept of totalitarianism, which 
he gave its first positive theory, and the claim that Fascist violence was an expression of 
the ideology’s irreducibly moral nature. Thereafter his opponents dubbed him ‘the 
philosopher of the blackjack’ (il filosofo del manganello), after the favoured weapon of 
Fascist militiamen (squadristi). Although his political influence dwindled through the 
1930s,3 and in his public role he advocated tolerance and clemency toward anti-Fascist 
activists, he remained an indelible symbol of the ancien regime.4 In his final weeks he had 
received death threats in which he was identified (accurately) as an ‘exponent of neo-
fascism,’ symbolically (and more dubiously) responsible for the deaths of five anti-
                                                          
3 Herbert Schneider notes that by 1928, Gentile was no longer a minister, but his ‘disciples’ were 
‘the most conspicuous and […] distinguished group of [F]ascist thinkers […] both in their 
numbers and in philosophic erudition.’ See Schneider (1968) Making the Fascist State. New York: 
Howard Fertig (Originally 1928) [344]. Although Gentile ghost-wrote the official Doctrine of 
Fascism under Mussolini’s name in 1933, his direct political influence had peaked in the early-
mid 1920s, before he was, as Harry Redner puts it, ‘kicked upstairs to the honorific, but 
powerless, post as a Fascist senior dignitary’ – as president of the Istituto Fascista di Cultura 
(Fascist Institute of Culture), in which position he remained from 1925-37 – where he remained 
‘irked that in the world of practical politics he counted for so little.’ Redner (1997) Malign 
Masters: Gentile, Heidegger, Lukács, Wittgenstein. Basingstoke: Macmillan [5-6] H.S. Harris 
likewise confirms that ‘after 1929 it was no longer possible for [Gentile] to nourish any illusion 
that he was a power in the land.’ Harris (1960) The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile. 
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press [198] 
4 Daniela Coli (2004) Giovanni Gentile: la filosofia come educazione nazionale. Bologna: Mulino 
[18] 
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Fascists in March of that year.5 On 15th April, a small group6 of Communist partisans 
posed as students7 and waited outside his villa. Seeing his car approaching, they called 
for the driver to halt, and after identifying the passenger as ‘Prof. Gentile,’ they shot 
him several times in the chest. They then fled on bicycles. Gentile’s chauffeur drove 
him to a hospital in Florence, but by the time they arrived, the philosopher was dead.8  
That brief and violent episode is the only one I shall recount in any detail. I 
include it because of its neat illustration of how closely opponents of Fascism associated 
Gentile with the ideology he had helped to devise and promote, even when his 
involvement in political decisions was minimal. The biographer Sergio Romano reports 
that the assassins boasted of having killed ‘not a man, but his ideas.’9 As the regime’s 
best-known theoretician, to kill him was, in a sense, to strike a blow against it. Such 
grand gestures are rarely without unintended consequences, however, and along with 
the Gentilean vision of Fascism, the assassins did serious harm to the subsequent 
reception of his ideas about epistemology, mind, logic, history and ethics. I assume that 
this was not a major motivation for the act. If in actual idealist metaphysics there is 
anything to warrant the author’s murder, it has eluded me. But Gentile’s death and the 
                                                          
5 Coli (2004) [23-4] 
6 Most reports refer to five assassins, but Gabriele Turi puts the figure at four. However, it may be 
that he discounts Bruno Fanciullacci, often described as the principal assassin. See Gabriele Turi 
(1998a) Giovanni Gentile: una biografia. Milan: Giunto [522] 
7 Among them was Theresa Mattei, a former student of Gentile. Mattei later reported that various 
reasons were offered that Gentile ‘had to die,’ including revenge for the death of Mattei’s brother, 
Gianfranco, who, as a ‘great intellectual,’ warranted the death of someone like Gentile. See 
Antonio Carioti (2004) ‘Sanguinetti venne a dirmi che Gentile doveva morire,’ in Corriere della 
sera, 6th August 2004, p. 29. Available on-line at 
http://archiviostorico.corriere.it/2004/agosto/06/Sanguinetti_venne_dirmi_che_Gentile_co_9_040
806079.shtml and accessed 08/01/2012 
8 The basic details of the assassination and its consequences are included in several studies, 
including Gabriele Turi (1998a) [522-3]; Daniela Coli (2004) [20-24]; Sergio Romano (1984) 
Giovanni Gentile: la filosofia al potere. Milan: Bompiani. [299-300]; Giano Accame (2004) 
‘Gentile e la morte,’ in Roberto Chiarini (ed.) Stato etico e manganello: Giovanni Gentile a 
sessant’anni dalla morte. Venice: Marsilio, pp. 51-62 [56-8]. For a reasonably detailed account in 
English, see Mario M. Rossi (1950) ‘Genesi e struttura della società, by Giovanni Gentile’ (review) 
in Journal of Philosophy 47:8, pp. 217-22 [218]. Note that Rossi puts the assassination on 17th 
April, two days later than the overwhelming majority of others. 
9 Romano (1984) [299] 
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events that followed – the Allied victory in Europe, the co-ordinated effort to prevent 
the future resurgence of Fascist and Fascist-like powers, and both condemnation of and 
bewilderment at the ways in which such regimes were able to gain and hold power at all 
– meant that he was soon left behind in the murky period from which people 
worldwide, not least philosophers, meant to distance themselves. 
 
2ii.  Gentile criticism since his assassination 
I contend that unless actual idealism’s Fascist connections are set aside, we 
cannot hope to judge the theory as moral philosophy, rather than as a historical artefact. In 
this respect my approach is unusual; Gentile’s political associations loom large in the 
existing secondary literature on actual idealism. This is especially apparent in what little 
such work is available in English.10 Given that his philosophy is usually categorised as a 
species of Hegelianism, which non-Marxist Anglophone authors have tended to view 
with suspicion, it is hardly surprising that he has remained somewhat obscure. His 
consistent support for Fascist totalitarianism exacerbates this tendency, since this 
affiliation remains, for better or worse, his most distinguishing feature. Marxists like 
Herbert Marcuse use Gentile as an example of Hegelianism gone badly wrong, and, by 
extension, as a standard for their contrasting readings of the same source materials.  
Practically no-one since the Second World War has wanted to be seen to endorse 
Fascism, not even tacitly by omitting to denigrate it roundly when the opportunity 
arises.11 Among the simplest ways to display one’s anti-Fascist credentials is to deny that 
                                                          
10 Consider this clutch of recent titles: Thomas Clayton (2009) ‘Introducing Giovanni Gentile, “the 
Philosopher of Fascism,”’ in Educational Philosophy and Theory 41:6, pp.640-60; M.E. Moss 
(2004) Mussolini’s Fascist Philosopher: Giovanni Gentile Reconsidered. New York: Peter Lang; A. 
James Gregor (2001) Giovanni Gentile: Philosopher of Fascism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 
If nothing else, these show just how unshakeable the ‘…of Fascism’ epithet has proven to be. 
11 I say ‘practically’ because there are some reputable theorists, like A. James Gregor, who argue 
that Fascism has been misunderstood; and disreputable persons who, for a variety of reasons, 
identify themselves with what they take to be Fascist ideology. 
0.1 Introduction 
7 
its exponents said anything worthwhile whatsoever, even about topics seemingly 
unrelated to politics. Thus it is easy to consign whole thinkers to the dustbin of history 
without the need for close engagement with works that are presumably insincere, 
ideologically warped and thoroughly distasteful.12 
The Anglophone secondary literature’s struggle to portray Gentile convincingly 
is partly due to his unattractive political connections, which give all but those already 
interested in Fascism a good reason to avoid him, but also to the limited availability of 
his major works in English. These are Carr’s useful but in some respects misleading 
translation of La teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro, Bigongiari’s of La riforma 
dell’educazione, Gullace’s of La filosofia dell’arte, and Harris’s of Genesi e struttura della 
società.13 Since Educazione is addressed to schoolteachers, not philosophers, and Arte 
chiefly concerns aesthetics,14 readers without access to Italian find themselves caught 
between Atto puro’s ostensibly apolitical metaphysics and the hurried, erratic 
argumentation of Genesi, with only a handful of philosophically unsound political works 
by which to estimate the connections between them.15 They find themselves dismissing 
the later work as a baffling corruption of the earlier one, or else relying excessively on 
                                                          
12 Gabriele Turi writes of how Gentile’s Fascist associations ‘long relegated [him], 
historiographically, to the status of a figure known to have been loyal to Mussolini and the Italian 
Social Republic to the bitter end and hence unworthy of further investigation.’ See Turi (1998b) 
‘Giovanni Gentile: Oblivion, Remembrance, and Criticism,’ in Journal of Modern History 70:4, 
pp.913-33. (Translated by Lydia P. Cochrane) [913]  
13 Note that to save words, after the first citation of any of Gentile’s works I employ an 
abbreviation. See appendix for details. 
14 It is important to note that Arte does include some chapters (especially Parta prima, chapter 4) 
on sentiment, which, as Harris notes, plays a role in Gentile’s moral philosophy. See Harris (1960) 
[234-5]. However, to my moral inquiry they add nothing that is not covered as well in 
Introduzione [38-67]. Arte is largely ignored in this thesis. 
15 It is particularly important for this thesis that the dialogo interno does not appear in Atto puro 
(1916), but it does in Diritto (also 1916) and the Logica (1917-22). This, coupled with Gentile’s 
exaggerated claims about the novelty of the dialogue as presented in Genesi (see ‘Avvertenza,’ no 
page number), gives non-Italian readers the false impression that he suddenly turned to moral 
theory in the last months of his life. 
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what a small number of commentators have said about Gentile’s output in the nearly 
three decades between the two.16 
In 1960, H.S. Harris published his influential study The Social Philosophy of 
Giovanni Gentile, alongside an English translation of Gentile’s last work, Genesi e struttura 
della società. Harris presented the former as ‘a rescue operation, or an essay in salvage.’17 
Several of the books’ reviewers were puzzled at the thought that Gentile’s political or 
moral philosophy was worthy of attention, except, perhaps, as a cautionary example of 
how widely-held ideals (liberty, democracy, order) might be abused. Fascism 
represented something to be avoided. Then, as today, the term retained an unusually 
poisonous taint, connoting unprincipled pragmatism, intolerance, brutality, 
indoctrination, and worse besides.18 We may be forgiven for thinking that anyone 
                                                          
16 Harry Redner is a particularly good example of such a theorist. He reads Gentile almost entirely 
through Atto puro and Genesi, which he identifies as his ‘primary’ and ‘secondary masterwork[s].’ 
He writes that ‘it is hard to see how real action could emerge from [Atto puro] at all’ [47]. Genesi, 
he argues, takes the former’s ‘double-think’ and ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ [26] and ‘adjust[s] 
itself to the Fascist reality’ in which it had since developed [quotation 55-6; see also 97-8]. But in 
presenting these arguments he makes no real reference to works before and between the two, 
with occasional (and often misinformed) claims recycled from H.S. Harris. One example is 
Redner’s claim that Gentile only developed ‘a more original conception of language’ in 1921’s 
Prologemena to the Study of the Child [73-4]. This is false, and suggests that Redner is unfamiliar 
with Gentile’s Sommario, written before the First World War. 
17 Harris (1960) [viii]. The importance of this book to the survival of Gentile studies, especially in 
English, cannot easily be overstated. Rik Peters notes that it is thanks to this book, plus Harris’ 
translation of Gentile’s last work, Genesi e struttura della società (Genesis and Structure of 
Society), ‘that Gentile’s name is not forgotten […] and his name is not simply associated with 
Fascism.’ See Peters (1998b) ‘Talking to Ourselves or Talking to Others: H.S. Harris on Gentile’s 
Transcendental Dialogue,’ in Clio 27:4, pp. 501-14 [501]. A year earlier Harry Redner noted that 
Gentile’s philosophy was ‘almost forgotten outside Italy,’ adding that this ‘ha[d] much to do with 
the collapse of Fascism after the Second World War and with Gentile’s untimely death at the 
same time.’ See Redner (1997) [15] 
18 Several scholars have made similar observations. Roger Griffin rightly notes that the 
transformation of the party identification ‘Fascist’ into the ‘pejorative’ term ‘fascist’ was cemented 
by the popular view of the Second World War as a ‘show-down between “fascist” and “anti-
fascist” forces.’ Since then the term has been ‘passed on to post-war generations as an emotionally 
charged word of condemnation for any political regime or action perceived as oppressive, 
authoritarian or elitist.’ Stanley Payne speaks of it is ‘one of the most frequently invoked political 
pejoratives,’ while Andrew Vincent calls it ‘a hackneyed term of political abuse’ that ‘conjur[es] 
horrifying visions of pogrom and unprecedented European destruction.’ See Griffin (1993) The 
Nature of Fascism. Abingdon: Routledge. (Originally 1991) [1-2]; Payne (1995) A History of 
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turning to a Fascist for ethical insights must have mischievous intentions or else is 
shopping in the wrong store. Since Gentile never dedicated a whole book to ethics, 
anyone seeking an actual idealist moral theory must untangle it from works on 
metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and law.19 To insulate actual idealist ethics from 
the surrounding system is bound to prompt Gentile’s most orthodox Gentilean 
interpreters to cry foul on grounds of vicious abstractionism. He did not treat ethics as a 
discrete discipline, runs the objection, so to present his works in this way is illegitimate. 
As I have said, the present thesis side-steps that objection by presenting a theory that is, 
at most, Gentilean in spirit. It is not an account of what he thought about ethics, but of 
a moral theory he could plausibly have supported. 
Italian scholars have faced a different set of problems. They could not ignore 
Gentile altogether, since for a time he undoubtedly played a prominent role in Italian 
politics and culture. However, while his role as a historic public figure kept him from 
becoming obscure, any serious post-War discussion of his philosophy was engulfed in 
the lively controversy over his PNF affiliations and his role in Italian public and 
intellectual life, which, of course, directly affected the post-War intellectual culture in 
which these controversies thrived.20 Some authors refused to treat him as a philosopher 
at all,21 and it is telling that, at the end of the 1980s, Augusto Del Noce claimed it was 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Fascism, 1914-1945. Abingdon: Routledge [3-4]; and Vincent (1995) Modern Political Ideologies. 
Malden: Wiley-Blackwell. (Second edition; originally 1992) [142] 
19 Harris (1960) [63]. In 1913, Gentile promised his readers an Etica at some point in the future, 
but no such work appeared.  
20 Daniela Coli lists some of the charges directed at Gentile. He was called a ‘most vulgar traitor,’ a 
‘political bandit,’ a ‘racketeer’ and a ‘corruptor of the whole of Italian intellectual life.’ See Coli 
(2006) ‘La concezione politica di Giovanni Gentile,’ in Logoi, Castelvetrano: Edizioni Mazzotta, 
pp.37-57 [37] 
21 Reviewing Harris’s translation of Gentile’s Genesi, Dante Germino writes that ‘a philosophical 
system is  not automatically discredited (although one’s suspicions about it are likely to be 
aroused) because its author happened to  have committed himself, on the basis of that same 
philosophy, body and soul to a totalitarian political regime’ [585]. He concludes that Genesi is ‘the  
crowning work  of  a  man  who  is unlikely to be  accorded a  place in  the  first rank of  
philosophers.’ [587]. See Germino (1961) ‘The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile, by H.S. 
Harris; and Genesis and Structure of Society, by Giovanni Gentile, translated by H.S. Harris,’ 
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only then possible to discuss Gentile’s idealism with an appropriate degree of ‘serenity,’ 
as opposed to the kind of ‘polemical virulence’ that had until then characterised the 
debate over its relationship with Fascism.22 Even so, most of Gentile’s works had been 
re-published several times between his assassination and Del Noce’s remark,23 and there 
had been a steady trickle of secondary texts, including two major biographies24 and 
many articles. Del Noce succeeded in spurring his peers into a more productive mode, 
and the last two decades have seen the publication of another major biography,25 several 
more highly-regarded studies,26 a number of collections of essays to mark the fiftieth 
and sixtieth anniversaries of Gentile’s death,27 and further articles in journals and 
specialist periodicals.  
Italian authors have now recognised the absurdity of discounting a theorist’s 
entire body of work in protest against part of it,28 and it is now more than a decade 
since Gabriele Turi called for ‘[a]n attempt to return to a strictly philosophical Gentile[.]’ 
This, he claimed, would be ‘a legitimate operation, justified by the need to break with 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(review) in Journal of Philosophy 23: 3, pp. 584-7. Ronald Gross likewise affirms that it is as a 
result of Gentile’s associations with ‘a completely  cynical  disregard  of  programs and  political  
promises  in  favour  of  an  activist,  inspirational, purely charismatic style of  leadership’ that 
Italian scholars had, until 1961, ‘understandably avoided him,’ culminating in a ‘tide of 
indifference’ [222]. Gross (1961) ‘The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile, by H.S. Harris; and 
Genesis and Structure of Society, by Giovanni Gentile, translated by H.S. Harris,’ in Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 336, pp.222-3. 
22 Augusto Del Noce (1990) Giovanni Gentile: per una interpretazione filosofica della storia 
contemporanea. Bologna: Il Mulino [7-16, but esp. 16] 
23 Del Noce died in late 1989, shortly before the publication of his book in 1990. I recognise that 
the book, much of which consisted of essays originally published in the 1960s, was not the only 
cause of the resurgence of serious Gentile scholarship. Strange though it may sound, the change 
may also owe something to the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent change in the tenor of 
the Italian debate over Fascism and anti-Fascism. Still, we cannot firmly establish cause and effect 
with respect to such large-scale paradigm shifts, so this cannot be much more than a conjecture. 
24 Manlio Di Lalla (1975) Vita di Giovanni Gentile. Florence: Sansoni; and Romano (1982) 
25 Gabriele Turi (1998a) Giovanni Gentile. Milan: Giunto. 
26 Chief among which is Gennaro Sasso (1998) Le due Italie di Giovanni Gentile. Bologna: Mulino 
27 Examples include Roberto Chiarini (ed.) (2004) Stato etico e manganello: Giovanni Gentile a 
sessant’anni dalla morte. Venice: Marsilio 
28 Riccardo Pedrizzi argues that Gentile’s ‘ostracism’ is particularly absurd given how we 
conventionally treat Plato and Aristotle, despite their influence on, respectively, ‘the tyranny of 
Syracuse’ and Alexander the Great. See Riccardo Pedrizzi (ed.) (2006) Giovanni Gentile: il filosofo 
della nazione. Rome: Pantheon [7-8] 
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rigid interpretive criteria that froze Gentile into the reductive pose of the “philosopher 
of fascism.”’29 Turi’s call has been answered to an extent, with an increasing number of 
studies acknowledging the need to engage with Gentile as a philosopher and not just as 
the philosopher of Fascism.30 But even these studies are shackled by the distinctly 
Continental style in which their authors trade. As an interesting figure in the history of 
Italian philosophy and politics, Gentile himself is never allowed to fall from view. There 
is a tendency for the Italians to expound on Gentile’s contribution as a whole, or to chart 
his development by noting greater or lesser resemblances to other canonical texts over a 
succession of publications. Big questions are routinely asked: was actual idealism really 
the philosophy of Fascism, or was it co-opted and distorted to fit the Party line? Where 
does it fit into the grand Italian intellectual tradition? How best to characterise Gentile’s 
relations to Hegel, Kant, Marx, Croce and Mussolini? Thus the Italians have created a 
complex, multi-faceted picture of the man, his works and his place in history. Missing 
from this picture is a persuasive account of why his ideas are worthy of attention 
irrespective of the cultural and historical circumstances from which they arose, and, by extension, 
why theorists with no special interest in the man himself should trouble themselves to 
bring his philosophy, unusually laden with baggage both in its political connections and 
its rarefied style, in from the cold. 
 
3. A new approach to Gentile 
Quite apart from his historical significance, Gentile is an unlikely candidate for 
analytic treatment. His approach to philosophy is, or at least seems to be, thoroughly 
metaphysical; he takes as his starting point the ‘pure act’ of thinking and on that builds 
                                                          
29 Turi (1998b) [915-16] 
30 Alessandra Tarquini probably exaggerates when she claims that ‘[Italian] studies on the role 
Gentile played in fascism are few and represent but a fraction of the by now very large body of 
literature devoted to Gentile’s philosophy.’ Tarquini (2005) ‘The Anti-Gentilians During the 
Fascist Regime,’ in Journal of Contemporary History 40, pp.637-62 [639n] 
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an elaborate system from which nothing is excluded, giving the doctrine an ‘omnibus 
character’ that defies attempts to address any part in isolation.31 Ethics, epistemology, 
religion, history and aesthetics are all bound up in this self-supporting system, which 
relies on unconventional and notoriously abstruse idealist metaphysics. Thus key steps 
in Gentile’s arguments are obscured by esoteric allusions to Italian history and literature, 
and presented in arcane terms like ‘Spirit,’ ‘the universal subject’ and ‘thought that 
thinks itself.’ Reviewing Harris’s translation of Genesi in 1962, H.P. Rickman wrote that  
Gentile's terminology and mode of argument are unfamiliar and uncongenial to 
our own climate of thought. If we are to be convinced of the importance of his 
speculations […] a more radical translation from his jargon and a more drastic 
confrontation with our own philosophic presuppositions would have to be 
attempted.32 
Half a century on, that challenge remains unmet. I do not here propose to 
translate any of Gentile’s works into English, but instead to translate a selection of his 
ideas into an idiom better suited to the ‘climate of thought’ in today’s Anglo-American 
philosophy. To discuss all the corollaries of actual idealism would require a thesis far 
larger than this. I propose to analyse only those parts of Gentile’s extensive system 
                                                          
31 A. James Gregor (1977) ‘Giovanni Gentile, contemporary analytic philosophy, and the concept 
of political obligation,’ in Simonetta Betti, Franca Rovigatti and Gianni Eugenio Viola (eds.) 
Enciclopedia 76-77: il pensiero di Giovanni Gentile (Volume 1). Florence: Istituto della 
Enciclopedia Italiana, pp.445-55. Gregor begins his article thus: ‘Perhaps the most formidable 
difficulty with which Anglo-American philosophers have had to deal, when considering the 
thought of Giovanni Gentile, is its omnibus character. In attempting to come to grips with any 
aspect of [actual idealism], one finds oneself inevitably drawn into a complex conceptual web. 
When dealing with Gentile’s thought, it is all but impossible to devote oneself to a single 
conceptual issue to the exclusion of indeterminate number of others’ [445]. He adds that ‘It is 
impossible to predict the subsequent course of Anglo-American philosophy, but it is clear that it 
can no longer simply dismiss systems of thought such as [Gentile’s] on the grounds that they are 
more preachment than analysis or more metaphysical than scientific’ [447]. 
32 H.P. Rickman (1962) ‘Genesis and Structure of Society by Giovanni Gentile and H. S. Harris; 
The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile by H. S. Harris’ (review) in International Review of 
Education 8:3/4, p.498 [498] 
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needed to make sense of his moral theory. These include his conception of the subject 
and the epistemological principles connected to it. In Gentile’s works these provide a 
prelude to his more elaborate political theory, but I shall argue that his preferred 
conception of politics is not well supported by the moral arguments used to reach it. At 
that point I desert his stated position and try to construct the theory his earlier 
assumptions would have led him to develop if he had more rigorously followed the 
logic of his own system. To defend a Gentilean moral theory that is both internally 
coherent and plausibly relevant to the problems of today, I must counter the claim that 
metaphysics is not philosophy at all, but instead tantalising but unsound speculation that 
muddies the waters philosophy is, at its best, uniquely suited to clearing.33 There is a real 
risk that once philosophers take their speculations farther than their arguments permit, 
they will find themselves (to borrow a line) ‘got into fairy land,’34 trading in fictions and 
metaphors beyond the reach of analysis or meaningful criticism. In place of those 
assumptions I try to develop one important part of his moral theory, the internal 
dialogue, as a model for constructivist practical reasoning. 
Since I have no qualms about abandoning Gentile’s stated positions where I 
find his justifications lacking, this is not quite a study in the history of ideas as 
conventionally understood, with theories faithfully described, compared with 
antecedents and successors, and mined for insights into the historical period from 
which they emerged. It is instead an analytic study in the history of philosophy, which aims 
                                                          
33 This claim is famously expressed by A.J. Ayer (1971) Language, Truth and Logic. London: 
Penguin. On [49] Ayer does not cite Hegel by name, but instead selects a passage from Bradley’s 
Appearance and Reality, and on [67-9] he argues that metaphysics, unlike philosophy, ‘does not 
constitute a branch of knowledge.’ Herbert Marcuse includes a similar claim about Gentile, 
claiming that his version of Hegelianism ‘cannot be treated on a philosophic level.’ See Marcuse 
(1955) Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. Second edition; originally 1941 [404] 
34 David Hume (2003) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press [72; §57] 
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at ‘rational reconstruction’ of its subject’s ideas, always with one foot firmly in the 
present. 35  
Let me make clear exactly what I mean to achieve. My general aim is  
(i) …to discover not what Gentile’s philosophy meant for him and his 
contemporaries, but what it could mean for us. 
Beyond this first, general aim, I have two further aims, one more ambitious than 
the other. Either can be achieved independently, but because I try to ground my 
Gentilean moral theory on the strongest basis that actual idealism can provide, it would 
be best for me if both tasks were achieved in tandem. These aims are 
(ii) …to describe a kind of moral constructivism that stands as an alternative to 
the dominant Kantian variety; and 
(iii) …to rehabilitate Gentile as a major moral and political philosopher whose 
ideas can be fruitfully applied to contemporary analytic normative theory. 
The constructivist theory mentioned in (ii) will be Gentilean in the sense that it 
draws on and articulates elements of Gentile’s philosophy, but is not simply an 
exposition of them. The resultant theory is not strictly Gentile’s, and should not be 
taken as a true and accurate exegesis of his views as presented in any one of his works. 
Instead it is an amalgamation of the best ideas described in several, or an interpretation 
of one composite view that can reasonably be attributed to him. Above all I aim to 
render actual idealism clearly. Strict loyalty to Gentile’s works is secondary to this. 
Problematic or superfluous parts of his theory are sympathetically adapted or jettisoned. 
In this way I emulate the method adopted by Derek Parfit and John Rawls when 
                                                          
35 For a valuable discussion of the difference between these approaches, see the preface to Bernard 
Williams (1978) Descartes: the Project of Pure Enquiry. Harmondsworth: Pelican [9-10] 
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interpreting Kant.36 The relation between my ‘Gentilean constructivism’ and Gentile’s 
writings is one of resemblance rather than identity. 
 
4. On constructivism 
Much of this thesis is about rehabilitating Gentile’s theory as a constructivist 
doctrine and comparing it with other such doctrines in order to show how they differ. 
The details of those other constructivisms will be revealed as and when it is appropriate 
to do so. For now, though, it is worth briefly establishing what this term means, and 
what would be needed to show that Gentile’s ideas properly belong to this class of 
theories.  
John Rawls introduced the word ‘constructivism’ to moral and political 
philosophy in a series of articles in the 1980s.37 Rawls identified it with his own work, as 
well as the account of Kant’s practical philosophy on which this was based. The term 
was taken up by other theorists and applied retrospectively to various varieties of anti-
realist moral philosophy, including David Hume’s. Lacking a widely-agreed and detailed 
definition, the term is closely analogous with anti-realism, understood here as the view 
that unknown properties cannot be true or false. In other words, this view denies that 
there is a real domain of facts existing independently of any subject’s knowledge of it. 
(For brevity’s sake, from this point forward I call that generic subject S.)38 On some 
                                                          
36 John Rawls (1980) ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,’ in Journal of Philosophy 77:9, 
pp.515-72 [517]. Rawls’ phrase is in fact ‘analogy rather than identity.’ See also Derek Parfit w/ 
Samuel Scheffler (ed.) (2010) On What Matters, (Volume 1). Oxford: Oxford University Press [17 
and 300] 
37 The best-known of these is ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,’ cited above. For an 
interesting discussion of how Rawls came to use this term, see Larry Klasnoff (1999) ‘How 
Kantian is Constructivism?’ in Kant-Studien 90, 385-409 [esp. 385-91] 
38 A note about pronouns: throughout the thesis I generally use the female pronoun to refer to the 
generically-conceived thinking subject, or S, and the male pronoun for persons with whom S 
interacts (and to whom I refer less often). I do this to improve clarity, to alleviate the need for 
repeated use of proper names, and especially to distinguish the much-cited thinking subject from 
Gentile, who is obviously referred to as ‘he’ or ‘him.’ However, there are cases in which I refer to 
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accounts, anti-realism implies that since the real world exists if and only if S knows it 
exists, to know that it exists is to create or ‘construct’ it. This would be to equate anti-
realism directly with constructivism, and would allow us to ascribe the ‘constructivist’ 
label to a whole host of philosophers from Protagoras onwards. This usage has been 
challenged on the grounds that self-identifying constructivists include in their theories 
distinctive features not shared by all doctrines opposed to realism. (After all, a sceptical 
doctrine may reject the claims of realism, at least within the moral domain, say, without 
affirming any kind of construction in its place. Moral claims might be straightforwardly 
nonsensical.) The term ‘constructivism’ then refers to a variety of anti-realism, but not 
anti-realism per se. 
In this discussion I distinguish between two kinds of constructivism. The first I 
call ‘simple constructivism,’ which refers generically to any anti-realist doctrine based on 
the epistemological principle that some or all objects of knowledge are constructed, 
generated or otherwise produced by S, rather than found or acquired in a free-standing 
reality.39 The second I call ‘procedural constructivism,’ since it is intended to decide 
matters of objective truth by means of a specially designed procedure. Not all kinds of 
simple constructivism include the distinguishing features of procedural constructivism. 
There is no doubt that actual idealism is a form of simple constructivism, but, as will be 
seen as the thesis progresses, it will be necessary to extend and elaborate parts of the 
doctrine to show that it also belongs to the procedural variety. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
a specific person, such as Robinson Crusoe, or to a quoted example in which genders are given. 
For those I retain the original genders rather than systematically alter the pronouns to fit my 
scheme. 
39 Thomas Mautner (ed.) (2005) Dictionary of Philosophy. London: Penguin [122] 
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4i. Simple constructivism 
According to simple constructivism, S, as the creator rather than receiver of 
knowledge, plays an active role in the epistemological process. Beyond this basic claim, 
there is enormous scope for variation. S might be an individual, thinking about the 
world and thereby creating it as a set of ideas. Equally, knowledge could be created by a 
society that, through the subtle play of norms and conventions, creates a structure, a 
language, or a conceptual scheme in which each member’s individual consciousness 
develops. This latter idea, broadly conceived, is at the heart of social constructivism. A 
third possibility is that there is some interplay between individuals and their societies 
(that is: not just other individuals as such), meaning that persons are products of their 
social environments but are able to effect changes on those societies by their own 
individual actions. This third conception differs from the second in that it allows us to 
account for the sometimes dramatic changes that occur throughout the history of ideas. 
There are myriad examples of actions undertaken by specifiable persons, all belonging 
to particular communities, who changed the ways people understood themselves and 
their social (or even natural) worlds. These include Galileo’s and Darwin’s precipitations 
of scientific revolutions, Dante’s and Shakespeare’s respective contributions to the 
Italian and English languages, and Marx’s theory and promotion of the idea of class 
consciousness, which was felt and expressed so keenly in the twentieth century. 
A constructivist may expand the scope of construction to a greater or lesser 
extent. It could be that part of reality is constructed while another is there to be 
discovered. A limited constructivist claim might be that language is constructed, say, but 
refers to an unalterable set of objects defined by God, goblins, or, less ambitiously, the 
internal structure of the human brain. Taken in isolation, this kind of constructivist 
claim seems plausible but banal. That I call a table ‘table,’ while someone born and 
raised in Italy calls it ‘tavolino,’ lends weight to the idea that the specific sounds and 
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symbols used as language are neither entirely given nor deducible from the objects 
themselves. The system of names is alterable, even if, like nominalists, we think that any 
mind structured such as ours would have to conceive of the concept of ‘table’ much as 
we do, whatever name we attach to it. The claim that the domain of language is to some 
extent constructed is difficult to reject. Even hard-line ontological realists and 
essentialists are likely to accept it, provided they also accept that S possesses some 
degree of agency and responsibility for her thoughts. This, surely, does not expose them 
as unwitting constructivists, having surrendered their realist and essentialist principles. 
Instead they conceive of construction as something limited in both scope and 
significance.40 
There can be no doubt that Gentile is a thoroughgoing simple constructivist.41 
His works contain numerous references to the creative or constructive power of thought. 
He argues that we can know the world only by thinking about it, and for this reason it is 
necessary to think of the world as a creation of thought. This conception of thought is 
fundamental to actual idealism. It is also from this conception that one of actual 
idealism’s chief difficulties emerges. If there is nothing we can know or say without 
thinking, and to think is to construct a world, it follows that everything is constructed. 
Some critics have thought that this means actual idealism is reducible to solipsism or 
Protagoreanism, according to which truth and reality are just whatever S happens to 
think they are. Objective standards are ruled out. This is a challenge that Gentile must 
                                                          
40 See Onora O’Neill (2003a) ‘Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,’ in The Cambridge Companion 
to Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Edited by Samuel Freeman) [363, endnote #4] 
41 This is most clearly and thoroughly articulated by Hervé A. Cavallera (1994) Immagine e 
costruzione del reale nel pensiero di Giovanni Gentile. Rome: Fondazione Ugo Spirito [passim]. 
However, Gentile’s (simple) constructivism is no secret; the creative power of thought is 
explicitly and repeatedly referred to in his works. Alessandro Amato, for example, gives a good 
overview of Gentile on the construction of morality in (2011) L’etica oltre lo Stato: filosofia e 
politica in Giovanni Gentile. Milan: Mimesis. [93-100]. In contrast to this thesis, in none of the 
existing work is there is any attempt to link Gentile with modern-day constructivists, nor to 
elaborate a procedure of construction that would allow us to work out what to do or to test claims 
or reasons that we presently affirm. 
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face, and much of the present thesis is concerned with showing how he can successfully 
do so. 
 
4ii. Procedural constructivism 
The simple constructivist’s idea that a value or moral law exists because it has 
been constructed does not help us to decide what to do when faced with a choice 
between several possible actions, nor when more than one person is involved in 
deciding what to do. Both these problems are typical of political decision-making. It 
could be that I ‘construct’ one moral law and you another. The fact that both are 
constructed does not imply that they need be compatible. This is inadequate for 
normative theorists interested in identifying what is (objectively) the right thing to do, 
rather than merely what one person (subjectively) thinks is right. To close this gap, 
moral constructivist doctrines typically feature strong procedural elements. Sharon 
Street has recently defined ‘the central, distinguishing feature of all constructivist views 
in ethics’ as follows: 
Constructivist views in ethics understand the correctness or incorrectness of some 
(specified) set of normative judgements as a question of whether those 
judgements withstand some (specified) procedure of scrutiny from the 
standpoint of some (specified) set of further normative judgements.42 
Street further distinguishes between ‘restricted constructivism’ and 
‘thoroughgoing or meta-ethical constructivism.’ The former class links a specified set of 
judgements about reasons with a corresponding procedure by which the correctness of 
those judgements is to be assessed. This means that there may be different procedures 
                                                          
42 Sharon Street (2008) ‘Constructivism about Reasons,’ in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford 
Studies in Metaethics. (Volume 3). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 207-46 [208] 
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for different kinds of judgement, and these may be mutually incompatible. For example, 
one reading of Immanuel Kant holds that he separates pure and practical reason. On 
this view, questions about pure reason are amoral and objective. There is no room for 
differences of opinion or interpretation, and if it is controversially imagined that pure 
reason is constructed, there is only one correct design that this construction can follow. 
The correct outcome of practical reason may depend to some extent on contingent 
facts about S, and although for Kant it must have a universal formal structure, its 
content can be determined by any procedure compatible with those necessary orienting 
principles. So for a restricted constructivism, like that of John Rawls, it may be that some 
moral claims are independently true, but need undergo Kantian procedural tests only 
when deciding how to design a scheme of justice shared by people with diverse 
conceptions of morality. 
Gentile argues that no concretely conceived action, as opposed to an abstraction 
such as ‘an immoral act,’ can be ruled out of (or into) a moral scheme definitively and a 
priori. He tries to provide for S’s contingent dispositions, whereas Kant designs his 
constructivism so as to reduce the significance of these. But in contrast to a theorist like 
Hume, who likewise refers to contingent dispositions, wants, and preferences, Gentile 
tries to build his moral theory into a comprehensive constructivist framework. By this I 
mean that it is not restricted to moral theory, but extends to reasoning as a whole. 
Indeed, he argues that because the act of thinking is necessary to any inquiry, it is absurd 
to distinguish discrete spheres of moral, theoretical, and empirical knowledge, or 
between constructed and non-constructed components of reality. The procedure for 
identifying truth, then, cannot be divorced from the one for identifying moral 
principles. A unified Gentilean conception of constructivist reasoning is the topic and 
outcome of this thesis. 
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5. Structure and overview 
The thesis consists of eight chapters, of which this introduction is the first. The 
bulk of the thesis (that is: everything apart from this introduction and the conclusion) is 
spread across two parts. In Part 1 I set out a summary account of Gentile’s moral and 
political philosophy, beginning with his metaphysics and his concept of the person as a 
pure act of thinking (chapter 1.1), then his theory of how the person is placed in moral 
relation to society (1.2), and finally his theory of the total ethical state (1.3). I find that in 
the development of his moral and political philosophy, Gentile makes a number of 
claims to which he is not entitled, with the result that his conclusions – and especially 
his characterisation of the state – do not follow from the metaphysical arguments used 
to reach them. 
In Part 2 I set about the positive task of re-assembling actual idealist 
constructivism as a plausible alternative to other such doctrines. To begin (2.1) I explain 
how Gentile understands the difference between his theory and Kant’s. This establishes 
the basis on which the following chapters build, for Kantian constructivism is a doctrine 
belonging to and developed by philosophers other than Kant himself, and it is against 
those interpreters that I set my Gentilean theory. In chapter 2.2 I explain how Gentile’s 
work on education can help us to understand his conceptions of freedom, autonomy 
and authority. In Part 2’s last chapter (2.3) I elaborate upon the dialogical conception of 
reasoning, accounting for the ways in which Gentilean procedural constructivism 
enables us to reach objective answers to questions of reason, which are, according to 
actual idealism, always moral questions. 
In the concluding chapter (3.1) I bring together my findings from what has gone 
before. My principal interest is in what a genuinely thoroughgoing or (near-) 
comprehensive form of constructivism entails, and why, once we know this, we might 
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be content to stop short of a constructivism that runs (very nearly) all the way down.43 I 
argue that Gentile offers a good account of such a doctrine, and that there are some 
basic orienting principles, several of which would be familiar to a Kantian constructivist, 
that he understands as necessary components of any tenable moral theory. In the final 
part of the concluding chapter I offer a sketch of Gentile’s place in the history of 
political philosophy, in light of my contention that he represents not just ‘the 
philosophy of Fascism,’ as is so often claimed, but a transferable and plausible 
constructivist doctrine that we have good reason to re-admit to the mainstream canon. 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 This useful phrase came to me from Bruce Haddock, but I have since discovered that Christine 
M. Korsgaard uses it in (2003) ‘Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral 
Philosophy,’ in Philosophy in America at the Turn of the Century (APA Centennial Supplement 
to Journal of Philosophical Research), pp.99-122. She maintains that Kant’s constructivism does 
run ‘all the way down,’ and so does hers [117-18]. Rawls ‘treats the problems of practical 
philosophy as problems that are practical all the way down,’ but he stops short of full 
constructivism [112]. 
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1.1 The pure act of construction 
  
Introduction 
In this chapter I lay out the main components of Gentile’s account of thinking 
as the act by which reality is constructed. This will give us the beginnings of a 
conception of the person and a theory of knowledge. To save words, I draw regular 
comparisons with Descartes’ and Kant’s better-known theories. Thus I intend to 
establish the main tenets of actual idealism in a maximally efficient and accessible way.  
To begin (sub-heading #1), I describe Gentile’s distinctive ‘method of 
immanence,’ showing what led him to adopt it and why it so deeply affects the 
development of his theory. Next (#2) I show how Gentile describes his radical 
conception of pensiero pensante, or ‘thought thinking,’ before offering two justifications 
for it. I then (#3) describe some of the difficulties to which this conception gives rise, 
before explaining how Gentile addresses them using the distinction between abstract 
and concrete logoi. Next (#4) I describe Gentile’s theories of truth and knowledge, 
showing how his demanding method forces him to discard conventional conceptions of 
truth, and rely instead on one grounded on the act of thinking. Following this (#5) I 
discuss Gentile’s conception of the will and its role in assigning truth claims their value, 
which in subsequent chapters we will see play a central role in actual idealist moral 
theory. At the last sub-heading (#6) I discuss the positivity of Gentile’s theory, showing 
how his conception of the act of thinking stands as a challenge to scepticism. 
 
1. On method 
Actual idealism constitutes an attempt to describe reality in phenomenological 
terms without relying upon unjustified presuppositions or descending into mysticism. If 
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it is to be useful for us as a model of practical constructivism that we have reason to choose 
over other theories, it must supply, at the very least, a criterion of truth and a conception of 
the subject (or person, which may or may not amount to the same thing). As a 
phenomenological theory, actual idealism’s conceptions of truth and the person are 
closely related. Without the first we cannot hope for it to yield conclusive answers to 
any questions we might ask. Without the second the moral theory has nothing with 
which to work.  
To begin, let us examine the method by which Gentile means to distinguish truth 
from falsity and reality from unreality. To identify a method that is rigorously 
defensible, he surveys a series of previous thinkers’ theories in search of untenable 
assumptions. Where he finds any, he discards the theory as speculative or unsound. It 
would be a mistake to infer from this that he is a sceptic. He is certainly highly 
demanding of the philosophers with whom he engages, but his aim is not only to 
expose error. He means instead to clear the ground for his own positive inquiry, noting 
whatever parts of his predecessors’ works he does consider rigorously defensible, and 
retaining them for his own theory. This marks a clear distinction between his project 
and those of, say, Nietzsche or the existentialists, who are similarly preoccupied with 
finding complacent assumptions, but little concerned with correcting them.1 
Gentile considers the problem of transcendence to be the heart of 
epistemology. His account of and solution to it are most clearly set out in his essays ‘Il 
metodo dell’immanenza’ (The Method of Immanence) and ‘L’atto del pensare come 
atto puro’ (The Act of Thinking as Pure Act), and further elaborated in his Sistema di 
                                                          
1 I accept that this is maybe a little unfair on Nietzsche, who does offer a kind of moral theory. He 
does not offer much to those of us who are not übermenschen, though. Gentile means to describe 
the necessary universal structure of moral thinking, not the story of its emergence. 
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logica (System of Logic).2 To illustrate the problem, he describes two kinds of logos in 
ancient Greek thought. The term ‘logos’ is notoriously ambiguous,3 but in Gentile’s 
usage it can be understood to mean ‘conceptions of the relation between truth, reality 
and knowledge.’ As such it bears directly upon the method by which the correct 
answers to questions are identified.4 The first of the ancient Greek logoi is Heraclitus’ 
‘objective logos,’ which is ‘a pre-condition of any knowledge’ of it. It is entirely free-
standing, god-given, and independent of S. The second is the ‘subjective logos,’ which 
Plato discusses (but does not entirely endorse) in his dialogue Cratylus. Under the 
subjective logos, a given claim’s truth-value depends upon whether it corresponds with 
some outer criterion of truth.5  
Gentile claims that it is impossible to make sense of either logos without the 
other. The objective Heraclitean version is unknowable without S’s intervention, 
whereas the Platonic version requires a Heraclitean counterpart to make sense of any 
truth claim. Plato famously supplies a permanent edifice of truth with his ‘world of 
forms,’ from which all concepts and names are derived. This means that when two 
critics disagree in their judgements about which of two artworks is more beautiful, for 
example, one of them is right. By invoking the form of beauty, they are trying to square their 
claims with a real and permanent object. As such their claims can be objectively true, and 
                                                          
2 Different terminology is used in each of these works. As its name suggests, ‘Metodo’ refers to 
method; Logica  refers to the logos. For brevity’s sake I run the two accounts together. 
3 This is put particularly well by Roger Holmes (1937b) The Idealism of Giovanni Gentile. New 
York: Macmillan: Gentile ‘use[s…] a concept which, in modern philosophy, has so fallen into 
disuse that when unqualified it is open to serious misinterpretation. […] [T]he Logos fulfil[s] the 
function of that in relation to which thinking is ultimately either true or false. It is the norm of 
thinking. In such a sense, removed strictly from rational or theological considerations, Gentile 
uses the concept’ [34]. 
4 Note that Gentile’s use of the word ‘logic’ is unusual. Rather than the strict, formal definition: 
‘the inquiry which has for its object the principles of correct reasoning,’ See Mautner (2005) 
[357], Gentile uses it interchangeably with ‘logos,’ denoting not only an inquiry but a whole 
conception of reality, truth and knowledge. 
5 Logica 1 [46-7]. Gentile here refers us to Plato’s Cratylus, in which Socrates and Hermogenes 
discuss the latter’s belief that names have no necessary relation to their objects. Plato (1921) Plato 
in Twelve Volumes. (Volume 12). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Translated by 
Harold N. Fowler) [§385b] 
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are distinct from subjective opinions. Since the question of the artworks’ beauty does 
not have more than one correct answer, a critic can believe sincerely and mistakenly that 
he has correctly identified which of the artworks is more beautiful. If this were not the 
case, and every claim S could make about an external world were nothing more than a 
claim about her opinions,6 there would be no possibility of falsity or error, nor any place 
for a meaningful account of truth. 
Plato’s method is the dialectic, or the process of question and answer by which 
the correctness of a judgement is ascertained. In each of his dialogues he identifies a 
core set of uncontroversial beliefs that all participants share, before testing successive 
answers to whatever question is under examination – what justice entails, for example – 
and discarding those that contradict the starting beliefs. Thus Plato means to discover 
the answer corresponding most closely to the ‘form’ of the object in question. Gentile 
objects that Plato assumes that the unchanging world of forms contains an answer to 
any question dialectically addressed. But the world of forms is transcendent; it is by 
definition removed from the world of possible experience. Its existence can only be a 
presupposition. (Plato famously hints that the forms can be understood by wise 
philosophers like himself, but he neglects to explain how he can be certain that they 
exist at all.) Objects of experience – which, in the language of a later time, we might call 
phenomena – can have at most partial resemblances to these forms. Since our experiences 
rely on objects of experience, Plato posits a truth to which S has no access, and about 
which she cannot make intelligible claims. Thus he falls into contradiction, and S 
remains estranged from the reality against which the truth-value of her claims is to be 
tested.7 
                                                          
6 In moral philosophy, such a view might be emotivism. In epistemology, we might associate that 
view with Protagoreanism, or the doctrine according to which ‘man is the measure of all things.’  
7 See Gentile’s essay ‘Il metodo dell’immanenza,’ in Hegeliana. Florence: Le Lettere, pp.196-232. 
(This essay originally 1912) [198-202] 
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This brings Gentile to a familiar problem of philosophy. If there is an objective 
reality, how can we account for S’s knowledge of it? If there is no objective reality, does 
all truth collapse into opinion? This must be solved without falling into mysticism, 
whereby unverifiable claims are made about vaguely-defined objects and yet held to be 
true.8 However tempting it may be to invoke ideas like absolute Perfection (with a capital 
‘P’) when accounting for those ‘tracts  of  experience connected with  man's most  
intense and fruitful  willing,  loving  and  conceiving,’9 without a clear idea of what these 
ideas mean we cannot hope to make sense of them. There is no way that we can talk 
about them in terms of truth and falsity; they are necessarily unknown and unknowable. 
To root a theory of truth in such mystical abstractions is to include in our theory 
something that we are unable to account for, if only because of ‘the inadequacy of 
speech.’10 This is effectively to give up on philosophy and embrace wishful thinking. 
The mystical features act as a presupposed backdrop to all subsequent inquiry, and S is 
deprived of the ability to make meaningful judgements about them.11 
Gentile notes that until the modern period, in the Christian world there 
prevailed a conception of truth based on a combination of Aristotelian naïve realism 
and religious faith. That is: the empirical world exists because God deigns that it should 
exist, while God himself, along with the supernatural planes of heaven and hell, is 
beyond human comprehension. He has a plan, but keeps it mysterious; He is perfect, 
                                                          
8 Evelyn Underhill puts the matter thus: ‘For Gentile, mysticism requires “the annihilation of the 
subject before an unknown transcendent Object.”  And here again, the  mystic would answer that  
“unknown”  is  the  last  word  which  he  could  truthfully apply  to  the  “Mighty Beauty” he has 
seen.’ Evelyn Underhill, R.G. Collingwood and W.R. Inge (1923) ‘Can the New Idealism Dispense 
with Mysticism?’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 3, pp. 148-
84 [150-1] 
9 Underhill (1923) [156] 
10 Underhill (1923) [153]. It is worth noting that Underhill, an established writer on mysticism, 
seems to have been lured into a misunderstanding of Gentile by his use of the quasi-religious term 
‘spirit.’ This term is a problem, but the systematic character of his work clearly distinguishes it 
from the kinds of mystical humbug with which Underhill wants to identify it. 
11 For the equation of the logos and ‘thinkability,’ see Atto puro [66-7]; Carr translation [65-67] 
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but His creations are not; He knows the whole truth, but He reveals it only in parts. 
This view hinges on the idea of a transcendent reality, manifest in God, who represents 
a complete and objective truth that He has freely created. Human knowledge is at best 
an imperfect reflection of that creation. Thus the Scholastic account is vulnerable to the 
criticisms directed at Plato: with the invocation of S’s faith in the existence of God, who 
possesses all the special qualities attributed to Him – omnipotence, omniscience, 
infallibility, and perfection – the question of knowledge becomes redundant. S’s thought 
has no bearing on the truth; there exists an ‘absolute spirit’ in God, and human thought 
either corresponds with that spirit or not. The best that fallible persons can do is to 
endorse codified Church doctrine, to love God and ‘forget [them]selves,’ assuming that 
the truth will be revealed to them.12 Thus the truth transcends S, who passively waits for 
this presumed God to reveal its proper contents. 
Christian philosophy’s real advance, Gentile thinks, was in its placement of truth 
inside the subject. St Augustine’s claim that ‘truth resides inside man’ (in interiore homine 
habitat veritas)13 follows from St Paul’s claim that, because he (Paul) has faith in God, 
Christ ‘liveth in [him]’.14 Since Christ is ‘the way, the truth and the life,’15 S, who has 
faith in God, will find the truth inside herself, for that is where Christ (and, by 
extension, truth) resides. In this way S is reconciled with the object of her investigations. 
                                                          
12 Giovanni Gentile (1963) I problemi della scolastica e il pensiero italiano. Florence: Sansoni. [39-
42]. Note that in these pages, Gentile refers especially to the way in which Bonaventure’s 
‘Platonic spiritualism’ gets around the problems of the Greek conceptions of knowledge and the 
world, in which the subject was a mere ‘spectator.’ The more Aristotelian Scholastics encountered 
the same problem as the Greeks (i.e. the presupposition of a real world).  See also ‘Metodo’ in 
Hegeliana [210-13] 
13 This comes from Augustine’s De Vera Religione [chapter 39, §72]. Gentile gives this reference 
in Sommario 1 [3n]. The whole passage runs ‘Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine 
habitat veritas.’ This has been translated in various ways, including this from Charles Taylor: ‘Do 
not go outward; return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth.’ The last sentence 
corresponds to the one Gentile quotes in Latin. Given actual idealism’s unusual conception of S, I 
can afford to translate more literally. See Taylor (1989) Sources of the Self: The Making of 
Modern Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [129] (emphasis added) 
14 Galatians 2:20 (King James version) 
15 John 14:6 (King James version) 
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Yet the problem of transcendence remains: although in a sense the Scholastics situate 
truth on the plane of immanence, they leave the real substance of reality (God) 
substantially beyond S’s grasp. God’s plan is perfect and unchanging, but it is unclear 
how S can conclusively uncover any part of its content. The truth that is said to be 
inside man is trapped there. Knowledge relies on revelation, and revelation relies on the 
intervention of God, who can never be known in His entirety. 
 
2. Toward pensiero pensante, the ‘thought that thinks itself’ 
The major step forward from this pre-modern position occurs with Descartes’ 
‘moment of subjectivity and certainty,’16 achieved in his Meditations and later developed 
in his Discourse on Method and Principles of Philosophy. Following the ‘general demolition of 
[his] opinions’ in his first Meditation,17 Descartes offers cogito ergo sum (I think; therefore, I 
exist) as a firm and certain principle on which he can reconstruct his knowledge. Having 
established his existence, he can manage his ideas with impunity and set about 
confirming or disconfirming other truth claims as they occur to him. While the full 
sense of the cogito has been questioned,18 it remains very difficult to deny this initial 
claim without dismissing all of ontology as a non-starter. 
Gentile is broadly in favour of Descartes’ aim to establish a subjective basis for 
certain truths. The cogito marks a significant step forward from earlier philosophical 
systems that had conceived of thought as an ‘object of mere speculation, antecedent to 
the philosopher’s act of thinking [pensiero in atto del filosofo].’ He writes: 
                                                          
16 ‘Metodo,’ in Hegeliana [215] 
17 René Descartes w/ John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (eds., trans.) (1984) 
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Volume 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [11] 
18 Is it, for example, a syllogism? Descartes thinks not, and Gentile agrees with him; but Jaakko 
Hintikka argues that, if the cogito is not a syllogism, then the ‘ergo’ is misplaced, and the ‘cogito’ 
may even be unnecessary. See Jaakko Hintikka (1962) 'Cogito, Ergo Sum: Inference or 
Performance?' in Philosophical Review, 71: 1 pp. 3-32 [4-5] 
Part 1: Components of actual idealism 
32 
Certainty is the Cartesian philosophical problem, resolved with the cogito ego sum, 
which is […] the construction of a concept of the real [that remained] unknown 
in all of ancient philosophy. It conceives of being as something that thought 
continually realises [in the process of] realising itself. [It is] reality as self-
knowledge […;] the same thought that searches for being, and, in searching, 
realises it. So it is not intellect, a spectator on its reality; but rather will, creator 
of that which is real.19 
The significance of Descartes’ cogito is not in its inference, the ‘ergo sum,’ 
understood as the plucking of a fact from the obscurity of previously unknown truths, 
but the ‘cogito’ – I think – itself. Gentile insists that, on any tenable account of 
knowledge, the act of thinking that one exists is effectively to make oneself exist by fiat. 
The act of thinking creates what is true and real. Of course, it is also possible to think 
(express) statements that one does not recognise to be true. The key difference between 
true and untrue propositions, then, is that only the former are affirmed through an act 
of will. Hence Gentile’s remark about the role of the will as the creator of the real: S 
thinks that she exists and recognises (wills) this claim to be true, so ‘realising’ herself as 
part of reality. In this way she is re-cast as the creator rather than passive receptacle or 
recipient of knowledge. This is something that earlier philosophers had failed to do. S is 
no longer estranged from the object of knowledge, relegated to a secondary plane of 
reality beneath a complete, transcendent and mysterious ‘Truth,’ but unified with it in 
the act of thinking. 
Gentile thinks that the act of thinking, rather than thought, a thinker, or a prior 
reality as object of thought, is basic to any investigation of truth and reality. Since the 
act of thinking entails the creation of reality, it makes no sense to refer to a reality 
                                                          
19 Logica 1 [33-4] 
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outside, prior to or conditioning the act. To ascertain the existence of even a thinker, 
conceived as something separate from the thought the thinker purportedly thinks, we 
require an act of thinking, i.e. ‘I think that I am a thinker.’ Gentile reasons that, given its 
necessity for and absolute priority over any claims about truth and reality, the act of 
thinking is the only possible ‘pure act,’ creating and conditioning itself without deferring 
to any prior act or fact. He uses several terms to capture this counter-intuitive concept. 
These include autoctisi, a Greek term meaning ‘self-creation,’ inherited from Bertrando 
Spaventa;20 ‘creative self-consciousness,’ which is reasonably self-explanatory, and 
captures the idea that reality, including the empirical self, is a product of consciousness, 
rather than consciousness a product of it;21 autonoema (‘the autogenetic act of the 
intelligence’);22 and causa sui (‘[that which is] its own cause’), which comes from 
Spinoza.23 Perhaps the most important, though, is pensiero pensante (literally ‘thought 
thinking’),24 or ‘thought which actuates and thinks itself.’25 This grammatically awkward 
formulation is intended to distinguish between thought understood as an object (which 
is pensiero pensato, or ‘thought [already] thought’) and as an act. The act always occurs in 
the present, or rather, it is timeless, since it is only through that act of thinking that one 
can possibly comprehend time, space, and the relation of events and physical objects 
                                                          
20 M.E. Moss (2004) [8]; also Gentile w/ Harris (1960) Genesis and Structure of Society [73n] Note 
that Harris elsewhere translates this as ‘self-constitution.’ See his (1960) Social Philosophy of 
Giovanni Gentile [35] 
21 Genesi [43]: ‘autocoscienza creatrice’ 
22 Logica 2 [75]; also cited Holmes (1937a) [90] 
23 Atto puro [188]; Benedict de Spinoza w/ Edwin Curley (trans.) (1996) Ethics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press [4; Part 1, Proposition 7] 
24 Since English uses ‘thought’ in a variety of senses, it is worth offering a brief summary of the 
relevant word forms in Italian. Pensiero (plural: pensieri) is equivalent to the abstract noun 
‘thought,’ as in ‘I was lost in thought,’ or ‘a thought occurs to me.’ Pensare is the infinitive form of 
the verb ‘to think,’ and can be used to express ‘thinking’ as an active alternative to ‘thought’ 
(hence ‘l’atto del pensare’: the act of thinking). Pensante is the present participle (‘wait a moment; 
I’m thinking’). Pensato (pensati when attached to a plural noun) is the past participle. 
25 Atto puro [105]: ‘…atto reale del pensiero, che si attua e si pensa.’ For this translation I have 
following the wording of the Carr translation [108]. Gentile raises the same point in ‘Pensare,’ in 
Hegeliana [195]: ‘The thesis does not make the synthesis possible, but, on the contrary, the 
synthesis makes the thesis possible, creating it with its antithesis, or rather, creating itself. And so 
the pure act is autoctisi.’ 
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that make sense of them. Hence thinking is always attuale (actual), which in Italian 
carries the double meaning of ‘current; of the present time,’ and ‘of or pertaining to an 
act.’ Pensiero pensante is the crux of Gentile’s system, which he calls idealismo attuale (actual 
idealism).26 
It is tempting to dismiss pensiero pensante as the result of a major category error 
whereby an abstract noun (namely pensiero, thought) is granted agential qualities 
independent of any thinker. If successful, this objection will prove fatal to actual 
idealism, showing it to rest on a confused notion no less nonsensical than ‘twitching 
kicks the ball’ or ‘literacy forgets.’ Before advancing any further, it is worth countering 
this objection by re-stating Gentile’s meaning in more familiar language. I see two ways 
by which Gentile reaches his conception of pensiero pensante. The first I call the Cogito 
Justification, since it involves a variation on Descartes’ cogito inference. The second, 
which I call the Logical Priority Justification, involves showing that thinking is the only 
possible pure act, and must be adequately accounted for in any tenable theory of 
knowledge. For that I will draw comparisons with Immanuel Kant’s idea of the ‘I think.’ 
 
2i. The Cogito Justification 
First, then, let us turn to the Cogito Justification. While Gentile admires Descartes’ 
broad project of accounting for the subjectivity of experience, he identifies transcendent 
residues in the Cartesian method of achieving certainty. One such fault is found in 
Descartes’ understanding of what the cogito properly implies. If ‘I think’ requires that ‘I 
am,’ what can we say with equal certainty about S – what form does the ‘I’ take? The 
cogito does not by itself prove the existence of an external material reality or any 
physical matter, such as S’s body, within it. Descartes’ answer is to posit the existence of 
                                                          
26 Note that Gentile freely interchanges this term with the alternative attualismo (actualism). 
Secondary authors also use both, but in general I favour the two-word version so as to avoid 
confusion with any of several unrelated doctrines also named ‘actualism.’ 
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a mind, or soul, or pure self, existing ontologically separate from, if not entirely 
independent of, the body. The self is ‘a thing that thinks’; not a material object, but one 
capable of effecting changes to the material world. This kind of dualism leads to the old 
problems of pre-modern philosophy. S is simultaneously posited in and cut adrift from 
the reality she might conceivably know, but, as we have seen, Gentile’s attempt to solve 
this problem by conceiving of reality (including the self) as secondary to the act of 
thinking leaves him open to the accusation that he has made a category error. 
Gentile objects that there is nothing in the cogito to suggest the existence of a 
separate entity beyond or prior to the act of thinking. But to reduce the cogito to the 
simpler assertion that there is thinking is problematic, since it seems to erase the subject 
entirely. There is no room in the claim ‘there is an act of thinking,’ nor Ayer’s ‘there is a 
thought now,’27 for us to insert a recognisable subject except as a presupposition; and 
without that, we cannot very well account for the apparent continuity of experience, the 
passage of time, or the sequence of and relations between thoughts. Gentile observes 
that we can think about thoughts that we have thought previously, so it seems that there 
is a need to account for some kind of continuity of consciousness. From here he 
reasons that if the self-evident truth of our thinking is to be cashed out without 
groundless presuppositions, and without adding anything new to our initial belief that 
‘there is an act of thinking,’ we are forced to characterise S as an act of thinking that 
thinks itself. 
This idea is not entirely original to Gentile. Something very similar occurred to 
Thomas Hobbes in his Objections to Descartes’ Meditations. He complains that if 
Descartes sets aside the concept of a material body in order to ensure that his 
conception of the ego ‘does not depend on things of whose existence [he is] as yet 
                                                          
27 Ayer (1971) [62-3]. I am grateful to Tom Bunce for bringing the continuity objection to my 
attention in November 2011. 
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unaware,’28 he lets verbs go unmoored from their nouns, resulting in awkward concepts 
such as ‘jumping without a jumper’ or ‘thinking without a thinker.’ This kind of double-
talk is reminiscent of the scholastic philosophy of the mediaeval period, which is to say, 
‘obscure, improper and quite unworthy of M. Descartes’ usual clarity.’ Descartes’ reply 
is instructive. He writes: ‘I do not deny that I, who am thinking, am distinct from my thought 
[…] I simply mean that all […] modes of thinking inhere in me.’ Thought is part of him, 
but he himself is not thought.29 
We can see here that Descartes’ concept of the subject is different from 
Gentile’s. Descartes straddles the old (transcendent) and new (immanent) concepts of 
reality, acknowledging the special status of the thinking subject as an active participant 
in the creation of the real, but still defining it in terms comprehensible within the old 
tradition. The Cartesian pure ego is a thing that thinks, but on Gentile’s account, 
Descartes cannot hope to know anything about that thing without first thinking about 
and thereby creating it in thought. To treat the pure ego’s existence as a given is to part 
ways with epistemology, replacing knowledge with presupposition. 
The outcome of the Cogito Justification is principally a negative one. It shows 
that Descartes’ argument rests on false claims about entailment and necessity. That is: 
that there is thinking neither entails nor requires as a condition the existence of a 
thinker. We can be certain that there is thinking without assuming the prior existence of 
a thinker, but not the reverse; we cannot know that a thinker exists without first 
thinking about it. This goes some way to dispelling the idea that Gentile’s theory rests 
on a category error, for unlike Descartes and many idealist philosophers, Gentile need 
                                                          
28 In the Second Meditation, Descartes writes that ‘if the “I” is understood strictly as we have been 
taking it, then it is quite certain that knowledge of it does not depend on things of whose 
existence I am as yet unaware.’ See Descartes w/ Cottingham et al (eds.) (Vol. 2) [18-19; 27 in 
standard pagination] 
29 Second and Third Objections, in Cottingham et al (1984) (Vol. 2) [122-5; 172-77 in standard 
pagination] (Emphasis added). Note that I do not capitalise ‘scholastic’ because Hobbes refers to 
‘the scholastic way of talking.’ [125; 177 in std. pag.] 
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not treat thought as a thing or substance. It is instead an activity, and references to it as a 
noun are abstract and metaphorical. We might say that in Gentile’s system there is no 
‘ghost in the machine,’ with a world of thought somehow transcending yet by 
mysterious means influencing the world of ‘real’ material things.30 When thought is 
conceived as an act, or pensiero pensante, the division between ghost and machine 
disappears. 
 
2ii. The Logical Priority Justification 
As I have said, the Cogito Justification explains Gentile’s abandonment of 
conventional conceptions of the subject as a ‘thing that thinks,’ but seems unable to 
offer a strong positive conception in its place. To attain that we can re-construct the 
case in a different way, examining Gentile’s reasons for choosing pensiero pensante as the 
basic feature of his theory rather than Kant’s ‘I think,’ as described in the first Critique. 
Gentile calls this Kant’s ‘great discovery,’ adding that it gave philosophy ‘a new 
horizon.’31 The Prussian philosopher writes: 
It must be possible for the I think to accompany all my representations: for 
otherwise something would be represented within me that could not be thought 
at all, in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least 
would be nothing to me.32 
The main idea here is that it is inconceivable that S should know anything 
without thinking it. To say ‘it is true that I exist’ implies (entails) ‘I think it is true that I 
exist.’ The former ‘truncated’ claim ‘is not a judgement we can make’ without 
                                                          
30 The ‘ghost in the machine’ myth is well articulated by Ryle (1990) [13-25] 
31 Logica 2 [40]; for more relevant material, see also Sommario 1 [76-8] 
32 Immanuel Kant w/ Marcus Weigelt (2007) ‘Transcendental Logic,’ in Critique of Pure Reason. 
London: Penguin, pp.85-570. [124; §16, B131-2 in std. pag.] 
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presupposing the extra features present in the latter.33 So understood, thinking is not an 
action like breathing, jumping or speaking. For it to be true (or untrue) that I am 
breathing, you are jumping or we are speaking, I must think we are performing these 
actions. Without that ‘I think,’ breathing, jumping or speaking would be, let us say, 
ontologically indeterminate. Absent from my thoughts, they would not exist, and claims 
about them would not even be false. It is necessarily ‘I’ that thinks, since only one ‘I’ 
can be subject to any given subjective experience. I cannot think your thoughts, for if I 
tried to do so, they would become my thoughts. The exercise would be wholly self-
defeating. It is possible to think without jumping, but not to jump (or, at least, to know 
that one is jumping, and, by extension, for the action to be real) without thinking. The 
act of jumping is known, created, as the object of thought. The same cannot be said of 
the act of thinking without tautology. The act of thinking is unique in this respect: it is 
the only act that possesses this universal character.  
This is not the end of the Logical Priority Justification. Before concluding, it is 
worth underlining one point: while Gentile is closer to Kant than to Descartes, he does 
not reject Cartesian dualism only to adopt Kantianism wholesale. He breaks with Kant 
not only over the ‘I think,’ but also over Kant’s general aim of describing pure reason. 
This requires him to separate knowledge from its object, referring to a ‘pure faculty of 
knowledge,’ including ‘pure reason, pure intellect, or pure sensibility,’ in order to make 
objective a priori judgements possible.34 The problem here is that in conceiving of 
reason, intellect and sensibility in their ‘pure’ forms, Kant employs an ‘absurd’ and 
faulty conception of each of the faculties described. Gentile insists that there is no 
knowledge without an object; there is no thinking over and above thinking something. 
Kant can draw up his table of judgements, for example, only by abstracting from actual 
                                                          
33 Atto puro [94-6]; in the direct quotation I have followed Carr’s translation [97] 
34 ‘Metodo,’ in Hegeliana [223] 
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thinking about actual problems. Likewise the ‘I think,’ which Kant – with Gentile’s 
support – takes to be a necessary predicate of any possible judgement, is not detachable 
from the judgement in which it is situated. The ‘I’ of ‘I think’ is all of a piece with the 
act of thinking, and meaningless without it. 
The Logical Priority Justification can be summarised as follows. Every possible 
judgement must include the predicate ‘I think.’ This is true of judgements about the ‘I,’ 
or individual, contained in that phrase. The act of thinking is therefore logically prior to 
its subject. ‘I think’ cannot be reduced to several separate elements – the ‘I,’ a thought 
and (perhaps) that thought’s object – without resorting to absurd abstraction. Thinking, 
then, must be conceived in its ‘actuality,’ with all these components in place: that is, as 
S’s act of thinking about an object. Thought in its actuality cannot be other than 
‘thought thinking,’ pensiero pensante, or the act of thinking that thinks, actuates, creates, 
itself. 
 
3. The abstract/concrete division 
Careful readers may notice that Gentile refers to pensiero pensante without 
specifying an object. By referring to thought at this level of generality, has he then 
inadvertently fallen into the same kind of absurdity of which he accused Kant? If so, it 
is hard to see how he could have done otherwise. To say anything at any level of 
specificity there is a need for a class of concepts that are clear, in Leibniz’s sense of the 
word (i.e. they are identifiable on successive occasions), if not wholly distinct from the 
particular objects to which they refer. Viewed through the act of thinking, which always 
occurs in a context, even a commonplace object is not precisely the same from one 
moment to the next. Supposing this object is a chair, for example, it is at one time ‘the 
chair at time T1’ and at another time ‘the chair, which I thought about previously, at 
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time T2.’ The latter has relational and temporal properties different from those of the 
former. Without the clear idea of ‘the chair,’ it would be impossible to conceive of the 
chair as an object existing in time. The object would have no continuity or identity, 
existing solely on the shifting sands of contingent particularity. Reality so conceived 
would be incomprehensible, imposing itself on S from moment to moment as 
unconnected and unfathomable intuitions.  
A problem arises: how can Gentile simultaneously insist on the idea of pensiero 
pensante and account for a class of objects or concepts at any level of generality? His 
solution is to draw a distinction between ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ thought. Concrete 
thought is thought as act, pensiero pensante. This is ‘the only thought that is really 
thought,’ and is ‘absolutely ours’ and ‘absolutely actual,’ in that S is constantly and 
necessarily subject to it.35 Being ‘actual’ – which, let us remember, has in Italian the 
double meaning of ‘of or pertaining to an act’ and ‘current; of the present time’ – 
concrete thought is timeless, existing always in the present. It comprises both the 
medium and content of reality, incorporating subject and object in a single act. It is also 
universal and singular, since there cannot be more than one concrete thought or act of 
thinking. For S to think about someone else’s act of thinking, she must posit it as an 
object of thought, and as such it would not be an act, but a fact, an abstract creation of 
S’s concrete thought. 
This last point leads us to a second conception of thought. S can think about 
another’s thoughts, or past, future or possible thoughts, even if she cannot think them 
directly without making them present, concrete, and hers. Thought conceived in this 
way is ‘abstract’ and unreal; it is pensiero pensato (literally ‘thought [already] thought), or 
thought conceived as the object of actual, concrete thinking. Abstract thought consists 
of descriptions or concepts that cannot be conceived concretely and actually except by 
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contradicting themselves. This does not mean that statements containing abstractions 
are necessarily nonsensical. Instead they refer to unreal objects, or objects incompletely 
realised in pensiero pensante. Nonetheless they play an important role in concrete thinking. 
We very often think about objects that existed in the past, will exist in the future, or 
may exist subject to as-yet unsettled conditions. By reference to such pensieri pensati we 
can account for objects persisting over time and in space, with continuous identities 
amid changing contingencies. It is only when viewed through the steady lens of abstract 
thought that concrete thought is distinguishable from mere contingent experience. S 
must draw names, relations and inferences from the realm of abstract thought in order 
to orient concrete thinking. One critic has claimed that concrete thought is ‘imprisoned’ 
within abstract thought, since actual thinking relies on abstract thought to provide 
concepts and truth conditions necessary to make sense of contingent experience.36 But 
we could not know anything about objects of abstract thought without actual, concrete 
thinking. The two are dialectically linked, united in that act. 
The ‘unity’ of thought enables Gentile to anchor his theory in the method of 
immanence, rather than a subjective but transcendent method like the one he attributes 
to Plato. His admission of abstract thought should not be understood as a concession to 
transcendent realism. To be clear: all forms of realism presuppose the existence of 
certain true facts prior to S’s act of thinking about them, and are thus relegated to the 
abstract logos; but because Gentile ties abstract thought to concrete thought, he avoids 
the realists’ conclusion that these abstractions subsist independently of S. The 
concrete/abstract distinction is not the same as Kant’s distinction between phenomena 
and noumena. Certainly the noumenon, or thing-in-itself, is an abstraction, but we 
cannot hope to know anything about its content, and much less say that it is real and 
                                                          
36 Fabio Gorani (1995) ‘Logo concreto e logo astratto nel pensiero di Giovanni Gentile,’ in Idee 28-
9, pp. 139-60 [152]. Gorani is here describing A. Carlini’s view. Note that he actually refers to the 
abstract and concrete ‘logos,’ not thought, but the two are interchangeable for my purposes here. 
Part 1: Components of actual idealism 
42 
permanent, without thinking about it. That, of course, is a logical impossibility, for once 
it is thought or spoken or known about, it ceases to exist independently and in itself.37 
Gentilean abstractions have no pretentions of independence, permanence or 
universality. They are particular and contingent creations of the act of thinking, and 
differ from concrete ‘phenomena’ only in their generality and unreality.38 
It is also important to note the relation between subject and object in actual 
idealism. Only abstractly is there a subject plus an act plus an object. No object can be 
concretely known except through its ‘synthesis’ with S. This means that S must think 
about it; and in so thinking, she changes something about herself. She becomes the act 
of thinking about that object rather than any other. Thinking about objects is what 
grants them an ontological status of any kind. It is by thinking that claims about them 
are true (and therefore not false) or false (and therefore not true) that truth becomes 
possible. This reinforces the idea that Gentile is a radical constructivist, embracing what 
earlier I called ‘simple constructivism.’ Since thought is a constructive act, and nothing 
is knowable except through the act of thinking, nothing is or can be excluded from the 
scope of construction. Thinking is not an activity in the same way as others. There is 
not thinking (in the sense of pondering, cogitating, deliberating) and then acting, but 
instead a permanent and universal act of thinking that underpins and creates all other 
acts. It is not simply a predicate in other propositions, but the entire medium that makes 
the proposition possible. So understood, the universality of Gentile’s concept of 
                                                          
37 Atto puro [248-9]; Carr translation [259-60] 
38 Gentile notes some problems with Kant’s noumena-phenomena distinction before the advent of 
actual idealism proper. See Gentile (1904) ‘Fenomeni e noumeni nella filosofia di Kant,’ in La 
Critica 2, pp. 417-22. Although this work appeared before he worked out the details of actual 
idealism, he notes that ‘Kant taught that we cannot say whether the noumenon is […] different 
from or identical to the phenomenon,’ since we can define it only negatively [420-422]. In this 
early version he follows Kant (or rather, he tries to give an accurate account of what Kant 
thought). The fuller theory is developed in the sixth chapter of Atto puro.  
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thinking is more comprehensive than anything we see in Kant or elsewhere. As Enrico 
Berti puts it: 
The Gentilean act can be understood effectively as practical activity – one that is 
transformative, creative, and revolutionary. In this way it acquires a fullness of 
content infinitely superior to that of the Kantian’s simple ‘I think.’39 
 
4. Truth in the method of immanence 
As we saw earlier, Gentile believes that ‘transcendent’ methods rely on 
inadequate theories of knowledge, since they reduce S to the role of a passive ‘spectator’ 
on reality, mediating truth claims that are presented directly to her. The phenomenal 
world’s content is imported wholesale into the consciousness of the thinking observer. 
As a result there is no room for S to exercise her will, to make conscious and intentional 
changes to the world, or actively to endorse or reject the appearance of reality as it is 
(seemingly) revealed to her. Hence the ‘problem of logic’: if truth claims are to mean 
anything – if there is to be any meaningful sense in which a proposition can be false – it 
seems that there must be some test of ‘universality’ to demonstrate ‘the exclusion of the 
possibility that other subjects, or the same subject under different circumstances, would 
think differently.’40 
This is much-trampled philosophical territory. Gentile’s response is ambitious, 
and rests on two important claims. These are that (i) any ‘transcendental method’ must 
be rejected and replaced with a ‘method of immanence’; and (ii) all previous attempts to 
design a method of immanence have failed because their authors have retained elements 
of transcendent doctrines. Gentile’s preferred method ‘has nothing in common with 
                                                          
39 Enrico Berti (1988) ‘La dialettica e le sue riforme,’ in Pierro di Giovanni (ed.) Il neoidealismo 
italiano. Bari: Laterza, pp.45-69 [57] 
40 Logica 1 [46] 
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those instrumental and canonical conceptions of the search for truth.’41 The real 
difficulty is to locate plausible and universal truth conditions without conceding the 
existence of a transcendent reality. In what follows I will describe his account of the 
will, by which truths are ‘affirmed,’ and the conditions in which this can occur; then the 
underlying coherence theory by which ‘thinkable’ claims are distinguished from 
‘unthinkable’ others.  
 
4i. The will and truth 
Earlier I mentioned that Gentile distinguishes true claims from false or 
nonsensical claims partly by reference to la volontà (the will). This is an unusual position 
for him to adopt. Traditionally the ‘practical activity’ of the will is taken to be the basis 
for physical actions, and is distinguished from the ‘theoretical activity’ of the intellect, 
which is the basis for knowledge.42 Since concrete pensiero pensante is a single on-going 
act, not several acts occurring simultaneously, we need to explain how the apparently 
separate activities of thinking and acting can be resolved into it. 
Gentile thinks that the commonsensical conception of ‘physical activity’ is self-
contradictory.43 Anything that is purely physical is not an activity, for an activity must be 
performed rather than merely occurring. As such it is inconceivable without S, who 
consciously acts in order to achieve some end. The will belongs to 
an ideal reality, not in space, but in spirit; and not in time, but eternity. [This is] a 
reality where the laws of […nature] no longer hold sway. Instead there are those 
of liberty and of ends. Events no longer occur because they cannot do anything 
                                                          
41 Gentile (2003b) ‘Immanenza’ in Hegeliana. [196] 
42 Sommario 1 [79]. Gentile notes that ‘empirical psychologists’ sometimes add sentiment as a 
third ‘category of psychic facts.’ He sets aside the question of whether there are properly two or 
three categories, insisting that the issue of the division between thought and action or intellect 
and will is of ‘supreme importance.’ 
43 Diritto [62-63] 
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but occur, given what went before; but everything is made to happen with some 
end in mind, which is to say, because it has to happen, [but] freely, without 
taking precedent into account. And human action concurs with the creation of 
this ideal reality, which, coming from man, is inconceivable except as [the] work 
of an author of nature, […] the constructor of a good (or of an evil).44 
The will is identified not only with the desire or intention to act but also the 
action by which S’s aim is realised. Intention without accompanying action is not will 
but velleity, which is separate, abstract and literally inconsequential, with no bearing on 
concrete reality. Willing involves S positing a ‘self in front of [her]self’ and moving from 
one state to another ‘without a point of departure really distinguishable from the point 
of arrival.’ Thus ‘the end is not cut off from the subject that pursues it.’ When S pursues 
this abstract version of herself and the world that she occupies, she acts in accordance 
with the ‘dynamic and analytical nature’ of concrete thinking.45 In simpler language, this 
means that S’s will consists in acts that she performs with the intention of bringing 
about some end that she believes to be valuable. This is an endless process, since it 
refers to an as-yet unrealised aim. Once the action is completed and the aim is met, the 
results become facts, things of the past, pensieri pensati. S must then act in this new 
setting.46 
                                                          
44 Sommario 1 [80]. Note that Gentile includes indefinite articles alongside ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in the 
original Italian. 
45 Diritto [63]. In Sommario 1 [83], Gentile explains why he writes of S creating herself, rather 
than the world. At the moment of completing an action, ‘the material with which [S’s] action 
must work is no longer remote, nor opposed to [her]; but, [having] already entered into the 
sphere of [her] dominion […] is one of the constitutive elements of [her] actual personality. […] 
So [her] desire will create a world; but this world will be the desire itself. […] Whence the 
infinite value of good and the infinite disvalue of evil: [hence] in the good will there is a good 
universe, and in the bad [will] a malign universe.’ 
46 Genesi [25]. The idea that moral value is found in acts, rather than things or facts, supports my 
contention that Gentile’s doctrine is a constructivist one. See Korsgaard (2003) ‘[A]ccording to 
constructivism, normative concepts are not (in the first instance […]) the names of objects or of 
facts or of the components of facts that we encounter in the world. They are the names of the 
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The will also plays a role in the creation of knowledge. The truth cannot be 
assumed to present itself to S directly and fully formed. This would make S a passive 
spectator on reality, which conflicts with the idea of mediating the world through 
abstract concepts of the understanding, and belies the possibility of error, since if truths 
are imported wholesale into S’s consciousness, we are unable to account for confusion 
and clarification, certainty and uncertainty, possibility and impossibility, truth and 
falsity.47 It would also make S an empirical thing, robbed of the capability to act on and 
thereby change the world. Thinking and experience – the whole of human life – would 
be nothing more than a stream of consciousness, its entire contents imposed from the 
outside. S’s experiences of desire, aversion, effort and anticipation would be empty 
illusions, for really her life would proceed along a course over which she, qua subject, 
has no control.  
To reconcile the fluidity of experience with knowledge, Gentile insists that to 
know is to act. Compelled by the insistent desire to think the truth, S must tell herself: I 
want to know the truth; I want to make sense of the world. She finds the truth by thinking, 
which is something that she must do (and to that extent will herself to do), not an event 
that she passively observes. She can never find a whole or objective truth, but she must 
cling to the belief that there is value in what she currently holds to be true. She 
constructs the most coherent and convincing account of the world that she can. This 
may be revised as she finds reasons to think differently or as circumstances change, but, 
until that occurs, her beliefs are true for her; they constitute knowledge. She does not 
(necessarily) assume that what she currently holds to be true must be and will always be 
so. But neither can she assume that what she currently thinks to be true is untrue without 
contradicting herself in the process. After all, the claim ‘None of my beliefs are true 
                                                                                                                                                                    
solutions of problems, problems to which we give names to mark them out as objects for practical 
thought’ [116]. 
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beliefs’ is itself a truth claim.48 Thus the dialectic of thinking develops: there is truth in 
the concrete logos, which exists always in the present tense, just as the unformed and 
abstract future becomes fixed in the abstract past of pensiero pensato.49 
 
4ii. The Gentilean will: being and Being There 
Gentile claims that it would be absurd to presuppose the existence of a reality 
outside thought. By thinking that an external world exists, we are surely creating it as an 
idea of reality, which is an internal world of thought. Hence our original problem would 
go unsolved. Instead of confirming the existence of an external or non-ideal world, we 
would have instead created an internal and ideal one. We cannot know that this created 
world reflects a pre-existing reality. Two significant problems arise from this account of 
simple or epistemological constructivism. Because they are related, I will discuss them 
together. The first is broad, and can be stated in several different ways; it concerns the 
persistence and regularity of reality. This I will call the Being There Problem. The second 
problem, which I call the Torturer Objection, extends from the first, and concerns the 
implications of Gentile’s description of the will. 
Being There begins with the observation that a world is persistently presented in 
certain ways that we seem unable to alter. Events sometimes occur unexpectedly or 
(seemingly) inexplicably; we sometimes face conditions with which we feel unable to 
reconcile ourselves, regardless of how much we would like to or how hard we try. We 
can forget or ignore features of the world only for them to persist when we next 
encounter them. But Gentile thinks that the notion of those objects already existing, prior 
to our thinking about them, is absurd. He adds that for something to exist concretely it 
                                                          
48 I am grateful to Graeme Garrard for suggesting this counter-objection to outright scepticism in 
a conversation we had in February 2012. 
49 ‘[T]he spirit resolves all of time (past and future) within the actuality of the present, which is its 
eternity.’ Logica 2 [93] 
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must be subsumed to S’s will, meaning that she must consciously affirm that it exists. 
But if there are strict limits to what she can think, or certain things that she is bound to 
think – or, to put it more strongly, if propositions’ contents come from somewhere, 
even if it falls to S to assign them their truth-value – then this constructivist doctrine 
appears less radical than Gentile claims. Beneath his dramatic language of creating the 
real is the banal observation that to think about and subsequently believe something is 
to perform an act, and it is in the course of this act that the qualities of ‘true’ and ‘real’ 
are assigned. Certainly they are created qua objects of knowledge. But if there are certain 
objects or relations between objects that S cannot help but create, or if the range of options 
is confined to one, then S’s ‘absolute creativity’ looks doubtful.50 
This is not strictly an objection. Nonetheless Roger Holmes identifies it as 
‘perhaps the most serious difficulty which Gentile’s actual idealism is called upon to 
meet.’  It entails a concession from which it is difficult for Gentile to recover without 
committing himself to a conception of reality that he sets out to avoid. It demotes 
Gentile’s ‘absolute creativity’ to an amplified sort of noticing and suggests that ‘his 
metaphysics is meaningless,’ leading us round on a long circle to the conclusions we 
would have accepted as true anyway. If the world somehow conditions the act of 
thinking, it is unclear what is ruled out by Gentile’s bold assertion that the world is 
created by that act. For all the purported power of thought, the world is presented 
rigidly and fully-formed, leaving it to S to notice it and recognise it as the proper 
measure of truth. Holmes writes: 
Thought might create for itself a world in which water ran up hill, but for all its 
creative power it is in some manner compelled to “create” the world in which 
we live as a world in which water runs down hill. We may well believe that the 
                                                          
50 George de Santillana asks ‘how Gentile is going to lift himself up by his own braces,’ or rather, 
how can Gentile make sense of the idea that thinking refers to thought itself and not to a prior 
outside world? (1938) ‘The Idealism of Giovanni Gentile,’ in Isis 29:2, pp.366-76 [369] 
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order and uniformity of nature are a creation of thought, yet the specific 
character of that order and that uniformity is quite evidently beyond the power 
of thought to alter.51 
My chosen name for this problem comes from H.S. Harris. He draws a 
distinction between ‘real’ objects and those that are ‘certainly there,’52 accounting 
respectively for those things whose ontological status we have (positively) confirmed, 
and those that are just there, outside the purview of current thought, yet bound to 
become real when S notices them. Again it would be strictly absurd to claim that such 
an object is, or exists, or anything of the kind. It is no less to absurd to say that it is not, 
or that it does not exist. To do this would be tantamount to answering a question without 
knowing that it has been asked. What, then, is the object’s ontological status? Suppose, 
following Harris, we accept that these objects are there, but do not (yet) have a definite 
positive status: they are not real. For now we might label them ontologically indeterminate. 
But if we suppose that they hang together in some sense, amounting to a world of 
possible experience that awaits our discovery of it, our hesitation in accepting them as 
‘real’ amounts to a pedantic (and optional) formality, deferring but in no way altering 
our conclusions. If this is true, actual idealism’s pure constructivist promise gives way to 
something like common-sense realism, and differs from it only in the criteria by which 
ontological claims (X exists/does not exist) are ascribed. 
                                                          
51 Holmes (1937b) [114-16]. Holmes adds that ‘for all its creative power, [the mind] is in some 
manner compelled to “create” the world in which we live as a world in which water flows down 
hill.  
52 Harris (1960) [36]: ‘What [Gentile] really means is only that the natural world is certainly there: 
it acts, it resists, it is stubborn. What we call “our” will as opposed to the brute persistence of 
natural facts is really thought striving to objectify itself, to make itself will, that is to make itself 
count in the world.’ On a similar note, Harris writes that The factual character of an experience is 
the limit of our actual comprehension. This limit is always there, but it is never final: we can 
never get to the bottom of Nature. It is in this sense that actual idealism affirms transcendence’ 
[18].  
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The related Torturer Objection is so called because of a colourful example that 
Julius Evola once used to illustrate it.53 He writes that Gentile would have us recognise 
every instance of ‘inner capitulation [and] conformism’ as the product of S’s own will. 
Every proposition or fact about the world that S affirms in the act of thinking is taken 
to have been willed. It matters not if she disapproves of the facts and wants them to be 
different, for the present facts are still the concrete manifestation of her will. They are 
just the ‘negative moment’ in the will’s dialectic. If she is powerless to change the facts, 
she is condemned to go on suffering them indefinitely, lumbered with the useless 
consolation that she has (apparently) willed her unhappy circumstances into being. To 
press this point home, Evola offers ‘a drastic example from the most banal domain’: 
Subjected to torture, the Gentilean would have to recognise that [her] “concrete 
will” is that of [her] tormenter, while the will that rebels and suffers would only 
be [her] empirical and “abstract” ego – [the] only [thing] through which reality 
can be different from the will.  
The Torturer Objection extends the Being There Problem by claiming that S’s 
will is limited by the contingencies of a transcendent real world. Evola’s example shows 
that S does not have unlimited power to do whatever she wants or create the world in 
whatever form she prefers. S does not decide to be tortured, and no doubt as the 
torture is taking place she feels an overwhelming desire for it to stop. If Gentile insists 
that, when subjected to torture, S’s suffering really is the product of her own will, he 
must explain how the free and unconditioned will he describes is distinguishable from a 
stream of consciousness over which S has, at most, limited control. Otherwise his bold 
claims about the will and the constructive capacities of concrete thinking would tell us 
nothing about how S should decide how to act in the more familiar senses of these 
                                                          
53 Julius Evola (1955) ‘Gentile non è il nostro filosofo,’ in Ordine Nuovo 1: 4-5, pp. 25-30 
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words. Desire and expectation would be nothing but ‘particular’ and ‘abstract’ moments 
of a will that is made universal and concrete on the crest of the continuous present, 
which could be described just as well without reference to it.54 
These problems are not easily disarmed. If they go unsolved, they risk exposing 
Gentile’s concept of the will as normatively indeterminate, referring only to what 
currently is rather than what could or ought to be. The most plausible solution, I think, 
is as follows. Gentile’s claims about the ‘absolute creativity’ of thinking are intended to 
emphasise that thinking is an act and S is an agent. This is uncontroversial. S must be an 
agent in order to ask herself whether or not she is an agent; strict determinism is to that 
extent ruled out. S can also imagine counterfactual states of affairs and intentionally 
work to bring them about. These aims are abstractions inasmuch as they are imaginary, 
but they are made concrete as S realises them. This is what Gentile means when he says 
that the true object of concrete willing is S herself: the will and moral value exist always 
in the present moment in which S acts. She must assign value to her acts by conceiving 
of them as constitutive of the ends they are intended to achieve. S works in the present 
toward an imagined future, which, by the time it becomes present, is no longer future. 
Here again we see the dialectic of thinking borne out. All of this requires S to engage in 
reflection, deciding what is valuable and what is not, just as she must reflect on her ideas 
and beliefs in order to determine which are true and which are false. 
 
4iii. The value of truth and its construction 
Gentile treats values, norms and truths in an unconventional fashion. Two 
points should be noted. First is that he emphasises the ‘value’ of truth claims. He 
                                                          
54 I take it that it is in response to these concerns that George de Santillana (1938) writes: ‘the 
developments of [Gentile’s] doctrine in action have proved so embarrassingly lunar and irrelevant 
that it is best to draw a chaste veil of silence. It is at this point that the irony of Fate overtakes 
idealism at last. For the unique Act becomes demonstrably, in the light of common day, actual 
passivity[, or r]ational, persuasive, albeit half-hearted yielding to the winds as they list’ [375]. 
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maintains that it is impossible to believe that a claim is true without attaching to it the 
value of universal truth. S cannot think that something is true while doubting it or 
otherwise suspending judgement on its truth-value, for this would be entirely self-
defeating. If she claims, ‘I think that X is true and Y is false; but the reasons for holding 
this belief are inferior to those for thinking the reverse,’ she does not really think that X 
is true.55 Suppose, for instance, that S was once a devout Christian, and although she 
now claims to have ceased to believe in God, she is at the same time afraid that God 
will punish her for her loss of faith. On Gentile’s account, this person is deluding 
herself about what she really believes. One belief must give way decisively to the other, 
or else she must concede that she does not really know what she thinks. In the reality of 
her thought, God exists, does not exist, or is unknown (in which case He does not 
positively exist). Hence truth claims demand ‘faith in truth,’ or the belief that what S 
currently holds to be true is equally true for anyone (it has ‘concrete objectivity’). Those 
truths would appear as such to any person who had proceeded through the same 
processes of thinking, equipped with the same assumptions, to arrive at a conclusion.56 
Gentile also refers to the central importance of ‘faith in thinking.’ He writes: 
‘There is no philosophical or scientific investigation [… nor] thinking of any sort […] 
without the spontaneous and unshakeable conviction of thinking the truth.’57 The major 
difference between ‘faith in thinking’ and ‘faith in truth,’ as far as I can see, is that the 
former applies not only to truth claims, but also to the reasoning used to reach them. 
The structure of thought, or logic, imposes considerable demands on S and the reality 
she creates. It would be absurd for her to affirm that such-and-such a claim is true while 
                                                          
55 There is no contradiction in the simultaneous claims that (I think that) X is true and (I think 
that) I may be mistaken. I may be unsure whether I’m right; X may be my best guess in light of 
the available evidence. It only becomes a problem when I add that (I think) I am probably wrong 
– that is, when the second assertion undermines, rather than reserves final judgement on, the 
first. See Harris (1960) [28 and 28-29n] 
56 Gentile ‘Pensare,’ in Hegeliana [183] 
57 ‘Pensare,’ in Hegeliana [183] 
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consciously believing that an incompatible and contradictory claim is simultaneously 
true. Of course, this does not mean that such inconsistencies do not occur. They may 
go unnoticed.58 In several places Gentile refers to the fundamental and universal duty to 
think, for S to assess and test her beliefs against each other in order to find a 
manageably coherent conception of reality or ‘universal truth.’59 Gentile’s point here is 
that once noticed, an instance of incoherence forces S to revise or abandon one or both 
of the affected truth claims. Logic is integral to the nature of thinking, so while it may 
be impossible to find purely objective truths, it is possible to eliminate incoherence and 
inconsistency within a set of beliefs already held. In this way we can discard any 
account of reality that relies upon simultaneous incommensurable claims. This 
reveals the extent of Gentile’s coherence theory of truth: the criteria by which a claim is 
judged to be true (for a given subject) are actual affirmation and coherence with existing 
thought.60 
                                                          
58 Note Rik Peters’ objection: ‘In principle Gentile was right that we are all philosophers, but he 
used to overlook the fact that we are not philosophers all the time. In daily practice we do not do 
all our activities as self-conscious philosophers. A painter may draw a line and not know why he 
draws it as he does, scientists and historians ask questions, although they do not know always 
exactly why they ask the questions as they do. Even philosophers, pace Gentile, are sometimes 
not entirely aware of all the implications of their thought.’ See Peters (1998a) The Living Past: 
Philosophy, History and Action in the Thought of Croce, Gentile, de Ruggiero and Collingwood. 
Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen. [515] 
59 Genesi [45-8]; see also Educazione [137] on Gentile’s equation of goodness and truth. In a rare 
example of an article explicitly dealing with Gentile’s ethics, Valmai Burdwood Evans affirms that 
‘to think is […] a moral responsibility. Man feels that he must or that he ought to think as he does 
think. Every resource of his reason must be employed in his thinking. It is a moral duty.’ See 
(1929) ‘The Ethics of Giovanni Gentile,’ in International Journal of Ethics 39:2, pp.205-16 [215]. 
Note that for the most part this article is exegetical rather than analytic; the author summarises 
Gentile’s views on ethics in the same roundabout fashion as Gentile himself. 
60 See, for example, Sommario 1 [172], where Gentile writes: ‘If I think of such-and-such an 
argument reaching a certain degree of truth, that is, of clarity and evidence, when I later go back 
to think it, I achieve a higher grade of truth; and to think on it a third time means an even higher 
grade, and so forth.’ 
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5. Coherence and construction 
What theory of truth does Gentile support? I think that it is a thoroughgoing 
kind of coherence theory, but I shall have to argue for this point, since it has been 
disputed. For example: in his influential book about coherence theory, Nicholas 
Rescher remarks in a footnote that in the 1920s and ‘30s, ‘there were rather more 
coherentists [on the Continent than in the UK], Carlo Gentile perhaps the most 
prominent among them.’ ‘Carlo’ is surely a mistake: Giovanni Gentile is the only 
plausible contender for this role.61 Meanwhile, Roger Holmes flatly denies that Gentile 
‘seek[s] a coherence theory of truth.’62 Discounting ‘Carlo,’ there is an obvious 
contradiction between these claims. Which one is correct? Unfortunately, Rescher states 
his claim without arguing for it, so more work is needed to build up his side of the 
argument. To offer an intelligible answer to this question, we must ask what coherence 
theory entails. Coherentism is unorthodox among today’s philosophers and was by no 
means ordinary at the time Gentile was writing. Since it bears directly on the moral and 
political theory that is elaborated in chapters 1.2 and 1.3 of the thesis, it is worth trying 
to understand this difficult part of actual idealism, even if the subsequent parts of the 
thesis do not assume that the reader affirms the tenets of its metaphysics.  
‘Truth,’ writes Gentile, ‘is relation; so too is logic. This relation is knowledge, 
which is possible only if there is an a priori relation between object and [a] subject that 
posits the terms [of the relation between them],63 and does not presuppose them.’ He 
continues: 
                                                          
61 The mistaken reference appears in Nicholas Rescher (1973) The Coherence Theory of Truth. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press [25n]. Regarding the Carlo/Giovanni mix-up, Rescher confirms that 
‘there was a slip of the pen/mind there.’ [E-mail correspondence with author, dated 4/1/2012] 
62 Holmes (1937b) [123]. Note that Harris also identifies Gentile as a coherentist. See his 
introduction to Genesis [21] 
63  Literally ‘posits its terms’ (‘pone i suoi termini’) 
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[I]t is clear that: first, a truth transcending the subject is neither truth nor 
knowable reality; second, nor is truth immanent within the subject while 
transcendent of the subject’s act of knowing; [and] third, nor is truth a truth 
immanent within the same subject that knows, but transcendent of the actuality 
of this knowing in a naturalistic conception of thought. The only truth that we 
can embrace and fix with cast-iron certainty[…] is that which is born out of and 
develops with the subject, inasmuch as [she] knows [it] in act.64 
It seems, then, that Gentile favours a coherence theory of the nature of truth. This 
means that he believes that truth ‘consists in’ coherence, rather than in some externally 
existing world that happens to be coherent (as does F.H. Bradley).65 But he also affirms a 
coherence theory of knowledge, in that S can be said to know a truth if it coheres with 
her other beliefs. In fact, given his insistence on the continuity of consciousness, the 
impossibility of consciously holding two contradictory beliefs simultaneously, and his 
repeated insistence on the concept of truth, Gentile seems to argue for what Ralph 
Walker calls ‘a pure form of […] coherence theory.’66 This means that he affirms 
coherence theories of 
 truth (‘the nature of truth’ consists in coherence; and ‘for a proposition 
to be true is for it to fit in with some designated set of beliefs’); 67 
 knowledge (we know X if and only if we believe X and it coheres with 
our existing beliefs B); and  
                                                          
64 Logica 1 [65] 
65 For some good indications of Bradley’s view, see (1909) ‘On Truth and Coherence,’ in Mind 
18:71, pp.329-42 [passim], and (1909) ‘Coherence and Contradiction,’ in Mind 18:72, pp.489-508 
[also passim] 
66 Ralph C. Walker (1989) The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-Realism, Idealism. 
London: Routledge [15]. Note that Walker is not describing Gentile’s theory, but instead a form of 
coherence theory to which Gentile’s theory corresponds. 
67 Walker (1989) [5, 7] 
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 justification (hypothesis Y coheres with existing beliefs B better than 
hypothesis Z coheres with B; this justifies the belief that Y is true and Z 
is not).  
Unlike ‘impure’ coherence theory, which might rely on ‘a correspondence 
account of straightforward “factual” truths about the world around us, but a coherence 
account of evaluative truths, or of truths about possibilities and necessities,’68 Gentile’s 
theory constitutes an attempt to do away with any kind of unjustified presuppositions, 
and to invest solely in coherence and the concept of the subject as the act of thinking. 
He also means to forestall the collapse into mysticism – that is, reliance upon 
unsupported, vaguely understood or speculative beliefs – which, he believes, 
characterises the majority of earlier attempts to explain reality. These stand as evidence 
of other thinkers’ failure to apply their convictions with sufficient rigour or consistency. 
There are several definitions of ‘coherence’ and what it means for claims to 
‘cohere’. In general, coherence theory is distinguished from correspondence theory by 
its concern with the relations between propositions in a given set, not between these 
propositions and a real world to which they ‘correspond.’ To be coherent and true, 
claims in a set must imply or at least not contradict each other.69 On some accounts, 
propositions are true when they cohere with one another and with some other set of 
propositions, such as the beliefs of an omniscient and infallible God, those constituting 
nature, or a Hegelian Absolute70 – a comprehensive set of insuperable, permanent, 
                                                          
68 Walker (1989) [6] 
69 The problem with coherence as compatibility is that ‘there seem to be as many cohering 
systems of propositions as there are possible worlds,’ so coherence by itself leaves us unable to 
‘distinguish the class of true statements from a self-consistent fairytale[.]’ See Francis W. Dauer 
(1974) ‘In Defense of the Coherence Theory of Truth,’ in Journal of Philosophy 71: 21, pp. 791-
811 [794]; Mautner (2005) [109-10]; and L. Jonathan Cohen (1978) ‘The Coherence Theory of 
Truth,’ in Philosophical Studies: an International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 
34:4, pp.351-60 [352-3]  
70 Walker (1989) [4]; and Michael Inwood (1992) A Hegel Dictionary. London: Blackwell [298-
301] 
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necessary and mutually coherent truth claims. Such halfway-house positions are at least 
superficially attractive. They allow us to say that mere coherence among the things we 
have noticed indicates the possibility of truth, or a plausible version of truth, rather than the 
genuine version that awaits our discovery. ‘The truth,’ which is authentic, objective and 
secure, is revealed in piecemeal fashion. While we have incomplete knowledge, then, the 
best we can do is to rely on the kind of provisional near-truth that coherence (among 
other things) offers, edging toward this real, genuine, authentic truth, although aware 
that we will never reach it. This distinction helps to reinforce the idea that there is a 
single truth to which all truth claims should aspire, even if we can never know it 
completely or directly. By the same token, it denies that there could ever be 
simultaneous mutually contradictory truths: where two people hold concurrent 
conflicting beliefs about the same object, at least one of them must be wrong. This is 
true regardless of whether there is any third subject to insist that one or both of the 
parties is mistaken. Correspondence theorists view the truth as though from the 
position of one who is already in possession of the facts. 
Correspondence theorists’ suspicion of coherence theory is understandable. 
Very often, though, this relies on a mistaken understanding of what coherence entails, 
assuming that ‘coherence’ is equivalent to ‘non-contradiction.’ For one instructive 
example, suppose that each person starts life without any fixed beliefs, as an Aristotle- 
or Locke-style tabula rasa. Any claim can be affirmed with equal ease. How does anyone 
make the jump from this starting point to anything like knowledge or certainty? Without 
any standard against which hypotheses can be tested, what is there to prevent the 
acceptance of nonsensical claims which subsequently inhibit the acquisition of workably 
coherent beliefs? Surely this would lead to people holding all kinds of arbitrary but 
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mutually supporting beliefs, and viewing all alternative claims with invulnerable 
incredulity. How, then, can we explain the near-consensus on so much of reality?71 
This conception of coherence is mistaken. While coherence theory operates 
without any concept of a free-standing complete or permanent truth, it would be 
incorrect to assume that any combination of non-contradictory propositions has equal 
claim to be true. Several authors have written about the importance of 
‘comprehensiveness’ in assessments of equally coherent sets of propositions.72 
Wolfgang Künne, for example, writes that ‘a set of beliefs α is more comprehensive, and to 
that extent more coherent, than a set β if α answers not only all questions answered in β 
but also at least one further question which remains unanswered in β.’ He continues: 
[T]he very word “coherence” carries the suggestion that coherence is a matter of 
how well the parts of a manifold “hang together” […] Consider the following 
consistent subset of my beliefs: {[Oxford has many spires], [Caesar was 
assassinated], [My name is “WK”]}. It is more comprehensive than any of its 
subsets, to be sure, but one is inclined to say that the elements of this helter-
skelter collection do not “hang together”. [… W]e can say that a set of beliefs is 
coherent only if its members support each other like the poles in a tepee. This 
support can be only due to justificatory connections within the set.73 
                                                          
71 Walker acknowledges these problems. He argues that ‘no pure coherence theory is tenable,’ 
precisely because ‘[a] tenable coherence theory will have to leave room for certain truths whose 
nature does not consist in coherence. These will have to include truths about the beliefs that 
define the system and determine coherence. Otherwise, the theory cannot get going.’ Walker 
(2001) ‘The Coherence Theory,’ in Michael Patrick Lynch (ed.) The Nature of Truth: Classic and 
Contemporary Perspectives. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp.123-58 [149] 
72 Aside from Künne (below), see Dauer (1974) [794] 
73 Wolfgang Künne (2005) Conceptions of Truth. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Originally 2003) 
[383-4]. Note that the proposition ‘Caesar was assassinated’ echoes essentially the same example in 
Bernard Bosanquet’s 1922 article, ‘A Word About Coherence,’ in Mind 31: 123, pp.335-6 [336], 
and may have precedents prior to that. On the idea of propositions that ‘hang together,’ compare 
Rescher (1973) [173], who claims that ‘[t]he essential distinctiveness of the coherence theory lies 
in its utilisation of the following precepts: (1) The truth of a proposition is to be determined in 
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If coherence is to be the measure of truth, these justificatory connections 
between claims must be more than requirements for consistency. If I have just begun to 
learn about Roman history, the claim ‘Caesar was assassinated’ (call this Caesar 
Hypothesis 1, or CH1 for short) does not contradict any of my existing beliefs. This 
cannot be enough to tell me that it is true, for the claims ‘Caesar died of pneumonia’ 
(CH2) and ‘Caesar committed suicide’ (CH3) would bring about no contradiction either. 
I have no doubt that Caesar is dead, for I am told he lived more than two thousand 
years ago, and people do not live that long. I am similarly confident that he cannot have 
died from assassination, pneumonia and suicide, for each person dies only once. What 
am I to believe?  Should I suspend judgement indefinitely, assuming that this list of 
hypotheses is not exhaustive, and other possibilities would cohere equally well with my 
beliefs? (Caesar might have died in an accident, and my assassination, pneumonia and 
suicide-affirming sources might be misinformed or otherwise trying to deceive me). 
How can my belief in any one of the hypotheses be justified at the expense of any 
other? Without an external or transcendent reality in which necessary relations obtain, 
how can I ever know that a currently-held system of beliefs coheres fully, rather than 
merely appearing to do so? 
Gentile’s answer to these questions is to identify coherence broadly with 
‘thinkability,’ leaving S to identify and apply other forms of justification or evaluation to 
the particular problems she faces. The appropriate kind of justification depends upon 
the question being asked. She must be convinced that her conclusions are sound and 
supported by the strongest arguments she can articulate. Returning to my Caesar 
                                                                                                                                                                    
terms of its relationships to other proposition in its logical-epistemic environment. And 
consequently, (2) The true propositions form one tightly-knit unit, a set each element of which 
stands in logical interlinkage with others so that the whole forms a comprehensively connected 
and unified network.’ Also Linda Martín Alcoff (2001) ‘The Case for Coherence,’ in Michael 
Patrick Lynch (ed.) The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, pp.159-82 [161] for ‘minimalist’ vs. ‘stronger’ versions. 
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example, I cannot know that CH1 is true (viz. that Caesar was assassinated) with the 
same sort of certainty I could have about something that is more immediately available 
to me, such as a claim about something that is occurring now, or that occurred recently, 
within my memory, such as ‘The book I placed on my desk earlier today is still there’ 
(call this Book Hypothesis, or BH). The number of justifiable beliefs, which for now I will 
take to mean, ‘beliefs that I am prepared to accept as true,’ that would lead me to 
believe that CH1 is true, while CH2 and CH3 are not, is far smaller than the number of 
beliefs that I can draw upon to support my current belief that BH is true. (I distinctly 
remember placing the book on my desk; I locked the door to my study, etc.) I cannot 
provide a chain of firm and coherent beliefs to connect any particular CH with my 
present belief in BH.  
My belief in CH1 is less easily verified and for that reason less certain than my 
belief in BH. CH1 is at least minimally plausible, since, as I have said, it does not 
contradict any of my beliefs about the mortality of man. Mere plausibility is inadequate 
justification for a belief, however. A huge number of incompatible claims are 
simultaneously plausible, including (it seems to me, in my ignorance of Roman history) 
CH1, CH2 and CH3. But in favour of CH1 I can also draw on the support of many 
sources. Even if I learn rather more about the history of ancient Rome, I cannot 
provide the claims necessary for comprehensive coherence to support any of these 
claims (all these historians might have colluded to deceive me). But the historical 
consensus still gives me evidence that Caesar was probably assassinated, rather than dying 
of pneumonia or by suicide. To think otherwise would commit me to another, far more 
ambitious hypothesis, namely that all my CH1-affirming sources are either mistaken or 
deliberately misleading. Again, this could be true. Nothing excludes it entirely. Even if I 
cannot hope to be absolutely certain about how Caesar died, I believe that it happened, 
and if I am to hold any specific beliefs about how it occurred, I must appeal to reasons 
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– the best available evidence, say – rather than believing some arbitrary and groundless 
proposition. 
Note that one key difference between coherence and correspondence theories is 
that the former hinge on some subject who affirms a set of beliefs and tests propositions 
against them. To a large extent correspondence theories can do away with such subjects. 
The claim ‘A proposition is true [if and only if] it agrees with reality,’74 does not appeal 
to any subject’s belief, knowledge, or assertion that this proposition is true. We might 
say that it would be true even if there were no-one able to entertain the idea. The 
‘reality’ referred to in the claim is doing the work independently of any subject. It is to 
this that true claims ‘correspond’ in correspondence theories. At a small stretch, we 
might call this conception of reality and truth ‘transcendent’ of our knowledge of it. It 
exists free-standing and independent of anyone’s knowledge of or thought about it. Our 
role when seeking the truth is to find the propositions that correspond with it. To put it 
another way: the truth is out there, and our job is to find it. For Gentile, this unknown, 
transcendent truth can only be a presupposition. We cannot know that it is there until 
we know what it is, having already constructed it. 
 
6. Actual idealism’s positivity and the unknown 
Gentile argues that thinking realises truth. The construction of truth is a strictly 
positive enterprise; falsity is not realised except in the sense that ‘[I think] it is true that X 
is false.’ We may then wonder how he conceives, or can conceive, of doubt and the 
unknown. To understand his position, we can assess his responses to the three famous 
sceptical hypotheses in Descartes’ Meditations. These are the ‘madman’ and ‘dreamer’ 
scenarios, which run as follows. Descartes wants to offer reasons for doubting what 
                                                          
74 Richard Kirkham (1997) Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 
[22]. Kirkham offers this as ‘an ideally expressed extensional theory of truth.’ 
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seem to him to be obvious truths. He notes that he is aware of people ‘whose brains are 
so damaged by the persistent vapours of melancholia that they firmly maintain that they 
are kings when they are paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are 
naked[.]’ He adds that his seemingly ordinary impressions of ‘sitting by the fire’ could 
equally be mistaken, as he is well aware of having dreamt such things in the past. It is 
not always obvious to one who is dreaming that one’s received impressions are in any 
way inauthentic. Therefore, Descartes’ belief that he is awake is not sufficient to prove 
that he is awake; or, as he puts it later, ‘every sensory experience [he] ha[s] ever thought 
[he] was having while awake [he] can also think of [him]self as sometimes having while 
asleep[.]’75  
Descartes addresses these sceptical hypotheses in the Sixth Meditation. He 
writes that he can ‘almost always make use of more than one sense to investigate the 
same thing,’ and that ‘dreams are never linked by memory with all the other actions of 
life as waking experiences are.’ When he ‘distinctly see[s] where things come from and 
where and when they come to [him],’ he continues, ‘and when [he] can connect [his] 
perceptions of them with the whole of the rest of [his] life without a break,’ then he can 
be certain of their truthful existence.76 What Descartes has presented here is a 
coherentist argument regarding the justification of truth claims. Dream-experiences are 
recognisable as dreams, as distinct from real experiences, in that they do not cohere 
with the rest of the reality in which they appear. That is: a dream-subject cannot 
comprehend and justify the objects of her experience by means of reflection, for the 
dream does not have a continuous past or present, or indeed any content beyond that 
which is placed in it by the dreaming mind. But Descartes’ appeal to coherence does not 
make him a coherentist per se. Even committed correspondence theorists may appeal to 
                                                          
75 Descartes, in Cottingham et al (eds.) (1984) ‘First Meditation,’ in The Philosophical Writings of 
Descartes (Volume 2) [13]; second quotation is from ‘Sixth Meditation,’ same volume [53] 
76 Descartes (1984) ‘Sixth Meditation’ [61-2] 
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coherence to support or justify their beliefs. The difference is that the correspondence 
theorist presupposes the existence of an already coherent reality to which maximally 
coherent truth claims necessarily correspond, whereas the ‘pure coherence theorist,’ 
such as Gentile, assumes that coherence plus affirmation – which may demand special 
reasons77 – is truth. Descartes believes in the existence of God and innate ideas, 
although neither of these can be derived from coherence alone. Their presence in his 
theory amounts to a correspondence theorist’s escape hatch for use when coherence is 
unable to provide answers. 
Gentile cannot presuppose the truth of innate ideas or divine revelation without 
abandoning his method of immanence, and is left with only coherence and actual will to 
serve as criteria for truth. This has deeper implication for Descartes’ third sceptical 
scenario, in which ‘a malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning’ sets out to 
deceive us. Gentile cannot countenance Descartes’ optimistic assumption that faith, 
innate ideas and coherence tests would expose the demon’s illusory world as a fiction. It 
follows from Gentile’s doctrine that if the demon presents S with a coherent illusion of 
reality, truth claims drawn from within that perceived reality stand up. Once S believes 
in the demon, and can find compelling reasons to think that the meta-reality in which 
the demon exists is more authentic than that with which she is presented, she cannot 
coherently assert that present-world truth claims are, as a matter of objective fact, true. 
Either assumption can give way to the other: either perceived reality is authentic, and 
truth claims drawn from it are genuinely true; or perceived reality is inauthentic, and 
claims drawn from it cannot be true. No intermediate position can be coherently 
conceived. 
                                                          
77 Note that I add ‘special reasons’ to cover cases where S believes (affirms) a particular claim 
because there are sufficient reasons in favour of it, not just because it does not contradict her 
other beliefs. For example: if I do not know your mother’s name, I cannot non-arbitrarily decide 
that her name was Maria unless I have some reason for doing so – you have told me, for example. 
The relevant ‘special reasons’ take different forms for different kinds of belief. 
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This does not explain why Gentile rejects scepticism. Why does he not say: ‘I 
concede that perceived reality could be an elaborate illusion. This illusion may be clearly 
apparent from a viewpoint beyond the ambit of perceived reality. But there is no reason 
to assume that within perceived reality, there should be any instance of incoherence that 
would confirm or otherwise alert me to reality’s inauthenticity. Hence I shall not affirm 
that any claim is true’? Gentile’s point, I think, is that we must assume that something is 
true, for even ‘there is no truth’ is a positive (albeit untenable) truth claim.78 If no 
incoherence is noticed in perceived reality, then we cannot ascertain any other 
hypothetical reality’s priority over this one; so for the time being, since we are subject to 
an ostensibly coherent and comprehensive reality, we must draw our conception of 
truth from within that, rather than positing necessarily abstract alternatives about which 
we cannot make even preliminarily certain judgements. Besides, if we accept wholesale 
scepticism, there arises another question: how does the demon know that his meta-
reality is not merely an illusion? Pursuing the line in this direction, we face an infinite 
regress of hypothetical demons and doubts.79 
It may be objected that Gentile fails to offer us a theory of truth, or that what 
he does offer is not really a theory of truth, but instead a theory of plausibility, possible 
truth, or worse, a slippery kind of half-truth without any means to make the leap to final 
or definitive statement on truth and falsity. To some extent this objection is well-
founded. Gentile is unwilling to assume that any hitherto reliable truth claim comes 
with a cast-iron guarantee. But this does not mean that he is uninterested in or less than 
                                                          
78 Diritto [49] 
79 In one short passage in Logica 2, Gentile appears to overstep the margins of pure coherence 
theory. He is writing about death, but for our purposes, it is worth noting what he says about 
dreams: 
[D]eath is frightening because it does not exist, just as nature, the past, and dreams do not 
exist. There is the man that dreams, but not the things he dreams about. And so death is 
the negation of thought, but cannot actuate itself [as] the negation that thought makes of 
itself. As we have seen, in fact, thought cannot be conceived except as immortal, for [it 
is] infinite. [177] 
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serious about truth. He shows a deep commitment to the idea. His argument, in 
essence, is that we cannot assume that the present offers an accurate indication of what 
will be or what has always been. He recognises our epistemological limits, and is 
unwilling to disguise these using concepts that he cannot hope to know or understand. 
For those who insist on a concept of transcendent truth, he writes, 
[t]he unknown is a great ocean, which all the sciences – mathematical or 
positive, moral or natural as they may be – are desperately navigating. The 
short-sighted thinker contents himself with the feeble light that science shines 
on as much of phenomenal reality as is presented to him, investing his faith in 
the power of knowledge and reason: but just as he tries to push his sights a little 
bit farther, a little bit higher, suspicions about the invincible unknown weaken 
his pride and his certainty, forcing him to be more modest; disheartened at 
thought’s impotence in penetrating the world, and making him fall suddenly to 
his knees.80 
Gentile believes that actual idealism allows him to do away with this gloomy 
picture of man ‘desperately navigating’ the ‘great ocean’ of the unknown. His way 
around it is to say that reality is no bigger than we think it is. We know reality inasmuch 
as we know ourselves, the minds that think it. Truth is a construction of thought; it is 
meaningless without the will. Certain principles of knowledge are necessary to unified 
thought; non-contradiction and necessity are two of these. We cannot think that two 
incompatible propositions are simultaneously true (although we might concede that 
both could be true, were it not for the present truth-value of the other). Nor can we 
suspend judgement altogether, and go without any beliefs. As his implicit re-working of 
the cogito shows, to think that nothing is true entails a contradiction that cannot be 
                                                          
80 Logica 2 [179]  
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sustained. So S is compelled to try to construct the most coherent picture of the world 
that she can.  
Gentile presents a theory in which truths may be altered or replaced, but which 
remain constantly true in the present tense for the reflective individual who believes in 
them. Gentile’s individual knows that she may be mistaken about any or all of her 
currently-held beliefs, but holds them nonetheless. She tests them, where possible, and 
changes them where she sees that it is appropriate to do so. Her belief is no less 
authentic for this caveat. She does not slide into blanket scepticism, or worse, nihilism. 
Hers are not beliefs ‘for the time being,’ held only provisionally until the true facts 
somehow emerge. The same applies to her moral beliefs: she knows that if she had been 
someone else, if she had lived in another time or place, her moral beliefs and 
commitments would, in all likelihood, be different. She also knows that she may change 
her moral convictions at some point in the future, in light of new ideas and 
circumstances. They are nevertheless authentic beliefs and commitments. The whole 
idea of a temporary truth makes sense only in retrospect, and for that reason only as an 
abstraction. While a proposition is seriously believed – which for Gentile requires its 
coherence with other beliefs – it is concretely true. We have only the ever-changing 
present in and on which to cast judgement. 
I have found it useful to understand Gentile’s theory of truth by means of what 
I call the Jigsaw Analogy. Suppose you are presented with a large bag of assorted jigsaw 
puzzle pieces [propositions], and you decide to fit them together as best you can. 
However, you do not have anything to which you can match the developing picture [no 
authentic reality]. It may be that some pieces come from different and totally 
incompatible sets [false or incoherent claims]. You simply try to make the most 
coherent picture you can with what you have. After you have provisionally matched a 
few pieces, it becomes easier to make sense of the picture as a whole, and to assess the 
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likely compatibility of a given new piece. It may be possible to fit pieces together in 
what appears to be a coherent way, but which prevents you from adding other 
connected groups of pieces. Thus you can build islands of pieces that have no obvious 
relation to each other. (Your beliefs about what ingredients are used in moussaka are 
largely independent of your beliefs about how the subjunctive mood is used in 
Portuguese). It is in your interest to try to build as large and coherent a picture as you 
can [comprehensiveness]. This is a reason to continue building your jigsaw rather than 
simply collecting individual pieces: a piece in isolation cannot really show you anything 
or enable you to make sense of other pieces.81 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen how, on Gentile’s account, the subject’s thinking is, 
for that subject, the sum of what there is. There are no substantive truths waiting to be 
found. Rather, truths are created and wholly constituted by the act of thinking. 
Coherence offers the test of their veracity; but, since propositions are inseparable from 
the subject’s act of positing them, the conditions of truthfulness are coherence plus belief. 
The limits of construction are to be understood as those of the coherently thinkable. 
Coherence is inherent to the structure of thought, and although noticing that thought has 
a structure might cause us to identify it as a defined and limited object, this impression 
is mistaken. Anything that occurs beyond the bounds of the thinkable – a necessarily 
unknown and unknowable realm, which we can describe only abstractly – is unavailable 
to us as a possible object of thought. 
  
                                                          
81 Note that this analogy is pure Wakefield and only loosely related to Gentile. 
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1.2 The priority of the socius 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 1.1 described the actual idealist conception of the subject and the 
theories of truth and knowledge that extend from it. Gentile argues that any tenable 
doctrine must take proper account of pensiero pensante’s continuous synthesis of subject 
and object, which is made intelligible through reference to abstract pensieri pensati. 
Doctrines such as realism and mysticism, which presuppose the existence of 
transcendent, purely objective domains, are dismissed as speculative and unsound. 
Extreme scepticism is rejected on the grounds that it is internally contradictory, since 
the claim that knowledge is impossible is itself a claim about truth and knowledge. 
This chapter situates the Gentilean subject in moral theory, promoting a theory 
of mind or subjectivity to a full-fledged theory of the person by accounting for the role other 
people play in the constitution of a given subject’s identity and values. To achieve this I 
first discuss and reject the argument that actual idealism’s strictly subjective basis makes 
it impossible for anyone to be bound by moral responsibilities (sub-heading #1). Next I 
explain how Gentile introduces the idea of a ‘transcendental’ or ‘internal society’ to 
make sense of a plurality of subjects despite the irreducible subjectivity of the act of 
thinking (#2). I then lay out his account of the ‘internal dialogue’ by which the thinking 
subject discerns the demands of the ‘universal will’ manifest in her conscience (#3), 
before describing how Gentile politicises his moral theory by having the state act as the 
ultimate arbiter of moral claims (#4). At the end of the chapter (#5) I indicate which 
issues Gentile leaves inadequately explained in his account of the internal dialogue. As 
we shall see in chapter 1.3, these inadequacies are exploited and deepened in the 
extended theory of the total ethical state. 
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1. Actual idealism and the person 
Recall Gentile’s conception of subjectivity as pensiero pensante.1 He argues that 
because the empirical world is known and constructed in the act of thinking, we cannot 
coherently identify an empirical person as the originator and agent of thought. Instead 
thought must direct, correct and condition itself, while its subject – the cogito’s ‘I’ – is 
an abstraction posited in that same act. As the Logical Priority Justification showed, no 
amount of empirically-derived knowledge about how brains work can dislodge Gentile 
from this position. Some critics have thought that this unusual conception of thought 
and truth prevents him from making meaningful claims about morality or offering any 
conception of the person beyond the contingent and ephemeral thoughts in a single 
stream of consciousness.2 One version of this objection holds that Gentile is a solipsist, 
or one who believes that only one mind or subject is real, while the objects thought 
about are not. A related objection holds that, if anything but the subject is real in actual 
idealism, its existence depends on the subject’s beliefs about it, so it cannot yield robust 
moral responsibilities. Gentile counters the first objection, and can, I think, defend 
himself against the second. However, the second calls for further clarifications of what 
actual idealism is intended to model. Both objections, together with replies, are 
rehearsed below. 
 
                                                          
1 Note that I say ‘subjectivity’ and not ‘subject.’ This is because pensiero pensante is strictly subject 
and object in one. Either taken in isolation is an abstraction. 
2 A. Robert Caponigri notes that ‘it has been charged that the humanism of Gentile […] is a 
humanism without the person, which is but a small remove from the paradoxical assertion that it 
is a humanism without man’ [61]. See Caponigri (1963) ‘The Status of the Person in the 
Humanism of Giovanni Gentile,’ in Journal of the History of Philosophy 2:1, pp.61-69. The point 
is reiterated in Caponigri (1977) ‘Person, Society and Art in the Actual Idealism of Giovanni 
Gentile,’ in Simonetta Betti, Franca Rovigatti and Gianni Eugenio Viola (eds.) Enciclopedia 76-77: 
il pensiero di Giovanni Gentile (Volume 1). Florence: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, pp.171-
83 [175-8]. Note that the non-person and solipsist objections are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, George de Santillana (1938) explicitly omits to tackle the ‘grievous question of 
solipsism,’ but concedes that in Gentile’s system, ‘the empirical person […] is brushed aside,’ and 
‘[t]he Concrete Logos [capitalisation sic] inhabits a perplexing world of inconcrete people’ [373]. 
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1i. The Solipsist Objection 
The Solipsist Objection holds that by placing S at the centre of a phenomenological 
universe of her own creation, Gentile reveals himself to be a solipsist, or so much like 
one as to replicate the problems that such a doctrine entails for moral philosophy.3 
Solipsism’s central claim is that only S is real.4 Other objects, including other persons, 
are considered unreal or else permanently in doubt. Their existence depends upon S, 
who cannot know any mind other than her own. Propositions about other persons as 
subjects are therefore nonsensical, and these others cannot be the originators of moral 
claims upon S. Reasons for thought and action count only if S recognises and believes 
them to do so. If she believes she has as-yet unrecognised reasons to pursue any 
particular course of action, she is deluding herself, for those reasons do not obtain in 
her universe. They and their purported originators are unreal phantoms trespassing on 
her unique reality. 
There is an obvious superficial resemblance between the solipsism just 
described and the actual idealism described previously. Gentile was aware of this, as well 
as the serious problems the equation of actual idealism and solipsism would have for 
the former’s potential as a moral theory. Even in the early essay ‘L’atto del pensare 
                                                          
3 Such views were particularly popular among readers of Gentile before and shortly after the war. 
Some examples: Roger Holmes explicitly affirms that Gentile is a solipsist [112]. Isacco Sciaky 
does not endorse this view but claims that one of the most ‘common’ and ‘easy’ criticisms of actual 
idealism was that ‘it would make it impossible to understand the multiplicity of […] individuals.’ 
[332] W.G. de Burgh thinks that Gentile fails to explain ‘who, in [the] concrete act of thinking, 
can truly be said to think[.]’ Gentile’s answer leaves ‘the living thinker […] circling restlessly, like 
a squirrel in a cage, between two abstractions [viz. subject and object]’ [22]. While this falls short 
of an explicit accusation of solipsism, it captures something of the strangeness of actual idealism’s 
conception of ‘the living thinker.’ See Holmes (1937b); Sciaky (1956) ‘L’io e i molti io e il 
significato dello spirito come atto,’ in Giornale critico della filosofia italiana 3, pp.332-54; De 
Burgh (1929) ‘Gentile’s Philosophy of Spirit,’ in Journal of Philosophical Studies 4:13, pp.3-22.  
4 There are different kinds of solipsism, and not all of these are described in the broadly idealist 
terms used here. For the description given here I retain the distinction between thought and 
experience even though this is not included in actual idealism. Also bear in mind that even 
Holmes, who most explicitly describes actual idealism as a solipsist doctrine, stops short of 
claiming that Gentile thinks other people, objects etc and just ‘figments of the imagination.’ (See 
sub-section 2 of the present chapter) 
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come atto puro,’ he distinguishes his own view from any solipsism for which ‘the world 
[is] closed inside the self.’5 Later, recognising the durability of the Solipsist Objection, he 
offers a lengthier explanation. Actual idealism is not solipsism because 
the solipsist’s ego is a particular and negative ego, which as such can feel its own 
solitude and the impossibility of escaping it. So the solipsist is [an] egoist [who] 
renounces goodness just as [she] renounces truth. But [her] ego is negative 
because it is identical to itself; and that makes it a thing, not spirit. Its negativity 
is the negativity of the atom, which is always [and only] that, incapable of 
changing. It can absolutely exclude other atoms from itself, and is itself 
excluded in turn from them, precisely because it lacks the power to negate and 
change itself.6 
Gentile believes that the solipsist’s subject is the solitary real thing amid a 
multiplicity of unreal things, without any meaningful relation to them or the power to 
alter them. He contrasts this with the subject in actual idealism, who constantly changes, 
creating her world through the position and subsequent affirmation or rejection of 
claims. (Where she rejects a claim that she formerly affirmed, she ‘negates’ herself.) 
Actual idealism’s concrete subject, S, is identified with the ‘infinite and progressive 
universalisation of the ego,’ meaning that she contains the whole of her reality within 
herself, but, as a progressive act that affects and forms7 the world, she is not limited to 
any single state of being. Neither is the world that she constructs. As her knowledge and 
understanding of it are increased in the endless process of correction and revision, she 
strives to attain universal knowledge, or that which is justified so any other rational 
                                                          
5 ‘Pensare,’ in Hegeliana [190]. Some of these ideas are further echoed in Atto puro [253]; Carr 
translation [264] 
6 ‘Concetti fondamentale dell’attualismo,’ in Introduzione [35-6] 
7 It is tempting to say that S interprets the world, but this would expose me to the objection that 
for something to be interpreted, its existence (and availability for interpretation) must be 
presupposed. 
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thinker, faced with the same considerations, would reach the same conclusions.8 She is 
not ‘imprisoned in a world of illusions,’9 but instead constructs and is part of the only 
genuine reality there is. 
This does not quite disarm the accusation of solipsism. Gentile has 
distinguished his position from that of the extreme solipsist, who may never have 
existed except as a caricature, as Socrates acknowledges of Protagoras in Theaetetus.10 But 
actual idealism’s account of the relation between thinker (or thinking) and the world 
thought about is a strange one, and as a descriptive term, ‘solipsism’ may be the best we 
can hope to attach to it. This is Roger Holmes’ view. He distinguishes Gentile’s position 
from Protagoras’ ‘crude and early’ solipsism,11 but maintains that other terms 
volunteered as descriptions of Gentile’s position, such as ‘mentalism’ and ‘subjective 
idealism,’ are inappropriate because 
Gentile's idealism is actual, not subjective: and, contrary to mentalism, it denies 
the existence of other minds. There is no single word which describes his 
position exactly. Although in its very derivation it refers to the self, which 
Gentile finds unreal, “solipsism” has been selected for use in this wider meaning 
because among recent thinkers it has become more than either of the other two 
symbolic of those very obvious difficulties which actual idealism must face. If 
solipsism is untenable because it denies existence to everything but the self, 
actual idealism is even more so […] because it denies existence even to the self. 
                                                          
8 I am deliberately echoing Gentile characterisation of universality as ‘the exclusion of the 
possibility that other subjects, or the same subject under different circumstances, would think 
differently.’ This was cited in chapter 1.1, sub-section #4. 
9 Harris (1960) [17] 
10 See Plato’s Theaetetus [171c-e]. Harris (1960), too, asserts that ‘no-one is actually a solipsist.’ 
[30n] 
11 Holmes (1937b) [111] 
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[…T]o go beyond the self to the act of thinking as the only existent is to carry 
the solipsistic trend to its extreme. In this sense Gentile is a solipsist.12 
Holmes’ designation is better understandable in this light. Nonetheless, I do not 
accept it. This is not just a matter of words. To construe Gentile as a solipsist is to 
situate him among philosophers radically different from him. Actual idealism resembles 
solipsism in its basic assumption that it makes no sense to say that any specific claim is 
true unless one knows it, and knowledge is inconceivable without a knower. But 
solipsism’s other major tenet – that nothing except S is real – is reflected in Gentile’s 
theory only because the two have markedly different conceptions of what S is and how 
far her identity extends. Gentile affirms that one cannot say anything about what is true 
or real without thinking about it, positing the idea of an object (or rather: the object as 
idea) and attaching to it the label of truth or untruth, reality or unreality. This is very 
different from the solipsist’s view of S as a mind or person without an epistemological 
handle on the world, and as such suffocated under blanket scepticism. 
 
1ii. The Conditionality Objection 
‘If a moral reality exists,’ writes Gentile, ‘it exists inasmuch as man makes it 
exist. Its moral character consists in precisely its existence as [the] product of the human 
spirit.’13 It might be thought that his insistence on the ‘absolute subjectivity’ of thinking 
means that nothing can be true unless S thinks it is true, which in turn means that there 
can be no binding moral claims on S – indeed, no morality at all – unless S currently 
believes herself to be so bound.14 If this were true, moral theory could never get started, 
                                                          
12 Holmes (1937b) [113n] 
13 Diritto [7] 
14 The phrase ‘absolute subjectivity’ appears in Atto puro: ‘Throughout the ages a profound and 
invincible need has made the human mind hold back from affirming the unmultipliable and 
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for morality’s contents and structure would depend upon S’s unaccountable beliefs, or 
lack of beliefs, about them. Call this the  
Conditionality Objection. Moral claims apply to S if and only if S presently thinks 
they apply. She cannot act rightly or wrongly unless she expressly thinks she is 
doing so (she cannot be mistaken in this belief). The claim that S ought to 
perform certain actions cannot be sustained, since any such moral claim’s 
authority is conditional upon an unaccountable belief that S may or may not 
hold.15  
On this account, claims about morality would be like claims about deliciousness: 
true for S only if S thinks they are true, but neither necessarily true for nor falsifiable by 
other persons (assuming they exist at all) who may think differently. Actual idealist 
moral theory would be reducible to a description of S’s current beliefs, rather than 
about standards consistently applicable to actions of people in general or to S at other 
times. This could yield a very thin conception of morality, according to which S acts 
morally when she believes she is acting morally, but not one in which S could be 
mistaken about this belief. She would act wrongly only when she behaves in a self-
consciously hypocritical way, doing what she thinks she ought not to do. ‘Morality’ 
would be an empty category, open to be filled with any content whatsoever.16 
                                                                                                                                                                    
infinite unity of the spirit in its absolute subjectivity. The spirit can neither detach anything from 
itself nor go outside itself’ [33]; Carr translation [30] 
15 I take it that it is for these reasons that Richard Bellamy notes ‘[i]t is hard to see what political 
consequences are likely to follow from this theory [of spirit as pure act] beyond the anarchism of 
bellum omnium contra omnes’ (the war of all against all). See Bellamy (1987) Modern Italian 
Social Theory: Ideology and Politics from Pareto to the Present. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press [104]. Here it is worth noting that Gentile explicitly rejects the idea of the bellum omnium 
in both Genesi and the earlier Diritto. He connects the bellum omnium to the atomistic 
Hobbesian conception of the person that he means to deny. See Diritto [71-2] and Genesi  [123-
4]; Harris translation [281] 
16 I trust that the meaning of this sentence is clear. To elaborate: according to the Conditionality 
Objection, S’s belief that an action of type X is morally good means only that X-type actions are 
good for S. By the same logic, if S believes that actions of type Y are supercalifragilistic, then 
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Actual idealism is less vulnerable to this objection than it may first appear. As 
we have seen, S exists in the continuous present, but she can reflect on the past and 
anticipate or otherwise imagine the future. She conceives of herself as a person whose 
identity persists over time, and for whom the future could take any of several different 
courses. She has at her disposal an array of abstractions, and although memories and 
imaginary constructs are not concretely real in the truth-determining sense, they enable S 
to make sense of concrete reality, giving her what earlier I called a ‘steady lens’ through 
which to view the ever-changing present. Such abstraction also enables S to conceive of 
herself as one person among others, and of other persons as thinking subjects, even 
though her own necessarily subjective standpoint prevents her from thinking (being 
subject to) their thoughts. She can imagine what other people would think about 
judgements she is making, and thus construct abstract standards for her own thinking. 
This idea substantially reduces the force of the Conditionality Objection, for while 
actual idealism requires S’s morality to be her own construction, she has the resources 
to review her beliefs and the reasons for them while the construction is in progress. 
This provides critical space between her present, contingent thoughts and the 
abstractions she uses to evaluate and refine them. She can show herself to be wrong 
about her beliefs, and engage with moral theory as she works out what the relevant 
standards should be. 
 
1iii. Persons and personalism 
Actual idealism’s view of the person is deceptively ordinary. It does us no good 
to take the day-to-day business of thinking about and interpreting the world, only to re-
describe it in such a way that it is disguised or misrepresented, however valid, elegant 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(tautologously) Y-type actions are supercalifragilistic for S. The quality of being morally good 
means only that it is believed to be so; the phrase ‘morally good’ means nothing in itself. 
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and ambitious-sounding the resultant theory might be. If Gentile were not describing a 
kind of thinking that we could recognise as our own, the detailed content of the theory 
would be arbitrary to the point of uselessness. Yet the basis of the theory is 
undoubtedly sound: each of us really does experience a single life in the continuous 
present, feeling ourselves to direct our thoughts; and it is only through this act that we 
can make sense of the world inside or outside our present experiences, interpreting 
sense data, emotions, truth and falsity using a catalogue of words.17 
This view is supported by A. Robert Caponigri, writing in the 1960s and ‘70s, 
and Antonio G. Pesce, writing today. They describe actual idealism as a kind of 
‘personalism,’ emphasising that its conception of the person includes but is not identical 
to the (abstract) subject of experience. Rather, as concrete subject, it incorporates the 
immanent dialectic by which thought reflects upon and adjusts itself. S recognises both 
what she actually, actively thinks and what she could but does not think, as well as the 
reasons for affirming the former but not the latter.18 Her self-conception as one person 
among others is needed for this dialectic to take place.19 The question of how Gentile 
                                                          
17 Language is perhaps the best illustration of the fact that persons need to assume that they share 
a world with others if any of their claims are to make sense. Gentile notes in Sommario 1 that ‘if 
men needed to make themselves agree to understand ‘red’ by the word ‘red,’ they would then 
need to make themselves agree to see it as red! And it is no more embarrassing – [for] whoever 
sets himself to thinking of the multitude of [tante] human souls as mutually impenetrable worlds, 
[or] independent unities without windows, as [… Leibniz] said – to take account of the way in 
which men attain certainty of seeing […] with different eyes, each taking its own account [of 
what it sees], we posit the same red for the same stuff; or when God thunders in the sky, do we 
not all hear the same noise?’ [59-60] 
18 Caponigri (1963) writes that Gentile’s ‘manifest humanism deserves the […] designation 
“personalism” in a sense far more intimate and profound than usually accompanies the 
attribution’ [69; see also 64-6]. Pesce even has ‘il personalismo di Giovanni Gentile’ (Giovanni 
Gentile’s personalism) serve as his book’s subtitle. He notes that actual idealism relies on a fluid 
conception of the person that responds to others and so changes itself [15-16]. Here Pesce is 
referring to the dialogo interno, which we will encounter later in this chapter. See Pesce (2012) 
L’interiorità intersoggettiva dell’attualismo: il personalismo di Giovanni Gentile. Rome: Aracne. 
19 More accurately still, S recognises that what she now thinks is just one of several things that she 
could think. 
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can make sense of a concrete, socially-embedded subject without overstepping the 
margins of actual idealism is addressed over the remainder of this chapter.20 
 
2. Socialising the pure act 
We have seen how Gentile can make sense of a plurality of points of view 
despite the ‘absolute subjectivity’ of thinking.21 On the evidence we have seen so far, his 
solution to this problem treats other people as mere abstractions, no different from 
persons S imagines for her own amusement. Since S can imagine a potentially limitless 
variety of different people, and any claim S imagines being made of her could be 
countered with an opposing claim, how (if at all) can these abstract persons impose 
moral claims upon her?22 To answer this question, we will need to show that S is not 
only capable of conceiving of other people, but also capable of using their ‘otherness’ to 
determine her own substantive moral responsibilities. 
Given that Gentile had to work hard to counter the accusation that he was a 
solipsist, it is remarkable that he readily refers to ‘the absolutely social nature of the 
                                                          
20 For a useful comparison, consider David Hume’s ‘bundle theory’ of the self, in which what is 
commonly called ‘the subject’ is really just a composite or ‘bundle’ of thoughts, experiences, 
memories, and so on, constituting a single entity in the same way that many countries collectively 
constitute a ‘commonwealth.’ The mistake, thinks Hume, is to imagine that there is a subject that 
must be added to this collection in order to make a person. On the contrary, the subject is the 
bundle. Actual idealism’s subject is not far removed from that. The difference is that Gentile 
supplies a more demanding and fluid account of S as ‘the act of thinking that thinks itself,’ and 
thus tries to have it incorporate a wider range of experience than Hume, as an empiricist, can 
address. As has been noted, what are commonly called ‘the thinker’ and ‘thought’ are, viewed in 
isolation, abstractions. This does not mean, as Holmes seems to think it means, that the person is 
erased altogether. Instead her existence is acknowledged in something like its proper complexity. 
See David Hume w/ L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) (1978) A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press [259-61] 
21 The phrase ‘absolute subjectivity’ appears in Atto puro: ‘Throughout the ages a profound and 
invincible need has made the human mind hold back from affirming the unmultipliable and 
infinite unity of the spirit in its absolute subjectivity. The spirit can neither detach anything from 
itself nor go outside itself’ [33]; Carr translation [30] 
22 These issues are raised in Genesi [20-21]; Harris translation [86-87] 
1.2 The priority of the socius 
79 
human spirit’ and man’s ‘primordial sociality.’23 Even in explicitly metaphysical works 
like Atto puro and the Logica he alludes to the multiplicity of things, including other 
individual spirits:24 
The language that we speak, the institutions that govern our civil life, the city in 
which we live, the artistic monuments that we admire, the books and records of 
our civilisation, and the religious and moral traditions by which, even without 
any special historical interest, we feed our culture[; through these] we are 
connected by a thousand chains to spirits not belonging to our own time, but 
who present themselves to us,25 and [are] intelligible only as free and spiritual 
reality.26 
This spiritual metaphor reveals a conception of the person far removed from 
solipsism. Gentile’s account is compatible with the idea that, empirically speaking, 
persons live individual lives, and have correspondingly individual identities, experiences, 
thoughts and so forth. But they are embedded in society, shaped by their surroundings, 
and live within a complex of institutions, values and conventions. At no point is S (or 
anybody) purely and simply an individual, possessing an identity but no social or socially-
imposed baggage. This is part of her identity from the beginning. For the duration of 
her life she is a part-constituent of a social group or groups27 that may have existed 
                                                          
23 Diritto [74] and Genesi [123]; Harris translation [181] 
24 As numerous critics of Hegelianism and other idealist doctrines have noted, the term ‘spirit’ is 
notoriously hard to define. We might ask whether a plurality of spirits entails a plurality of 
subjects, since (it might be argued) a person without subjective experience could not be described 
as a ‘spirit’ unless each and every object were also described as such. Tempting though it is, I will 
not pursue that issue any farther here. 
25 Literally: ‘whose reality is presented to us’ (‘la cui realtà è presente a noi’) 
26 Atto puro [193]; Carr translation [203] 
27 I include ‘or groups’ for two reasons. One is that S may be a member of many groups (in Diritto, 
Gentile suggests friendship groups, families, schools, states and the Church) at once [74]. The 
other reason is that S may change her allegiance and identity over the course of a single life. For 
example, she may emigrate to another country and identify herself with that, ceasing to identify 
with her former place of residence.  
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before she was born and may persist after she is dead. Society, incorporating all of these 
groups, is prior to its members, but cannot exist in their absence; so inasmuch as society 
determines who S is and how she defines herself, it is part-author of her. It ‘speaks 
through [her] mouth, feels with [her] heart, and thinks with [her] brain.’28 
These remarks explain how Gentile can justify his reference to a plurality of 
‘spirits’ in the passage quoted above. Although S is the only thinker who truly thinks, 
she still identifies herself as a member of society that also contains others. She cannot 
be directly subject to the thoughts and experiences of those other people, but she can 
re-think or re-construct their (presumed) thoughts for herself, even if those others ‘do 
not belong to [her] own time,’ and are not empirically present. Others’ thoughts can be 
communicated to S in a variety of ways, but most obviously in speech or writing. The 
potential to direct present thinking along the lines of past thinking distinguishes written 
language from shapes drawn on a page, speech from noise, and empathy from passive 
observation. S remains the active centre of the process by which she constructs her own 
self-consciously social identity. Other people exist only insofar as S thinks they exist, 
but since S thinks in a social context and as an irreducibly social animal, the issue of 
their non-existence does not arise. Gentile compares the issue of the ‘primitive savage’ 
to whom the idea of other people never occurs with that of a sleeper who is unaware 
that she exists. Even to raise the question of whether she truly existed while she was asleep, 
she must be conscious (and self-conscious); likewise, now the socialised thinker 
conceives of herself as a person among persons, the possibility of her not being so is 
only abstractly conceivable.29 
                                                          
28 Genesi [15]; Harris translation [82]. Note that Gentile here refers to ‘the community,’ but I take 
it that the same claims can be made of society without altering his meaning. 
29 Genesi [42-4]. The claim that no-one thinks there are no other people might be thought 
unconvincing, since it does nothing to explain why someone who did hold such a belief, even if 
no-one actually does so, would have reason to change it. Harris and Holmes both offer some help. 
Harris (1960) [24] writes that ‘although the philosophy of the pure act may be a system of 
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2i. The internal society and the conscience 
Actual idealist moral theory hinges on the distinction between the particular will 
of the individual and the universal will to which that is subsidiary. As we saw in chapter 
1.1,30 Gentile believes that the will cannot be separated from the action to which it 
corresponds. To will an end is to imagine it, identify it as valuable, and set about 
realising it. As such the will is more complex than desire or inclination, which has no 
need of any rational basis. S can simultaneously desire two or more mutually 
incompatible ends, but she cannot will them in Gentile’s sense, since that would entail 
their realisation, which is impossible. Nor is willing a case of desiring only mutually 
compatible ends; S could be making her decision on the basis of misinformation, faulty 
inferences, or caprice. For her (potentially flawed) will to generate moral claims, it must 
be ‘resolved into the universal [will]’ manifest in her ‘moral conscience.’31 This is 
achieved dialectically by reference to the ‘society inside the person’ (la società in interiore 
homine). Even the fictional castaway Robinson Crusoe, alone on his island, is a member 
of this internal society. He conceives of himself as Robinson Crusoe, an English sailor, 
interpreting and understanding the world by means of a language and a set of beliefs 
                                                                                                                                                                    
necessary and universal knowledge, its very necessity and universality will render it valueless 
unless it helps us to deal with the personal problems of our lives as individuals.’ Holmes (1937b) 
[11-12] similarly insists that ‘Gentile does not mean that there are no objects in our rooms or 
rooms in our houses, nor that there are not men and women in the world, nor that there are no 
natural laws. He does not mean that these things are figments of the imagination. He argues only 
that the demands of logic limit the conclusions that may be reached in our thinking about these 
entities and laws, that they may be studied in and for themselves but that such a study will not 
lead to an understanding of reality. And the understanding of the real is the problem of 
philosophy.’  
30 Chapter 1.1, sub-section 4i 
31 A note on language: the Italian word for ‘conscience’ is coscienza, which is difficult to translate 
into English. It is distinct from conoscenza (knowledge) but covers the same ground as 
‘awareness’ and ‘consciousness,’ which have no specifically moral connotations. This is worth 
bearing in mind wherever I point out a reference to ‘conscience’ in Gentile’s writings. Sometimes 
either word can be used as it is unclear which English word best captures his meaning.  
Part 1: Components of actual idealism 
82 
and values presented to him by society.32 These are not separable from him; no 
complete description of him could omit them. As a thinking subject, he does not 
consist of an essential identity and a number of optional social embellishments, but 
instead as a composite of elements that, while individually available for revision or 
jettison, cannot be viewed from a solid, permanent or fully objective standpoint.33 He 
reflects on his choices and measures the value of his actions against the standards other 
people once imposed upon him, and continue to impose even when they are empirically 
absent.34 
When he first introduces the idea of the internal society in Diritto, Gentile omits 
to explain how S can use it to unlock the content of the universal will. It might be 
thought that Gentile is suggesting, by means of a metaphor, that individuals’ 
consciences are socially constructed, and morality is whatever S’s conscience tells her it 
is. S internalises the values held by the people around her, and her conscience comes to 
berate and chastise S when her actions fail to meet those socially- and self-imposed 
standards. The will would be ‘universal’ inasmuch as (S thinks) it is sanctioned by S’s 
                                                          
32 Daniel Defoe (1987) Robinson Crusoe. Leicester: Galley [80-1] for some of Crusoe’s frequent 
appeals to God and the ideas of Good and Evil (capitalisation sic). Also relevant is Crusoe’s 
attempt to educate the ‘poor savage’ Man Friday on [243-61], and especially with reference to 
moral matters and God [251 and 257] 
33 There is an obvious resemblance between this idea and Otto Neurath’s famous remarks about 
‘sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to dismantle it in 
dry-dock and reconstructed from its best components.’ See his (1983) ‘Protocol Statements,’ in 
R.S. Cohen and M. Neurath (eds.) Philosophical Papers 1913-1946, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp.91-99. 
This essay first published 1932 [92]. Another analogy may be drawn with the debate over 
Wittgenstein idea of private languages. Plainly Gentile does not believe that subjects think in 
‘mentalese’ and translate these thoughts into a ‘public language’ when they want to express them. 
While interesting, this debate extends beyond the margins of this thesis, so I do not pursue it here 
beyond this brief comment. 
34 This example, together with a description of the relation between individual and universal will, 
appears in Diritto [70-5]. The idea of the internal society is echoed in a telling passage in 
Educazione, where Gentile claims that so long as Italian expatriates living in the United States 
remain ‘tied by the natural bond of common origin, [...and] we continue to speak to each other in 
our old language’ – note that Gentile here uses the first-person collective pronoun, noi, although 
he was not an expatriate himself – ‘always feeling ourselves [to constitute] a special community, 
with common interests and peculiar moral affinities, Italy has crossed the ocean with us, and we 
have preserved our nationality, although divided and far distant from our ancient peninsula.’ 
Educazione [14]; Bigongiari translation [10]. 
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society. This would make Gentile’s moral theory a kind of intuitionism undergirded by a 
social constructivist account of how individuals come to hold substantive intuitive 
beliefs about morality. The right thing for S to do would be whatever her conscience 
demands, or whatever she feels is right. These demands would always be immediately or 
intuitively plain to her, and the conscience would have unimpeachable authority.  
This would be a crude moral theory. It would assume that S already knows what 
the conscience and, by extension, morality require of her. Thus it would neglect the 
most obvious problem motivating moral theory: we (or S) do not always know what 
morality requires; the conscience can respond inconsistently or ambiguously (and 
sometimes not at all) to the actions we perform or propose to perform. This theory 
would also fail to explain how morality is created or constructed. There would be no 
dialectical process, for the universal’s will’s content would come to S fully formed from 
an external source (the society of other empirical persons) without her thought 
mediating it in any way. Instead the conscience would be the voice of S’s ‘internal’ 
society only inasmuch as S notices it. The claims that it has authority over S, or that it 
provides decisive and morally binding reasons for S to conform to it, would be 
presuppositions without rational justification. This combination of social constructivism 
and unmediated intuitionism casts the internal society as a reflection of an external 
society constituted by many empirical persons, and the universal will as an aggregate of 
their individual wills. These other persons’ wills differ from both the universal will and 
each other. There is no guarantee, then, that these will inform any unified or coherent 
set of standards for S, who may even be ignorant of what other people (would) think 
about the choice she faces. If Gentilean moral theory identifies morality with the 
universal will of the internal society, it must provide some way for S to untangle the 
sometimes contradictory expectations that society, broadly conceived, might have of 
her. 
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2ii. The internal dialogue 
Diritto contains no detailed description of the procedure by which S determines 
the universal will’s content and to what extent her personal, particular will corresponds 
to that. However, the book does include important stipulations about how S’s social 
nature is developed. The fact of socialisation means that a great many ideas are more-
or-less directly imported into S’s thinking. These include values, concepts of right and 
wrong, and some associations35 with which she comes to identify herself. These 
contribute to her identity and will. The socialised conscience is formed as S battles two 
‘enemies’: the ‘external enemy,’ namely ‘the evil about which we warn others,’ which is 
generally countered through education; and the ‘internal enemy,’ which is ‘the egoistic 
and irrational inclination that each vigilant conscience finds from time to time […] at its 
lowest ebb.’36 The egoistic inclination (selfishness) is irrational because it ignores the 
fact that S is a product of her society, so presenting an abstraction in the guise of the 
concrete subject. In inviting S to overcome the ‘internal enemy,’ or ego, Gentile is arguing 
for neither perfect altruism nor conformity, but instead for her to give due regard to her 
irreducibly social identity when considering what she wants and wills. By reflecting on 
how other people would view her actions, S overcomes her ego and begins to act 
according to a self-consciously moral and universal will. That other people are socialised 
to hold the same values and ideas about what is not desirable (the external enemy) helps 
her to understand what other people think. S’s recognition of others as fellow holders 
of a shared identity, Gentile claims, constitutes a bond of empathy and even love.37 
                                                          
35 Only ‘some’ because persons can, of course, enter associations voluntarily. This is less true of 
others, like families or nations.  
36 Diritto [68]. Note that in the passage cited, Gentile refers to the ways in which we ensure that 
la volontà buona – the good will – ‘prevails’ over its internal and external enemies. 
37 Sommario 2 [42-4]; Genesi [45-6]; Harris translation [110-11] 
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A more elaborate explanation is offered in Gentile’s last book, Genesi, where he 
describes the ‘internal dialogue’ taking place in the ‘transcendental society’38  comprising 
the ego, or the narrowly personal part of S’s identity, as she considers her particular 
interests and circumstances; and the ‘socius,’ or the part voiced by other people as a 
whole,39 which presents itself to S as an ‘alter-ego [which] joins [her] in a dialogue, 
speaking and listening as [her] partner in life’s drama.’ This ‘dialogue’ between these two 
abstract parts of S’s ‘absolutely social’ identity enables her to identify the demands of 
her conscience, or the universal will, and distinguish these from the contrary demands 
of her internal and external enemies.40 In more ordinary language, the dialogue 
represents the process of moral reasoning. The socius is cast as an 
interlocutor and actor in this drama of the transcendental society, wherein man 
is, absolutely speaking, a political animal [… The] ego reflects on itself and is 
placed in a synthetic unity of the self and the other, as opposites that are 
therefore identical[.]41 
This ‘synthetic unity’ entails the construction of the conscience. If this dialogue 
is to be any kind of conversation, it must allow meaningful interaction and change on 
each side. The socius (hereafter A, for ‘alter-ego’) cannot be directly identified with the 
                                                          
38 Note that ‘transcendental society’ is interchangeable with ‘internal society.’ 
39 In the chapter of Genesi immediately after the discussion of la società trascendentale, Gentile 
refers to our need for the ‘otherness’ (alterità) of other people, even if we ‘reduce [their] external 
otherness to the otherness that is within us,’ in order for the ‘interior dialectic of our existence’ – 
that is, of thinking – to take place, ‘closed in the circle of the active synthesis of our restless 
spirituality’ [46]; Harris translation [111]  
40 Note that Gentile does not explicitly refer to the internal and external enemies in Genesi. 
41 Genesi [38]. Note the similarity between this reference to man as an ‘absolutely […] political 
animal’ and those to ‘the absolutely social nature of man,’ written in Diritto more than two 
decades before. H.S. Harris translates less literally but perhaps more clearly when he writes, ‘The 
drama in which this interlocutor takes part is the transcendental society, which is what makes 
man a “political animal” in an absolute sense, from the moment when he is reflectively aware of 
himself and becomes a real individual, a synthetic unity of self and other as opposites which are 
therefore identical; or even from the moment when he is an individual implicitly, when he has 
still only a feeling of self.’ See Gentile w/ Harris (trans.) (1960) [103] 
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agent of the universal will, for that will is the outcome of the dialogue, not a contributor 
to it. If S always knew what the universal will (and morality) required, there would be no 
need for any dialogue. S must reflect upon, respond to, converse with A in order to know 
the universal will’s content, and in the process re-align her own will to match it. The 
reason S must re-align her will with the result of the dialogue is that this represents the 
will of the ‘universal subject’ or ‘universal man’ to which S continually aspires, all the 
while conceiving of herself as subject to incomplete knowledge, sometimes erroneous 
thinking, and wrong choices. She does so because ‘the universal man is always right’: the 
conclusion to which S’s best thinking leads is the right conclusion by virtue of its 
derivation.42 
 
3. Constructing the universal will 
The internal dialogue models S’s method of determining which single course of 
action is the right one for her to perform. The very necessity of the dialogue suggests 
that S lacks direct access to the answer to this question. The socius, or A, cannot 
represent the universal subject tout court, but somehow enables S to discern the universal 
will’s content. It is striking that Gentile places this dialogue between S and her ‘moral 
conscience,’ for this implies, unusually, that S cannot directly perceive her own conscience, or at 
least what she can directly perceive – call this her ‘particular conscience’ – does not 
                                                          
42 The idea of the ‘universal subject’ (my emphasis) is discussed in Atto puro [90-3]; Carr 
translation [92-95]; Diritto [73-5]; and Religione [89]. The quoted sentence about the ‘universal 
man’ appears in Genesi [55] where Gentile refers to the need for moral judgements to be ‘actual,’ 
in that they are, in the language I have been using, actively and consciously constructed by S in 
the continuous present. Note that I have altered Gentile’s punctuation. He actually places 
‘universal’ in parentheses: ‘L’uomo (universale) ha sempre ragione.’ Harris translates this as ‘The 
universal spirit of man is always right’ [119], but the addition of the word ‘spirit’ in this case gives 
the sentence the feel of a sweeping rhetorical declaration that it does not, or need not, possess in 
Italian. A final important point is that this phrase obviously echoes the Fascist slogan ‘il Duce is 
always right’ (il Duce ha sempre ragione). It might be thought that this implies that Gentile 
identifies the universal man (or subject) with Mussolini; but, as I shall argue in this chapter and 
the next, I find it more plausible that il Duce is a specially-constructed ideal to which political 
leaders ought to aspire. 
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represent the universal will. This distinction between the particular conscience and the 
genuine article helps to overcome the problem of the (particular) conscience’s 
unreliability, inconsistency and ambiguity. As S participates in dialogue with A, she 
constructs the universal will, using rational procedures to distinguish it from the 
contingent demands of her particular conscience. 
Earlier I claimed that A represents ‘other people as a whole.’ Even Gentile’s 
early critics found his conception of the social nature of the individual ‘intolerably 
ambiguous,’ so to make sense of this concept and its role in the dialogue, we must 
define it in more detail.43 It is an idealised ‘other’ with whom S identifies herself and to 
whom she refers when she wants to know whether her actions are justified.44 Gentile 
characterises this figure in a variety of ways. He suggests45 that A represents the unified 
voice of the society or community to which S belongs,46 the people that S loves and to 
whom she feels an emotional bond,47 any person with whom S interacts and tries to 
understand,48 God,49 and the state.50 Considered as discrete entities or groups, these 
might conceivably lead S to different conclusions about what she ought to do. The 
state’s expectations of S – defined by the law of the land, say – might be incompatible 
                                                          
43 W.G. de Burgh complains of the ‘intolerably ambiguous’ idea of ‘the I that is We’ that occurs in 
Atto puro. See de Burgh (1929) [11].  
44 Antonio G. Pesce offers an apt description of the socius as ‘[one’s] perpetual companion on the 
path of life, standing in for [cambiano] friends, the people we remember from our early years 
[…], even the people we have freely loved and with whom we have formed stronger 
commitments, but nevertheless company, […] which [provides us with] reason so long as it 
illuminates our spirit.’ See Pesce (2012) L’interiorità intersoggettiva dell’attualismo. Milan: Aracne 
[167]  
45 Note that I say ‘suggests’ because Gentile refers explicitly to the internal or transcendental 
dialogue only in Genesi. Nevertheless, he elsewhere refers to other people and the derivation of 
universality out from the immanent dialectic of the self and other people, and I take it that the 
same underlying thought motivates his claims there. The citations offered below point to only a 
few of the copious relevant passages. 
46 Diritto [70-5]; Genesi [15-16]; Harris translation [80-82] 
47 Sommario [18-19]; Religione [79]; Logica 2 [171]; Genesi [45-6]; Harris translation [110-11] 
48 Atto puro [16-17]; Carr translation [13] 
49 Religione [78-9]; Genesi [18-19]; Harris translation [84-85]. Gentile identifies universality with 
divinity in Sommario 1 [20] 
50 Introduzione [179-82]; Genesi [passim] 
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with the moral code prevalent in her society. It may even be unclear what society as a 
whole requires of S, for its members do not necessarily share a single, coherent system 
of values. Even if it were possible to eliminate value pluralism by means of social 
engineering, the plurality of persons would make it difficult to ascribe a single will to 
society. Individuals have personal interests and relationships to each other, and live 
correspondingly individual lives. Each one, as an empirical person, must live in some 
particular place, know particular people, and otherwise have experiences that at least 
some others will not share. Even where all members of society share a single 
conception of value, these basic differences may lead them to will different ends. 
I suspect that these problems are insurmountable, so it is fortunate that 
Gentile’s moral theory does not require a solution to them. He even denies the possibility 
of a full resolution of the social milieu, broadly conceived to include God, the state, and 
all the rest, into one homogeneous entity. As we have seen, it is precisely the difference 
between S and A that makes the internal dialogue possible. Without that difference, no 
such dialogue could occur. The outcome of and motivation for the dialogue is the 
universal will, or the will of the universal subject. To claim that the will is universal is no 
different from claiming that a factual claim is universally true. S recognises that she does 
not know the whole truth, and may be deceived or confused. She also knows that other 
people hold different beliefs, and that she herself has held different beliefs in the past, 
but they too may be (and, S must assume, in fact are) mistaken. Likewise each person 
has contingent desires, plans and values. If these various actual and hypothetical 
persons are to generate authoritative claims about what S ought to do, they must be 
subsumed to some kind of universal authority. More simply: for S to believe that she 
ought to perform one action and not another, she must believe that some claim about 
what she ought to do is true. By extension, claims that she ought to perform other 
actions are false, even if other people do not believe them to be so. If S’s belief is to be 
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anything but the result of an arbitrary choice between possible accounts of what she 
ought to do, she must find one that is universally true, meaning that it is supported by the 
best thinking she can manage.51 The universal will has the property of universality because 
S imposes it; it does not represent some fact or feature that happens to be shared by all 
the entities referred to in its construction, but instead an ideal synthesis of their 
differences in a single will. We might say that it represents the best discernible answer to 
S’s question, ‘What ought I to do?’  
 
3i. Internality and indeterminacy 
The suggestion that the universal will is constructed by S gives rise to a variant 
of the Conditionality Objection discussed earlier in the chapter. Call this the 
Particularity Objection. If S constructs the moral will, and in doing so acts as the 
arbiter of its universality, that will is not universal but particular. Its alleged 
universality depends upon S’s judgement, so the will’s specifications – its 
prescriptions for S – are contingent on who S refers to in the internal dialogue 
and what method she employs to reduce the plurality of claims to one. Despite 
her aspirations to know universal truths, S is always at least potentially subject to 
false beliefs, irrationality and ignorance or misinterpretation of the relevant 
facts. The moral will cannot be universal unless all thinkers are actually subject 
to it. 
The problem is that the dialogue’s conclusion hinges on S’s contingent beliefs 
about what other people in her society think and how their various claims contribute to 
one will. There is no guarantee that any two persons conducting internal dialogues will 
reach the same conclusion, even if they believe themselves to belong to the same 
                                                          
51 Sommario 1 [20-22] 
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external society. Each can dismiss the other’s conception of the universal will as a 
mistake; and because each is the arbiter of her own conception – each must decide for 
herself when she has reached the right conclusion – neither can decisively show the 
other to be wrong. There is no fact of the matter regarding what society or the state really 
wills. A claim cannot be universal while it is applicable to only one subject, for if it were, 
universality would be indistinguishable from particularity. No member of society can 
make claims that are automatically privileged above those made by others, so unless 
there is genuine unanimity, to call any particular conception of the moral will ‘universal’ 
is illegitimate.  
The following variant of Gentile’s Robinson Crusoe example illustrates his 
position. Call this  
Passé Castaway. In Crusoe’s absence, the accepted moral code in his native 
England has changed so radically that what his conscience tells him no longer 
correlates with the norms prevalent in that (or any) real society. He identifies 
with a community that no longer empirically exists. He is now the only person who 
continues to believe in his conception of right and wrong.  
Set apart from the other members of society, Crusoe cannot use empirical 
means to establish what the universal will requires. He can neither ask other people 
whether they agree with the conception at which he has arrived, nor what reasons they 
have considered in favour of their different conceptions. Crusoe can refer only to the 
internal society. Since in this example it is supposed that his beliefs about what the 
relevant people would say are mistaken, and his internal society does not accurately 
reflect any society of empirical persons, does he act wrongly when he believes he acts 
rightly? Can he legitimately claim to have identified and acted according to the demands 
of the universal will? 
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The actual idealist conception of truth suggests that Crusoe can make legitimate 
moral claims. If the internal society were an exact reflection of an external entity, and its 
power to justify S’s (or Crusoe’s) moral claims depended on its correspondence to that, 
any claim about the internal society would be reducible to a claim about the external 
one. The internal society’s internality would add nothing to the theory. This would have 
major implications for the claims of persons in ordinarily social contexts. Societies are 
large, complex and ever-changing institutions, including people who do not necessarily 
know each other, and who certainly do not have intimate knowledge of each other’s 
thoughts about all topics and at all times. S cannot comprehensively survey the ideas of 
every member whenever she needs to make a decision, for then the decision would 
never be made. She must instead work with what is available to her, even though her 
internal version of society is only an incomplete and imperfect reflection of its external 
counterpart. Crusoe’s predicament is an extreme version of the challenge facing anyone 
who tries to make a moral judgement according to the universal will, but their problems 
are two of a kind. Although he is estranged from other people, Crusoe can still have a 
meaningful dialogue with himself, assessing his current beliefs, or propositions whose 
truth-value he has not yet determined, against his past beliefs and beliefs he can 
hypothetically imagine himself holding. This is made possible by the ‘internal doubling 
of the spirit’ requisite to self-conscious reflection: S posits herself as simultaneously an 
abstract object of contemplation, such as a will already willed or a thought already 
thought; and the concrete, living activity of thinking, which constantly revises, re-
evaluates and corrects itself.52 
 
                                                          
52 Sommario 1 [97]. Note that Gentile’s word is geminazione (gemination), which I have rendered 
as ‘doubling’ to avoid confusion with ‘germination.’ First published in 1913, this marks an early 
and somewhat crude description of the dynamic that makes the internal society, first described 
three years later in Diritto, possible. 
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3ii. A schematic for the socius 
The Particularity Objection so far remains unanswered. We have not yet seen 
how the internal dialogue enables S to derive the universal will from the internal society. 
The dialogue is a subjectively-bound process, and while it may yield a private, 
provisional morality, applicable exclusively to S at the moment she consciously evaluates 
her thoughts and actions, its outcome depends on what its participants (S and the 
socius, or A) say to one another, which in turn depends upon what A is imagined to 
represent. If this were left to S’s discretion, her dialogue might follow a course different 
to that of anyone else faced with the same considerations. It may also follow a different 
course if she faces those considerations a second time. Unless A’s identity is reasonably 
settled, S could refer to versions alternately based on God, society and those nearest and 
dearest to her, finding different conclusions each time.53 To anchor the dialogue in such 
a way that moral judgements are more than a matter of opinion, we will need a more 
detailed picture of the socius. 
Consider why we might reject the contingent and subjectively-bound version of 
morality described by the Conditionality and Particularity Objections. On my account of 
actual idealism, S does not simply do what she wants to do, following her intuitive, 
brute desires. Nor do her beliefs come to her without her intervention, in a continuous 
                                                          
53 In the course of his career, Gentile made remarks that could be extended to support various 
different conceptions of what the socius is supposed to represent. In Religione, for instance, he 
presents himself as a Catholic (of sorts), and emphasises actual idealism’s Christian heritage. The 
socius could be identified with God, and the image of the individual subject struggling to 
overcome her selfishness, conversing with a single alter-ego that is somehow part of her, reflects a 
Christian image of the repentant sinner trying to reconcile herself with the perfect image of her 
creator. But this leaves open the question of how the subject knows what God wants, especially 
with regard to issues on which the Gospels are unclear or internally incoherent. Nor is this 
convincing as a general moral theory. What about subjects who are atheists or followers of a non-
Christian religion? Note that Gentile’s own religious beliefs are disputed. Antonio G. Pesce insists 
that ‘there is in fact no doubt that Gentile was a Catholic,’ but Gentile occasionally identifies 
himself as an atheist, albeit one who is still culturally a Catholic. See Pesce (2011) ‘La 
fenomenologia della coscienza in Giovanni Gentile,’ in Quaderni Leif, 5:6, pp. 39-54 [quoted 52n; 
also 42-3]; and Gentile (1922b) ‘Le ragioni del mio ateismo e la storia del cristianesimo,’ in 
Giornale critico della filosofia italiana 3, pp. 325-28 
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and unreflective stream of consciousness.54 She has an idea of what someone else might 
think, or what she herself might think under different circumstances. If S is going to 
settle on a conclusion or change her mind about something previously affirmed, and 
this is not just a mistake, she needs a reason for doing so. Since there could be reasons 
in favour of several mutually incompatible conclusions, S must have in mind some 
standard by which these reasons can be assessed and the strongest ones identified. This 
standard applies not only to S but to the reasons other people have (or might have) for 
thinking whatever they think. The dialogue between S and A represents S’s attempt to 
identify the best reasons for thought and action. The support of these reasons grants the 
dialogue’s outcome universal status. This suggests that A cannot be an arbitrarily-selected 
alter-ego. There must be some connection between it and those reasons. 
From here we can extrapolate four distinguishing features of the socius and the 
reasons connected to it.55 These features overlap, and each is open to a degree of 
interpretation, but among them there is no real order of importance. The first feature is 
that A should present S with reasons. The second is that A must be distinguishable from S. 
It must be possible for A to present S with reasons other than those that S presently affirms, 
for otherwise A would be redundant, and A and S would have nothing to say to one 
another. In effect, S would be talking to herself in an uninterrupted monologue. The 
third distinguishing feature, connected with the first, is that A’s reasons must purport to 
be authoritative for S. Once S has determined what morality56 requires of her, she must 
have decisive reasons to do what it demands rather than what she personally wants to 
                                                          
54 This is debatable. We might say that some beliefs come to S without her intervention, such as 
those affirming simple claims like ‘my feet feel cold’ or ‘this book is red.’ But this is not true of all 
her beliefs. Some require her to draw inferences and make judgements, which are undoubtedly 
actions on her part.  
55 It is important to stress that these features are not made explicit in Gentile’s work. Rather, they 
are included here because the logic of Gentile’s theory appears to demand them. 
56 Since actual idealism holds that subjects have a duty to think as well as they can, any factual 
statement has a moral character. Hence what morality demands of S extends to what reason 
demands of her. 
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do. (This reflects Gentile’s claims about the flight from morality’s ‘enemies,’ including 
selfishness.) A fourth and final feature of A is that its reasons should be both shared and 
stable. This means that for S to recognise A’s reasons as good reasons, they must count 
as reasons for other rational people (hence shared), and for S in circumstances that could 
but do not presently obtain (hence stable). These features are particularly important for 
establishing the universality of the conception of the will derived from the dialogue. 
Otherwise A’s reasons might be those that just happen to occur to S at the moment the 
internal dialogue is commenced, with the result that the authority of the will constructed 
from them is illusory.57 
 
4. Politicising the internal society 
I have laid out some strictly formal specifications that the socius must meet if it 
is to determine the universal will’s demands. If this interpretation is correct, the internal 
dialogue is an explicitly constructivist device, providing the procedure needed to 
promote what earlier I called simple or epistemological constructivism to procedural 
constructivism.58 The central motif of refining universality from particularity aligns 
Gentile’s theory with some of the best-known constructivist doctrines, and especially 
those in the Kantian tradition. We should note, however, that Gentile does not pursue 
his moral theory in this direction. Instead he turns to the political implications of his 
theory, arguing that the state must act as the embodiment of the universal will. To do 
                                                          
57 Some of these features, and especially the claim that reasons should be shared and stable, reflect 
John Rawls’ conception of ‘reflective equilibrium.’ In Rawls’ usage, the term refers to the 
matching of abstractly-derived principles of justice to the considered judgements of the persons 
subject to them, weighing both sides (that is: the principles and the judgements) until the two 
overlap. The same dynamic can be seen in the derivation of ‘universality’ from the internal 
dialogue, except here S begins with the reasons she presently affirms, rather than an abstractly-
derived set of principles, and throws these into contention with the reasons already held by 
others. These themes will be taken up and elaborated in Part 2 of this thesis. See Rawls (1971) A 
Theory of Justice. (Original edition) London: Belknap Press [48-9] 
58 These terms were defined in chapter 0.1, sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2. 
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this he draws on two elements of the theory that we have seen already, namely, the 
social construction of the individual and the equation of the universal will with the 
moral conscience. I trace the development of Gentile’s theory of the total ethical state 
in chapter 1.3, but my final aim for the present chapter is to assess the extent to which 
the politicisation of the internal dialogue is compatible with the rest of actual idealist 
moral theory. 
 
4i. Internal and external dialogues 
The politicisation of the internal dialogue relies upon a close correspondence 
between the internal society and some external reference point. At its simplest, the 
dialogue could be the process by which, whenever she faces a difficult moral dilemma, S 
checks her judgement against that of some other person whom she considers 
authoritative – a trusted friend, family member or expert in the relevant topic, for 
example – and, in the event that their judgements differ, adjusts hers accordingly. Such 
an internal dialogue would be subsidiary to a conventional, external dialogue or 
announcement in which the authority figure has made a relevant view known to S. A 
would be an internal or imaginary substitute for something or someone external. In 
cases where S does not know what, if anything, the authority thinks about the issue at 
hand, she may instead refer to more general maxims, codes or reasons that she 
considers authoritative. She may alternate between the two, following the explicit 
commands of an authority figure (an appointed leader, say) when such direction is 
available, and conforming to a code (perhaps the law or some more locally specific set 
of rules) when it is not. 
What kind of external entity (call this EA, for external alter-ego) could meet the 
requirements specified in my schematic account of the socius? To meet the second, of 
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being distinguishable from S, is straightforward: EA has an explicit view to which S’s 
more or less accurately conforms. EA’s very externality means that it cannot 
consistently reflect what S happens to think. The authority requirement is met if S 
recognises EA as an authority that gives her reasons to do as he says. (Given Gentile’s 
conception of S as the sole arbiter of truth, it is strictly these reasons that have 
authority, not the institution or person who gives them.) Less clear is what follows from 
the demand for EA to be shared and stable. Crudely stated, this could be reduced to the 
requirement that EA’s advice is not partial, arbitrary or irrational. S does not follow EA 
only because he might withhold future good advice if she does not conform; that would 
be a threat, and would amount to a reason for S to follow EA’s advice, whatever this 
advice demands, provided that this is more desirable than for him to put the threat into 
action. This would make EA unstable, in that the reasons to follow his advice depend 
upon him actually being present to dispense it.59 S cannot make moral judgements 
unless she knows what EA thinks. One solution to this problem would be to ensure 
that S knows, if only approximately, by what rationale EA makes his decisions. This 
could involve a process of rational justification60 or consistent rule-following. For 
example, it might be that EA’s past decisions constitute rules for subsequent ones, as in 
a common law system. Thus S can, with reasonable confidence, refer to similar past 
cases to determine what EA would (probably) say about the present one. 
This account of EA is extremely demanding. One objection is that no actual 
figure can possibly anticipate and answer every possible question S might face. Even if this is 
deflated with the observation that S does not need an answer for every possible question, 
since the range of contingencies likely to arise is, in fact, manageably small, there 
                                                          
59 More abstractly, if EA is the law of the land, S would need to know exactly what (if anything) 
the law says about the issue at hand. She would be unable to act unless she had access to and a 
sound understanding of the relevant legislation. 
60 This would allow A to be wholly internal. It may be external if the rationale is imported from 
the outside, in the form of a series of maxims, say. 
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remains the problem of how EA’s content is determined in the first place – or how, if 
EA is identified with a person or office, he is to determine what to advise S. The figure 
identified by other people as EA cannot refer to EA in order to know what to do, and 
must at some stage justify his choices in another way. 
For ease of reference, let us say that there are two related problems here. Call 
the first 
The Regress Problem. If EA is necessarily authoritative and always external to S, 
the person identified as EA must refer to some further external figure in order 
to determine what S ought to do. The burden of justification is transferred from 
S to EA, but EA must transfer it to a further EA, and so on ad infinitum. Unless 
the chain of justification is brought to an arbitrary arrest, it extends to an 
endless regress. 
Call the second 
The Recognition Problem. If EA is morally authoritative only if and because S 
recognises it as such, its authority has no rational foundation. S need not have 
any reason to think that EA is authoritative; its authority, or the reason-giving 
power of its claims, is founded not on reasons but on an arbitrary belief that S 
may or may not hold. One person’s version of EA can be wholly at odds with 
another’s, even if those persons believe themselves and each other to be 
subjects of the same social group and moral code. 
 
4ii. The state and the universal will 
A partial solution to these problems can be found in Gentile’s characterisation 
of the relationship between society, the state and the individual. We have already seen 
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that he considers persons to belong to a ‘social system’ insofar as they are conscious of 
living together in society.61 This society does not have a clearly-defined and authoritative 
voice; this is supplied instead by the state. In Genesi, for example, the state is identified 
with the ‘common and universal will,’ and as ‘the individual in [her] universality.’62 
Given what we have seen so far, this suggests that the state is the outcome of the 
internal dialogue, and that the dialogue represents S’s means of determining what the 
state wants. But the state plainly is not, or is not exclusively, an imaginary ideal 
constructed by a particular subject. Gentile explicitly claims that an individual will is 
rational (and to that extent universal) insofar as it corresponds to the will of the state. 
‘The political community,’ he writes, ‘is a form of universality’; the state is the ‘universal 
personality’ of its members; and the individual ‘truly wants’ when she wants ‘what the 
state wants [her] to want.’63 These remarks suggest that the state has a will that its 
members do not necessarily share, or at least that they do not yet appreciate they share. 
Otherwise the claim about the state wanting S to want what it wants would be an empty 
tautology. Gentile pushes this point further when he claims that the state actively shapes 
the consciences of its citizens to fit the will of il Duce.64 The relation between the 
particular and universal wills does not arise organically; it is instead the result of 
deliberate intervention, even social engineering, by political actors. 
                                                          
61 Genesi [13]; Harris translation [80] 
62 Genesi, [57 and 67]; Harris translation [120 and 131]. The relationship between the state and 
society is never made explicit. I will examine the role of the state in the next chapter, but for now 
I assume, perhaps controversially, that Gentile’s account of the internal society shows how S may 
come to know what the universal will demands of her. 
63 Educazione [33 and 36]. Note that I have run together two versions of the same sentiment: in 
the first instance, Gentile writes that ‘As a citizen, I want what I want: but, when I look more 
closely [quando si va a vedere], what I want coincides exactly with what the state wants (me to 
want),’ and on the second, ‘I truly want when inside me is the will of the state to which I belong.’ 
See [29-31] in the Bigongiari translation. 
64 Origini [268]. I discuss this general theme in chapter 2.2 and this specific passage in sub-section 
3. 
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The state’s will, which is usually expressed through the law, determines what S 
wills, or, less directly, the background assumptions enabling S to ascertain whether her 
particular will is morally licensed. The ‘universality’ of S’s will depends upon, or is at 
least limited by, its compatibility with the law. She identifies herself with the state and 
the law because her self-conception has grown out of that particular social context, and 
she cannot ignore her social self-conception (viz. her self-conception as a member of a 
specific social and political community bound by specific laws) when she decides what 
she ought to do. The moral authority of positive law ultimately comes from the persons 
subject to it. S must recognise that the law is hers, and that she, as a member of her 
society or state, ought to conform to it. This account of the law’s moral authority allows 
the content of morality to be imposed artificially by the political state, though licensed – 
assigned its moral authority – by S.65 If S affirms that, other things being equal, all 
members of the group (community, state) to which she belongs ought to conform to 
laws imposed by a recognised authority, she has effectively sanctioned those laws as 
applied to herself.66 
To what extent can this conception of the state address the Regress and 
Recognition Problems? Of the two, the Recognition Problem is the more easily 
addressed, at least in theory.67 The state that somehow brings it about that its citizens 
recognise it as a moral authority has effectively made itself morally authoritative for 
                                                          
65 This idea can be extended to the view of the socius as God. If S thinks that some set of precepts 
accurately reflects God’s will, and that God’s will is authoritative over hers, she can use those 
precepts to check that her personal will has appropriately impersonal (divine) sanction. 
66 This could be question-begging. If subject S believes that (Pi) all members of group G ought to 
comply with law L, and (Pii) S is a member of group G, then S thinks that she, S, ought to comply 
with L. But this could be re-worded without the normative ‘ought’: (Qi) all members of group G 
are required to comply with law L, and (Qii) S is a member of group G. This does not require S’s 
self-imposition of any moral duty. It may be practical; suppose we add the claims that (Qiii) all 
non-complying members of G will be horribly punished, and (Qiv) S does not want to be horribly 
punished, and nor is it in her interests for this to happen. S is rationally, though not morally, 
motivated to comply with L. What matters for Gentile is that S must identify with the law and 
recognise it as authoritative over her; only in this way can it give her reasons for action. 
67 I add ‘at least in theory’ because there remains an open question of whether any real state could 
meaningfully effect such comprehensive social changes. 
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them. This might be achieved by means of extensive propaganda, education (or 
indoctrination), or by less direct means, such as cultural programmes designed to 
cultivate pre-existing patriotic sentiment and national identity. The Regress Problem is 
less easily addressed. The solution to it, I think, must be as follows: while the state may 
set out to cause citizens to identify with it, it cannot do so by forcing them to hold an 
arbitrarily-assembled set of beliefs.68 The state’s laws and policies must have the support 
of good reasons. If they are to draw their moral authority from the individuals subject to 
them, they must be potentially subject to review and revision by every such individual. 
This means that the legislator to whom citizens refer when making moral judgements 
must himself refer not to a further external source, but to the ideal of universality, 
entailing maximum coherence and rational justification for each person. 
This is a crude sketch of the Gentilean model of the state. It is important to 
remember that it describes an ideal. After all, a state could equally impose laws that no-
one is prepared to accept or identify as her own. Such laws would not occupy any place 
in S’s conscience. They would be abstractions with no connection to S’s will, and, for 
that reason, no moral authority over her. Nor is positive law guaranteed to provide clear 
and unambiguous prescriptions for every situation in which S might need to make a 
choice. Laws could be mutually contradictory or insufficiently detailed and 
comprehensive in scope to be applied directly to the decision S now faces. S could even 
be ignorant of the relevant parts of the law. In that case, Gentile could conclude that 
choices about which the law is silent, or about which S does not know what the law 
requires, are not morally significant, so S could apply any decision procedure (a coin-
                                                          
68 A nuanced version of the same sentiment is given in Genesi [134-6], where Gentile denies that 
the state can impose its will dogmatically ‘with [the] right of “forced currency”’. Instead it must 
retain a firm basis in truth, which in turn must be recognised ‘in human thought.’ See [191-3] in 
Harris translation, and [192n] for a note on the term ‘forced currency.’ The renewed emphasis on 
the autonomy of thought is especially striking when this is compared with the version cited 
above: Origini [268] 
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toss, say) to determine what to do. This solution would contradict the idea of morality’s 
substantive content as a creation of the will, which implies that every choice S consciously 
makes is morally significant.69 She would need to refer to something other than the law 
to determine what she ought to do. 
As before, the solution to these problems lies in the idealisation of the state. 
Gentile ultimately describes two distinct entities: first, the transcendental state, or the 
state as it should be, which is to say a state that corresponds as far as possible with the 
ideal of universal truth; and second, the empirical state, or the state as it is, a political 
institution comprising many individuals, each of whom is potentially subject to 
ignorance, false beliefs, partiality, and incomprehension. The second is to be identified 
with the first only to the extent that it can justify its actions and its claims of moral 
authority according to those ideals. The extent to which that is possible is determined 
by the internal dialogue in which each and every citizen engages. We might say that the 
empirical state must continually try to match its ideal counterpart, although it may never 
perfectly achieve this aim. In this respect it is like S as she aspires to know universal 
truths: for individual and institution alike, moral goodness is endlessly realised through 
the act of self-consciously recognising and striving after the ideal, not in its conclusion. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have offered an overview of Gentile’s attempts to extend his 
metaphysics to make moral theory possible. First I rejected the argument that actual 
idealism is a solipsist doctrine. Next I showed how Gentile accounts for the existence of 
multiple thinking subjects by reference to the transcendental society and the internal 
dialogue that takes place within it. This, I claimed, is the keystone of actual idealist 
                                                          
69 Diritto [13]: ‘The will,’ writes Gentile, is ‘conceivable as creator of the moral world only if one 
thinks [of it as] creator of goodness, and, as creator of goodness, creator of itself.’ 
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moral theory. However, it is inadequately theorised. Notably absent is a full explanation 
of what the socius represents, and how the subject can know that her chosen 
conception of the socius is appropriate and authoritative. Because the internal dialogue 
is portrayed as a conversation between two parties, S and A, rather than many parties, I 
argued that a more robust account of the socius is required to prevent actual idealist 
moral theory from collapsing into individualist subjectivism. In the third part of the 
chapter I rehearsed several versions of what features the socius could have if it were to 
act as the primary reference point in the process of making moral judgements. In the 
fourth part of the chapter I discussed the idea that the state might be able to impose a 
substantive code. I argued that, if it is to be compatible with the rest of actual idealist 
moral theory, such a state must be viewed under two distinct aspects: one ideal or 
transcendental, and the other empirical. It is in its transcendental capacity that the state 
may represent the socius, which need not have any empirical counterpart in order to 
generate moral claims. Any moral authority the empirical state has must be derived 
from its transcendental counterpart. In the next chapter I show how Gentile conflates 
these ideas in his theory of the total ethical state. 
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1.3 The total ethical state 
 
Introduction 
In chapter 1.2 I explained how Gentile expands his theory of the pure act to 
accommodate multiple thinking persons. To do this he offers an account of the person 
as a socialised individual, capable of thinking and acting according to both particular 
(personal, partial) and universal (impersonal, impartial) reasons. These are synthesised in 
the internal dialogue, where both aspects of the subject interact in order to establish the 
basis for moral judgements. S weighs her personal reasons against her conception of the 
‘socius,’ a social alter-ego whom she identifies as a constituent part of her own identity. 
The claim that moral judgement takes the form of a dialogue between one’s social and 
individual selves is not much of a moral theory, and, until we have a better idea of what 
its protagonists represent and how this dialogue might play out, it cannot give rise to 
substantive conclusions. At the end of chapter 1.2, the socius was still unclearly defined, 
although I specified several formal requirements that it must meet to prevent actual 
idealist moral theory from collapsing into subjectivism. 
My aim in this chapter is to examine Gentile’s theory of the state. He sometimes 
describes this in terms closely corresponding with the socius, and this, understandably, 
has led some commentators to imagine that Gentile’s moral theory is nothing more 
than ‘a parade of Hegelian language’ and ‘a thinly veiled apology for [state] terrorism.’1 I 
argue that this interpretation is largely legitimate, but it arises because of Gentile’s 
conflation of two distinct concepts of state: one political, and the other spiritual. To 
remain consistent with the rest of Gentile’s moral theory, we must separate the two. 
                                                          
1 George H. Sabine (1961) A History of Political Theory. London: George G. Harrap  [897-9]. 
Sabine is critical chiefly of Gentile’s political theory, not his ethics. However, since Gentile’s 
theory of the state is given such a prominent place in his ethics, Sabine’s point remains relevant to 
my project. 
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Nonetheless, the spiritual state and political state can and in the best case should 
overlap. 
The chapter is structured as follows. At sub-heading #1 I exposit Gentile’s 
theories of the state in his Filosofia del diritto and Introduzione alla filosofia. At #2 I discuss 
his critique of Hegel’s theory of the state, on which his is loosely based, showing how 
he re-formulates Hegel’s ‘ethical system’ as one in which the state is supreme. Next (#3) 
I discuss the mature version of Gentile’s political theory as set out in Genesi e struttura 
della società, showing how this relies on the conflation of what previously were parallel 
though mutually distinctive conceptions of the state. At #4 I bring out some of the 
most forceful objections to Gentile’s political theory and the confused conception of 
the state that underpins it. I then argue (#5) that to save actual idealist moral theory, the 
empirical or political version of the state must be subsumed to the spiritual or ‘internal’ 
conception. To conclude (#6) I explain how this corrected view of the state resolves 
some of the ambiguities of the internal dialogue described in chapter 1.2, before 
pointing out some further problems to be addressed in later chapters.  
 
1. Gentile on the state in Diritto and Introduzione 
Gentile first attempts to describe a political theory in 1916’s Fondamenti della 
filosofia del diritto (Foundations of the Philosophy of Right).2 As discussed in chapter 1.2, 
Diritto contains a nascent transcendental society, with Robinson Crusoe referring to the 
società in interiore homine when making judgements on his island. Diritto links this idea with 
actual idealism’s concept of will and the law. It was not until the third edition of the 
book, published in 1937, that Gentile inserted chapters dealing explicitly with the state 
                                                          
2 Note that Harris, for example, translates this as …Philosophy of Law. Gentile’s word is ‘diritto,’ 
which can be translated as ‘law,’ but which connotes the broad sweep of legal culture, including 
‘right’ (in Hegel’s sense) and ‘rights’ (entitlements). Law in the narrower sense is ‘legge.’ Gentile 
certainly uses this term in the book. However, since the book’s topic is the moral status of law, I 
deem it appropriate to preserve the ‘…of Right’ translation. 
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and politics as separate objects of concern. By that time the Fascist state, which was at 
least nominally totalitarian,3 was in full swing. Amid the political uncertainty of 1937, 
when the PNF set about re-aligning its policies with the racist and warlike programme 
of the National Socialists in Germany, it was expedient for Gentile to re-align his 
philosophy of right with the extant regime. With one hand he held tightly to the ongoing 
Fascist project, but with the other he signalled for caution, insisting that Italian 
authoritarianism retain a measure of legitimacy and reminding his peers what their 
spiritual conception of the state meant – and, perhaps, how it differed from that of their 
increasingly ruthless and vocal ally.4 We cannot assume that these new chapters are a 
straightforward elaboration or clarification of the first edition’s content. To judge their 
congruence with the theory that went before, and how, if at all, the state should feature in 
our model of Gentilean moral constructivism, we must look closely at Gentile’s 
treatments of the state in his systematic works. 
It is tempting to think that Gentile’s state is included in his later moral theory 
solely as a means to square actual idealism with the political status quo, thereby ensuring 
the author’s continuing prominence in Italian politics and culture, albeit at the expense 
of his intellectual integrity and, by extension, his theory’s value. This suspicion, echoed 
time and again in the literature, would be irresistible if the concept of the state was 
introduced to actual idealism only when Gentile and his employers stood to gain from 
                                                          
3 Historians of Fascism have often remarked that the Italian state, in which the adjective 
‘totalitario’ and noun ‘totalitarismo’ first arose, was less successful in putting the idea of 
totalitarianism into practice than either Hitler’s Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union. This is a 
general claim, but for some revealing statistics, see Stanley G. Payne (1995) A History of Fascism, 
1914-1945. Abingdon: Routledge [117]  
4 Diritto does not refer directly to empirical politics, so this conclusion must be inferred. Still, it is 
telling that, after adding a brief essay and ‘re-touching [his] exposition to make it clearer and 
more precise’ in the second edition (1923) [see Diritto ‘Avvertenza,’ no page number], he 
overhauls the book for the third edition (1937), just as the German and Italian states draw closer 
together. The third adds chapters on the state and politics, as well as a lengthy introduction in the 
form of an essay on ‘Practical Philosophy and the Moral Life,’ written in 1914 as the conclusion to 
his editorial commentary on Rosmini’s Il principio della morale. The moral foundations laid out 
in the introduction help to counteract the authoritarian implications of the later chapters. See 
Harris (1960) [338-9] 
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it. However, Gentile’s conception of the state has a pre-Fascist pedigree. In his 
‘Clarifications,’ written in 1920 and added to the second edition (1923) of Diritto, he 
claims that the only ‘true and real’ state is ‘the state inside the person’ (lo Stato in interiore 
homine).5 This is an important departure from the earlier version in which society is cast 
in the same role.6 There can be no such state, he writes, without a moral character. A 
merely empirical and abstract state is unreal and therefore without concrete value. This 
is broadly consistent with what Gentile writes later, but here the concept looks 
worryingly Procrustean, with the state defined so as to fill a lacuna in Gentile’s moral 
theory (viz. the unspecified content of the moral law), rather than the theory adjusted to 
accommodate the concept of state as it is ordinarily understood.  
After the second edition of Diritto,7 Gentile’s next major philosophical account 
of the state is the 1929 essay ‘Lo stato e la filosofia,’ (The State and Philosophy).8  Here 
he writes that the state 
is the nation conceivable in its historical unity. It is man himself, so far as he 
realises himself universally, determining this universality in a certain form. [This 
is a] necessary determination [in the same way] as it is necessary to speak using 
certain words. [… N]one of the material or moral elements that belong to the 
life of a people is extraneous to this wholly spiritual form that is sealed in the 
self-conscious [bond of] of nationhood that is state.9 
                                                          
5 Diritto [137] 
6 See Amato (2011) [95-8] on this issue. 
7 As mentioned, the ‘Clarifications’ were added to Diritto’s second edition as an appendix.  
8 ‘Lo stato e la filosofia,’ in Introduzione alla filosofia. This chapter originally appeared in (1929) 
La giornale critico della filosofia italiana 10, pp. 161-70 
9 Introduzione [181]. Note that I have added ‘bond of’ and ‘nationhood’ to clarify Gentile’s 
meaning. He refers to ‘l’autocoscienza della nazione che è Stato,’ (the self-consciousness of the 
nation that is state), which, literally translated, leaves ambiguous the question of whether it is the 
nation or self-consciousness of it that Gentile identifies with the state. 
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This can be expressed more simply. Gentile is here equating the state with the 
nation ‘in its historical unity,’ meaning, roughly, the nation viewed as an entity persisting over 
time. The state of Italy exists so far as people recognise themselves and each other as 
members of the Italian nation and its political institutions – hence ‘the self-conscious 
[bond of] nationhood that is state’. The phrase ‘historical unity’ means that viewed over 
the course of a century, say, the specific individual persons constituting ‘the people of 
Italy’ will change due to births, death, immigration, emigration, and changes over the 
course of each of those lives. There may also be diversity in or changes to what those 
people understand by the idea of shared nationality or state membership. Despite these 
concerns it is possible to talk about an unbroken super-personal identity called Italy. 
Gentile aligns this with the internal society, writing that ‘the man who in his singular 
personality feels himself to be outside [the state] is an historical abstraction: […] he 
might be immoral, and not feel the universal conscience pulsing in his own.’ He adds 
that ‘all its external manifestations[, like] territory, the executive force under its control, 
[and] the men representing [its] various capacities […] draw their value from the will 
that recognises and wants them as necessary to and constitutive of the state’s historical 
and actual form.’10 
The novelty of totalitarianism was its assumption that persons grow to fit their 
circumstances and that by engineering those circumstances it is possible to cause 
persons to fit a prescribed form. Thus Gentile’s political state acts as a coordinating 
device, and, insofar as it succeeds, it invests itself with spiritual value through S’s 
recognition of it as an extension of herself. The internal state is identified with the 
universal conscience, and the universal conscience is identified with the socius, which is 
the key to true moral judgements. Therefore that property also belongs to the state, 
which assumes responsibility for constructing S’s personal identity by means of 
                                                          
10 Introduzione [181] 
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education and establishes laws to give the socius a voice. S knows what her social alter-
ego thinks precisely because its thoughts are already set out in law. In this way Gentile’s 
legislator not only manipulates but also creates the individual conscience in whichever of 
its possible forms he deems best. Really all that qualifies the political state as the closest 
earthly manifestation of the internal state is that it is (or was, in the world as Gentile saw 
it) uniquely able to create, impose and enforce laws, as well as controlling the 
educational and cultural institutions that would define those laws’ reception.11 
The substitution of the transcendental state for transcendental society prompts a 
question. What is the relationship between these, and how can Gentile justify 
exchanging the two? At least a partial answer is given in the chapters added to Diritto’s 
third edition (1937). Here Gentile examines Hegel’s theory of the state, which is one 
part of the ‘ethical triad’ alongside civil society and the family. 
 
2. Gentile on the Hegel’s ethical state 
For Gentile, the originality of Hegel’s state theory is its positivity. Before Hegel 
the state ‘was always conceived as something negative.’ It limited the individual subject’s 
capacity to realise herself.12 This negative conception resulted from the presupposition 
of the individual as ‘an absolute prius’ to which the state would be added later. Doctrines 
of natural right and law [giusnaturalismo] proceed from this position, loading the 
individual with inalienable entitlements and duties before situating her in an 
ethical/political context. The state is confined by these unproven predicates, which ‘it 
must recognise, because they pre-exist it as conditions of its existence.’13 These 
                                                          
11 The explicit link between state qua extended moral personality and qua institution distinguishes 
the conception of the conscience from the nascent version in the first edition of Diritto. In this 
late version, the state’s ‘external manifestations’ are identified directly with the spiritual universal 
to which individuals consider their beliefs subsidiary. 
12 Diritto  [103] 
13 Diritto [104] 
1.3 The total ethical state 
109 
conditions require any legitimate state to secure natural rights and submit to natural 
laws, or else manifest itself as a despotic power, outside the ambit of moral life. 
Hegel also rejects ‘contractualism’ (social contract theory) which, like natural 
rights theory, begins with the concept of asocial individuals, and uses the state as ‘the 
means of liberty’s realisation.’14 The method of determining rights’ and laws’ proper 
contents takes the form of hypothetical or actual agreement among individuals.15 On 
some contractualist accounts, there exists a set of laws and rights to which contracting 
parties must agree, or are constrained to agree if they are to live together in reasonably 
stable schemes of social co-operation. In the technical language of contemporary 
philosophy, we might call these rights and laws necessary corollaries of the contract’s meta-
ethical setup. Even if this is so, contractualism differs from natural rights theory in that it 
does not assume that laws are readymade objects awaiting discovery. Instead they are 
constructed. So the contract does not, or does not entirely, presuppose what Christine 
Korsgaard calls ‘substantive moral realism,’16 but instead acts as a means of constructing 
moral precepts that, in order to make sense, may be able to take only one form.17 
As conceived in both these doctrines, Gentile complains, the state imposes a 
limit on S, ‘a simple reality of fact,’ without any independent value or agency.18 Social 
contract theory leaves the state wholly subject to the terms of the agreement by which it 
was created, and that agreement reflects the contingent will of the ‘pure individual’ – the 
                                                          
14 Diritto [104]; emphasis in original 
15 For more on Hegel’s rejection of individualism and subjectivism, see Judith N. Shklar (1976) 
Freedom and Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [102-10]. An earlier, shorter 
version of the same material is to be found in Shklar (1973) ‘Hegel’s Phenomenology and the 
Moral Failures of Asocial Man,’ in Political Theory 1:3, pp. 259-86 [esp. 261-2]. Bruce Haddock 
offers a nuanced interpretation of Hegel’s view of contractualism in (1994) ‘Hegel’s Critique of the 
Theory of Social Contract,’ in David Boucher and Paul Kelly (eds.) The Social Contract from 
Hobbes to Rawls. London: Routledge, pp.147-63.  
16 This phrase appears in Korsgaard (1996a) ‘The Normative Question,’ in O’Neill (ed.) The 
Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.7-48 [35] 
17 I will elaborate on this theme in the second half of the thesis, and especially chapter 2.3. 
18 See Diritto [105]. The phrase ‘reality of fact’ (‘realtà di fatto’) rings strangely in Italian and 
English alike. 
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asocial, transcendental subject. This agreement constitutes the beginning and the end of 
the state’s ‘constructive process’ and its whole raison d’être.19 On the natural law account, 
it is similarly confined by the dictates of some transcendental reason. For both, the 
moral law directly connects the source, which is the contract or natural law, to each 
individual. It is unclear how the state, or indeed any other conception of community or 
collective identity, can fit into this picture. Gentile insists that the logical consequence 
of this ‘liberal individualism’ is ‘anarchism,’ with individuals thrown together as a jumble 
of materially distinct objects, and bound together by capricious and contingent 
agreements. Society is no more than ‘an aggregate of individual humans, each closed in 
on itself, without any necessary relation to each other.’20 
All of the foregoing is common to both Gentile’s view and that which he 
ascribes to Hegel. The way to avoid the anarchistic conclusion, Gentile explains, is ‘to 
deepen the concept of the individual.’21 Hegel does this in his Phenomenology, 
systematically showing the development of consciousness into self-consciousness, and 
all the moral, social and political relations that come with it. This is echoed in Gentile’s 
conception of S as a self-consciously fallible agent working to construct true 
judgements: she is one thinking subject among others, and as such a part of the 
universal thinking subject.22 It is as a contributor to and subsidiary of the universal 
subject that she comes to recognise laws, duties, permissions and so forth. For these to 
count as moral principles for her, rather than presenting themselves in opposition to her 
or otherwise limiting her freedom, they must be internalised so she wills herself to 
conform to them.23 
                                                          
19 Diritto [105] 
20 Diritto [106] 
21 Diritto [105] 
22 Diritto [107] 
23 Diritto [111]; also G.W.F. Hegel w/ A.V. Miller (trans.) (1977) Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press [esp. 104-38] 
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Only in the Philosophy of Right does Hegel explicitly identify the state as the chief 
manifestation of the universal subject’s ‘ethical substance’ (Sittlichkeit). The justification 
for this move is notoriously unclear. It contains a non-sequitur: why should identifying 
oneself as a particular subject necessitate the existence of a corresponding universal 
subject? Why should S identify the universal subject with the (political) state, rather than 
some other, smaller entity or group of which S sees herself to be a part, like ‘dentists’ or 
‘diabetics’; or some larger inclusive concept, like ‘rational beings’ or even ‘the universe’? 
Could she not recognise herself as an example of a particular type (that is: as a person), 
rather than extending this to any kind of universal (the universal person)? Or rather: 
could she not recognise that as one who thinks, she belongs to the universal class of 
thinkers, without needing to say that the universal thinker is, concretely, a thinker who 
thinks? The move has transcendent overtones, echoing Plato’s theory of the forms. As 
such it seems especially alien to Gentile, who so fiercely opposes the idea of 
transcendent realism.  
These concerns do not strike Gentile as problematic. He claims that the link 
between the parts and wholes was established in Spinoza’s works.24 There is little doubt 
that Hegel also had Spinoza in mind when choosing the term Sittlichkeit (ethical life, of 
which Hegel considers the state a constituent part). After all, he wrote that ‘thought 
must begin by placing itself at the standpoint of Spinozism,’25 and both this neologism 
and the concept to which it is attached are reminiscent of Spinoza’s holism. But this 
does not settle the question of why the state is uniquely suited to this all-encompassing 
                                                          
24 There is a good discussion of Gentile’s thoughts about Spinoza in Hervé A. Cavallera (1995) 
‘Gentile e Spinoza,’ in Idee 28-9, pp.185-212 [esp. 188-92] 
25 G.W.F. Hegel w/ E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (1955) Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy. New York: The Humanities Press [257]; Merold Westphal (2003) ‘Hegel between 
Spinoza and Derrida,’ in David A. Duquette (ed.) Hegel’s History of Philosophy: New 
Interpretations. Albany, NY: New York University Press, pp.143-63 [144-5] 
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role. Spinoza, of course, assigns that same role to God.26 A conventionally omnipresent 
and omniscient God is hard to situate in Gentile’s metaphysics, since it requires the 
presupposition of something transcendent of human knowledge and understanding.27 
Yet Spinoza’s equation of the ethical category and God is in some respects more 
comprehensible than Hegel and Gentile’s placement of the state in the same role. An 
infinite and permanent God can be described as a ne plus ultra without embarrassment. 
The political state, meanwhile, seems anything but infinite, as the existence of other 
states suggests. 
Gentile’s first step in resolving this problem is to re-assert the difference 
between the ethical and empirical manifestations of the state. In doing so he quotes 
Louis XIV’s claim that ‘l’état, c’est moi’ (the state is me; I am the state). Gentile’s aim is 
not to endorse political autocracy, though. Rather, he means that if it is to have ethical 
status and the power to issue morally binding commands, the state must be recognised 
by S as an authority of her own creation. She must identify the state with herself and its will 
with her own. The state is Louis, for sure, but it is also each and every one of its other 
constituents. This is what Gentile means when he says it must be internalised. An 
external state, removed from the individual will and self-conception, is no different 
from a foreign or historical state: it is abstract and morally insignificant. Only once it is 
internalised so the will of one matches that of the other can S and the state 
simultaneously possess ‘true and real liberty.’28 
                                                          
26 For Spinoza, God is the only substance. See Benedict de Spinoza w/ Edwin Curley (trans.) 
(1996) Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press [3-13; Part 1, Propositions 1-15].  
27 This is not to say that he did not identify himself as a Catholic, nor that Catholic readers have 
not tried to reconcile Gentile’s spirito with the Holy Ghost and the atto puro with Aquinas’ actum 
purum (which ‘belongs to God alone’). See (1927) Summa Theologica, I-II, 50, 6: ‘Whether there 
are habits in the angels.’ [24-7] But this resemblance is specious: the substantial bulk of Catholic 
theology is wrung out in its passage through the actual idealist mangle. 
28 Diritto [113-4]. Note that Gentile refers to Louis XIV’s dictum in Genesi, but there he 
emphasises its authoritarian implications [62]. 
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Gentile believes that Hegel grasps this idea but fails to follow it to its proper 
conclusion. If the state is to be identified with Sittlichkeit and the ‘true and real liberty’ 
mentioned above, it cannot be limited by other entities. Hegel’s state, writes Gentile, is 
limited in three ways, all stemming from Hegel’s mistaken concessions to empirical 
methods, which try ‘to view spiritual reality from the outside.’ These limitations are: 
first, the state’s conception as a state among others; second, its identification with 
‘objective spirit,’ an intermediary moment between ‘subjective’ and ‘absolute’ spirit; and, 
third, its relation to the family and civil society, which also occupy the domain of 
objective spirit, and provide the state’s ‘necessary foundation.’29 
The first limitation runs contrary to how we ordinarily talk about states. The 
problem is that to think about states in this way is to ignore what makes the state (our 
state) distinctively ours. This is to make the ordinary mistake of treating the world as if 
we were viewing it in itself from an external, impartial and impersonal standpoint. He 
compares the status of the term ‘the state’ with the term ‘mother’: ‘everyone has one, 
but no-one has more than one; and no-one can speak of the world in general without 
speaking of her own unique world in which there is only one mother.’30 
Is the state’s special status just a matter of words? Of course, when I say 
‘mother’ I might mean my mother, a specific person who is related to me in a specific 
way. No-one else can be my mother; her status is an office that can admit only one 
person. How does this formal necessity arise? Is it a question of biology? On Gentile’s 
view, it cannot be so. To clarify this point, consider the situation of someone who has 
been adopted. This adoptee might call an adoptive parent ‘mother,’ since she is 
performing the day-to-day role most often filled by a biological parent. The adoptee 
may be aware that she is adopted, and that there is or was once someone else who, by 
                                                          
29 Diritto [114-5] 
30 Diritto [116] 
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some definition, is also her mother. A non-adoptee might reject the idea of having a 
mother: perhaps she feels terribly wronged by or otherwise alienated from her biological 
mother, and denies that the term – or what Gentile might call its spiritual significance, vis-
à-vis its relation to her self-conscious identity – can be applied to her or else to their 
relationship.  
To clarify. What Gentile means to emphasise is that, while I can refer to your 
mother, French mothers, or what have you, and can probably assume that you identify 
with yours in a way different to that in which I identify with mine, these other mothers 
are only abstractions unless they have some concrete meaning for me.31 That is: I know 
the person in question, and the term ‘your mother’ connotes a specific person, with 
some relation to me. Likewise I can talk intelligibly about other states. For example, I 
might say, ‘in 1870-1, France was at war with Prussia,’ without ever having been French, 
Prussian or alive in the nineteenth century. But for these to have concrete significance, 
and to have any impact on my will, I must conceive of them in relation to the state that I 
identify especially as mine, as an extension of my personality. Hence we must 
distinguish between, first, states ‘that we know to exist,’ but whose existence neither 
helps nor hinders the continued existence of ours, and, second, those with which our 
state stands in direct or indirect relation. Firmly attaching S to the state with which she 
self-consciously identifies, the idea of other states as limits on her state ceases to be a 
problem. S’s own state, as a super-personal extension of her personality, still defines her 
will, aspirations and relations. The state presents itself to her as her alter-ego, rather than 
as some hypothetical, possible alter-ego, which could be saddled with any sort of 
convictions or will, but which, lacking the power to cause S to identify with it, cannot 
                                                          
31 What if you are my sibling? When we each say, ‘mother,’ we refer to the same empirically 
distinct person. But the connotation is still different; that I recognise the person my sibling calls 
‘mother’ as my mother is a coincidence. A different relationship is implicit in each sibling’s 
utterance: that between me and my mother and that between my sibling and her mother (who 
happens also to be mine). 
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affect her will or self-consciousness in any way whatever. (Gentile does not here refer to 
the transcendental society or internal dialogue, but the link is plain.) 
The second limit on Hegel’s state results from its placement at the intermediary 
stage between subjective and absolute spirit. This is likewise removed through careful 
application of actual idealism’s metaphysical principles. According to Gentile, the triad 
of subjective, objective and absolute spirit is ‘fictitious and arbitrary.’ As we saw in 
chapter 1.1, on Gentile’s account there can be no pensiero pensante without an object. 
That would be an act of thinking without a thought, or object of thought. Nor is it 
possible to conceive of an object without a subject, since the very act of conception 
demands a subject to perform it. Thus the distinction between subjective and objective 
spirit dissolves. ‘Absolute spirit,’ which comprises absolute categories of art, religion 
and philosophy, has no place in actual idealism. The absolute cannot exist transcendent 
of the thinker, for this would make it a presupposition. If it is not transcendent of the 
thinker, it must be thought; its special elevated status is unwarranted. S cannot step 
entirely out of her social world in order to become pure and absolute spirit. The only 
alternative is to ground her conception of the social world in a theory of immanence, set 
within the limits of what is thinkable.32 
Gentile’s approach to removing the third limit is crucial to understanding his 
conception of the state. It clears the way for totalitarianism. To Hegel’s triad of 
objective spirit, with family, civil society and state all supporting each other, Gentile has 
two objections. One is that Hegel places the family, the first and simplest stage of 
objective spirit, in opposition to the state, which is the last. The family cannot be ‘interior 
ethical reality’ recognised by all its members, a ‘true form of self-consciousness,’ and 
‘the spirit in its effectual existence,’ if these same characteristics also belong to the state 
                                                          
32 Diritto [118-9]; a nice summary of Gentile’s position appears in Giacomo Rinaldi (1994) ‘Italian 
Idealism and After: Gentile, Croce and Others,’ in Richard Kearney (ed.) Continental Philosophy 
in the 20th Century. London: Routledge, pp. 350-89 [357] 
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in which it is contained. For the two to co-exist, S would need two identities, one as 
citizen and another as family member, as well as two wills, two self-conceptions, and so 
on. This would make moral responsibilities impossible, ruling out any meaningful 
appeal to a ‘universal will’. A person with more than one will effectively has none.  So 
for Gentile, the family must be absorbed into the state, and its distinct claims on the 
individual annihilated.33 Is this justified? I do not see how it can be, assuming that the 
state is understood in conventional terms as a politically if not morally authoritative 
institution. To assign this special role to the state seems arbitrary, and Gentile is no 
more entitled to demand the family’s absorption into the state than he is to demand the 
state’s absorption into God, humanity, or members of supranational organisations, or 
else the family into (international) ethnic groups, classes and so on. 
Gentile’s view is better understandable if we take ‘the state’ to mean not the 
empirical institution, but the ultimate constructed arbiter to which S refers. There is no 
doubt that Gentile accepts that persons assign their families special importance, and no 
question of dismissing this institution as a mistaken abstraction. His reference to the use 
of the word ‘mother’ attests to this. What could it mean for the family to be absorbed 
into the state, and its separate status thus ‘annihilated’? Gentile cannot mean that 
persons should identify family and state as the same thing. If this were the case, the 
whole idea of one’s mother’s special status would be indefensible. More plausible is the 
idea that the family should make demands that are compatible with those of the state. 
Just as family members’ individual wills contribute to that of the family, so do families’ 
wills contribute to that of state. They are, in Hegelian language, all part of the same 
organism.34 The state is distinguished by its members’ recognition of its authority and its 
                                                          
33 See Sommario 1 [142-3 and 149-50] and, for more on Gentile’s view of the family, Genesi [64-5 
and 113]; Harris translation [128-29 and 172-73]. 
34 There is an interesting question of whether Hegel thinks the state incorporates the family or 
exists in parallel with it as one of the three components of what Andrew Vincent calls ‘the 
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scope. The state is better able to impose its will on the family than any family can impose 
its will on the state. But it is not simply the state’s ability to do this that gives it priority 
over the family where the two impose different demands. After all, it may be that some 
foreign state is better able to impose its will on a subject’s family than her own state can. 
Once again, what matters is that the political state is identified with the morally 
authoritative spiritual state – the socius – with which she identifies herself.  
Gentile has much the same second objection and response to civil society. He 
maintains that it cannot limit the state’s authority for the simple reason that it is based 
on a false concept of the person. Hegel’s reference to ‘individuals [… as] private and 
material persons whose end is their own interest’35 confines them to the abstract logos. 
We cannot think concretely of persons as social atoms any more than we can talk about 
an incomplete whole or a square circle. Only what is concrete and real can play a 
meaningful, active role in society. Abstractions are products of such activity. This 
argument is difficult to counter within the confines of Gentile’s metaphysics. In this 
way, then, Gentile concludes that ‘in spiritual actuality, the family is state, and the state 
is family,’ and that ‘there is no civil society that is not also state.’36 
 
3. Gentile’s mature state 
The theory of the state in Diritto is often overshadowed by Hegel’s. Gentile 
criticises his forebear and suggests what his own theory might look like if it were laid 
out in purely Hegelian language. But, as we have seen in the preceding discussion, he 
sometimes dismisses an idea as untenable (as with the family as an independent moral 
                                                                                                                                                                    
institutional structure of the social world.’ See Vincent (1991) Theories of the State. Oxford: 
Blackwell. (Originally 1987) [123-7; quotation 123 only]. Gentile is certainly more 
uncompromising in his assertion that the state is the ultimate all-encompassing entity in the 
hierarchy of institutions. 
35 G.W.F. Hegel w/ T.M. Knox (trans.) (1945) Philosophy of Right. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. (Originally 1942). [124: §187] 
36 Hegel (1945) [120: §180]. This reference also applies to the preceding paragraph. 
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claimant and civil society in general) without making clear what he would do with it 
instead. Does he think, for example, that the family has no concrete spiritual 
significance? Fortunately, he returns to the state in his last book, Genesi e struttura della 
società (Genesis and Structure of Society). To keep my exegesis within moderate limits, in 
what follows I shall identify some general points of difference before focusing on the 
questions left unsettled in Diritto. 
Prepared in just five weeks, Gentile’s last work of systematic philosophy37 has 
been compared to ‘a drowned man’s last testament,’ in which the author works 
frantically to justify past words and deeds before a jury from whom he had, under the 
regime’s protection, been shielded.38 As such its tone is strange, its discussion 
scattershot, and its arguments often faulty. Old material is recast to fit new and 
uncertain circumstances. The totalitarian state, which had provided the backdrop for 
most of his earlier discussion of the state as concept, was gone. In its place was a 
foreign power in the process of losing a war. If we assume that Gentile’s earlier 
accounts of the state were intended to provide philosophical licence for his employers, 
with all concepts devised to accommodate de facto political arrangements, Genesi seems 
less self-assured. Its principal message is no longer that individuals have good reason to 
submit to an all-encompassing authority, but a simpler one of solidarity. In the 
                                                          
37 Historically-oriented works such as Storia della filosofia (dalle origini a Platone) (The History of 
Philosophy: from [its] origins to Plato) were published later, having been left in manuscript form 
at the time of Gentile’s assassination.  
38 G.R.G. Mure (1950) ‘Genesi e struttura della società, by Giovanni Gentile’ (review), in 
Philosophical Quarterly 1:1, pp. 83-4. [83]. The full paragraph runs: ‘[It reads] tragically […] like a 
drowned man’s last testament drifting shoreward from a wreck. The faithful toil with which he 
spins every dogma of Fascism out of man's original self-consciousness, and his somewhat pathetic 
attempt to show that, despite the inevitability of war, the end of it all is peace and good will 
through the self-recognition and self-love of man in all men; the occasional parentheses of 
professional self-defence; the stretches of rather febrile exhortation, and the relatively long 
discussion of death and immortality in the last chapter-all these are clear traits in the sombre self-
portrait of a thinker who through the twenty years of his service to the Fascist regime always 
resented the shadow of his greater master whom Mussolini dared not touch, yet never quite 
stilled his own philosophic conscience, and now quails perceptibly before the approach of 
national and personal catastrophe.’ 
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foreword, Gentile indicates that he wanted to show Italians that they were still a people, 
and still had reason to hold together, in difficult and fractious times (and, we might add, 
without an authoritarian state to remove the choice to do differently). This echoes his 
concerns about the brief rise and sudden collapse of national solidarity during and after 
the First World War.39 
There are some changes in weight and focus. Hegel is moved to the margins; 
Gentile’s language remains unambiguously Hegelian, but there is no real exegesis of or 
explicit comparison with the Philosophy of Right. The discussion of the state is expanded 
to six (often short) chapters, rather than Diritto’s one. These cover ‘The State’, defining 
it as a concept and distinguishing it from ‘the nation’; ‘The State and Economics’; ‘The 
State and Religion’; ‘The State and Science’; ‘The State and [other] States’; and ‘History,’ 
in which, once again, Gentile gives special prominence to the state’s role.  
Diritto’s extensive discussion of the role of right, or law (that is, diritto), is less 
prominent in this later version, and compressed to just two pages.40 (This does not 
indicate any major change of attitude on Gentile’s part. Genesi concerns the spiritual 
conception of the whole gamut of social relations, not the law’s moral status as such. 
There is considerable overlap between the two books, but again, the contents of Genesi 
should be considered elaborations on and not replacements for those of Diritto.) His 
attention is now on the state’s will and its relation to S, as well as the various possible 
conceptions of society and state that might be opposed to her own.41 The state’s role as 
law-maker is again described as a moral office insofar as S willingly subscribes to it. Once 
she has overcome the law’s ‘positivity’ – that is, her perception of it as a limit on action, 
                                                          
39 See Gentile (2004) ‘Origini and dottrina del fascismo,’ in Renzo di Felice (ed.). Autobiografia del 
fascismo. Turin: Einaudi, pp. 247-71. (Originally 1927) 
40 Genesi [58-9]; Harris translation [122-23] 
41 One common interpretation of Genesi, already indicated in several citations, has it that Gentile 
wrote it as a desperate post facto justification for the regime that had, as he produced it in just five 
weeks in the Salò Republic, all but collapsed. With the writing on the wall, a politically engaged 
man like Gentile could see that he would soon need to defend his role in the Fascist experiment. 
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rather than a guide and protector of liberty – it ‘is resolved into morality’ for her. This 
means that the last word on what is right is whatever the law says is right.42 Later 
Gentile reaffirms the state’s role as ‘the individual in its universality,’ and ‘the concrete 
actuality of [the individual’s] will.’43  
Subsequent chapters are spent showing how the concrete elements of moral and 
social life can be fitted into the state, and that the abstract elements have no real value. 
This is achieved at a fast pace. The discussion of the state and economics deals mainly 
with utilitarian44 conceptions of politics and morality. These are given over to the 
abstract logos, along with the body (except one’s own body, which every subject 
identifies with her own consciousness), and natural and mathematical theories of 
economics. The state’s character is inseparable from that of religion, since, again, one 
identifies one’s own religion as part of one’s personality, bringing it into the fold of 
concrete spirituality, along with the state. 
The relation between family and state is laid out more clearly. However, Gentile 
does not entirely resolve the issues identified previously. He writes: 
Man is [the] family. He works for himself, but he also works for his children 
[…] The state has interests in cultivating and encouraging the instinct, which in 
man becomes a vocation, toward the generation and recognition of offspring. 
As such it has interests in the formation of the familial unit [literally ‘nucleus’] 
out of which the individual is led by nature to break the crust [spezzare la crosta] 
of his narrow-minded egoism and to widen the sphere of his natural 
individuality. […] Woe betide the man who condemns himself to sterile 
solitude, and woe betide the state that renounces humanity’s perennial moral 
                                                          
42 Genesi [59-60]; Harris translation [123-24] 
43 Genesi [67]; Harris translation [131] 
44 Note that when Gentile criticises ‘utilitarianism,’ he is concerned not with Bentham and Mill, 
but rather the idea of means-ends practical reasoning. 
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nursery, which is the personality integrated within the family, cemented by love 
and perpetuated by inheritance.45 
The lack of spiritual language is especially noticeable here. Gentile has 
abandoned Hegel’s strict terms of reference. This is partly understandable, given his 
earlier objection to the triad of subjective, universal and absolute spirit; but nowhere 
here, in contrast to the earlier version, is the family’s absorption and annihilation even 
suggested. Gentile appears to have retreated from his former radical and rather strange 
position in order to adopt a more conventional account of the family, in which the state 
‘has interests’ in maintaining and protecting its members’ ‘perennial moral nursery,’ that 
domain in which love is especially important, without swallowing or overriding it.  
So: has Gentile simply given in to Hegel’s view of the family? To an extent he 
has. The heightened emphasis on love reflects Hegel’s description, in which the family 
is ‘specifically characterised’ by it.46 Sentiment, of which love is one variety, serves to 
orient the individual will toward other people, establishing an impulse toward empathy, 
understanding and reasonableness.47 Unlike Hegel, Gentile denies that the family can be 
just one object among others, as is required in Hegel’s move from family to civil 
society.48 Gentile leaves civil society out of contention; the family remains as the anvil 
on which man’s moral ore is beaten out. But this still occurs within the state. In Gentile’s 
system it cannot be claimed that family and state sit alongside one another in the sphere 
of objective spirit, with each preserving some distinct faculty or right that shields it 
from the other. Instead, the state is the universal spirit, and the family is part of the 
state. To maintain S’s united will, the family cannot impose moral demands contrary to 
                                                          
45 Genesi [113]. Note that the passage has a different structure in Harris’s translation [172] 
46 Hegel (1945) [110; §158] 
47 In Genesis, Harris notes that Gentile began to emphasise the importance of love in his Filosofia 
dell’arte, and further in the chapter, ‘Il sentimento,’ in the Introduzione alla filosofia. It should be 
noted that love is featured in the early works, too. Sommario is full of it, but there Gentile does 
not make its full importance explicit. 
48 Hegel (1945) [122; §181] 
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those of the state. This does not mean that one must give way entirely to the other and 
thus make the losing claimant redundant. Instead the state and family must make 
compatible demands. These may still differ in their substantive contents, just as when 
someone’s mother is in need of help, say, the daughter has (and feels) a stronger 
responsibility to intervene than would a stranger. Provided that this does not require her 
to break any other moral commitments, it is perfectly compatible with the conception 
of state and family that Gentile proposes. For any individual family member, state and 
family both appear to exist concretely and uniquely: she does not feel the tug of two 
families, two states, or family against state. They are all one with her concrete will. 
Perhaps the most substantive change from Diritto is found in Genesi’s chapter on 
‘the state and other states.’ This includes a passage on international law, understood as 
‘the unification of states by means of treaties.’49 He warns us that the logical extension 
of this tendency, namely ‘a confederation, a centralised empire, a society of nations, or 
what have you […] would not be the absolute realisation of the state but its end.’ 
Without other states to act as our state’s alter-ego or antagonist, ours would become 
nothing more than a thing. Deprived of conflict, it would cease to pulse with ‘the eternal 
rhythm of human social life,’ and its spiritual character would vanish. To avoid this 
outcome, there must be a plurality of states in ‘inevitable opposition’ to one another, 
constantly and unendingly trying to transcend that opposition through means including, 
if not restricted to, war.50 
Harris correctly observes that this argument is fallacious, and that Gentile ‘ought 
logically to argue that the state does not depend on other states any more than the 
individual depends on other individuals for society.’51 Even a solitary state would be 
able to develop; its whole existence relies on a constantly changing cast of persons, with 
                                                          
49 Genesi [103]; Harris translation [164] 
50 Genesi [103-5]; Harris translation [164-65] 
51 Harris Genesis [164n] 
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transient interests, relationships, and circumstances. It is even easier to conceive of ‘the 
moment of otherness’ in the state than in the case of Robinson Crusoe on his island. As 
he weighs up his choices, Crusoe is subject to the rhythms of the spirit even though he 
is empirically alone. The state can do this without even projecting imaginary persons. It 
contains a plurality of competing individuals, each with her own preferences, opinions 
and so on. If the state is free and infinite for every individual subject residing within and 
identifying herself with it, the existence of other states is immaterial. At most, S’s 
acknowledgement of other states’ existence, even as abstract entities, is what links the 
state qua spiritual extension of S with the state qua political institution. But I cannot see 
how this link is necessary. If those other states did not exist, what S calls ‘state’ would 
cease to be an example of a state, just as if all mothers but mine ceased to exist, it would 
no longer be the case that mine was an example of a mother. She would still be ‘mother’ to 
me. The relation would still mean the same as I saw it. Only her relation to the abstract 
concept of ‘mother’ would be affected.  
 
4. ‘The real shipwreck of actualism’: some standard objections 
The changes to Gentile’s conception of the state as it approaches its totalitarian 
endpoint reflect his increasing tendency to conflate two essentially different concepts: 
the spiritual or internal state, which is at the heart of his doctrine; and the empirical 
state, which is manifest in a contingent arrangement of institutions. The first does not 
require the second in order to act as a reference point in moral decision-making. Unless 
persons associate the second with the first, recognising the various manifestations of the 
empirical institution as bearers of moral authority, the second is an abstraction without 
moral significance, just as some imaginary otherworldly society is for someone living 
today. An empirical state may still act as though it were a spiritual state, and try to 
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compel its citizens to recognise it as such, but, as Gentile says of police states, for 
coercion to be necessary implies that the spiritual version is not yet properly established. 
If it were, citizens would already want what the state wants and act accordingly.52 
Gentile’s treatment of the state is the crux of the standard objections to his 
political and moral theory. Within his lifetime he was accused of ‘statolatry’ (statolatria) 
providing dubious arguments to justify elevating political contingency to the point that 
the decisions of certain empirical individuals are treated with uncritical reverence because 
of where they originate rather than because their content has any special qualities.53 Gentile’s 
attempts to meet this objection only exacerbate the issue.54 In Genesi, he begins a 
paragraph on statolatry with the claim that ‘[t]he state, inasmuch as it is the unique 
reality, is undoubtedly divine.’55 This is worryingly reminiscent of some of the cruder 
translations of Hegel, giving the impression that the (political) state is (pretending to be) 
a substitute for God, with all the infallible truth-affirming qualities that this suggests. 
Thus Gentile plays into the hands of his critics.56 However, there is a way out, and the 
phrase ‘inasmuch as it is the unique reality’ hints that this interpretation is flawed. As I 
understand him, Gentile can only be arguing that the transcendental state, understood as 
the widest or ‘universal’ extension of S’s personality, is the entirety of what she can 
aspire to know. Or rather: the state contains all ‘the elements belonging to the life of a 
people’; anything that an individual knows is, ipso facto, also contained within (known 
                                                          
52 For Gentile’s view of police states, see Genesi [124-5] and Harris translation [182]. 
53 This objection is levelled on a regular basis against Gentile and, often for better reasons, other 
Fascists and fascism(s). 
54 Note that he also discusses the charge of ‘statolatria’ in Diritto, but there defends Hegel against 
it. His point, I think, is that the state can be equated with ‘the march of God through the world’ 
only while its citizens identify it as the manifestation of their liberty. Once it becomes something 
material, it is ipso facto non-spiritual and therefore non-moral. See Diritto [112-3] 
55 Genesi [107]. Note that the phrase translated as ‘inasmuch as it is the unique reality’ comes from 
the Italian, ‘in quanto l’Unico’ (literally, ‘inasmuch as [it is] the Unique.’ I borrow the less 
awkward ‘unique reality’ translation from Harris’s  translation [167]. 
56 Harris also points out the link with Hegel’s ‘march of God through the world’ etc in his 
translation of Genesis [267n] 
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by) the state; Gentile’s ‘pure immanence’ requires that we cannot make concrete truth 
claims about anything that we do not know; therefore, the state is the highest (and, at a 
small stretch, the ‘divine’) form of human consciousness. 
For theorists without Gentile’s unusually privileged real-world political 
connections, the conflation of empirical state and transcendental state might be 
dismissed as an embarrassing philosophical mistake, an example of an author carried 
away on his own hyperbole. But since he consciously wrote these works to provide 
theoretical justification for the Fascist state, the consequences ran unusually deep, and 
are not so easily isolated and set aside. Gennaro Sasso argues that Gentile’s 
identification of the universal will with the (political) state is wholly unjustified and 
ultimately damaging to actual idealism’s credibility as a moral and social philosophy. S 
does not recognise the authority of the universal spirit’s will and align hers with it 
through the internal dialogue. Instead the universal spirit’s will (which is really the will 
of a dictator or equivalent political executive) replaces S’s will. There is no negotiation or 
justification or recognition; S’s will does not come into the equation. Under these 
circumstances it is senseless to talk about an ethical state, individual freedom, or even 
the state’s ‘interiority.’ Where the state is deaf to the individual will, yet possesses a will 
of its own, to which S is forced to submit irrespective of what she personally wills, the only 
meaningful will is external, possessed by a person whose arbitrary identity is only 
obscured by Gentile’s spiritual posturing.57 
                                                          
57 Sasso (1998) [268-9, 507-9 and 528-31]. Gennaro Maria Barbuto has more recently written that 
Gentile makes the state ‘an Absolute: in one way, a universalisation of the state, pure act, free, 
infinite, unlimited; in the other, its particularisation in a single entity, the state to which one 
belongs.’ He continues: ‘Gentile’s political thought exhibits an ambivalence. In his works, and 
above all in [Genesi], one can read a great deal about the alterità [otherness] of the alter[-ego] that 
is in us and is our socius, [and] about the transcendental dialectic between the ego and the self, 
which is the origin of society. But, on the other hand, a monolithic absolutisation of the state 
prevails, constituting the horizon of individual sense.’ See Barbuto (2007) Nichilismo e Stato 
totalitario. Libertà e autorità nel pensiero politico di Giovanni Gentile e Giuseppe Rensi. Naples: 
Guida [24-5] 
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Views similar to Sasso’s are common in the secondary literature. Some 
commentators are straightforwardly disparaging, maintaining that Gentile’s philosophy 
was always vague, and could be rendered compatible with any prejudices that its author 
happened to hold.58 Few have claimed that the political theory flows directly from the 
Teoria generale.59 A more common view is that actual idealism has something to offer, 
but, in one way or another, its political manifestation does its metaphysics a disservice; 
once the state is granted special discretion over all questions of truth and value, actual 
idealism can no longer offer a critical standpoint on social and political contingencies. 
Instead, it seems to guarantee any kind of authoritarian regime the appearance of 
legitimacy. ‘The state’ is left so empty a term that it can be filled with whatever the 
reader likes. In his book The Living Past, Rik Peters, by no means a flippant or hasty 
critic, states this objection in bold terms: 
[T]he real shipwreck of actualism came when Gentile began to confound the 
ideal of the self-constitutive act of thought with the reality of fascist politics, 
with the result that he saw fascism as the necessary, universal and self-justifying 
outcome of history. At this point the norma sui principle, which otherwise would 
have formed the basis of a most tolerant philosophy, turned into its own 
opposite, and formed the basis of one of the most intolerant philosophies in 
history.60 
                                                          
58 Harry Redner is a good example of such. Critics like Sabine and Marcuse could be included in 
this group, but their assessments of Gentile are so uniformly savage that it is hard to say what 
they think his theory would have been worth if he had not become a Fascist. 
59 One example is A. James Gregor, who claims that Gentile’s theory was ‘betrayed’ and 
misrepresented by its nominal adherents. See his introduction to Gentile (2007) Origins and 
Doctrine of Fascism. New Jersey: Transaction [xii]. An account of other Fascists’ attempts to deny 
that actual idealism represented the substance of Fascist doctrine can be found in Gregor (2001) 
Giovanni Gentile: Philosopher of Fascism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction [67-80]. 
60 Peters (1998a) [515]. The quotation continues: ‘Only at the end of his life, seeing the results of 
fascism, Gentile did [word order sic] try to reinforce the tolerant aspect of actualism with his 
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Bruce Haddock makes a similar point. Since there is no truth outside the mind 
by which political arrangements can be judged, ‘it follows that political orders establish 
their own terms of reference.’ If the state ‘creat[es] unity, rather than passively reflecting 
it[, it is] not enough to value the traditions and practices that had [formerly] shaped a 
way of life.’ Instead, in Gentile’s state, citizens ‘have to identify with the organised 
projection of those values by the state, treating the state as the public embodiment of 
their personalities.’61 Gentile’s basic criterion of political legitimacy is that the state’s will 
and the individual wills of its constituent persons should align. He does not assume that 
these conditions already obtain. They must be brought about through active 
intervention. But he neglects to specify any limits on how much the state may do to 
bring about such an alignment. His theory, preoccupied with S’s ‘unity’ with the state, 
removes all traditional limits on the state’s authority. Even its conceptual structure is 
designed to eliminate conflicts of interest, as shown by the assimilation and near-
obliteration of Hegel’s concepts of family and civil society. Indeed, with Gentile’s 
insistence that orders of value must be imposed, he seems to have granted the political 
state an unlimited amount of power to impose its will upon individuals. The idea of the 
concrete will, or of the world constantly changing according to subjects’ acts of self-
realisation, allows him to excuse current problems, such as widespread intolerance or 
state terrorism or opposition to the state by its own citizens, as unfortunate but 
inevitable wrinkles in the universal spirit’s development. Viewed through the concrete 
will of the state, what appears to be opposition is just history in fieri: the state’s will is 
bound to be vindicated in the future.62 
                                                                                                                                                                    
theory of the transcendental dialogue according to which society is based on the possibility that 
we can talk to ourselves.’ 
61 Bruce Haddock (2005) A History of Political Thought: 1789 to the Present. Oxford: Polity. 
[124]; emphasis added 
62 The idea of the disparity between the state that is and the state that it is in fieri is at the heart of 
Sasso’s general critique. 
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There are two problems here. One is that the will is attached to an empirically 
identifiable entity without adequate justification. Thus we see Gentile endorsing Benito 
Mussolini as the agent of history, rather than the role or office that Mussolini may or may 
not fill. The second problem is that, having too readily granted the spiritual value of one 
person or administration, Gentile becomes unable to criticise it. What is the status of a 
disobedient citizen in a totalitarian regime? From the regime’s perspective, the citizen’s 
will represents a moment in the development of its proper form, which will ultimately 
(and inevitably) conform to the ‘universal will’ of the state. From the citizen’s 
perspective, the regime is tyrannical, and its will opposed to her own.  
It is a matter of speculative history whether Gentile would have supported the 
Fascist regime in the event that Mussolini had been replaced. Since Mussolini outlived 
Gentile, the philosopher’s loyalty was never tested in this way. I do not think that his 
excessive acceptance of the regime’s activities can be explained in terms of his theory. 
Some authors have claimed, with varying degrees of scorn, that Gentile became caught 
up in Mussolini’s cult of personality and swallowed the Party line on how ‘il Duce is 
always right’ (il Duce ha sempre ragione).63 Others portray Gentile not as deluded but as a 
tragic figure who often disapproved of Party policy, but was aware that he was so deeply 
embroiled in the Fascist project that he could not leave without bearing the 
responsibility for its wrongs. On this account he felt that he could better employ his 
moderating influence from inside the regime than outside. A third account has it that he 
knowingly betrayed his own principles, producing philosophy to order in exchange for 
influence – and that he certainly gained, as the owner of a publishing house, the editor 
of the Enciclopedia Italiana, and (somewhat artificially) Italy’s most prominent public 
                                                          
63 Harris (1960), for example, characterises Gentile’s adherence to Mussolini as a symptom of 
‘opportunism’ [190-1 and 219-20] 
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intellectual. Again, though, these are historical and biographical curios. The present 
study does not claim any insight into Gentile’s psychology, but rather his theory. 
Fortunately, Gentile’s early efforts elaborating actual idealism’s system give us 
enough material to distinguish effective objections from misdirected ones, or those 
which misrepresent the theory they mean to criticise. A recent example of the latter 
comes from M.E. Moss. She writes that when the concrete truth-affirming qualities of 
state are invested in specific individuals, Gentile finds himself supporting a ‘romantic 
concept of the elite person, the uomo fascista[.]’ From there it follows ‘that any 
proposition[,] no matter how contrary to empirical evidence or combination of 
propositions, even if inconsistent with one another, expressed by Il Duce must be true.’ 
On the purely metaphysical analysis, an act of thinking is necessarily conditioned by that 
of the state, since that is spirit itself: it represents what S already affirms. Transplanted 
to the political state, this dynamic implies that any person who wants anything other 
than what her state (i.e. the dictator) wants must be mistaken. The dictator is imagined to 
be infallible and insuperable. ‘This,’ writes Moss, ‘is the path to folly, not to truth.’64 
I suspect that Moss overstates her case. What she describes is a step removed 
from even the most far-reaching political authority that actual idealism can 
accommodate. This is not to say that Moss’s claims do not reflect how Gentile and 
some of his Fascist colleagues sometimes treated the relation between the state (or its 
leader) and its citizens. But as we saw in chapter 1.1, Gentile insists on a theory of truth 
based on coherence and belief. While it is true that he denies the value of empirical 
evidence in itself, he cannot claim that the state’s truth claims trump individual beliefs 
where individuals have compelling reasons (including empirical evidence) to hold the 
                                                          
64 M.E. Moss (2004) Mussolini’s Fascist Philosopher: Giovanni Gentile Reconsidered. London: 
Peter Lang. [54-5]. For more on the idea of what the state ‘wants [the citizen] to want,’ see 
Educazione [33]: ‘As a citizen, I want what I want; but, on closer inspection, I see that what I 
want coincides precisely with what the state wants (me to want). And my will is the will of the 
state.’ (Note that the parentheses are present in the original.) 
Part 1: Components of actual idealism 
130 
beliefs they do. Nor can the state make claims that are ‘inconsistent with one another.’ 
According to Gentile’s definition of truth, such inconsistency requires that one or more 
of the incompatible claims be adjusted or jettisoned. Thinking is primitive; the state’s 
will is not, and is rather constructed by individual (albeit socialised) thinking subjects. The 
state can cause an indefinite number of propositions to be true, and can alter citizens’ 
beliefs through propaganda and education, but only within the bounds of thinkability. 
As such, the state’s actual truth claims are available for reasoned scrutiny and 
subsequent criticism. 
 
5. The ethical state of mind 
It is plain that Gentile’s identification of the political state with the state or 
socius in his moral theory is an aberration. In order to present them as the same object, 
he needs to make untenable assumptions about S’s beliefs, namely, that they square with 
those of the political state, however those are understood. This demands one of several 
highly improbable arrangements. It could be that the state is able to alter S’s will 
directly, perhaps through a maximally efficient and comprehensive system of 
propaganda and education. If S were already committed to the idea that what the state 
wills is what she personally wills, this could be achieved. But this would make her 
nothing more than a credulous and uncritical follower of an external authority. These 
thoughts are not subjected to examination, compared with alternatives, checked for 
coherence and integrity, and subsequently affirmed, but imported from the outside. 
Under these conditions S cannot be free in the way Gentile thinks requisite to morality. 
The relation between S and the state would be not a dialogue but a lecture. The 
privileged few with political power cannot have moral authority over S – who, let us 
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remember, represents every thinker – unless she self-consciously recognises them as 
such.  
The only solution to this problem, as I see it, is to insist on the sharp division 
between the two concepts of state. There is the empirical, political state and the 
spiritual, ethical state. These two may coincide, but only in special circumstances. It is 
crucial that these are not confused with one another. A maximally efficient political 
administration may be able to marshal the beliefs of its constituent citizens in such a 
way that they hold reasonably compatible commitments, recognise each other as fellow 
contributors to a common endeavour, and are otherwise able and motivated to behave 
in ways that further their collective ends. However, Gentile treats the political state as 
though its citizens already share a collective consciousness and recognise its supreme 
authority in matters of law, culture and morality. Plainly this was not and was never the 
case. A moral theory that relies upon a merely possible arrangement of empirical 
circumstances is no more than an abstract exercise concerning responsibilities held and 
discharged by imaginary people. If the theory does not reflect the facts that actually 
obtain, it can present S with no morally significant reasons for action. 
There is a worrying dissonance between what Gentile insisted the state 
represented and what was believed by the very individuals he claimed to describe. 
Persons already identify strongly with groups other than the state, to which they can 
even be apathetic or hostile. Sometimes these other groups make moral claims on their 
members that contradict or otherwise cannot be assimilated into those of the state. The 
state cannot then impose its contradictory order of value and have persons uncritically 
accept it. Indeed, the state’s conception of value would present itself as a moral affront 
to persons already so committed. This clearly indicates that the political state cannot be 
assumed to fulfil the role of the socius. Persons with other beliefs may ignore or 
consciously reject the demands the state makes of them. There is no point at which 
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previously-committed persons do not already exist; even under conditions of extreme 
social conditioning, the existence of persons and commitments prior to those conditions 
remains problematic.65 
The spiritual conception of the state is more promising. It does not presuppose 
S’s identification with any particular political entity or community of empirical persons. 
It is instead a model of the best reasons and truest beliefs that she can conceive. 
Although S is the arbiter of reasons, the demands of the universal will – of morality, in a 
word – are not just whatever S happens to want them to be. Through careful 
consideration of Gentile’s wider system, and particularly the setup of the internal 
dialogue, we can flesh out the socius and fit it into a workable moral theory that can 
discipline her thinking and identify universal reasons. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I explained the development of Gentile’s concept of the state 
and showed what role it is assigned in his moral theory. I contend that he fails to justify 
this insertion. The problem is that he runs together two distinct concepts – the political 
state and the spiritual state – and tries to cover the difference between the two using 
unconvincingly adapted terms from elsewhere in his theory. When the political state is 
identified with the socius, and the state’s will is identified as the ‘true’ counterpart to S’s 
will, the ‘internal dialogue’ – the process of moral reasoning – ceases to be a 
conversation. Instead it becomes a monologue, consisting of the state’s claims about 
what its constituent persons ‘really’ believe, undergirded by the dubious assumption that 
these claims somehow supersede the beliefs those persons might (mistakenly) think 
themselves to hold. They are deprived of any critical standpoint, and their personal 
                                                          
65 The experiences of Roman Catholics and Mafiosi in Fascist Italy are relevant (if in most respects 
very different) examples of how and why these problems might arise. 
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judgements count for nothing in the determination of what to think or do. This is 
wholly incompatible with the basic tenets of actual idealism, in which S must have the 
capacity to judge and endorse (or reject) what moral claims are made of her. At the end 
of the chapter I argued that the solution to Gentile’s problem is to divide cleanly 
between the political state and its spiritual counterpart. The two may overlap, and in 
morally upstanding states any disparity between them will be minimal. But Gentile’s 
attempt to fasten his theory to a nascent authoritarian regime is unconvincing, and 
requires him to compromise the theory’s structure in order to supply a facade of 
constant legitimacy. 
In chapter 0.1’s brief overview of constructivism I distinguished ‘simple’ 
constructivism from its ‘procedural’ counterpart. This first half of the thesis has shown 
actual idealism to be an unambiguous example of simple constructivism, since it 
conceives of all thinking, including the subject and object of thought, in an endless 
process of self-creation. It also contains hints of a constructivist procedure in the form 
of the internal dialogue. In Gentile’s moral theory, however, the constructivist principles 
are undermined when he equates the political state with the socius and S’s will with that 
of the state. The theory collapses into the assertion that what S ought to do is whatever 
her political state wants her to do. The content of those commands is left immune from 
rational scrutiny. Thus moral claims become facts, purely objective features of a realist 
cosmos. This is anathema to actual idealism’s constructivist principles.66 My task in the 
coming chapters is to elaborate a more sophisticated version of the socius and the 
internal dialogue, revealing how, without the (political) state’s disruptive influence, 
Gentile’s theory can be rehabilitated as a plausible moral constructivist doctrine. 
                                                          
66 Recall Street’s definition of ‘constructivist views in ethics [as those which] understand the 
correctness or incorrectness of some (specified) set of normative judgements as a question of 
whether those judgements withstand some (specified) procedure of scrutiny from the standpoint 
of some (specified) set of further normative judgements,’ in Street (2003) ‘Constructivism about 
Reasons,’ already quoted in chapter 0.1, sub-section #4ii.  
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2.1  Gentile contra Kant on practical reason  
 
Part 1 in review and Part 2 in preview 
To set the scene for this chapter and those that follow, let me briefly summarise 
Part 1. Chapter 1.1 described actual idealism’s conception of the subject as pensiero 
pensante, together with the idea of truth as a process of construction within the bounds 
of the coherently thinkable. Chapter 1.2 explained how Gentile distinguishes his theory 
from solipsism and situates the subject (S) in a world alongside other people. The link 
between S and other persons, and, by extension, S and morality, is contained in the 
‘transcendental society’ in which the ‘internal dialogue’ occurs. This dialogue involves S 
justifying her beliefs through reference to the ‘socius,’ an arbiter that she constructs. 
Chapter 1.3 described Gentile’s attempts to have the political state fill this role. I argued 
that this strategy proves self-defeating, since the person or persons representing the 
political state must refer to a third agent in order to know what they (and the state) will. 
The third must refer to fourth, that to a fifth, and so on in an endless regress. 
Over the second half of the thesis, and starting with this chapter, I mean to 
employ Gentile’s conception of the socius as part of a recognisably constructivist internal 
dialogue procedure, or IDP. Since Gentile’s moral theory has not previously been presented 
as a full-fledged procedural constructivism, I refer to other theories to see what features 
such a doctrine should have. This will also allow me to show how the IDP is 
distinguishable from them. Especially important is Kantian constructivism, since 
Gentile frequently compares Kant’s doctrine with his own, praising it for its 
demonstration of the possibility of a doctrine without unjustified presuppositions, despite 
the residual dualisms that persist in Kant’s actual writings. More recent Anglo-American 
theorists have tried to render Kant’s doctrine in fully constructivist terms. I refer to 
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their writings where contrasts with Gentile’s positions are more striking than those 
between Gentile and Kant himself. 
The present chapter is structured as follows. I begin (sub-heading #1) with a 
summary of Gentile’s account of reason as put forth in his Logica. From that I extract 
the IDP’s basic outline. I then indicate a number of questions that remain unresolved in 
this account of the IDP. To see how these might be answered, at sub-heading #2 I 
describe Kant’s various formulations of the categorical imperative (hereafter CI), which 
has been widely interpreted as the centrepiece of the recent constructivist literature. 
Under the next three sub-headings I assess the extent to which these formulations can 
be applied to the IDP: the Universal Law Formula (#3); the Kingdom of Ends Formula 
(#4); and the Autonomy Formula (#5). I find that the Autonomy Formula bears the 
closest resemblance to the Gentilean theory I describe, but, while a strong conception 
of autonomy enables us to answer some of the questions raised earlier, actual idealism’s 
unusual structure leaves the full meaning of autonomy ambiguous. (That problem is 
taken up in chapter 2.2.) At sub-heading #6 I comment upon the CI’s features that 
Gentile does consider worth retaining, before concluding with an overview of the 
questions still to be answered (#7). 
 
1. Reason in actual idealism 
Part 1 showed actual idealism to be a thoroughgoing variety of anti-realism. The 
method of immanence denies the possibility of any independent domain against which 
claims can be tested.1 This leaves pensiero pensante open to the charge of crude 
intuitionism, according to which truths are immediately available to the thinker without 
any need for mutual coherence or consistency. This would deny the possibility of error, 
                                                          
1 ‘If a moral reality exists,’ writes Gentile, ‘it exists inasmuch as man makes it exist. Its moral 
character consists in precisely its existence as [the] product of the human spirit.’ Diritto [7] 
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for any claim or combination of claims could be simultaneously true at the moment S 
thinks of them as such. She would be at the mercy of the whims of intuition, her 
thought determined by what is given to it, without any power to distinguish and thus 
construct the truth. 
Similar charges can be made of anti-realist doctrines in general. We might say 
that if nothing is independently real, anything can be true, and if anything can be true, 
the prospects for achieving certainty in judgements look doubtful. Gentile replies to this 
accusation by appeal to the unity of thought and value. To hold something to be 
valuable, an argument to be valid, or a truth claim to be justified requires S to affirm a 
belief about it. This act of affirmation is the basis for actual idealism’s distinction 
between right and wrong beliefs, or thinking well and thinking badly. S must try to find 
beliefs that are justified, in that they have enough mutual coherence for her to affirm 
them simultaneously without needing to think two or more mutually contradictory 
claims at once. 
The usual constructivist solution to this problem is to invoke the idea of reason 
or reasons for belief and action, with different accounts of what S ought to do 
(including, perhaps, what she ought to think) undergoing scrutiny in accordance with 
some specially-designed procedure. We have already seen evidence of such a procedure 
in Gentile’s internal dialogue. In the version presented so far, it is unclear how subject 
and socius are related. Until we know this, we cannot know how authoritative moral 
judgements can be reached. A successful account of actual idealist moral theory must 
operate without presupposing the moral authority of some external agent such as the 
political state. That would infringe thought’s unconditioned liberty. Conversely, if it is 
possible for the state to act in a morally authoritative way, its actions must meet criteria 
freely imposed upon it by thought. To see how Gentile achieves this, I turn to the 
account of reason in his Sistema di logica. In what follows I lay it out, drawing 
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occasionally on relevant supporting passages in other parts of the Logica. This will give 
us the basic materials with which to design a practicable constructivist procedure. 
Gentile notes that throughout the history of philosophy,2 it was believed that 
thought could be divided into discrete events or individual thoughts occurring 
successively over time, enacted by empirically separate subjects, each thinking ‘this or 
that thought’ in her own mind.3 These commonsensical assumptions about the 
existence of other minds cannot be rigorously defended, as actual idealism’s conception 
of the subject goes to show. However, both actual idealism and the conventional view 
recognise the need for a unified conception of thought. That is: in order for people to 
live together, and even for them to think at all, these separate though (sometimes) 
simultaneous thoughts must ‘come together’ in the dialectic, wherein thinkers can, first, 
‘compose and resolve the multiplicity of natural things […] in a [shared] cosmos and a 
single being’; and, second, ‘gather together and reduce the multitude of men under the 
empire of a single thought, of a unique intellect, of an impersonal reason.’ These two 
postulates,4 he writes, were ‘energetically affirmed’ by successive philosophers, showing 
how much ‘faith in thought had been strengthened.’5 
The first postulate refers to the idea that thoughts contribute to a whole. If S 
asks herself the question, ‘Are these my shoes?’ and thinks (affirms) that P (e.g. ‘yes; 
these are my shoes’) and not-P (‘no; these are not my shoes’), she is confused, assuming 
                                                          
2 This is a liberal translation of the Italian. Gentile in fact refers to the spirit’s ‘historical 
representation,’ which I take to mean ‘the history of philosophy, construed as one ongoing 
project.’  
3 Note that Gentile uses the verb ‘appropriarsi,’ meaning to appropriate (for oneself). Hence 
subjects appropriate this or that thought. It may be worth bringing out the implications that, 
according to Gentile’s view of the ‘historical representation of the spirit,’ the range of possible 
thoughts is viewed as though it exists prior to the thinking of them, allowing thinkers to 
appropriate rather than create them per se. 
4 ‘Postulate’ means, roughly, to assume [something] as the basis for subsequent discussion or 
reasoning. In these cases, then, the relevant postulates are strictly (1) that it is possible to 
‘compose and resolve the multiplicity of natural things […] in a [shared] cosmos and a single 
being’; and (2) that it is possible to ‘gather together and reduce the multitude of men under the 
empire of a single thought, of a unique intellect, of an impersonal reason.’ 
5 Logica 2 [96] 
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that she also believes both of these claims to refer to the same object under the same 
circumstances. Not every combination of thoughts thought (call these ‘claims’) can be 
affirmed simultaneously; a claim’s truth or falsity is not a property independent of other 
claims. It is quite ordinary to say that what a person thinks is wrong, or that she has 
failed to reason correctly. The basis for this, and S’s motivation for finding coherent 
beliefs, is the assumption (a necessary assumption, unless persons are to retreat to a 
solipsist standpoint) that, despite the subjectivity of thinking, there are multiple subjects 
or at least points of view that could be adopted in S’s world. 
The second postulate extends this idea to inter-subjective reason. Although 
earlier philosophers assumed the existence of multiple, individual and separate thoughts 
and thinkers, they persistently referred to thinking as an activity in which all thinkers are 
engaged and of which every thought is a product. Although people sometimes think 
differently when faced with the same set of considerations, or come to hold different 
beliefs, it would be strange to say that they each occupy a separate universe about which 
they can make accordingly separate, incommensurable claims. Since they assume 
themselves to belong to a single, shared universe, persons can review, reject and/or 
follow each other’s reasons for thinking and acting in much the same way that they each 
review, reject and correct their own. The ‘empire of […] impersonal reason’ refers to 
the single, shared conception of reason against which several (and perhaps all) subjects 
test their own and each other’s ideas. Without a conception of a ‘united’ cosmos, 
persons face the unedifying prospect of a world ‘crumble[d] into the multiplicity of 
things, parts or phenomena, [before which] the individual feels [her]self [to be] enclosed 
by an impassable barrier [and] cut off from other individuals.’ Even when overcome by 
doubt and uncertainty, thinkers persist in ‘peer[ing] through the gloom, searching 
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anxiously for ways to unite [their own thoughts] with the thoughts of others.’ This 
search for unity, Gentile thinks, is driven by ‘the very nature of thought itself.’6 
 
1i. The internal dialogue re-visited 
In chapter 1.1 I noted that Gentile’s conception of concrete thought is strictly a 
positive one. ‘Not thinking P’ is not an act one can perform. Instead, one must 
(positively, actually) think something else. Nevertheless one requires a conception of 
what one does not think, as well as a set of reasons that one does not think it, in order to 
be able to articulate clearly what one does think. An appreciation of this opposition or 
resistance is the very basis of reason. S needs not only the consensus of other thinkers, 
but also ‘their dissent, their opposition and their resistance to [her] thought.’ Gentile 
asks:  
What does it matter whether [a person] encounters other people empirically, as 
they are thrown together in political life, in crowds and assemblies; or lives for 
[her]self according to the cowardly warnings of epicurean7 wisdom? 
His answer is that the second person, who ‘lives for [her]self’ at the exclusion of 
other people, ‘will never be content with that changeless death’ – surely a spiritual death 
– ‘that [Epicurus’s] wisdom promises,’ because in losing any resistance to her thought, 
she also loses the basis for her positive self-conception. That is: without an idea of what 
she does not believe (and why she rejects these propositions as false) S has no way to 
distinguish her actual, positive beliefs from unjustified assumptions. The abstraction of 
other persons’ ideas is ‘overcome’ when S re-thinks and rejects or affirms them for 
                                                          
6 Logica 2 [97] 
7 Note that Epicurus thought that pleasure was the sole criterion for a good life. I think that what 
Gentile suggests here, then, is that a person might live ‘for [her]self’ in a self-interested, pleasure-
seeking fashion, at the exclusion of what other people think. 
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herself. Thus they cease to be a ‘limit’ on her thought. It is in overcoming the limit 
imposed by other thinkers and other (perhaps hypothetical) points of view that her life 
as self-creative, self-correcting pensiero pensante consists. 
This should not be read as a claim that persons empirically isolated from others 
are unable to think or apply reason. To drive this point home, Gentile unambiguously 
invokes the internal dialogue: 
In solitude, man speaks to himself. He makes his alter [ego] inside himself, and he 
labours away in the secret conversation with the interlocutor that he, in the 
abstract solitude of his particular life, has created, in a drama identical to that 
which each of us brings to life in the concrete marriage of our being with the 
whole of our world. And one has no less need to make oneself agree with this 
secret interlocutor, [by] overcoming or yielding or submitting; finding in him 
sometimes a satanic tempter, another time a stern or benign mentor, another 
time a criminal or a judge, and in general a partner.8 
The most notable difference between this and Diritto’s brief description of 
Robinson Crusoe is the acknowledgement of the variable character of the alter-ego (or 
socius). This plainly distinguishes it from a hypothetical onlooker at an Archimedean 
point, like Kant’s ‘impartial and rational spectator,’9 Hare’s ‘archangel,’10 or any of 
countless other ideal observers. It would be strange to invoke and follow the advice of 
an acknowledged ‘satanic tempter’ when considering what to think or do.11 The socius’s 
authority in reasoning cannot be derived directly from its identity, for that would have 
                                                          
8 Logica 2 [97]. Thanks to Matteo Fabbretti for his help in correcting this translation in September 
2012. 
9 Kant w/ Paton (1948) The Moral Law. London: Hutchinson [61: 393 in std. pag.] 
10 R.M. Hare (1978) ‘Moral Conflicts,’ in Tanner Lectures in Human Value, pp. 171-93. Accessible 
at www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/tanner.pdf [182] 
11 Harris acknowledges this point: ‘Even the roles and attitudes here suggested – “tempter,” 
“mentor,” “criminal,” “judge,” “subjection” [for which I have offered ‘submitting’], “conquest” [for 
which I have given ‘overcoming’] – are slightly suspicious.’ (1960) [110] 
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the IDP hinge on a kind of intuition, with the present state of the socius corresponding 
to a changeable set of facts already available to S.12  Figure 1 shows how this implausible 
dynamic would operate. S is the subject, who refers (solid line) to A, the socius or alter-ego. 
A is taken to have moral authority (dashed line) over S. The imperative presented by A 
reflects S’s immediate awareness (intuition) of what she ought to do, and is unmediated 
by reasons.  As such it is liable to change, and can be taken to be authoritative only as S 
recognises it as such. 
Figure 1: non-constructed moral authority 
S 
 
  A 
 
S’s awareness that A could appear under a different guise suggests that A can at 
most feature in the reasoning process as one element among others. Hence S’s ‘drama’ 
is ‘identical’ to those of other people only inasmuch as persons recognise each other as 
fellow thinkers. But for a given thinking subject, the socius remains secret: it is internal, 
and is not strictly shared with other people. Its characteristics are not wholly arbitrary, 
of course. S does not create it in a social vacuum. It may reflect other people, specific or 
otherwise, as S imagines what they would say about the judgement she is making. It 
cannot be assumed that any two people will reason identically, since each must create 
her secret partner for herself, and respond to whatever form it might take. 
 
                                                          
12 To clarify: S cannot refer directly to the socius in order to decide what to do. This is because (i) 
it would assume that S had the answers already, but was projecting them onto this mysterious 
‘other’; and (ii) it does not explain the reconciliation of S and the socius in ‘a single thought.’ 
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1ii. Universality and objectivity 
Recall that in his later works, Gentile calls the dialogue ‘transcendental.’ Given 
his resistance to the idea of transcendent domains beyond the immanent plane of the 
thinkable, this may seem an inapt choice of terminology. Here, though, the term 
‘transcendental’ should be understood in another sense. Rather than ‘removed from the 
phenomenal plane of existence,’ it means ‘inherent in the way thinking occurs.’13 Crusoe 
distinguishes reasoned from unreasonable judgement in consultation with others in the 
‘transcendental society.’ He imagines what other people would say about whatever 
problem he faces; he reflects on their suggestions and adjusts his judgement where he 
considers it appropriate to do so. He asks himself, ‘If I were someone else, how would I 
assess this problem?’ He overcomes his particularity, recognising the possibility of other 
points of view and the subservience of his reasons (and those of other people) to those 
of a ‘universal subject’ whose reasons are not only unbiased but sound. These are good 
reasons rather than his (or S’s) particular reasons.14 More generically, once S has judged 
the matter in what she considers the best way she can, viewing it from the (imagined) 
perspectives of people other than herself and deciding how she ought to respond to 
them, her judgement ceases to be merely subjective and gains objective status. 
Figure 2 (overleaf) models a minimal dialogical constructivist procedure. The 
subject (S) refers to the socius (A), and may or may not accept A’s reasons as 
                                                          
13 This is a generous interpretation. It is notable that Gentile does not refer to the transcendent 
society (which really would be unknowable, and claims about it therefore nonsensical) but the 
transcendental society, which, following Kant’s distinction between the two, would make it the 
society that ‘pertains to the necessary conditions of knowledge.’ See Mautner (2005) [622] 
14 On a rather charitable interpretation, Gentile might be thought to make this point in Sommario 
2 [34-5] and Genesi [20-1]; Harris translation [86-87]. The phrase ‘soggetto universale’ occurs 
rarely, in works like Religione [89], although variants appear elsewhere and appear to have the 
same meaning. In Logica 1 [40], for example, Gentile refers to ‘mente universale’ (universal 
mind). Most often, though, he uses the word ‘universal’ as a noun rather than an adjective. 
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authoritative. S may also find that her original reasons are superior to A’s,15 and are as 
such vindicated through the dialogical process. It could otherwise be that some new 
intermediate position provides the strongest reasons. In this way S can construct a 
universal subject (US), which S recognises to have the best reasons available from S and A. 
Figure 2: minimal dialogical construction 
  A   
     
S    US 
 
Recalling the Particularity Objection raised in chapter 1.2, it might be objected 
here that A – the other participant in the internal dialogue – is an invention of S, whose 
thought is already ‘particular,’ since it includes her contingent characteristics, perhaps 
including stupidity, ignorance, prejudice, and self-deception. Hence the purported 
universality of its result cannot be anything more than a mirage, and aspirations to it 
necessarily misguided. Someone who fundamentally misapprehends or is ignorant of the 
facts of the matter will posit internal interlocutors with the same impediments. If I am 
very stupid, and cannot think through a problem, I am unlikely to see the correct 
answer in the clear light of reason because an imaginary alter-ego has put the case to 
me. Either I have reasoned out the problem for myself, or else those in the internal 
dialogue will have nothing to say. A judgement made in isolation is necessarily a 
subjective one, and its aspirations to objectivity via inter-subjectivity are illusory. 
Gentile responds to this objection in the Logica’s first volume. He equates S’s 
‘process’ with the truth’s ‘dialectic.’ So conceived, the process (viz. thought) is ‘subject 
                                                          
15 For now, controversially, I take the idea of a good reason’s superiority to a bad reason to be 
basic. I will come back to the question of what qualities better or worse reasons have in chapter 
2.3. 
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and object in one,’ incorporating both ‘the subject’s liberty and the object’s necessity.’ 
In simpler language, he means that thought constantly corrects itself. He continues: 
Against those who would object that our [viz. actual idealism’s conception of] 
subjectivity cannot pretend to contain the genuine objectivity which is proper to 
truth, [we] must reply that that subjectivity in which one finds what one 
legitimately wants to save in the objectivist conception of truth is not our 
dialectic[al] subjectivity, but [instead] that abstract concept of transcendent truth 
statically opposed to the reality of truth.16 
These objectors are making a mistake by imagining a form of objective truth 
existing without S. As we saw in chapter 1.1, Gentile insists that purely objective truths 
are unattainable, and cannot, therefore, yield intelligible standards for knowledge. S 
cannot know a pure object even so far as to be able to compare her own subjective 
claims with it. Thus ‘objective knowledge’ is a contradiction in terms, confusing ‘the 
shadow thought projects in front of itself’ for an object that conditions and determines 
that thought.17 If reason is imagined to be an ‘unattainable’ object, isolated from S in 
‘the strong fortress of the abstract logos,’ out of time and space and isolated from any 
actual thinker, the problem of describing or meaningfully applying reason would seem 
insoluble.18 Gentile’s reference to ‘dialectical subjectivity’ hints at how S might attain a 
more robust kind of knowledge than unmodified subjectivity allows by responding to 
alternatives to her reasons for thinking and acting as she does. That will be one of the 
tasks for the IDP developed over this second half of the thesis. 
The unifying feature of Gentile’s account of reason is his claim that thought, 
actual concrete pensiero pensante, is prior to reason. Reason is thought’s product, and 
                                                          
16 Logica 1 [126] 
17 Logica 2 [240] 
18 Logica 2 [99] 
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insofar as thinkers appeal to principles of reason to guide their thinking along a single 
path that other thinkers would recognise as the right one, they are invoking the 
authority of abstractions that are authoritative precisely because actual, concrete thought has made 
them so. Two thinkers might think very differently about some contentious problem and 
come to different conclusions about what solution is best. If they think separately, 
justifying their respective conclusions by appeals to reasons that they each believe to be 
sound, they can both be said to exercise reason. It is only when they come together and 
see that they have each presupposed a different conception of reason that they are 
prompted to re-assess their judgements. The aim is to attain 
true and absolute objectivity: absolute because [it is] self-governing, and has no 
need for external norms to which it must correspond. But without any such 
external norm, all of thought, in its actuality [as] pensiero pensante, is 
homogeneous.19 
 
1iii. The heart of reason 
It is often assumed that reason is separate from sentiment.20 On the 
conventional intellectualistic account, to apply reason is to think in a structured, logical 
way. Sentiment, being notoriously capricious, serves mainly to disturb its finely-tuned 
counterpart, which requires care and deliberation to be effective. Emotions that 
different people may or may not feel are too unreliable to count as universal reasons, 
however much those subject to such emotions might feel compelled to take them into 
account. This view prompts the familiar metaphor of the impartial spectator, who 
                                                          
19 Logica 2 [100]. I have written ‘self-governing’ although Gentile in fact uses the more technical 
and suggestive word ‘autarcà’ (autarchy). I return to this important term under sub-heading #5 in 
the present chapter. 
20 Gentile points this out in Sommario 1 [79] 
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reasons out arguments unaffected by troublesome personal preferences or feelings. 
Gentile insists that this view is mistaken: 
The heart’s thought is in the same line of thought as reason: thought belonging 
to that [species of ] reason […] that is called heart by those who orient 
themselves toward a conception of truth [using] norms of the abstract logos. 
Thought, which is the ego being non-ego, does not admit anything […] outside 
itself. What is not heart is not reason, and what is not reason is not heart. [What] 
is not intellect is not sense; nor vice versa.21 
The significance of ‘the heart’ in this passage is not immediately obvious, and 
might, on an uncharitable reading, be dismissed as a poetic flourish. But this would be 
to concede the whole passage to ‘those who orient themselves toward […] the abstract 
logos,’ which is plainly something Gentile means to resist. ‘The heart’ is something that 
those favouring a purely objective conception of reason, based in the abstract logos, 
would eliminate from their method of inquiry. What Gentile has in mind, I think, is S’s 
considered conviction or feeling that what reason tells her is true. She must countenance the 
abstract outcome of her reasoning, conceding that it follows logically (say) from the 
other relevant considerations; but also its concrete outcome, recognising that she ought to 
believe the testimony of her own thought. In more ordinary language, we sometimes speak of a 
person having the courage of her convictions, meaning that she resists the temptation to 
compromise on her aims and beliefs. This is distinguishable from stubbornness, which 
might involve adherence to beliefs that S just happens (but has no good reason) to hold. 
The Gentilean subject endeavours to justify her convictions and desires, altering them 
where appropriate, in order to find a coherent, unified self-conception. 
Gentile’s account of ‘reason and the heart’ concludes as follows: 
                                                          
21 Logica 2 [100]. Note that I do not follow Harris in distinguishing lowercase ‘ego’ (the pure 
individual, or social atom) from ‘Ego’ (concrete thinker). 
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[A] heart will be conquered by a reason, not because the heart was ever destined 
to succumb in the struggle, but because reason always conquers itself. Or rather: 
it is an eternal victory over itself. And whoever employs syllogisms to win over 
the mother’s heart, ignorant of exactly this centre [viz. the heart] on which the 
reason of syllogisms must hinge itself, has never suspected this living link 
between the abstract logos and the concrete, outside which there will be the 
philosopher’s truth, but a truth that will taste of straw for the man to whom the 
philosopher tries to offer it.22 
This passage again refers to a conflict between reason and the heart. However, 
since the heart also ‘has its reasons,’ the two are not incommensurable.23 Unlike Plato 
and Aristotle, who divide thought into abstractly distinct functions or faculties,24 Gentile 
means to unite them in the dialectic of ego and non-ego, intellect and sense. Logic will 
not compel S to alter her beliefs until she feels that the truths logic has revealed are 
authentic.25 They must not be only the kinds of speculative fancy indulged by 
philosophers, but instead true claims about concrete reality. The idea that the heart can 
be ‘conquered’ by a reason26 suggests that unity can be achieved: the heart, or sentiment, 
or feelings, must give way to reasoning, which is, after all, a special kind of thinking. We 
see here again that Gentile’s reason is a product and analogue of thought, something 
endlessly created and re-created in the act of thinking. 
                                                          
22 Logica 2 [100] 
23 Antonio G. Pesce points out that when he says that ‘the heart has its reasons,’ Gentile invokes 
Blaise Pascal, whom he elsewhere quotes in the epigraph to Atto puro. See Pesce (2012) 
L’interiorità intersoggettiva dell’attualismo: il personalismo di Giovanni Gentile.  Rome: Aracne 
[128] 
24 Logica 2 [99] 
25 This point is further reinforced in Atto puro [99-100]; Carr translation [102]. 
26 Note that I say ‘a reason’ and not ‘reason.’ This is not a typo. In the Italian, Gentile writes: ‘Un 
cuore bensì sarà vinto da una ragione; ma non perchè il cuore sia mai destinato a soccombere nella 
lotta, sì perchè la ragione vince sempre se stessa.’ (Emphasis added). 
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To summarise. Reasoning involves the reconciliation of contradictory 
viewpoints in a single subject’s thought. This means that propositions are systematically 
affirmed or rejected in order to construct a unified and coherent set of ideas that S can 
recognise as justified, supported both positively (in that she believes she has sound 
reasons for choosing her preferred position) and negatively (in that she believes the 
reasons for choosing other positions are less convincing). Hence reasoning relies upon 
the simultaneous recognition of positive and negative reasons for selecting one’s 
position. The process cannot come to a decisive close without S’s beliefs becoming 
presuppositions. Alternative views can be presented directly to her, as in a conversation 
with other empirical persons, or else in the internal dialogue, in which she imagines 
versions of the socius challenging her views and implicitly inviting her to alter or re-
affirm them in light of theirs. In this way it is possible to achieve objectivity in 
judgements, understood not as pure knowledge of a permanent object (which would 
rely on implausible dualism) but as subjective knowledge elevated to objective status 
through systematic justification from a variety of different standpoints. Although the 
outcome of a given stretch of reasoning can never be fixed with absolute certainty, and 
may at any time be altered to accommodate superior reasons, S may (and must) still 
trust the conclusions she has reached. To accept thought’s authority only abstractly is to 
resign oneself to endless doubt. The endpoint of reason is the heart, or rather, S’s 
concrete conviction and feeling of being right. 
 
1iv. The IDP in outline 
This account of reason is both unconventional and ambitious. It explains 
how Gentile conceives of reason, not how he proposes to exercise it. From it we 
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can infer what the basic structure of the IDP should look like.  Figure 3 models this 
structure: 
 
The subject (S) appears here under three different guises: initially as the 
‘personal subject’ (PS), who presents pre-reflective reasons to some appropriately-
designed hypothetical alter-ego (A); later as the ‘thinking subject’ (TS), who occupies a 
series of transient hypothetical standpoints as she refines her reasons; and ultimately as 
the ‘universal subject’ (US), who represents the procedure’s provisional endpoint.  
The outcome of the first exchange between PS and A1 is manifest in TS1, who 
differs from PS at least insofar as her reasons have been tested against A1. The process 
continues as S posits a new version of A to challenge her new, provisional reasons. 
Once again these may or may not persuade TS to adapt her reasons. For S to recognise 
that any of A’s reasons are better than TS’s is itself a reason for S to abandon the 
affected reasons and adopt the relevant superior reasons instead. But TS and A always 
retain their separate identities. They are separate abstractions posited by S, and although 
it is possible for S to adopt an A’s reasons wholesale, only S has a continuous though 
changing identity (suggested in this diagram by the dotted line) in successive TSs. 
Alternatively, if TS’s reasons consistently trump A’s reasons, TS will continue to present 
Figure 3: the IDP in outline 
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       US 
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the same reasons to successive As. Every A is a new creation, offering a different point 
of view from which S can check and challenge the reasons of the current TS. 
After an indefinite number of steps, TS is promoted to the status of universal 
subject, or US. The full criteria for this promotion will be developed in the coming 
chapters, but for now we can define them loosely. TS becomes US when it has been 
shown that TS’s reasons are better, stronger reasons than the others considered, and S 
knows of no decisive reasons for further changes to TS. This is not guaranteed 
indefinitely. At any point it could be that new reasons arise, and a previously-accepted 
US must be demoted to TS and thrown back into contention against some new A. But 
US represents the best and most convincing reasons that S can presently conceive. As 
such it is the best approximation of ‘impersonal reason’ that S, whose thought is 
necessarily subjective, can derive. 
 
2. Kant’s categorical imperative 
The given account of the IDP leaves some important questions unanswered. 
Some of these I keep for later chapters.27 The ones I mean to answer over the 
remainder of this chapter are: why should S recognise the authority of US?  On what 
grounds can we justifiably call any US ‘universal’? Can S not assume that US is, like TS, 
potentially vulnerable to as-yet unconsidered A-objections, and for that reason bracket 
it as only another hypothetical view that she (S) could hold? My reply refers to Kant’s 
CI, which in his philosophy, and the theories of several influential constructivists, is 
used as a test of universality and objectivity. Although not all the CI’s formulations are 
                                                          
27 The specific questions I have in mind are: By what criteria can S determine that one set of 
reasons is better than another? Which A-views must be considered before TS is promoted to US 
status? If this is left wholly to S’s discretion, it could be that S considers only those objections she 
considers most amenable to her original views at PS, and, after an arbitrary number of exchanges, 
tells herself that her beliefs are vindicated by the IDP. So conceived, the IDP would be a 
procedure for reinforcing existing beliefs, or else forcing arguments to reach pre-determined 
conclusions, and thought’s freedom to correct itself would be impaired. 
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compatible with actual idealism, they can all contribute to a clearer picture of the IDP, 
how it is distinguishable from similar devices used by other constructivists, and what 
limitations it carries with it. An ideal solution to these problems would yield some test 
of IDP-derived judgements’ objectivity. 
The CI is among the most distinctive features of Kant’s philosophy. In its 
several formulations, this provides the basis for his conception of objectivity in ethics. I 
will compress Kant’s four or five formulations28 into three: 
1.  The Universal Law Formula: ‘Act as if the maxim of your action were to become 
through your will a universal law of nature.’29 
2. The Autonomy Formula: ‘[T]he supreme condition of the will’s conformity with 
universal practical reason – namely, the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will 
which makes universal law.’30 
3. The Kingdom of Ends Formula: ‘[R]ational beings all stand under the law that each 
of them should treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at 
the same time as an end in himself. But by so doing there arises a systematic union of 
rational beings under common objective laws – that is, a kingdom. Since these 
laws are directed precisely to the relation of such beings to one another as ends 
and means, this kingdom can be called a kingdom of ends[.]’31 
                                                          
28 As well as the three presented here, Kant also refers to the End-in-Itself Formula and two 
slightly different versions of the Universal Law Formula. (See next footnote for details.) I take it 
that these overlap the three described here to such a great extent that they can be run together 
without harming the theory. 
29 Kant w/ Paton (1948) [88-89; 420-421 in std. pag.]. The wording here is labelled ‘the Formula of 
the Law of Nature.’ I take the slightly earlier ‘Formula of Universal Law,’ namely ‘Act only on 
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ to 
express the same idea. 
30 Kant w/ Paton (1948) [98-99; 430-31 in std. pag.] 
31 Kant w/ Paton (1948) [100-102; 433-4 in std. pag.]; see also the End-in-Itself formula at [95-96; 
427-29 in std. pag.]. It is worth stressing that in the next paragraph, Kant adds that ‘a rational 
being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member, when, although he makes its universal laws, 
he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as its head, when as the maker of laws he 
is himself subject to the will of no other.’ [101; 433-4 in std. pag.] When S thinks of herself as 
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Christine Korsgaard points out that ‘each formulation [of the CI] is intended to 
represent some characteristic feature of rational principles.’32 These formulations are not 
three separate imperatives, but instead three expressions of the single imperative in 
accordance with which subjects can test their subjective claims or maxims, which are 
‘regarded by the subject as valid only for his own will,’ and elevate them to the status of 
‘objective, or practical laws […that are] valid for the will of every rational being.’33 This 
unity is implicit in the conspicuous overlap between the various formulations. (1) and 
(2) refer to the CI’s universality, although (1)’s reference to ‘a universal law of nature’ 
emphasises the statement’s imperative form, suggesting that persons ought to accord 
with the CI with the same consistency as if ‘a law of nature’ caused them to do so – that 
is, as if they were incapable of doing otherwise. Likewise (2) and (3) can be taken 
together to capture Kant’s conception of humans as rational beings, and all rational 
beings as ends in themselves.34 (3) takes up the previous formulations’ idea of the will’s 
conformity with reason and extends it to ‘common objective laws.’ Since all persons, as 
rational beings, are subjects of the same ‘kingdom of ends,’ any law that they will and 
thereby impose upon themselves should apply equally to all other subjects if their 
reasons are to have objective, universal status. 
Kant’s followers have interpreted the CI in a variety of ways, prioritising 
different formulations over others on the grounds that they are (in certain cases or 
interpretations) mutually contradictory. I will now examine each formulation in turn, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
both legislator and subject to these laws, she is forced to engage in hypothetical reflection with 
imagined others, which is the central motif of the IDP. 
32 Korsgaard (1996b) Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
[106-7] 
33 This is how Kant puts it in his Critique of Practical Reason (1898) [105; 126 in std. pag.]. It may 
be objected that Kant believes his formulations are mutually equivalent. To that I must reply – in 
much the same way that Gentile rejects the idea of the thing-in-itself – that while Kant says this, 
we have only his word for it, and when worked out in detail it is by no means guaranteed that the 
formulations will lead to the same conclusions. Since Gentile shares Kant’s aim of subjecting 
claims or maxims to a test of ‘universality,’ it is appropriate to treat the formulations separately. 
34 This is Korsgaard’s method in ‘Kant’s Formula of Humanity,’ in (1996b) pp.106-32. 
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starting with the Universal Law Formula, then the Kingdom of Ends Formula (which 
Gentile can challenge on similar grounds to the Universal Law Formula), and finally the 
Autonomy Formula. In each case I assess the formula’s compatibility with the IDP. 
 
3. The Universal Law Formula 
The CI’s first formulation is probably the best known, and of the three it is the 
most programmatic. According to John Rawls, the CI demands that S ask herself, ‘Can I 
rationally will that my proposed course of action (that is: my maxim) should become a 
universal law, such that persons are compelled to comply with it as though by a law of 
nature?’ If the answer is yes, the mooted action is legitimate; if not, it is illegitimate. By 
applying this test, S can assess her contingent desire as moral or immoral. She can say, 
for example, ‘I know that it would be rational for me to perform this action. At present 
it seems to me that the results would be desirable. But a world in which everyone did 
what I now propose to do when faced with an equivalent decision does not seem 
desirable (or is impossible). My proposed action fails the CI test, and is therefore not 
morally justified.’ Motivated by the desire to do her duty as an end in itself, rather than 
any further end she means to realise through her action, she can impose a law on 
herself: do not act on the maxim.35 
There are several objections to this account of the categorical imperative. One, 
which we can call the Practical Application Objection, holds that the requirement for 
everyone to be able to act on a legitimate maxim makes practically every possible action 
illegitimate. Persons do not act in a transcendent realm of universals. There is scope for 
serious practical difficulties once the decision’s outcome is re-applied in contingent 
circumstances. If treating the maxim as a universal law demands that everyone (an 
                                                          
35 This is basically what John Rawls calls the ‘categorical imperative procedure.’ See Rawls w/ 
Barbara Herman (ed.) (2000) Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press [162-80] 
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indefinitely large number of persons) must be able to act on the maxim, a vast array of 
possible actions must be counted as immoral on banal pragmatic grounds. If I eat some 
particular biscuit, say, others will be unable to do so. I cannot universalise such a 
particular, narrow maxim; I cannot will that ‘always eat this biscuit’ become a universal 
law for all persons and all possible circumstances.  
This absurd conclusion is probably a misinterpretation of Kant’s meaning, since 
it refers to particular, phenomenal contingencies (the number of people in the world 
and the number of instances of this biscuit). For a maxim to be universalisable, it must 
be expressed as a general statement applicable to a wide range of possible experiences. 
Hence my maxim could be something like ‘always eat biscuits,’ or – since surely Kant 
does not expect us to commit to one activity unconditionally and forever – ‘it is always 
permissible to eat biscuits if I so desire and this does not prevent me from fulfilling 
other moral responsibilities.’36 Thus S is moved from her contingent, ‘phenomenal’ 
standpoint to a universal, ‘noumenal’ standpoint from which she can freely and 
rationally assess her proposed maxim without influence from her changeable 
preferences, interests, and circumstances. She cannot create a truly noumenal self, 
because that, as a product that she has created, would not exist ‘in itself’ in the way that 
noumena require. Instead she does the next best thing and posits an abstract version of 
herself that is identical, or as close as possible, to what she thinks any other rational 
                                                          
36 Derek Parfit points out that such a reading of the CI would logically exclude seemingly 
admirable maxims like ‘Win an Olympic gold medal,’ ‘Become a doctor,’ and ‘Discover the causes 
of cancer.’ To achieve each of these goals excludes others from doing so (there are only so many 
Olympic gold medals; we cannot all be doctors; and the causes of cancer cannot be discovered and 
rediscovered ad infinitum). What Parfit describes are, in Andrew Sneddon’s terms, ‘puzzle 
maxims,’ viz., ‘principles of volition which seem clearly morally innocuous, yet which fail the CI 
universalisability test.’ See Parfit (2002) ‘What We Could Rationally Will,’ in Tanner Lectures on 
Human Value, (Volume 24), pp.287-369. Available on-line at 
http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/volume24/parfit_2002.pdf/ and viewed 
06/10/2012/ [315-18; quotation 318 only]; and Sneddon (2011) ‘A New Kantian Response to 
Maxim-Fiddling,’ in Kantian Review 16:1, 67-88 [84-6; quotation 84 only]. While Kantians may 
object that the impossibility of everyone achieving a goal does nothing to prevent everyone from 
trying to achieve it, this is not much good for a moral theory concerned with what S actively and 
actually does, rather than remaining content with what could be done. 
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person would create. This is achieved by ignoring or altering certain characteristics that 
could otherwise differentiate between them. Being the same, these ‘universal subjects’ 
reason identically, despite the diversity of the contingently embedded persons they 
represent. This grants the shared outcome of their judgements universal, objective 
status.37 
This leads to a second, more explicitly Gentilean problem. There is no fully 
impartial and privileged interpretation of any given action.38 For example: imagine S 
proposes to assassinate a tyrant who she knows to be persecuting his subjects. She 
perceives her action as the liberation of a people, or the removal of suffering. She tells herself 
that this is something she could rationally will to become a universal law. But someone 
else might interpret her proposed action as murder, which would not satisfy the CI. 
There is potentially a huge range of interpretations of her act, viewing it at greater or 
lesser levels of generality. I call this the Linguistic Objection because, as Gentile makes 
clear, truth claims are linguistic constructs.39 A maxim’s compatibility with the CI 
depends on the terms in which it is expressed. This is to deny that there is an objective 
(noumenal) archetype to which the action corresponds. For that reason there can be no 
definitively true account of what one is really doing when one acts. The CI’s (implicit) 
universal subject has no special authority to define the maxim under scrutiny; that is 
                                                          
37 In an important chapter on ‘The Unity of Values’ in Logica 1, Gentile writes that Kant’s strict 
distinction between phenomena and noumena leaves no tenable position for the subject of 
knowledge. He notes that Kant claims that the subject acts freely when it exercises its autonomy 
as a moral agent, but ‘insomuch as it knows, it sees no need for any liberty.’ Kant’s first Critique 
portrays the subject as a phenomenon, or an object of knowledge, but for Gentile this is 
unsatisfactory because phenomena are constructed through the act of thinking, so such a subject 
presupposes the existence of its creator. Being ‘subject to the category of causality,’ it cannot be 
free. The idea of a noumenal subject is also problematic, since the noumenon’s role is to ‘make 
sense of the stuff of the phenomenon,’ and can only be glimpsed darkly through phenomenal 
objects. It cannot, therefore, be comprehended by the subject. Only knowledge of the moral law 
enables the subject to see through ‘the veil of the unknowable [noumenon].’ This would not make 
sense without some concept of freedom. It is necessary for Kant ‘to make a claim for liberty in the 
noumenal subject.’37 See Logica 1 [108]; and Gentile (1904) ‘Noumeni e fenomeni nella filosofia di 
Kant,’ in La Critica 2, pp.417-24, [passim]. 
38 Remember that Gentile denies that an action can be repeated. See Genesi [1] 
39 Sommario 1 [56-65, but especially 60-61] 
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something that the actual thinking subject must do before presenting it to the CI for 
rational tests. Since she has such considerable room for manoeuvre, there are limited 
prospects for an objective account of the action’s legitimacy.40 
The Idealisation Objection refers to the counterfactual abstraction or idealisation 
on which the CI hinges. The procedure alters or ignores troublesome factors in order to 
generate consistent results. The question of what should be retained, ignored or altered 
is deeply controversial, since it can bias the CI in favour of certain outcomes; but if too 
many factors are left out of consideration, the procedure will prove indeterminate. Even 
to assume for the sake of convenience that people are equally rational would be ‘utopian 
reasoning,’ an ‘idealisation’ based upon ‘illegitimate assumptions about the basic 
premises of reasons.’ Such idealisation differs from abstraction, whereby some details 
about actual persons are left outside the ambit of inquiry, and rather assumes the 
presence of features (‘illegitimate assumptions’) that do not, or do not necessarily, 
obtain. Hence idealisations necessarily give rise to partial reasons, in that they are biased 
toward one or more of the features that persons might but do not necessarily possess. 
The purportedly objective or universal status of any judgement based on such partial 
reasons would be uncertain. Reasons based on abstractions, by contrast, are ‘at worst 
[…] incomplete,’ and may even be necessary if it is possible to describe a reasoning 
process relevantly applicable to problems at any level of generality.41 
Taken together, the foregoing objections leave the Universal Law Formula open 
to serious doubt. The Practical Application Objection denies that actions can be 
universalised except when conceived abstractly as noumena. The Linguistic Objection 
denies that the noumenal (abstract) realm can provide definitive solutions to 
                                                          
40 The Linguistic Objection is the basis for the problem of ‘maxim-fiddling,’ which Andrew 
Sneddon has discussed and attempted to solve in a recent article (2011) [passim]. 
41 Peri Roberts (2007) Political Constructivism. London: Routledge [85-6 and 88]. Note that 
Roberts is talking about O’Neill’s (Kantian) constructivism at this point. 
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phenomenal (concrete) problems. The Idealisation Objection once again suggests that 
the CI’s prescriptions could never be followed by a non-abstract subject. The Kantian 
universal subject is irreconcilably alienated from the actual, concrete subject it is 
intended to represent; the two do not share a meaningful identity, and, on the evidence 
we have seen, the universal, noumenal subject’s reasons have no purchase on the 
particular, contingency-bound subject’s reasons for thought or action. 
 
3i. O’Neill on universality 
Of all Kant’s recent interpreters, Onora O’Neill has done the most to present 
his theoretical and moral works as one unified constructivist project. She stresses that ‘if 
reason’s principles are precepts for seeking the greatest possible unity, these precepts 
must apply both to thinking and to doing.’42 Since Kant identifies the CI as practical 
reason’s ‘supreme principle,’ it must also be the supreme principle of theoretical reason. 
O’Neill acknowledges that this interpretation of the CI is ‘highly controversial,’ but for 
our purposes it is notable for some of the close similarities between it and Gentile’s 
account of reason as described earlier in this chapter. The comparison is relevant 
because O’Neill claims to describe and interpret Kant’s views, rather than adapting 
Kant or drawing inspiration from him when developing her own theory. As such she 
and Gentile are concerned with the same texts. Their differing responses to these texts, 
as well as their differing accounts of what a fully constructivist doctrine entails, are 
especially revealing in this context. 
In Constructions of Reason, O’Neill explicitly rejects the idea that Kant conceives of 
reason as a pure object, something with a ‘transcendent basis’ that is ‘inscribed in us.’ 
She acknowledges that ‘we often need to think of reason in abstraction from acts of 
                                                          
42 Onora O’Neill (1992) ‘Vindicating Reason,’ in Paul Guyer (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to 
Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.280-308 [288-9] 
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reasoning,’ but without assuming any such otherworldly transcendent paraphernalia, we 
cannot ‘think that specific rules and algorithms are what is fundamental to reason.’43 It 
is notable that she does not think this is true of the understanding, which Kant spends 
much of his first Critique describing.44 But this is no obstacle to O’Neill, who means 
merely to show that Kant offers a constructivist account of reason; and without that, 
Kant would have no way to develop the complex and seemingly necessary account of 
the understanding he offers. (This idea of reason as an action or process, rather than an 
object or scheme, is already amenable to Gentile’s idea of the logical priority of 
thought.) 
O’Neill notes Kant’s use of judicial and political metaphors in his description of 
reason. He refers to ‘tribunals’ and ‘trials’ by which reasons can be tested for suitability 
as bases for subsequent judgements.45 This idea of reason’s vindication in the eyes of 
other people, or by some impartial standard, is reinforced later when O’Neill cites 
Kant’s claims that ‘[r]eason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism [… 
whose] verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must 
be permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objection or even his veto.’46 In 
another article O’Neill explains that 
                                                          
43 O’Neill (1989) Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [24] 
44 O’Neill writes that ‘[t]he use of reason is not assigned any counterpart to the reduced, empirical 
realism that Kant allows the understanding.’ [282]; emphasis added. 
45 O’Neill (1989) [9-10]; she refers to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason [Axi-xii and Bxvi]. She 
explains her interpretation of Kant’s use of political imagery in (1989) [16-20]. There is another 
pertinent judicial metaphor in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, where the conscience is described as 
an ‘internal court in man.’ This is very similar to Gentile’s IDP, although to associate the IDP with 
the conscience would be to underestimate the range of its applications. See Kant w/ Gregor (ed., 
trans.) (1998) The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [188-9; 6: 437-
40 in std. pag.] 
46 Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason [A738/B766 in std. pag.], quoted in O’Neill (1989) [15]. Note that 
even O’Neill refers to the ‘materials’ used to construct reason: ‘manifolds and forms of intuition, 
categories and empirical concepts.’ (1989) [21] 
Part 2: Gentilean constructivism in moral theory 
162 
it is because reason’s authority is not given that it must be instituted or 
constituted – constructed – by human agents [… who] need, if they are to 
organise their thinking and doing together, to find – to construct – some 
common authority. If they cannot, they will not be in the business of giving and 
receiving, exchanging and evaluating each other’s claims about knowledge and 
action. 
Thus it is possible to rule out ‘ways of thinking and acting that cannot be 
followed by differing others,’ as well as the idea that ‘the fundamental principles of 
thought and action need only reflect some local authority, as the acolytes of […] 
communitarianism [maintain.]’47 This confers the resultant conception of reason objective 
status,48 and, in its opposition to particularism, plainly reflects O’Neill’s view of the CI as 
the guiding light for all reason.  
In other works O’Neill elaborates her conception of ‘followability’ as the key 
test of universality. This requires that for something to count as practical reason, it 
should ‘at least aim to be followable by others for whom it is to count as reasoning.’ She 
adds that ‘[t]hose who organise action and thinking about action in ways which they 
take not to be followable by some of those who are to follow, even be convinced by, 
their claims offer those others no reasons.’49 Her explicit reference to practical reason 
should not deter us from extending these criteria to theoretical problems as well; what 
O’Neill describes here is a normative principle that applies to ‘all stretches of thought 
[that purport to count as] reason or reasoning.’50 While at this stage she refers to only 
                                                          
47 O’Neill (1992) [298] 
48 O’Neill (2003a) ‘Constructivism in Rawls and Kant’ [358]; much the same point is made in 
O’Neill (1992) [297-8] 
49 O’Neill (1996) Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [51] 
50 Thomas M. Besch (2008) ‘Constructing Practical Reason: O’Neill on the Grounds of Kantian 
Constructivism,’ in Journal of Value Inquiry 42, pp.55-76 [55] 
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‘some’ of the relevant people, she soon makes clear that her claims have a broad 
(though at this stage still imprecisely defined) scope: 
[Some] thinking about and justifications of action must be presentable, hence 
followable and exchangeable, not merely among an immediate group of 
participants, or of those present, or of the like-minded, or even among fellow-
citizens, but among more diverse and often more dispersed others, whose exact 
boundaries cannot be readily identified. […] This formally universal 
specification of the scope of anything that is to count as reasoned is not in itself 
informative; its import depends wholly on the specification of the inclusive or 
restricted domains within which that stretch of thinking is to be followable.51 
Even here O’Neill stops short of the crude universalism under which an 
argument or judgement (‘stretch of thinking’) must be followable by every person, or 
perhaps even every possible person, or still more ambitiously every possible rational being. Since 
no-one can know for sure how as-yet unknown others would reason out a problem, it 
would be senseless to assume that we owe an account of our reasons to those we can 
conceive of only abstractly. Thinkers on some distant planet, if such thinkers exist, do 
not yet owe me reasons for what they do. The same would have been true of persons 
on mutually undiscovered continents in earlier periods of human history. But when 
these persons encountered each other, or if I encounter these extraterrestrials, and 
they/we recognise each other as rational beings, capable of expressing and justifying our 
actions in terms of reasons, then followable reasons are owed by each to all. 
 
                                                          
51 O’Neill (1996) [53-4] 
Part 2: Gentilean constructivism in moral theory 
164 
3ii. A Gentilean reply to Kant and O’Neill 
O’Neill’s overtly anti-realist interpretation of Kant has several parallels with 
Gentile’s conception of reason, premised on the IDP. Kant’s judicial metaphor is 
especially apt because it models an IDP-like scenario and ascribes to its participants two 
features that Gentile does not overtly demand: freedom and equality. In Kant’s version 
the former demand is made explicit where he refers to ‘the agreement of free citizens.’ 
The latter is implicit, but still present, since every citizen is permitted to voice objections 
or even to veto a claim ‘without hindrance’ from others. In that respect citizens are 
equal, as there is no meaningful hierarchy among them qua reviewers of the reasons 
under discussion. 
Gentile can endorse both of these orienting assumptions, though not for quite 
the same reasons that Kant offers. For both it is true that reasons cannot be imposed by 
coercion. S must recognise their authority for herself, in her own thought. No-one can 
be denied the opportunity to challenge reasons presented by others. Thus, to put it in 
more Gentilean language, thinkers are free and equal insofar as they think. Reason’s authority 
cannot be adduced except by thought; its warrant comes from its recognition as 
authoritative by a jury of thinkers, or rather, by one subject engaged in the IDP and 
thinking on behalf of each of its abstract participants. Since S articulates and constructs 
the participants’ reasons for herself, she cannot strictly misinterpret them.52 She and the 
interlocutors, or their reasons and hers, are equal in that respect. No reason can be 
affirmed or denied at all without being articulated and evaulated by S. This reflects 
Gentile’s idea of thought as ‘homogeneous,’ relying on no ‘external norms.’ 
Kant’s judicial metaphor makes explicit reference to ‘free citizens’ participating 
in the tribunal of reason. Elsewhere Kant claims that freedom (as well as God and 
                                                          
52 This does not rule out the possibility that S misunderstands what another empirical person has 
said to her, of course. 
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immortality) is a postulate of morality: any tenable moral theory must presuppose it, 
although it cannot be tested in experience or otherwise demonstrated.53 All three 
postulates are working assumptions. Gentile, of course, thinks that thought’s freedom 
as pensiero pensante can be demonstrated, albeit negatively, in that nothing can be known 
to condition or limit thought without thought, so in its logical priority to any possible 
conditioning object, thought is free.54 But this is only a thin and formal conception of 
freedom. As the Torturer Objection showed in chapter 1.1, there is very little that the 
freedom implicit in thought’s logical priority can rule out. It is again in the idea of 
thought’s homogeneity that we find the full meaning of Gentile’s conception of moral 
freedom. 
As we have seen, Gentile’s idea of spirit as pensiero pensante is a strictly subjective 
conception of the person. Other people’s thoughts are abstractions. This consideration 
explains Gentile’s use of the IDP metaphor in preference to a more flexible third-
person formulation, like Kant’s tribunal or O’Neill’s followability criterion, in which the 
first-person subject has no clearly-defined role. In Gentile’s version, S is always present, 
and the claims of other people, or of hypothetical others, are presented individually and 
successively before her. S also retains a set of beliefs and ideas, which, as elements of 
the act of thinking, cannot be detached from her. Like Descartes, who ring-fences some 
beliefs par provision while he tests and re-constructs the edifice of knowledge,55 S remains 
actively involved in the reasoning process by which objectivity is established. For her to 
know that a ‘stretch of thinking’ is ‘followable’ she must think it – follow it – for 
                                                          
53 Kant w/ Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trans.) (1898) Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and Other 
Works on the Theory of Ethics. London: Longmans, Green and Co. [216-29; 260-74 in std. pag.]. 
Garrath Williams (2009) ‘Kant’s Account of Reason,’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/ and 
viewed 28/03/2012. (Originally 2008) 
54 This was discussed in chapter 1.1, herein (see sub-section #2 and especially #2i and #2ii) 
55 This occurs in the third part of the ‘Discourse on Method.’ See Descartes w/ Cottingham et al. 
(1984) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. (Volume 1) Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press [122-6] 
Part 2: Gentilean constructivism in moral theory 
166 
herself. To know whether she can affirm a truth claim she must test it against other 
claims within its set in order to establish their mutual coherence, then against claims she 
already believes or recognises herself to have good reasons to believe to be true. To do 
this she must review her reasons from the ‘abstract’ positions of other possible subjects, 
or at least those that are appropriately rational according to S’s present beliefs about 
reasons. 
The irreducible subjectivity of the IDP places further obstacles before the 
distinctively Kantian project of establishing ‘objective validity.’56 The Kantian subject 
need only show what reasons can best sustain scrutiny from the standpoints of other 
people, culminating in the establishment of objectivity in the judgement of a 
universalised ‘other.’ Gentile’s S must do this (viz. draw an abstract judgement) and 
then attend to her own concrete beliefs and ideas. That these might be out of sync, with 
S finding that reason leads her to one conclusion and her personal beliefs another, 
explains why Gentile invokes the heart in his account of reason. There is no assumption 
that thinkers applying reason are fully rational; they are instead embedded in personal 
and social contexts, forming and correcting ideas with reference to incomplete and 
sometimes misleading information. The endpoint of the reasoning process, if we allow 
that thinking can be conceived abstractly as a series of discrete processes, is the unity of 
heart and intellect. Once again: beliefs may be replaced and assessments of a reason’s 
value may change, but thought is always true at the moment of its attuale affirmation. 
 
4. The Kingdom of Ends Formula 
The idea of treating persons as ends-in-themselves, or else as citizens of one 
‘kingdom of ends,’ has offered Kantian theorists an attractive alternative to the cold 
                                                          
56 I am using this phrase somewhat out of context. Kant says it in Pure Reason [116 in Weigelt 
translation; A89/B122 in std. pag.], but there he is really talking about the categories of the 
understanding. 
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formalism of the Universal Law. As Korsgaard explains, while universality ‘gives us the 
form of the moral law,’ humanity is ‘the appropriate material for a principle of practical 
reason.’57 This newly humanised CI also allows Kant to deny that a legitimate moral 
maxim can be followed in order to further some other end. Pragmatic reasons, which 
can only ever be ‘relative’ to the contingent circumstances at hand, are not moral 
reasons.58 A moral reason must be justified according to universal principles drawn 
from reason itself.59 Humanity is special insofar as it is, or at least possesses the 
potential to be, rational. By thinking and acting rationally, S respects rational (human) 
beings. 
Gentile claims that the Kingdom of Ends Formula takes insufficient account of 
S’s contingent circumstances. She is in the world, encumbered with desires, mores, and 
interests; but is at the same time required to act as a ‘citizen of the kingdom of ends, 
[…]  breath[ing] the pure air of the moral life,’ in which contingency has no place. 
Gentile claims, predictably, that such dualism is ‘impossible,’ and amounts to ‘putting 
one foot in two stirrups.’60 Kant cannot have it both ways: S (Gentile thinks) wills and is 
committed to one course of action or another, and cannot be judged to will one end in 
the phenomenal world and another wholly separate end in the unreal and abstract 
kingdom of ends. ‘The idea of a horse,’ Gentile reminds us, ‘is not a horse one can ride.’ 
Likewise a merely abstract maxim is not a maxim on which one can act.61 
This objection echoes those levelled at the Universal Law Formula. With some 
small embellishments we can bring out the distinctiveness of Gentile’s position. His 
conception of the will suggests that an end or outcome is not an act one can perform. It 
is necessarily an abstraction, for once it is achieved, it ceases to be an end. It is instead 
                                                          
57 Korsgaard (1996b) [106-7] 
58 Korsgaard (1996b) [107-9]  
59 See Kant w/ Paton. [93-5; 426-7 in std. pag.] 
60 Religione [95] 
61 Atto puro [83]; Carr translation [84] 
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part of the reality in which the subject operates. Despite their abstract status, the values 
ascribed to ends contribute to the assessment of the worthiness of possible actions. A 
subject’s conception of what she is doing at any given moment contains at once the act, 
the reasons for it and the ends at which it is directed. In a passage of uncharacteristically 
plain Kantian inspiration, Gentile writes that 
if you want to find out whether your action is moral, look to the maxim that 
[the action] obeys. […] Look not to an abstract maxim that you can propose as 
the object of mere speculative contemplation, [nor] to the standards by which 
you come to judge the action; but to the maxim that you in fact follow in what 
you are doing [operare]; that is, to the maxim that is immanent in the action, [and] 
of whose intrinsic validity you have, by acting upon the maxim, already shown 
yourself to be convinced. In the end, the maxim is not your abstract ideal, but 
the inner law of your effectual will.62 
Some of Gentile’s critics, including Herbert Marcuse, have thought that his 
equation of thinking and acting, manifest here in the resolution of ‘action’ with ‘maxim,’ 
means that ‘all thought is rejected if it is not […] immediately consummated in action,’ 
leading to a conception of ‘aims and norms that may not be judged by any objective 
ends and principles.’63 If Marcuse is right, the whole of Gentile’s moral theory looks 
deeply suspect. It is exposed as a theory about something other than morality, and his 
elaborate accounts of reason, heart and the will must be considered disingenuous. A 
more plausible reading is that Gentile denies the possibility of purely formal ethics. 
Once again: S cannot transcend her contingent circumstances and the particular 
problems she faces. A maxim abstracted for ‘speculative contemplation’ serves no 
                                                          
62 Religione [88]  
63 Herbert Marcuse (1955) Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. Second edition; originally published 1941 [408-9] 
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purpose unless it applies to an actual practical problem. Purely hypothetical situations 
do not in themselves make moral demands of non-hypothetical subjects. The concrete 
subject of any moral decision must be recognised and accounted for throughout the 
reasoning process.64 
This last point deserves elaboration. Gentile does not strictly deny that human 
reason is an end in itself. What he does deny is the Kantian assumption that it is possible 
to make intelligible claims of a pure faculty abstracted from the act in which it is 
exercised and realised. To speak of ‘human reason’ without recognising S, the singular 
human subject who employs it, is to misapprehend the nature of thought. S acts in 
accordance with reason when she recognises the authority of her own thought. Her 
thought’s unity, which amounts to its coherence both now and in an as-yet uncertain 
future, is achieved as she identifies reasons that she recognises and (she expects) will 
continue to recognise as good reasons in the future.  
 
5. The Autonomy Formula 
So far my attempts to find a role for the CI in the IDP have fallen foul of 
Gentile’s objections to dualism, and especially his claim that merely abstract reasons do 
not and cannot obtain for real, concrete, contingently embedded subjects. If the same 
objection could be used to dismiss the CI tout court, it would do us no good to rehearse 
this argument any further. We could shelve the CI as an abstract procedure that 
necessarily leads to alienating conclusions premised on false assumptions about the 
nature of thought. (This would have disappointing implications for my attempt to 
present Gentile as a distinctive moral theorist, since his arguments would add nothing 
                                                          
64 It may be objected that Kant does not present his categorical imperative as a ‘pure formal’ test 
either. Gentile agrees with this. He thinks that Kant’s followers made his doctrine implausibly 
formalist. We might think of actual idealism as an attempt to clarify the position uncovered by 
Kant, removing elements that could prompt a formalist reading and reinforcing its plausibly 
phenomenological basis. 
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to Hegel’s description of Kant’s ‘empty formalism’ a century earlier.)65 Fortunately, 
though, Kant’s Autonomy Formula is designed to address concerns of precisely this 
kind, showing how it is possible for a subject to act according to a moral law without 
thereby infringing her own liberty.66 
 
5i. Kant on autonomy 
Kant and Gentile agree that freedom is indispensible to any account of moral 
agency.67 A subject whose actions are entirely caused by external forces acting 
independently of her desires and intentions is neither free nor accountable for her 
actions and the consequences leading from them, just as an inert object (a libellous 
letter, say) is not morally responsible for the ends to which it directly or indirectly 
contributes.68 Kant does not deny that persons are in some respects causally determined 
natural objects. Their bodies are objects among others. But we do not ascribe 
responsibility for actions to a person’s body, even if the body is, empirically speaking, the 
instrument with which the relevant actions are performed. Instead we refer to the 
                                                          
65 This famous argument occurs in Hegel (1945) [90; §135n]; and, for the similar idea that ‘the 
laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that never were green,’ [252; §124n]. Gentile sails 
particularly close to Hegel when he writes that because it is abstracted from the circumstances in 
which action occurs, ‘a wholly [radicalemente] good will is unable to act and so realise [attuare] 
the good. This is the great defect of Kantian formalism.’ See Diritto [23]. A similar point is made 
in Logica 2 [80] 
66 Robert Stern has recently claimed that ‘[t]here is widespread consensus amongst constructivists 
that Kant should be credited as holding a constructivist position in ethics at least partly on the 
strength of his commitment to autonomy[.]’ See Stern (2012) ‘Constructivism and the Argument 
from Autonomy,’ in James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer (eds.) Constructivism in Practical 
Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.119-37 [121] 
67 Note that I interchange freely between ‘agents’ and ‘subjects.’ Korsgaard distinguishes them: ‘[a] 
person is both active and passive, both an agent and a subject of experiences.’ See (1989) ‘Personal 
Identity and the Unity of Agency: a Kantian Response to Parfit,’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs 
18:2, pp.101-32 [101-2]; also in (1996b) The Sources of Normativity, pp.363-98 
68 Gentile equates the CI with the Golden Rule insofar as both ‘hint at moral activity’s sole 
distinctive character: not desire’s conformity to the law, but the will’s self-position as law.’ Loving 
one’s neighbour and positing one’s will as law both involve the subject’s recognition of her place 
‘as pure spirit, as spirit free of those natural limitations that are proper to all objects of our 
experience[.]’ See Religione [87-88]. (I return to this theme in chapter 2.3, sub-section 4ii.) 
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subject so embodied, understanding it along the lines of the ‘I think’ discussed in chapter 
1.1.  
Kant’s conceptions of the subject’s body and the subject per se as possessors of 
different attributes should not be mistaken for Cartesian mind/body dualism. These 
separate conceptions are made possible by the use of two ‘standpoints’: the ‘naturalistic 
standpoint,’ from which objects appear as particular phenomena, determined by natural 
laws that obtain independently of the subject who observes them; and the ‘practical 
standpoint,’ which offers a view of the ‘intelligible world,’ or the world of noumena, 
governed by laws ‘that have their grounds in reason alone.’ Kant believes any tenable 
moral theory must have S ‘look upon [herself] as belonging to the sensible world and 
yet to the intelligible world at the same time.’69 This is because neither a disembodied 
subject nor a body without subjective experience is conceivable as a moral agent. Rather 
than ontologically separate worlds, these standpoints reveal different features of a single 
world. Neither is intelligible without the other.70 
Some familiar questions arise. If S freely creates (‘wills’) the moral law and 
imposes it on herself, is that law not an exclusively subjective creation without purchase 
on other persons’ lives or ideas? If not, and she is in any way limited by coherence 
requirements, say, does she really create and impose the laws freely? Not every 
consideration relevant to an actual moral decision can be known a priori. At the very 
least, S considers the decision in some particular context, and very often with reference 
to particular people. So if part of the decision can be influenced by particular, contingent 
and phenomenal factors, which are already acknowledged to be independent of S’s 
reason, is this freedom not at best partial and at worst illusory? 
                                                          
69 Kant (1948) [121; 453 in std. pag.] 
70 O’Neill, among others, insists that Kant refers to separate ‘worlds’ only figuratively. The whole 
motivation for the theory of two standpoints would be redundant if there were already discrete 
worlds. Note the strong parallel between these claims what, as we saw earlier, Gentile 
characterised as trying to put ‘one foot in two stirrups.’ 
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Kant answers this with his concept of autonomy, according to which moral 
directives are known without reference to any free-standing external authority, and 
imposed by each subject upon herself as binding obligations that are discharged for 
their own sake.71 Autonomy ‘is the sole principle of all moral laws, and of all duties 
which conform to them.’72 This differs from heteronomy of the will, whereby its cause is 
something outside it; the desired outcome is a means to some other end.73 When S acts 
autonomously, ‘the laws of morality are the laws of [her] own will and its claims are 
ones she is prepared to make on herself.’74  It is for this reason that Kant thinks a moral 
subject may not use other people as means, only as ends in themselves. I have already 
explained why Gentile cannot follow that step in the argument in quite the way Kant 
describes it. Ultimately S must not recognise other people as ends in themselves, but 
instead rationality, the authority of her own thought, which can only be recognised 
through the exercise of the same. 
 
5ii. Korsgaard’s account of Kantian autonomy 
Christine Korsgaard offers a distinctive theory of Kantian constructivism in 
which the autonomous will is the sole ground of normativity.75 It is because a maxim is 
autonomously willed that S ought, or has reason, to act upon it. Korsgaard also appeals 
to the Universal Law Formula, holding that the will is recognisable as will, as opposed 
to another kind of volition, when S is able to will that her maxim become universal law. This 
                                                          
71 J.B. Schneewind (1992) ‘Autonomy, Obligation and Virtue: an Overview of Kant’s Moral 
Philosophy,’ in Paul Guyer (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp.309-41 [309] 
72 Kant w/ Abbott (1898) [122; 146 in std. pag.] 
73 Kant w/ Paton [108-9; 441 in std. pag.] 
74 Christine M. Korsgaard (1996a) [19] Note that most of this passage is also quoted in Christopher 
W. Gowans (2002) ‘Practical Identities and Autonomy: Korsgaard’s Reformation of Kant’s Moral 
Philosophy,’ in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64:3, pp. 546-70 [547] 
75 Gowans (2002): Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant is distinctive because she advocates ‘a theory 
of autonomy that grounds normativity solely in the will’ [551]. 
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requires that S be able to see the reasons supporting and guiding her will, which would 
be impossible if she were to take her will solely on credit, as it were, from an external 
source whose reasons she does not comprehend. Hence on Korsgaard’s account of 
Kant, 
[t]o be governed by reason, and to govern yourself, are one and the same thing. 
The principles of practical reason are constitutive of autonomous action: they do 
not represent external restrictions on our actions, whose power to motivate us is 
therefore inexplicable, but instead describe the procedures involved in 
autonomous willing. But they also function as normative or guiding principles, 
because in following these procedures we are guiding ourselves.76 
It is not yet clear how the Autonomy Formula, which includes an explicit 
reference to the idea of universal law, differs from the Universal Law Formula already 
discussed. For Korsgaard, at least, the difference is that while the Universal Law 
Formula gives us the formal criterion by which legitimate maxims are distinguished 
from illegitimate ones, the Autonomy Formula allows us to locate maxims’ contents in 
contingent facts about the subject. This claim signals Korsgaard’s rejection of any moral 
realist interpretation of Kant, according to which the Universal Law Formula can be 
used to deduce a complete and detailed free-standing set of moral laws. 
Korsgaard recognises the contingency of many (indeed, she writes ‘most’) of the 
identities or self-conceptions that give persons reasons for action.77 No-one is purely 
and simply a citizen of the kingdom of ends, a moral agent without a wider, messier 
identity. Much of what we recognise as true about ourselves is taken for granted. Given 
names offer a simple illustration of this idea. I strongly identify myself as James while 
                                                          
76 Korsgaard (1997) ‘The Normativity of Instrumental Reason,’ in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut 
(eds.) Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.215-54 [219] 
77 Korsgaard (1996a) ‘The Authority of Reflection,’ in Sources of Normativity, pp.90-130 [120]; 
mentioned in Gowans (2002) [552] 
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recognising that my identification as James, and not, say, Crispin, is a result of some 
wholly contingent facts about my upbringing. Doubtlessly if I had been given another 
name, I would now identify myself just as strongly with that. That my being James is in 
a sense arbitrary does not make it insignificant. If someone were to take my name away 
from me, as it were, I would feel deprived of or alienated from some important part of 
my identity. This need not be a bad thing. I may intentionally and consciously rid myself 
of my present identity in order to cultivate a new one, and in the course of doing so 
encourage others to call me by a different name, so as to reinforce my familiarity with 
the new identity I have made for myself. But in the ordinary course of things, it is 
important to me that others call me by a name with which I identify, even though my 
identification with some particular name (James) rather than any other (Crispin) is not 
rationally defensible independently of contingent facts of my personal history. To call a 
generically conceived person Crispin is not to abuse him. It is only once he is given 
some particular characteristics, such that he identifies and ascribes significance to the 
idea of himself as not-Crispin, that such abuse can occur. 
Korsgaard makes clear that any given person typically holds multiple ‘practical 
identities,’ understood as roles providing reasons (even if these are very weak reasons) 
for acting. Hence S might be a mother, a daughter, a friend and a member of both the 
local badminton club and the East London mafia. These roles can come into conflict 
when simultaneous incompatible claims are made of her. Korsgaard suggests that in this 
case, the subject must rank her various identities in order of importance, and perhaps 
even discard some altogether, ceasing to identify herself with some role (as a Mafioso, 
say) that she deems either unworthy of her adherence or excessively demanding of the 
time and effort she would rather dedicate to other commitments. This is very obviously 
a constructivist procedure. S decides how she is to constitute herself, even though she 
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may not have consciously chosen those identities in the first instance.78 Nonetheless, it 
is clear that this process of ranking and discarding identities to construct a unified will 
involves a further value claim, such as ‘It is more important that I fulfil my 
commitments as a friend than as a Mafioso,’ which cannot be rationally defended all the 
way down. It hinges on ‘particular values […] that we just happen to hold,’79 as basic or 
non-derivative features of our thinking. Still, on Korsgaard’s Kantian account, there 
remain various tests that we can apply when deciding which of those values are worth 
retaining. But recognising that one does not have full justification for valuing something 
is not necessarily enough to make one cease to value it. A value may be strongly 
endorsed but irrational or rational but entirely unfelt.80 
 
5iii. Gentile on autonomy (and autarchy)  
Actual idealism’s account of reason, which was parsed at the beginning of this 
chapter, has several parallels with Kant’s account of autonomy. According to Gentile, 
thought that is ‘self-governing, and has no need for external norms’ is appropriately 
‘homogeneous.’  Underlining the above claim about thought as an end in itself, this means 
that the reason for S to submit to reasons she recognises as good must be justified in terms of 
thought itself. An unrecognised good reason is not, or is not yet, a reason for S to alter 
her convictions. This observation explains why the IDP’s subject should recognise the 
authority of the universal subject (US) constructed in the course of the procedure: US’s 
authority over S stems from S’s recognition that each step in the dialogical process has 
been justified using better reasons than the one before it. US is, in effect, the same 
entity as the subject that constructs it. US has authority over PS (viz. the subject’s pre-
                                                          
78 Gowans (2002) [553] 
79 Korsgaard (1996d) ‘Reply,’ in Sources of Normativity, pp.219-59 [242]; also Gowans (2002) 
[553]. 
80 I return to this theme in chapter 2.2. 
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reflective reasons) because its reasons are, and have necessarily been recognised to be, 
superior. US’s authority is legitimate because S remains ‘homogeneous’ – autonomous, 
perhaps – throughout the procedure. In this respect the IDP plainly differs from Kant-
style universalisation procedures in which S is (potentially) estranged from the 
constructed subject that legislates on her behalf. The Kantian US is effectively someone 
else, an abstraction applying S’s thoughts to unreal and alien circumstances.81 To borrow 
Gentile’s memorable phrase: for the subject who reasons only abstractly, the 
procedure’s results will ‘taste of straw.’82 The Gentilean US may (but does not 
necessarily) prescribe the same actions as the Kantian US. However, it arrives at that 
destination via a long, low road, eschewing more direct routes (e.g. a single-step test) in 
favour of a larger number of intermediate steps between which the justificatory link 
between S and US is kept intact. 
So: what can Gentile make of Kantian autonomy? He cannot accept the 
Universal Law Formula implicit within it. If he instead endorses autonomy without 
universality – if, indeed, this is possible – we will need more details to help us determine 
whether, and how, he can navigate between abstract universality on one side and 
ungeneralisable particularity on the other. With this in mind it is telling that when 
Gentile writes of objective thought, he refers not to its autonomy (autonomia) but its 
autarchy (autarcà). In some recent literature on moral philosophy, these terms are 
                                                          
81 Again it may be objected that this is not what Kant really thinks, and that the outcomes of the 
Kantian CI are no less constructed (and to that extent non-alienating) than those of the IDP. In 
reply, we can say that the versions of US implicit in the CI and IDP are not different in kind; both 
are constructed, but the IDP version’s construction is deliberately gradual and incomplete. Thus it 
is supposed to yield the provisional certainty of the Kantian version while alleviating what Rawls 
calls the ‘burdens of judgement.’ 
82 Gentile expresses the same point in Religione: ‘Without [a] duty that is fundamental to all [the 
other] duties, we would be able to apprehend the others as, at most, simple notions: strange, 
flavourless notions, without positive significance or the capacity to hold our interest. But we 
would never know such notions to impose real obligations on our desire[s]. We would apprehend 
them as voices not directed at us. […] [The subject would] remain outside and above the world in 
which this conversation is taking place.’ [90-91] 
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contrasted in the following way.  The autonomous subject recognises the objective 
truth-value of her judgements because they correspond to a norm that she recognises as 
authoritative. Hence to be autonomous is to be able to justify and defend one’s 
judgements in this fashion. Autarchy emphasises self-sufficiency as well as self-government. 
The autarchic subject need only feel certain about the judgements she makes, 
submitting to no authority other than her own. It is not necessary for her to be able to 
provide a robust defence of the reasons underpinning them.  
Using different terminology, Stefan Bird-Pollan argues that these same charges 
can be made of Korsgaard. It is unclear, writes Bird-Pollan, exactly what the 
autonomous construction of reason entails. He proposes two possible though 
contradictory readings of what Korsgaard is doing. One he calls ‘the strong autonomy 
thesis,’ which holds that ‘we will according to the principle of respecting all rational 
beings.’ He contrasts this with the ‘weak autonomy thesis[, which] merely states that we 
can determine ourselves according to principles we come up with.’83  The strong version 
appears better fitted to what Kant has in mind, since it reduces the significance of 
principles improvised to fit the individual subject’s current and contingent inclinations. 
Applying the weak autonomy thesis to reason in general, it is possible for S to invent 
any sort of explanation or rationalisation for her ideas. These need not satisfy any kind 
of outside scrutiny to count as rational. The strong thesis presses her to eliminate mad 
or otherwise bad reasons from her attempts at justification. If she is thinking rationally, 
she must present, or at least try to present, reasons that (would) make sense to another 
rational being.84 
                                                          
83 Stefan Bird-Pollan (2011) ‘Some Normative Implications of Korsgaard’s Theory of the 
Intersubjectivity of Reason,’ in Metaphilosophy 42:4, pp.376-80 [376-7] 
84 It should be noted that this seems obviously circular. If I test the rationality of my judgement 
against what another rational person would judge, have I not presupposed some criterion of 
rationality by which I can meaningfully say that the other person is rational? An explanation of 
how we might escape the charge of circularity is given in chapter 2.3. 
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The strong autonomy thesis is designed to solve the problem of the 
incommensurability of persons’ reasons. It follows from Korsgaard’s (and Kant’s and 
Gentile’s) rejection of moral realism that no act has value in itself. Hence, as Bird-Pollan 
explains, ‘my desire to sleep in on Sunday morning after a late night of drinking is not in 
any way “more privileged” as a principle of action than your desire to have me drive 
you to the airport early that day.’85 If, as the weak autonomy thesis suggests, autonomy 
consisted only of acting on reasons S happens to value at the time, the question of what 
is the right thing to do would be unanswerable on anything but a subject-by-subject basis. 
Bird-Pollan claims that it may appear that Korsgaard endorses the strong and weak 
autonomy theses at different times, and that these theses make incompatible demands 
of S: either she is autonomous in the full (strong) Kantian understanding of the word, 
testing maxims against the Universal Law Formula and, if they pass muster, imposing 
them on herself; or in the weaker, ‘immanent,’ more contingency-sensitive 
understanding, but never able to attain a privileged standpoint from which one set of 
reasons could be seen to be objectively better or worse than another. 
Bird-Pollan proposes an explicitly Hegelian solution to Korsgaard’s problem. 
He claims that she must deny the distinction between the strong and weak theses, and 
endorses ‘the idea that reason has the inherent tendency to clarify itself through the 
interaction between subjects and objects,’ together with ‘the idea of provisional universal 
willing.’86 He goes on: 
This conception would allow for the development of reason through 
interaction. It would permit us to learn from our mistakes and improve the 
universality of our reflection. The essential point, then, is that norms are 
constructed communally and the more people self-consciously engage in this 
                                                          
85 Bird-Pollan (2011) [377] 
86 Bird-Pollan (2011) [379]; emphasis added 
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construction, the more these people are able to interact smoothly and justly. 
This suggests a gradual increase of the accuracy in our provisional universalising 
process.87 
Here Bird-Pollan has very obviously (though, I assume, unintentionally) situated 
Korsgaard on Gentilean ground. The IDP is designed to address exactly this need; every 
step in the procedure is a move toward some abstractly-conceived endpoint (genuine 
objectivity) that S knows she will not and cannot ever reach. To test one’s reasons 
against those of other people is, provided that one is prepared to follow where one’s 
best and most rational thinking leads, always a step toward a better, more complete 
justification for whatever view or action one proposes to hold or perform. In the 
context of the IDP, then, to abandon Kantian autonomy for autarchy does not signal 
the abandonment of principle in favour of contingency. Instead it is to unburden 
Kantian autonomy of its most implausible feature – the appeal to universality per se – 
and embrace the next best thing, namely the idea of universality whose concrete 
expressions will always be provisional and changeable, but ultimately justified through 
concrete thinking.88 
The autonomy/autarchy distinction, though subtle, is more than a matter of 
words. Implicit in Kant’s account of the autonomous subject is the assumption that the 
principles of reason to which one refers are insensitive to the contingent characteristics 
of the referring subject. An attempt to apply reason can reflect those principles more or 
less accurately. There is, as some philosophers put it, an Archimedean point from which 
the facts of reason can be seen. If Gentile really is describing an autarchic subject, 
judgements can be tested according to a wider variety of criteria. There is no 
assumption of a complete and permanent plan of reason, nor of formal principles such 
                                                          
87 Bird-Pollan (2011) [379-80] 
88 It is worth noting in passing that Bird-Pollan (and, if he is right, also Korsgaard) do not  
conceive of ‘other people’ in the same unconventional way as they are imagined in the IDP. 
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as the Universal Law Formula, to which any judgement must conform. Instead, if S’s 
thought really is to remain homogeneous, reason must be able to shift with the 
development of pensiero pensante. 
At this point it should be clear that Kant would agree with my assessment of 
Gentile’s moral theory as laid out in Part 1. If the standard by which value claims are 
tested – in other words, the yardstick for goodness – is the will of some particular agent, 
be this Benito Mussolini or God, S’s conformity to that standard cannot be 
autonomous. She would not be ‘legislating’ her own actions.89 While Gentile is less 
inclined to use the distinctively Kantian language of autonomy and heteronomy, they 
share the basic contention that beliefs, values and motivations cannot be ‘conditioned’ 
or ‘determined’ by anything other than the spirit of which they are constituent parts.90 
 
6. Re-constructing Gentilean moral theory 
Before concluding, it is worth adding some remarks on what Gentile does think 
worth retaining from the CI. He believes, crucially, that it cannot yield maxims 
independently. The temptation to try is common to ‘hasty critics’ of Kant’s formalism. 
By interpreting Kant’s work even ‘more rigidly’ than Kant himself did, such critics keep 
the CI from being anything but a formal procedure. To specify its content in advance as 
‘a law that is a pre-condition of the act of willing’ would be ‘fatal to liberty’ and to 
‘moral life itself.’91 The CI’s role is not to furnish subjects with a test of a proposed 
action’s moral goodness, but instead the basic idea of a universal duty to which all 
particular duties are subsidiary: 
                                                          
89 Schneewind (1992) [316]  
90 Logica 1 [98-9] 
91 Religione [89]. Note that ‘a law that is a pre-condition of the act of willing’ is translated from 
‘una legge presupposta all’atto del volere,’ or literally ‘a law presupposed to/by the act of willing.’ 
The word ‘presupposta’ (or ‘presupposto’) is more flexible than its direct equivalent in English, 
covering facts, pre-conditions, basic assumptions, bases, starting-points and pre-requisites. 
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Beyond all the single duties that we distinguish from each other, and before 
which we can sometimes stand perplexed, we have one, without which there 
would be no way to conceive any determined and particular duty: the duty always 
to do our duty.92 
This single, immovable duty is required to make all other duties intelligible. 
Without it they would present themselves to S abstractly, as ‘strange, flavourless 
notions,’ like commands given in a sermon to which one is not really paying attention.93 
For a given subject, as pensiero pensante, that duty is always present, although the specific 
imperative contained within it changes over time. To be clear: S is always bound by 
duty, which, understood formally, is the duty to do her duty; but what she is duty-bound to 
do is contingent on the circumstances in which she finds herself and the claims (or 
reasons) she recognises as authoritative at the time. She cannot have two simultaneous 
but incompatible duties. All but one of these must be abstractions. Claims that she would 
recognise as authoritative in the event that she found herself in different circumstances 
cannot by themselves generate duties for her. She should regard them as duties belonging 
to someone else. Real duties, by contrast, arise through the ‘spontaneous generation of 
the heart,’ as S feels herself to be personally committed to them.94 
The duty to think is not imposed from without; the truth does not present itself 
to thinkers wholesale and without their participation. They must identify, create, and 
realise it, motivated by the will. This, like all thought, is ultimately a process of self-
creation, and is for that reason ‘essentially moral,’ and, as we have seen, partly 
compatible with a Kantian conception of autonomy.95 S thinks about and ascribes value 
to an abstract world in which she better understands what is presently unknown to her. 
                                                          
92 Religione [90]; emphasis added 
93 Religione [91]. I have combined two of Gentile’s analogies here.  
94 Religione [91-92] 
95 Sommario 2 [46-47] 
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She then sets about realising the object of her will. But the concrete will – that is, the 
will possessed in the unfolding present, and tied inextricably to S’s current act of self-
realisation – cannot ever be realised completely. To reach the target that she sets for 
herself, to realise ‘a supposedly absolute form of the good, satisfying all of [her …] 
moral aspirations,’ would entail the end of willing, and therefore the end of morality. As 
the activity of realising or striving to realise an end, the will would ‘strip itself of any 
moral virtue, since there is no morality that is not movement, life, creation of […] 
reality.’96 The truly moral will is never fully satisfied; its concrete form outstrips any 
abstract will (that is: some target that S consciously sets herself) at the moment its 
realisation is commenced. It creates an imperfect world, and, by extension, a new form 
of itself – the will – within it. 
The disparity between the world that is and the world that could (and should) be 
is what motivates and defines morally virtuous action. The search for the good is 
endless, for the target at which virtue aims is always moving and never to be reached. 
Striving after goodness entails not ‘the impoverishment and straining of reality, but [its] 
enrichment and reinvigoration.’ In contrast to the ancient (Aristotelian) idea of 
perfection, then, Gentile’s subject attains ‘perfection,’ understood as ‘fullness of being,’ 
in the concrete actualisation of her will; or, in less abstruse language, perfection consists 
of self-consciously doing what one thinks is right, rather than in some state of affairs that 
results from that action. Goodness is identified not with a static form of perfection, but 
with the construction of value in fieri.97 
To sum up: the will, Gentile claims, is fully integrated with the moral subject. ‘I 
freely want,’ he writes, ‘insofar as I neither detach myself from my desire as an effect of 
my activity; and nor does my desire detach itself from me.’ If either is detached from 
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the other, subject and effect become mere objects, empirical phenomena 
comprehensible only within a mechanical, realist metaphysics of causation. The action 
would be ‘crystallised in its external effects’ as pensiero pensato, and as such immune from 
moral scrutiny.98 The only solution to this problem is to conceive of subject and action, 
intention and effect, as one continuous process – as the moral manifestation of the pure 
act of thinking. 
 
7. Conclusion 
After all that we have seen in this chapter, a clear and precise statement of the 
link between Gentilean and Kantian moral theory remains out of reach. Several of 
Gentile’s objections to Kant are recognisably Hegelian in origin. The accusation of 
‘empty formalism,’ with its denial of the possibility of substantive a priori principles, is 
chief among these. For the past two hundred years, much of Western moral (and 
political) philosophy has rested on the assumption that one must choose sides between 
the great Prussian thinkers: on one hand Kant, with his formal, rational, universal 
principles; and on the other Hegel, with his emphasis on contingency, ‘situatedness,’ 
change, and particularity. O’Neill’s and Korsgaard’s efforts to ‘immanentise’ Kant have 
shown that the image of him and Hegel as polar opposites is something of a caricature. 
Such an understanding would, among other things, make the observation that Gentile 
(or anyone) falls somewhere between the two a platitude so obvious as to be almost entirely 
unhelpful. 
Gentile’s position is distinguished by his insistence that while Kant’s system 
relies on a problematic dualism of phenomena and noumena, Hegel is less successful in 
escaping this fiction than is commonly imagined. Hegelian moral philosophy has a 
tendency to be under- or indeterminate, assigning entities to special roles and describing 
                                                          
98 Religione [81-82]  
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the dynamics between them in terms of a broad historical narrative. These concepts are 
suited to ethical questions on a correspondingly large scale. The ordinary moral question 
‘What ought I to do now?’ is not readily answerable in these grand terms. By having his 
theory hinge on the act of thinking, which preserves concrete contingency and abstract 
rationality alike, Gentile is better able to manage these small questions. As I have 
presented it, the difficult task Gentile sets for himself is to retain a role for specially-
conceived abstractions, such as the universal subject, which keep the construction of 
morality from becoming merely subjective: there is an end in sight. At the same time he 
recognises that pure objectivity is unachievable; aspirations to it make morality into 
something unreal, its content arbitrary and detached from the life of any actual person. 
My account of Gentilean constructivism still has some way to go. This chapter 
has salvaged the concrete subject from the purported abstraction of Kantian formalism, 
but we have not yet seen what the Gentilean view of autonomy (or autarchy) implies in 
practice. By retaining autonomy without universal law, there is, as ever with Gentile’s 
philosophy, a risk that actual idealist moral theory will become one of ‘monad[s] 
without windows, [each] possessor of a private world and of nought besides.’99 If that 
were true, the prospects for actual idealist moral justifications of political action would 
look very bleak indeed. To resolve some of the outstanding ambiguities, we will need a 
clearer understanding of the dynamics of the IDP. On what grounds, exactly, can S 
distinguish a good reason from a bad one? That question, broadly conceived, is the 
focus of chapter 2.3. Before we answer that, though, we must ask how this formal 
procedure can acquire content. How are we to account for the origins of S’s values? For 
Gentile, education is the answer; but with it come further questions about the possibility 
of morals that are at once binding and freely constructed.  
                                                          
99 W.G. de Burgh (1929) ‘Gentile’s Philosophy of Spirit,’ in Journal of Philosophical Studies 4:13, 
pp.3-22 [7]. De Burgh refers to a difficulty faced by actual idealism generally, but the point has 
particular significance when applied to moral theory. 
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2.2 The construction of value in Gentilean education 
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter gave us the IDP’s outline. We saw how the subject (S) 
presents her reasons to one or more hypothetical interlocutors who offer alternative 
reasons in an attempt to persuade S to alter her position. S winnows the various reasons 
on offer and thereby establishes the best reasons that she can coherently construct, 
perhaps using a composite of elements from other sources. The IDP differs from 
Kantian constructivist procedures in its insistence that we recognise S’s central and 
necessary role in the reasoning process. This consideration leads to a special emphasis 
on S’s autonomy and corresponding conceptions of universality and the ends at which moral 
actions are directed. At the end of the chapter we saw how Gentile reclaims the CI as a 
strictly formal and permanent law commanding all persons to do their duty, but unable 
to explain what, at any given moment, that duty requires. 
Gentile’s solution to the problem of his theory’s lack of content reveals a new 
and distinctive aspect of his constructivism. He proposes to use education to bring 
about ‘determined subjectivity.’1 In this chapter I show how this plays out as a process 
of institutional constructivism, whereby the state, represented by a teacher, guides S as she 
constructs her own knowledge and values. Throughout the chapter I address 
reiterations of a major objection to Gentile’s proposal: if the teacher leads S to 
construct her knowledge in a pre-determined way, there is no meaningful sense in 
which S remains the autonomous constructor of her own ideas. If her subjective 
                                                          
1 Sommario 1 [129]. Gentile uses this phrase when describing the ideal state of affairs in which the 
scholar identifies wholeheartedly with the teacher. He writes: ‘the scholar […], when he truly 
apprehends and shivers and vibrates in the instructor’s word[s], feeling inside himself a voice that 
gushes from his own inner being, does not watch the instructor,  seeing his glasses and beard, nor 
the chair on which he sits. Nor does he [the scholar] hear his [the instructor’s] word[s] as the 
word[s] of another. [Instead,] he is wholly caught up in the flow of the lesson, as all of [these 
peripheral details are] re-absorbed and fused in his determined subjectivity’ [128-9]. 
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experience is conditioned (‘determined’) in this way, she has no autonomy, and cannot, 
therefore, hold moral responsibility for her actions. 
The chapter is structured as follows. At sub-heading #1 I summarise the role 
Gentile assigns to education and explain why this may raise problems for his account of 
the autonomous subject. Next I give a more detailed account of Gentile’s vision of 
moral education, first (#2) in metaphysical terms, and second (#3) in terms of the 
political state’s role in shaping a unified public consciousness. At #4 I offer several 
versions of the argument that Gentilean education amounts to the indoctrination of 
citizens, followed at #5 by replies to these, showing that Gentile recognises the dangers 
an overly prescriptive and restrictive education would carry for his conception of 
thought’s freedom. At the end of the chapter (#6) I consider what these considerations 
imply for actual idealist moral and political theory as a whole, before reviewing the 
problems still to be addressed in chapter 2.3 (#7). 
 
1. Autonomy, indeterminacy and ‘determined subjectivity’ 
We have already seen how the IDP could be applied by a single subject. This 
reflects the actual idealist view that reasoning, like any form of thinking, can be enacted 
only in the first person by the subject of pensiero pensante. This is true even if S refers to 
other empirical persons, imagining herself as one of them in order to assess what she 
would do or think if she were in their position. For others’ claims (reasons) to be 
intelligible to her, S must re-think and so reconstruct them for herself. Although S 
aspires to view her reasons from the standpoint of an impersonal universal subject (US), 
the lack of substantive a priori moral norms means she can never be certain that her 
judgement has truly universal and therefore inter-personal application. The range and 
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force of a US’s2 claims depends upon the extent to which other subjects recognise the 
authority of its reasons. Hence S can use the IDP to identify and refine good reasons in 
order to construct moral duties applicable to her, but not (necessarily) to other people 
who may or may not share the relevant beliefs and values. 
If this were the whole story, the IDP would not have disarmed the accusation 
that actual idealism leaves S unable to make meaningful claims about value except 
insofar as she contingently happens to affirm them from moment to moment. There would 
be no possibility of the IDP’s authoritative inter-subjective application. Gentile’s 
explicitly political solution to this problem is to educate people so they share a common 
set of basic beliefs and values while identifying themselves as fellow contributors to and 
members of something larger than themselves: namely, the state. Thus persons’ 
constructions of morality are given some of their content in advance. This maximises 
the likelihood of all recognising good reasons as authoritative, or, in the language of the 
IDP, of them coming to construct universal subjects with enough mutual similarity to 
make moral disagreements unlikely and resolvable. This opens the way for orderly and 
maximally beneficial social co-operation. Gentile argues that such an arrangement 
secures the liberty of individual and state alike. A correctly-designed programme of 
moral education brings about ‘determined subjectivity,’ in which S’s free and 
autonomous will is guaranteed despite another subject (the teacher) having determined 
its object.  
To defend this last claim, Gentile must face the objection that such a 
prescriptive education would effectively scotch the autonomy, liberty and equality of 
thinkers subject to it, and instead offer autonomy and liberty to only the person or 
                                                          
2 I acknowledge that the idea of ‘a universal subject’ (among other universal subjects) seems 
jarring. My point is simply that actual idealism’s rigorously subjective standpoint prevents us from 
saying that my conception of the US is the only conception there is. It is as universal and 
objective as I can make it, but it is not universal and objective independently of my (subjective) 
input. 
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persons who decide the educational programme’s content, and equality only insofar as 
all subjects (apart from that privileged elite) are equally disenfranchised. Since the 
authority of autonomous thought applies only to the subject for whom that thought is 
concrete pensiero pensante, it is hard to see how the promotion of any specific values 
could be justified from an appropriately impersonal standpoint. 
This problem is not exclusive to Gentile. Indeed, it is one that all deeply anti-
realist constructivist moral theories must face. How can persons make claims on each 
other when they each construct morality for themselves; and if that construction is in 
any way conditioned, can the subject really be said to be its author? For example: as we 
saw in the previous chapter, despite Korsgaard’s insistence that she describes a 
constructivism that runs ‘all the way down,’ she imagines S constructing a hierarchy of 
‘practical identities’ and the values that go with them. S may reject some of her values, 
like those attached to a role with which she no longer identifies. But this identification 
or rejection relies on further value claims; it is possible only because she already 
considers some other values worth retaining at the expense of others – that is, to be 
valuable. These values are not themselves constructed by S. Korsgaard is content to 
accept that there are certain values, beliefs and identities that persons hold without 
having consciously chosen them, perhaps as a result of their upbringing and 
circumstances. They are ‘given’ to them. S’s constructive role is to review and 
subsequently endorse or abandon some (but not all) of these given values and identities 
at a later time. 
Christopher Gowans has argued that Korsgaard’s account of the ‘given’ makes 
her constructivist project incoherent. She cannot say that ‘our identities are both given 
to us and constructed by us’ without determining the outcomes of construction and so 
making them at best partly attributable to the subject.  In other words, Korsgaard’s 
attempts to explain the link between given and constructed values lead her to adopt a 
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‘rather uncritical passivity’ before those that she just happens to have.3 The business of 
construction begins only when those values are already entrenched. As such it is not the 
autonomous subject but they, or the given’s sources, that determine morality’s content. 
Korsgaard’s motivation for trying to marry universalism and contingency is clear: she 
means to address the shortfalls of Kant’s declared moral theory, which treats its subject 
as a high-minded abstraction quite unlike any of the actual persons to whom said theory 
is supposed to apply. But she finds herself touting a theory unable to deliver what it 
promises without taking certain unconstructed features of personal identity for granted.4 
To describe the issue more formally, we might say:  
 If subject S constructs value V on the basis of assumptions A, and  
 Subject T constructs assumptions A, then 
 Subject T constructs value V.5 
If T constructs V in advance, there is nothing left for S to do. S’s alleged 
autonomy depends upon the intervention of T. Therefore, S is not autonomous. Here 
Korsgaard’s difficulties closely resemble Gentile’s, but with one crucial difference. On 
Korsgaard’s account, T need be a subject only in the broadest sense. It may alternatively 
be a culture, a constitution, a routine or any number of other things that determines 
what S takes to be valuable. In this respect Korsgaard accommodates the idea of social 
construction, in which the construction of norms is not (necessarily) attributable to any 
specifiable person. A purely social T need not satisfy any rational criteria for its 
constructed values to have force. We cannot blame something so messy and complex as 
a cultural tradition for failing to test the coherence and comprehensiveness of the values 
it promotes. 
                                                          
3 Gowans (2002) [556]; emphasis added 
4 Gowans (2002) [555-6] 
5 We can describe this argument using propositional logic. Let us say that {P1: ‘S constructs V 
using A’}, {P2: ‘T constructs A’}, and {P3: ‘T constructs V’}. Hence: (P1&P2) ⊃P3 
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Gentile cannot accept the idea of mere social construction, for that would make 
received beliefs and identities into presuppositions, so infringing thought’s autonomy. 
He thinks he can escape Korsgaard’s bind by identifying T with a person, namely, the 
teacher responsible for S’s education. This argument for rigorously directed education 
as a means to bolster individual autonomy might seem perverse. However, Gentile is 
acutely conscious of the risks that prescriptive, doctrinaire socialisation carries for his 
moral theory.6 His solution to this problem – of describing the construction of citizens 
as something other than indoctrination – binds the moral and political elements of his 
theory, offering insights into his vision of the state and what criteria it must meet in 
order to have real moral authority. 
 
2. Gentile’s phenomenology of education 
‘The problem of education,’ writes Gentile, is ‘the problem of man’s 
formation.’7 In actual idealist theory this can be understood literally according to its 
unconventional conception of the subject. Education is not a process of imparting 
information, or knowledge, to a passive or fully-formed person. Rather, the acquisition 
of knowledge is a process in which S actively participates and is thereby changed, 
developed, realised, constructed. The most salient questions for us are: how is it possible 
for someone (a teacher) to educate another subject (S); and when this occurs, does S still 
construct herself in the way Gentile believes necessary for the resultant beliefs to have 
concrete value? A concrete conception of education, which for Gentile is the only real 
                                                          
6 In Diritto [74], for example, Gentile writes: ‘A society that perfectly unifies spiritual diversity 
[within itself], leaving no trace of variety, is a society that has come apart on the inside, starved of 
any spiritual energy. Strictly speaking, it is already dead.’ This passage exemplifies Gentile’s 
commitment to what he later called ‘the moment of otherness’ in society. His ideal total state is 
characterised not by rigid conformity, but instead by wide participation, evaluation and criticism 
in conditions of solidarity. This point is well argued by Alessandro Amato (2011) [211-15]. 
7 Sommario 1 [116]. Note that these phrases occur in reverse order, as ‘the problem of man’s 
formation, which is the problem of education…’ 
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form it can take, must account fully for the process of construction and how it is 
brought about through the joint enterprise of pupil (identified here with S) and teacher.8 
In what follows I offer an outline of this relationship before drawing out its deeper 
moral and political implications at the next sub-heading. 
The teacher’s principal task is to situate persons in relation to each other, and 
further with ‘the whole of what we call nature,’ understood broadly to mean the world in 
which S finds herself. In this way, with the teacher enabling or equipping S to understand 
herself in self-conscious relation to the world around her, she is given her ‘spiritual 
being.’ S’s knowledge and understanding, together with her increased competence in 
articulating these as sophisticated and mutually coherent ideas, grant her access to 
culture, history, and society, as well as the natural world, at a deeper level than is 
possible through experience alone.9 No individual can realise her full potential without 
support from others; but more than using them as instrumental means to achieve full 
self-realisation, the Gentilean individual incorporates the social system within her 
identity. Where persons recognise each other as members of and contributors to a 
shared collective identity, they can more easily comprehend and respond to others’ 
moral claims. Straightforward conflicts of interest and fundamentally contradictory or 
incommensurable reasons are less likely under these circumstances, though not ruled 
out. With widely recognised laws and civic responsibilities, a mutually intelligible 
language (so persons can understand each other), each person is situated in a wider 
social milieu. In Hegelian language, this is the basis of reciprocal relationship; S is morally 
bound to others so long as she recognises them as moral agents and they likewise 
recognise her. 
                                                          
8 Note that, in the IDP, the roles of pupil and teacher might be occupied by the same person. 
9 Sommario 1 [184-5] 
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The suggestion of holism reflects Gentile’s belief that all thinking is imbued 
with a moral character. As we saw earlier, he insists that facts and values are inseparable, 
since ‘there is no fact that is not the establishment of a value.’10 We cannot cut the tie 
between truth and the affirmation of it, nor with its implications for the self-conscious 
thinker conceiving of herself as simultaneously ‘the [person] that is and the [person] that 
ought to be.’11 It would be a mistake to imagine that moral education can be 
‘differentiat[ed]’ from the other areas of study, so that pupils are instructed how to be good 
much as they are instructed how to be good biologists or mathematicians or speakers of 
French. Gentile insists that these are part and parcel of the same process.12 
The claim that facts and values are not concretely separable does not tell us 
much about what kind of education Gentile recommends. There is a danger that his 
objections to abstract differentiation of moral and non-moral education will lead us 
nowhere. What, then, is he prescribing? Certainly he rules out a conception of moral 
education for which moralising takes place solely in ethics seminars, referring to unlikely 
and abstract examples. Rather, it imbues the entire relationship between pupil and 
teacher. It is not a mechanical process by which the raw material of an uneducated 
person is transformed into a morally upstanding citizen. That would contradict the 
conception of education as the ‘realisation of ideality,’ a process of ‘formation’ 
identified with the ‘development that is life.’13 The realisation of goodness consists in 
action and process, rather than the life of a person abstractly conceived as possessing a 
permanent quality of goodness, virtue or similar. The value of moral life cannot be 
meaningfully separated from the living of it. 
                                                          
10 Sommario 1 [118]; see also Educazione [137]; Bigongiari translation [137-38] 
11 Sommario 1 [114-5] 
12 Sommario 1 [117] 
13 Sommario 1 [198-9] 
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This last observation puts Gentile in opposition to Rousseau, who understands 
the aim of education as the realisation of the inherent goodness of human nature. 
Gentile, of course, doubts that this kind of essentialism can be meaningfully upheld. 
Education for him is ‘the actual generation of the spirit, the whole position and 
resolution of its content, [and] its living history[.]’14 It is, in sum, ‘the creation of a 
world[.]’15 It makes no sense to talk about cultivating good or bad moral qualities while 
they are only presupposed, unnoticed or unrealised, for the obvious reason that we 
cannot make substantive claims about an unknown and isolated property. However, we 
can afford to talk about formal requirements such as the one for liberty. Another major 
outcome of education, and especially moral education,16 is that the educated subject 
should be freer and more autonomous than she would have been without it. Liberty, 
understood as S’s self-realisation in the act of thought, requires that pupils are equipped 
to identify incoherence and eliminate false propositions from their beliefs. As an 
autonomous moral subject, S cannot depend on some outside source to supply her aims 
and values. She must construct her world for herself. In obtaining and subsequently 
exercising the ability to judge truth claims, she comes to educate and thereby create 
herself.17  
This does not mean that Gentile conceives of individuals educating themselves 
without direct input from others, like the paragon of self-sufficiency that is Rousseau’s 
Émile.18 The roles of the teacher and the school are referred to repeatedly in Gentile’s 
                                                          
14 Sommario 1 [220] 
15 Sommario 1 [220-1] 
16 By this I mean education that refers to questions of value, how to be good, practical reason and 
so forth; not an education that possesses moral attributes in and of itself. 
17 Sommario 1 [143]: ‘Why does the spirit educate itself, form itself, make itself? […] If we 
remember that the spirit is self-creation, [we see that] this question contains its own answer. The 
spirit makes itself because it is nothing other than self-creation.’ 
18 While I have not the space for a detailed discussion of Rousseau, it is worth noting that the 
model for Rousseau’s Émile is Robinson Crusoe. See Judith N. Shklar (1976) Freedom and 
Independence [65]. Descartes, too, places a premium on the education of the self, rather than by 
Part 2: Gentilean constructivism in moral theory 
194 
work. The meaning of his reference to the pupil’s ‘self-creation’ is unclear. If education 
is a process enacted by two parties, the teacher and the pupil, in what sense is the 
pupil’s spirit creating itself? Or to put it another way: how can we know who is 
responsible for the creation of the resultant spirit? Of course, the actual idealist 
conception of the self as an act synthesising subject and object demands that, in a sense, 
anything that a person thinks (notices) be attributed to that person. Insofar as S thinks, 
she creates the stuff of her consciousness. In some cases, such as when someone has an 
original idea, this is self-evident. Other cases are more resistant to such labelling. When 
two people discuss a problem and arrive jointly at a conclusion, having each suggested 
propositions that the other accepts, is it still true that each is the sole author of the 
changes to her own spirit, or self, as it emerges from the discussion? 
I think that the most plausible Gentilean answer to this question is as follows. 
Persons must think (articulate) and ascribe value to propositions for themselves. But 
this does not rule out the possibility of a second person presenting propositions to the 
first, or else showing the first person which ideas she might find most plausible or 
coherently thinkable given what she already thinks. Drawing on the IDP, we might say 
that a person can educate herself without the need for any other (empirical) person. For 
S to read Hobbes’ Leviathan, for example, is, provided that she gives it sufficient 
attention, effectively to engage Hobbes in conversation. While she cannot respond to 
Hobbes – or, at least, cannot hope to read Hobbes’ replies to any such comments – the 
dialogical process is borne out as she accepts or rejects Hobbes’ claims, or else strives to 
grasp Hobbes’ meaning, even when at first this seems obscure. There is a sense in 
which Hobbes is educating S, and another in which S is educating herself by speaking to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
another person: see ‘Discourse on Method,’ in Cottingham et al (eds.) The Philosophical Writings 
of Descartes (Volume 1) [124-6]. The same cannot be said of Gentile, although he would say that 
Crusoe’s business in educating himself is more like conventional inter-personal education than is 
commonly imagined. 
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herself in Hobbes’ voice. The second sense is key, for the engaged reader not only re-
thinks Hobbes’ words verbatim, but also re-interprets and re-phrases them in order to 
understand them better. The same is true of a pupil as she learns from her teacher; 
education is meaningless unless the pupil is actively engaged in evaluating, 
understanding and realising the content of the lesson. 
 
3. Education and the state 
So far I have described Gentile’s metaphysics of education, set out in the Sommario 
di pedagogia (1913 and 1914) and, to a lesser extent, the Riforma dell’educazione (1920). 
These ideas are consistent with the actual idealist conception of the person. Indeed, it is 
in the Sommario that Gentile first offers a systematic account of his epistemology and 
philosophy of mind, which together constitute this conception. Although these ideas are 
(arguably) only the ‘dry bones’ of the more elaborate theory of Atto puro and the Logica,19 
they are foundational to his later work, going largely unchanged amid the development 
and embellishment of the theory. It is notable that Gentile’s distinctive conceptions of 
freedom, autonomy and authority all arise in a work about education, and are 
subsequently transferred to other theoretical contexts (politics, ethics) without 
substantive change.  It strongly suggests, but does not quite prove, that Gentile 
modelled much of his social and political thought on what goes on in the classroom. In 
his early work, he tends to attach education to society rather than the state.20 Despite the 
shift in emphasis that occurred after 1922, this link between education and politics 
                                                          
19 ‘Dry bones’ is HS Harris’ description in his introduction to Genesis [20]. Elsewhere, in his 
(1960) The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile, Harris  emphasises that a substantive shift 
occurs in 1931’s Filosofia dell’arte, in which a greater role is assigned to feeling. [224n] 
20 In Sommario 1 [142], for example, he claims that ‘as a matter of necessity, society […] must 
provide its members with an education.’ It should be noted that there is not a hard distinction 
between the ‘society’ period and ‘state’ period. There are plenty of references to the state even in 
pre-actualist works like ‘Programmi e libertà,’ in (1908) Scuola e filosofia. Palermo: Sandron, pp. 
77-114  [66, for example] 
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survived the society-state transition, and as A. James Gregor notes, Gentile viewed the 
state as ‘essentially a teacher[.]’ Gregor distinguishes this conception from those of 
other Fascists, not least Mussolini, for whom the state was instead ‘a disciplinarian.’21  
The characterisation of the state as teacher makes Gentile’s educational theory 
begin to look newly sinister. The role of the school in ensuring that citizens ‘want what 
the state wants [them] to want’ becomes fully apparent. It is worth quoting from Origini 
e dottrina del fascismo (Origins and Doctrine of Fascism), in which Gentile really does 
appear to advocate some kind of state indoctrination, at some length: 
The Fascist state is [… a] popular state, and is in that sense [the] democratic 
state par excellence. The relationship between the state and, rather than [just] this 
or that citizen, each citizen who has the right to call himself such, is so intimate 
[…] that the state exists inasmuch and just so long as the citizen makes it exist.22 
So its formation is the formation of [a shared] consciousness by the people,23 
which is to say, by the masses in whose [collective] power the state’s power 
consists. That is why the [Fascist] Party, and all the institutions of propaganda 
and education corresponding to Fascism’s political and moral ideals, need to 
work at ensuring that the thought and will of one man, il Duce, become the 
thought and will of the masses. Hence the vast problem to which [the Party] 
devotes itself: to squeeze all the people, beginning with the little children, into 
the Party and the institutions it has created.24 
                                                          
21 A. James Gregor (1969) The Ideology of Fascism. Toronto: The Free Press [129] 
22 Original Italian: ‘…lo Stato esiste in quanto e per quanto lo fa esistere il cittadino.’ Thanks to 
Fabio Vighi for his advice on the translation of this passage in November 2012. 
23 Original Italian: ‘Quindi la sua formazione è formazione della coscienza dei singoli, e cioè della 
massa [...]’. 
24 Origini  [268]. For an alternative English translation, see Gentile w/ Gregor (ed., trans.) (2002) 
[28-9]. A shorter version appears in Gentile (1928) ‘The Philosophic Basis of Fascism,’ in Foreign 
Affairs: an American Quarterly, pp. 290-304. [302-3] 
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Passages like this show Gentile’s equation of authority and liberty at its most 
vulnerable to dismissal as Fascist apologia. To defend it, we must dig deeper to see what 
it means for the teacher to embody authority in the way Gentile thinks necessary to 
complement the liberty of the pupil.  
The teacher is responsible for finding effective ways to communicate the 
abstract content of the lesson to the pupil. In Hegelian language, education consists in 
the realisation of a single spiritual (mental) process by the pupil and the teacher at once. 
The pupil strives to understand the teacher’s lesson while the teacher tries to present it 
in a way that the pupil will understand. Through this slow-dance of the spirit they 
achieve spiritual unity. The aim of education is for them – to use a different metaphor – 
to converge on a single position, unified by a thought or idea, and aware of their 
commonality in doing so. Although the educational process is directed toward this 
specific end, the teacher must be sensitive to the pupil’s particular needs, strengths and 
weaknesses. A pupil is not free or autonomous if she is expected to remember and 
repeat information without understanding it, or to follow rules without identifying with 
them and the ends they are intended to safeguard. The teacher’s authority is not a limit 
on the pupil’s liberty; rather, it is the pupil’s autonomous recognition of the teacher as 
authoritative that makes him so. 
Despite this caveat, the teacher undoubtedly retains considerable power to 
mould the pupil’s identity to some predetermined form. He can, by more or less direct 
means, create and specify the pupil’s will and its object. This is plain enough when 
Gentile writes: 
To educate [a pupil] is to act upon [her] mind, and therefore not to leave her to 
her own devices. [The teacher] cultivates interests that [the pupil] would not 
otherwise feel; points her toward a destination whose value she would not 
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appreciate on her own; [and] pushes her along the path when she lacks the will 
to go on. In short he gives [her] a little of [himself,] and so fashions her into a 
creature with a character, a mind, [and] a will.25 
We may infer from this passage that Gentile perceives the pupil as a malleable 
object whose consciousness and identity are largely26 under the teacher’s control. This 
would further imply that the appearance of education as a process of self-construction is 
an illusion, or at least that it describes the process from only the pupil’s subjective point 
of view. But Gentile anticipates these concerns when a page later he writes: 
The mind of the teacher oscillates between the zealous desire to watch over the 
pupil, guiding her development along the best, fastest and most secure path; and 
the fear of starving fertile seeds, of presumptuously restricting the spontaneous 
life of the spirit and its personal impulses, or of forcing [her to wear] a garment 
not fitted to her, [like] a [stifling] lead cape.27 
Here Gentile acknowledges the importance of the pupil’s active role in the 
educative process. He acknowledges that mechanistic indoctrination, insofar as it forces 
the mind to develop to a particular end, threatens to stifle individual potential – the 
                                                          
25 Educazione [41]; Bigongiari translation [37]. I use the female pronoun for the pupil and the 
male pronoun for the teacher. This is to ensure that it is always clear to whom Gentile refers. 
While the difference is not always explicit in Italian, Gentile tends to use male pronouns for 
generic persons. Note Bigongiari’s less literal translation of the same passage: ‘[T]eaching implies 
an action exercised on another mind, and education cannot therefore result in the relinquishment 
and abandonment of the pupil. The teacher must awaken interests that without him would lie 
dormant. He must direct the learner towards an end which he would be unable to estimate 
properly if left alone, and must help him to overcome the otherwise [in]surmountable obstacles 
that beset his progress. He must, in short, transfuse into the pupil something of himself, and out of 
his own spiritual substance create elements of the pupil's character, mind, and will.’ 
26 I’ve retreated to this position because Gentile refers to the teacher contributing ‘a little of 
himself’ to the pupil’s character, mind and will. 
27 Educazione [42]; Bigongiari translation [38]. This idea has precedents in Gentile’s philosophy of 
education that predates his actual idealism. See Gentile’s 1902 essay, ‘L’unità della scuola media e 
la libertà degli studi,’ in Scuola, pp. 77-114 [91]. Note that in my translation of this passage I have 
inserted ‘stifling’ where Gentile writes ‘mortifera’ (deadly). I choose ‘stifling’ to emphasise the 
unwieldiness of the garment rather than its poisonous properties. 
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‘spontaneous life of the spirit.’ But again it is clear that Gentile wants to promote the 
free and active development of the individual within the sheer confines of a codified 
social and political order. He considers these aims complementary. The school becomes 
a miniature self-contained world, with rules, expectations, and a shared moral code.28 
These extend to the rules and maxims with which pupils are expected to comply in the 
classroom – be kind, act fairly, do not fight, do not steal, etc – and further to the 
structures of authority and obligation, dominance and deference, that define social life. 
More than an analogue for society at large, the school is the pupil’s society. The 
resemblance between the teacher’s authority (over the pupil) and the state’s authority 
(over the citizen) is no coincidence. The two are the same; the teacher is the state for the 
pupil subject to his authority. 
Gentile argues that the ‘grave problem’ of the pupil’s autonomy can be resolved 
through the ‘reconciliation of the maestro’s authority with the pupil’s liberty.’29 The 
pupil’s recognition of the teacher’s authority is integral to the relationship between 
them. This requires that, in the pupil’s estimation, the teacher belong to ‘the highest 
grades of human value,’ deserving the same kind of ‘religious reverence’ as her priest 
and parents. The relationship is even one of love, manifest in ‘spiritual expansion and 
devotion,’30 requiring the commitment and mutual recognition of each participant’s role 
in constituting a unified spiritual act.31 Teacher and pupil have different roles in the 
performance of this act. The teacher does not teach himself in the same way that he 
                                                          
28 This conception of the school has clear parallels with Herbart’s vision of the school as ‘a 
miniature world, to be regulated by the same system of moral ideas as that which obtains in 
society.’ See his (1913) Outlines of Educational Doctrine. London: Macmillan [12]. (Note that this 
line may come from the annotator rather than Herbart himself.) 
29 Gentile (1908) ‘L’unità della scuola media e la libertà degli studi’ [110] 
30 Sommario 1 [175-77] 
31 Since I have mentioned love, it is worth taking note of Hegel’s view that (as Judith N. Shklar 
interprets him) in ‘the final act, the erotic act, the [spirit’s] equivalent of reproduction […] the 
ego recreat[es] itself fully in order truly to know itself. […] In mutual recognition men 
acknowledge their identity and overtly know each other as one “we”.’ See Shklar (1976) [59] 
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teaches her, and neither does the pupil teach the teacher. There is a clear analogy 
between Gentile’s conception of the teacher-pupil relation and Hegel’s conception of 
lordship and bondage, or master and slave, in the fifth chapter of the Phenomenology. At 
first the pupil, like the slave, must submit to the teacher, or master, who is dominant. As 
she learns to think, the pupil begins to see how much she does not yet know or 
understand. She subsequently recognises the teacher’s authority, and strives to match it 
by self-consciously engaging with what is being taught. Thus the division between 
teacher and pupil, master and slave, is gradually bridged, and the two are united as joint 
and equal contributors to a single thought.32 
The resolution into full self-consciousness is only a target. There is no guarantee 
that it will ever be achieved. Much of the educational process occurs with the 
participants contributing unequally, one as recognised authority over the other, 
subservient member, who still tries to attain the liberty and autonomy necessary to 
resolve the distinction between herself and the teacher. Gentile’s claim that liberty 
implies authority is a familiar tenet of the doctrine of positive liberty, famously 
articulated by Isaiah Berlin. Positive liberty is enabling freedom, or the provision of 
means to the realisation of persons’ aims. This is distinct from negative liberty, or 
freedom from external restrictions on persons’ actions. In his original description of the 
two concepts, Berlin warns that reliance on the positive concept of liberty can mean 
that persons are free to live only ‘one prescribed form of life.’33  
This can be put more simply. Liberty does not imply an unlimited range of 
options. Liberty per se is an empty abstraction; to be meaningful it must be the freedom 
to do something. A subject with a wide range of choices but no power to choose 
                                                          
32 This is obviously a brief and simple summary of Hegel’s description of lordship and bondage in 
Hegel w/ Miller (trans.) (1977) [111-19; §178-96] 
33 Isaiah Berlin (2002) ‘Two Concepts of Liberty,’ in Henry Hardy (ed.) Liberty. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 166-217. (Essay originally published 1958). [177-81; quotation 178] 
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decisively between them, or whose intentions are at the mercy of fortune (if she is 
prone to sudden and unpredictable changes of heart, say), is not free. The range of 
perceived options at least partly defines what the subject wants, wills and values. This 
ties with Gentile’s conception of character and civil courage, according to which one must 
exercise ‘steady fidelity to one’s own conscience,’ and ‘bear witness […] to the truth 
recognised in one’s own mind.’34 That S could have been a different person, or at least 
could have ended up with different interests, beliefs and commitments if some features 
of her life had been different, is not a reason to abandon what she is and believes herself 
to be. So again: freedom is only freedom when S recognises it as such. The range of 
available options may be very small indeed. But provided that S’s will squares with what 
is available, she is no less free than if we were to add to those options any number of 
extra possibilities that she does not want to pursue. 
An example will clarify Gentile’s meaning. For someone to be (positively) free 
to become an expert violinist, say, she will need access to at least a violin, perhaps a 
competent and knowledgeable teacher, supportive friends and family members, the time 
and space to practise, and so forth. Even if her friends, tutors, family members and 
wider social environment are rigidly oriented toward this one specific outcome, she is 
undoubtedly free to pursue it. Indeed, she has considerable advantages over would-be 
violinists who lack these facilities. But these factors are liberating only insofar as the 
pupil aspires to be a violinist. If she wants to live a life in which violins do not feature in 
any way whatsoever – she finds practice a tiresome strain on her real aim of maintaining 
the callous-free hands requisite to becoming a hand model – then the encouragement of 
others and the quality of the available equipment and facilities give her no kind of 
benefit. It is tempting to conclude that while this unwilling violinist is free to pursue 
                                                          
34 Genesi [31]; Harris translation [95-96]. ‘Conscience’ and ‘mind’ are used to translate repeated 
instances of the Italian word coscienza. In this I follow Harris. See the footnote in chapter 1.2, 
section 2i herein.  
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that specified career, she is not free in the sense of being autonomous; she does not 
identify herself as a violinist, and unless she changes her mind, the freedom she has to 
pursue the end has no concrete value for her. 
In state and school alike, the optimal configuration of liberty and authority 
results in the overlap of the relevant parties’ wills. The citizen who wants what the state 
wants her to want is likely to find that the opportunities afforded her correspond closely 
with her intentions and desires, assuming that the state brings it about that she is given 
what she wants. While there are certain things that the law prevents her from doing, she 
does not want to do them, so her liberty is, in an important sense, secure. Similarly, the 
state whose citizens want what it wants really is ‘the democratic state par excellence,’ since 
all of its citizens, rather than just the outspoken or politically active holders of the most 
popular view, affirm the state’s will, and find it in their interests to support it 
wholeheartedly. In this way the total state can avoid the kinds of deep and intractable 
disagreement that characterise less prescriptive, more liberal states.35 
 
4. Three objections to Gentilean education 
Gentile’s defence of a self-consciously prescriptive educational programme 
(hereafter GE, for ‘Gentilean education’) can be dismissed very easily as a disingenuous 
attempt to disguise authority as liberty and suppression as assent.36 Since 
                                                          
35 Obviously these claims are deeply contentious. To be clear: these are Gentile’s reasons in favour 
of the total state, and are reported here without endorsement. They will be challenged in the next 
sub-section. 
36 Hannah Arendt describes such manoeuvres as characteristic of totalitarian regimes in general. 
They succeed in ‘dominating and terrorising human beings from within’ [325].  ‘ By pressing men 
against each other,’ she writes, ‘total terror destroys the space between them; compared to the 
condition within its iron band, even the desert of tyranny, insofar as it is still some kind of space, 
appears like a guarantee of freedom. Totalitarian government does not just curtail liberties or 
abolish essential freedoms; nor does it, at least to our limited knowledge, succeed in eradicating 
the love for freedom from the hearts of man. It destroys the one essential prerequisite of all 
freedom which is simply the capacity of motion which cannot exist without space’ [466]. See her 
(1962) The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Meridian. 
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subjects/citizens want what they want because this has been explicitly or implicitly 
prescribed for them, or, perhaps more worryingly, because they have been taught to 
believe that some external entity has authoritative insight into what they really want (but 
might not, as mere individuals, know that they want), it looks doubtful that any 
meaningful account of education as self-construction can be sustained. This gives us the 
Indoctrination Objection (hereafter IO) to GE. IO holds that in the state Gentile describes, 
citizens are nothing but products of a system of indoctrination, which is both 
impermissible and somehow distinguishable from a legitimate form of moral education. 
Gentile’s political and educational theory contradicts his moral theory, rendering his 
system of thought incoherent and leaving him open to attack as unprincipled and 
intellectually dishonest. 
Indoctrination can be defined in a variety of ways, so I shall treat IO as an 
umbrella term covering three subsidiary objections. While linked, each of these 
prioritises a different specific conception of what indoctrination means and why it is to 
be rejected. For IO to succeed, it must at least partially explain, if only negatively, what 
an authentic moral education would look like. Otherwise there is a risk that any (moral) 
education must involve indoctrination, with the result that moral objections to GE lead 
nowhere. These three versions refer, respectively, to the claim that GE is indoctrination 
because it involves imparting false beliefs or operates with insufficient regard for truth (‘the 
Falsity Objection’); because it involves the manipulation of pupils, whereby they are 
treated as means to the teacher’s ends (‘the Manipulation Objection’); and because its 
content is arbitrary, having no justified authority over the existing values and moral 
conceptions that persons might possess (‘the Coercion Objection’). 
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4i. The Falsity Objection 
The Falsity Objection claims that beliefs imparted through indoctrination are 
false, whereas those imparted via a legitimate form of education are (at least potentially) 
true. We might say that an indoctrinator intentionally causes the pupil to hold dubious 
or false beliefs about nationality, responsibility and so forth, while aware that these beliefs do 
not have the support of the best reasons. GE misleads pupils into believing that they are all 
subject to some identifiable authority (the state) that they would not recognise if 
equipped with true beliefs.37  
This claim is hard to sustain with reference to value education (a term that I 
shall use broadly to mean any kind of education that causes or encourages persons to 
adopt beliefs or commitments with explicit normative components). It is not clear in 
what sense it could be true or false that, as a matter of fact, ‘Marie owes more to her 
native France than to her adopted home of Canada.’ Nor is it certain by what criteria we 
could justify even the descriptive claim that Marie is meaningfully French rather than 
Canadian. Even if this claim refers to a loosely-defined set of further, verifiable claims – 
referring to where Marie lives, which language she speaks, and in what kind of 
documentation her existence is recorded – the Falsity Objection cannot show 
conclusively that claims attached to organically-arising social conventions are truer than 
those brought about through deliberate social engineering. So understood, the Falsity 
Objection would be unable to gain a purchase on the normative beliefs that GE means 
to inculcate. 
We can reinforce the Falsity Objection against such replies by having it say not 
that indoctrination trades in false claims, but instead that its claims are presented in such 
a way that rational assessment of their truth-value is impossible. The following 
                                                          
37 The Fascist regime’s notoriously cavalier attitude toward truth and falsity supports this view. 
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definition, from Thomas F. Green, draws a fairly typical distinction between 
indoctrination and what the author calls ‘instruction’: 
In indoctrinating, the conversation of instruction is employed only in order that 
fairly specific and pre-determined beliefs may be set. Conflicting evidence and 
troublesome objections must be withheld because there is no purpose of 
inquiry. The conversation of instruction is adopted without its intent, without 
the “due regard for truth” so essential to instruction. [… T]he intent of 
indoctrination is to lead people to hold beliefs as though they were arrived at by 
inquiry, and yet to hold them independently of any subsequent inquiry.38 
This is not quite the same as the claim that beliefs acquired via indoctrination 
are always false. It entails no contradiction with Green’s definition for a teacher to 
indoctrinate a pupil with true beliefs. What matters is the route by which she is led to 
arrive at her conclusions. An uncontroversial claim, such as ‘Sicily is south of Italy,’ can 
be learned by rote, through the study of maps and history books or by travelling. The 
same conclusion is likely to emerge whichever method is used, but only in the latter 
cases, where Sicily’s location is something other than an article of faith, can the belief be 
shown to have the support of a coherent set of further beliefs. Demonstration of the 
reasons why the pupil should believe the proposition is prerequisite to the ‘due regard 
for truth’ that distinguishes indoctrination from genuine instruction.39  
A sceptical worry arises. Since claims about nationality and civic or moral 
responsibility cannot be conclusively proven,40 must they always be treated as beliefs 
                                                          
38 Thomas F. Green (1972) ‘Indoctrination and Beliefs,’ in I.A. Snook (ed.) Concepts of 
Indoctrination: Philosophical Essays. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp.20-36. [34-5] 
39 Note that Gentile denies that there can be a hard distinction between education and instruction. 
See Sommario 1 [223-40, and esp. 239] 
40 It may be objected that we have compelling reasons to live our lives some ways rather others, 
and that this is all morality is about: there is no reason for us to go in search of free-standing 
moral particles, say, like the ‘morons’ Ronald Dworkin dismisses in his book Justice for 
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conveyed through indoctrination – that is, without due regard for truth? If so, any 
attempt to cause persons to hold beliefs about nationality (say) involves indoctrination, 
and should therefore be abandoned.41 The problem with this conclusion is that, in 
maintaining that no moral claim can be proven, it rules out any possibility of any such 
claim being legitimate; none can possibly pass the truth-regarding test. The resultant 
position may suit a deeply sceptical theory, but is not much good for our purposes if 
our intention is to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate forms of education. 
How can we bring it about that Marie (or S) holds these beliefs and shares in 
this identity without infringing her autonomy and freedom to exercise due regard for 
truth? As I have said, the claim that Marie is French cannot be conclusively proven (nor 
disproven) as a matter of fact. Even if, as suggested above, Marie’s alleged Frenchness is 
provisionally accepted as a convenient social convention attached to her language, 
location and documentation, we face a further difficulty in attaching to her any 
specifically normative claim, such as ‘Marie, as a French person, ought to care about 
France and the people belonging to it.’ We might think that Marie should come to this 
conclusion more-or-less spontaneously, partly because so much of what she knows is 
conventionally understood to be French, and what a person cares about and feels 
deeply committed to is usually what that person knows best. Could it be that a 
legitimate moral education reserves the issue of S’s identification with values to be 
inculcated through undirected socialisation? If Marie is surrounded by people who feel 
bound to each other as members of a common national community, and they take 
Marie to be a fellow member, she will have difficulty in puncturing this idea of 
community by simply expressing scepticism about the meaning of Frenchness. The 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Hedgehogs. But even then we face a serious (and, many sceptics think, insurmountable) difficulty 
in extending the claim ‘there is morality’ to ‘person P actually possesses moral obligation M.’ 
41 To be clear: it should be abandoned because it is nonsensical, not because it is morally wrong 
(which would contradict the premise). 
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teacher could educate S about relevant topics that do bear truth-regarding scrutiny, such 
as language, history, politics, and moral philosophy, but leave her to make the last step 
to the conclusion that she possesses a nationality and attendant responsibilities. S’s 
move between knowing about a language, a culture, a system of norms and values, and a 
certain group of close associates, and identifying herself with those things as integral parts 
of her extended spiritual personality, is one that she makes independently of the teacher. 
In this way, by thinking of herself as bearer of a particular social identity and 
responsibilities, S thereby makes it true that she possesses these qualities. 
This solution implies that a legitimate, autonomy-preserving education requires 
the teacher to restrict his input to laying out the materials with which S constructs her 
moral self-conception. He goes only so far as to specify what she will construct, while 
avoiding responsibility for the resultant construction. The difference between the two is 
a matter of words. It is assumed that the pupil remains autonomous so long as the 
teacher takes care not to make any positive claims about S’s moral responsibilities, 
identity and so forth, even if he consciously drives her toward a specified outcome. This 
conclusion is absurd. Suppose S asks the teacher directly: ‘You say that most people 
here identify themselves as French, and believe themselves bound by French laws and 
the principles that underpin them. Are they right to think so? Am I French? Are you?’ 
Mindful of offering a reply that he cannot defend, the teacher could shrug his shoulders, 
or ask a question in reply: ‘What do you think?’ But this is no answer. It suggests that S’s 
identification with the role described for her is optional; she could as well conclude that 
claims about nationality and normativity are arbitrary nonsense. Indeed, this is the 
opposite of what the laying out of that role was intended to achieve. By conceding 
thatthe question of whether or not S identifies with it is up to her, the teacher forfeits 
the operation at its most delicate and decisive moment. This whole solution relies on it 
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never occurring to S to ask this question, having found its answer already settled in her 
mind after a lifetime of indirect socialisation. 
 
4ii. The Manipulation Objection 
The Manipulation Objection refers not to the truth-value of the beliefs S comes 
to hold, but instead to the intention of the teacher who causes S to hold them. The pupil 
is caused to hold specified beliefs in order to further some end. It suits the interests (or 
preferences) of the teacher, or some third party (such as the state), for S to hold them. 
Whether or not she has good reasons for doing so is immaterial. Indeed, harking back 
to the Falsity Objection’s idea of ‘due regard for truth,’ it is precisely the point of 
indoctrination that S should not be able to recognise and assess the reasons for holding 
these determined beliefs.42 They are articles of faith that she affirms because she does 
not know what else she could believe or on what grounds she could justify the exchange 
of her current beliefs for different ones. 
This objection is compatible with the one before. Consciously lying to S is 
obviously an example of manipulation, as this leads her to a belief that the teacher 
knows she does not, in fact, have good reason to hold. But the teacher need not 
disbelieve the proposition that S is caused to affirm in order for the process to be 
manipulative. He could cause S to hold true beliefs for bad reasons. These reasons may 
themselves be based on false claims. For example: suppose my young daughter refuses 
to brush her teeth before bed, and I truthfully tell her, ‘You know, I once read a story 
about a monster who ate children who didn’t have clean teeth.’ In saying so I have the 
specific intention of causing her to do what I want – which is something I assume she 
                                                          
42 Colin Wringe, for example, writes that ‘the difference between the democratic teacher and the 
anti-democratic indoctrinator [is that] the indoctrinator is […] concerned to instil certain 
substantive beliefs in such a way that they will not later be questioned or changed.’ See Wringe 
(1984) Democracy, Schooling and Political Education. London: George Allen & Unwin. [35]; 
emphasis added. 
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has good reason to do in any case. My statement is true, although it is expressed with 
the expectation that the child will understand it one way (that is: as a cautionary tale) 
and I another (as a means to have her brush her teeth, and, perhaps, to keep myself 
amused). I am cultivating in the child a habit that she will later have reason to endorse, 
but offering incomplete or misleading sets of true claims in order to do so.43 So: if our 
pupil comes to hold a true belief, and this belief is the same one at which she would 
have arrived via another, sounder route, what does it matter how the ideas are 
transmitted? 
Some help is offered in Gideon Yafee’s recent article on the concept of 
indoctrination. In relating the following example, I shall refer to the teacher as T, and 
the pupil as S.44 Yafee identifies two kinds of manipulation by which T can ‘get [S] to do 
what she [T] wants [S] to do.’ The first is characterised by T ‘get[ting] her way by leading 
[S] to ignore those aims and wants with which [S] identif[ies] and do as she [T] wants,’ 
while in the second, T ‘perniciously works on [S] to alter what [he] identif[ies] with so 
that it conforms with what she [T] wants [S] to care about.’ Yafee claims to be more 
‘frightened’ by the latter than the former, noting that 
The second kind of manipulation has lasting effects that the first does not. In 
the first case, [S] can look back on [his] conduct later and see that [he] had no 
reason of [his] own to do as [he] did, while in the second, the fact that [S was] 
being used is, in effect, concealed from [him]: [he] will see [him]self later – and 
                                                          
43 To extend that example: we can probably agree that I would be abusing my parental authority if 
I were to invoke spurious monster-based fables every time I want my daughter to behave and 
think in a way I have prescribed, even if at no point do I lie or prompt her to do something I do 
not think she would endorse if presented with the relevant facts. Here are some optional 
additions to the tooth-brushing example: ‘Let us further assume that her bedtime has passed, she 
has been drinking sugary soft drinks, and she is too young to be moved by true accounts of the 
effects such chemicals can have on unbrushed teeth.’ 
44 Note that the genders of these participants are different from those used throughout most of the 
thesis. As Yafee relates his example, he is the victim of a female manipulator. I replace first-
person references with a male pronoun and retain the third-person female pronoun for the 
manipulator.  
Part 2: Gentilean constructivism in moral theory 
210 
[he] won't be mistaken – as having had reasons of [his] own for doing as [he] 
did. 
‘If I have to choose,’ Yafee concludes, ‘I would rather be a pawn than a toady.’45 
Why would he object more to being manipulated into acting as a ‘toady’ than a ‘pawn’ – 
a response he assumes most people would share? After all, Toady-S does not have to 
contend with the kind of dissonance imposed on Pawn-S, who, by contrast, is at least 
potentially conscious that what he is doing is in tension with his actual aims and wants. 
Although Pawn-S is not free to do as he wants, he is at least free to resent this lack of 
freedom. Toady-S’s actions square with his aims and wants, if only because T has 
caused them to do so. As such, Toady-S really did have ‘reasons of [his] own’ for doing 
what he did at the time he did it. If later he comes to his senses and readopts those aims 
and wants that he had before T caused him to change them, he will doubtlessly perceive 
his T-caused actions as misguided mistakes, or at least actions that, given his renewed 
aims and wants, he should not have performed. But this would be true however the 
change in actions and wants occurred. It is perfectly ordinary to change one’s mind 
about what is valuable or worth doing, and there is no reason to assume that S’s non-T-
given aims are themselves any more justifiable or long-standing than the ones that 
temporarily replaced them. The factor determining whether T’s intervention is 
legitimate is whether the T-given aims withstand reflection.46 
Recall my earlier description of a teacher who fosters S’s social, cultural and 
political identity without at any point forcing it upon her as an article of faith. Thus he 
might preserve S’s autonomy while effectively specifying what she will autonomously 
choose. The problem with this is that it assumes the teacher’s ignorance of the likely 
consequences of his actions. Undoubtedly the teacher has assisted in the process of 
                                                          
45 Gideon Yafee (2003) ‘Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will,’ in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 67: 2, pp. 335-356 [338] 
46 A fuller account of what this entails is given in chapter 2.3. 
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socialisation that we may reasonably expect to occur anyway, as a consequence of the 
pupil’s situation within a particular social context. If it occurs to the teacher that a pupil 
loaded with knowledge of some particular culture, and surrounded by people who claim 
to belong to it and to subscribe to a broadly shared system of values, is likely to identify 
herself with that same culture and value system, does the teacher then possess the 
intention to cause the pupil to hold dubious beliefs? I do not see how we can say for 
certain either way. A teacher might have unscrupulous motives and try to bring it about 
that a pupil holds beliefs that are false or at least suspect, in that she (the pupil) has no 
more reason for holding them than for holding one or more other, incompatible beliefs. 
But supposing it is granted that the pupil will acquire a nationality, which, much like her 
name, is neither deducible nor provable, the teacher might then say, by way of 
justification: ‘The pupil will incorporate this nationality into her self-consciousness as a 
result of her upbringing and ordinary social development. Her education will give her 
access to culture, shared values and norms, and a language, so admitting her into a rich 
social identity which she can share with her peers.’47 Thus he can present reasons for so 
educating the pupil that do not rely on free-standing and suspect value claims (e.g. 
‘Marie ought to identify herself as French’) but instead value claims that correspond to 
truth claims (‘Marie identifies herself as French; so she should be educated to make the 
most of that identity’). 
 
4iii. The Coercion Objection 
Another variant of IO holds that this kind of education, unlike legitimate 
varieties, entails the coercion of S.48 Obvious ways in which education could be coercive 
include mandatory submission to restrictive oaths, prohibitively harsh punishments for 
                                                          
47 This resembles the kind hypothetical agreement discussed in chapter 2.3, sub-section 3i. 
48 Yafee (2003) [passim] 
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expressions of dissenting views, or constraints on with whom pupils may associate. (In a 
wider political context, these would account for the detention of political prisoners or 
prohibitions on public meetings.) Less directly, coercion might consist of restrictions on 
what pupils are permitted to read, view or hear (that is: censorship or media control). 
While Gentile opposes the idea of a police state,49 his remark about ‘propaganda and 
education’50 suggests that this second kind of coercion is not ruled out. Pupils could be 
indirectly forced to hold specified beliefs by depriving them of access to alternatives, or 
else because they are overwhelmed by evidence – which I interpret broadly to include 
propaganda and rhetoric, as well as logically sound arguments and demonstrations – for 
the belief specified by the teacher. 
To assess the force of this objection, we need a clearer understanding of why 
coercion is to be rejected in the context of education. There are undoubtedly cases in 
which coercion is not morally amiss, even in the context of the classroom. If pupils are 
restrained from fighting or similarly dangerous or disruptive activities, for example, they 
are in a sense being coerced. The same is true of threats of punishment for 
misbehaviour or even the simple expectation that pupils be in specific places at specific 
times. But this would happen in practically any tenable and orderly classroom, 
regardless of how doctrinaire or liberal the education programme might be. There is no 
evidence to suggest that GE would be any more than ordinarily strict or harsh in its 
punishments. If it is to be criticised for its coercion, the fault must be found in the 
theory itself. 
                                                          
49 Genesi [124-5]. Gentile’s concerns about police states have been discussed in chapter 1.3, sub-
section #4. 
50 This phrase occurs in Origini, in a passage already quoted in this chapter (sub-section #3). The 
specific remarks that led to him being characterised as ‘il filosofo del manganello’ (the 
philosopher of the blackjack) should not be overlooked, although there he refers to the state and 
not to the school. 
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It can be argued that GE is coercive in that it leads (or forces) pupils to hold 
pre-determined beliefs, as the previous two objections claimed. To this the Coercion 
Objection adds that those pupils are also prevented from holding beliefs that they might 
(legitimately)51 have held otherwise. As the Manipulation Objection claimed, GE masks 
some options from pupils in order to ensure that they choose (construct) beliefs in the 
way the teacher desires. Thus they are deprived of a range of options, and tacitly of the 
freedom to choose. With respect to moral beliefs, this is hardly exclusive to doctrinaire, 
illiberal education systems. D.O. Hebb, for example, argues that 
[a] liberal, democratic, moral education sets out, rightly, to remove freedom of 
choice from a child's mind in moral questions. […] Imposing ideas we agree 
with is OK, and necessary too. Education is in a bad way if a boy on reaching 
maturity has to sit down and argue out the question before deciding whether 
race prejudice is a good thing, or cruelty to animals, or fascist governments, or 
“Watergating” – or if a girl leaving home has still to figure out whether a career 
in shoplifting or prostitution would be a good idea. Impose ideas? Try to limit 
freedom of choice? Of course we do, all of us.52 
On Hebb’s account, an educational programme may legitimately exclude 
options like these and impose others. But since he refers to a ‘liberal, democratic moral 
education,’ the denial and imposition of options cannot be so prescriptive as to deny 
pupils any choice whatsoever – otherwise it would not be liberal, and it would lack the 
plurality of views necessary to make democratic politics meaningful. How, then, is Hebb 
able to specify that racism, animal cruelty and so on are wrong? If the reason is simply 
that they are not ‘ideas we agree with,’ then he is vulnerable to charges of partiality. By 
                                                          
51 I add ‘legitimately’ because any education prevents persons from holding certain beliefs. The 
assumption here is that pupils could ‘legitimately’ have thought otherwise, meaning that what GE 
causes them to think is in no way privileged above these neglected alternatives. 
52 D. O. Hebb (1974) ‘What Psychology is About,’ in American Psychologist, 29:2, pp.71-9 [72]. 
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the same logic, GE could have any content whatsoever, provided that ‘we’ – the 
representatives of the state, perhaps – agree with it. A stronger argument may be that a 
programme that makes no impositions, and permits persons to develop moral beliefs 
favouring racism and animal cruelty, allows the acceptance of beliefs that persons have 
no good reasons to hold. We cannot expect people to recognise themselves as morally 
bound to laws underpinned by good reasons while their personal beliefs are groundless 
and arbitrary.53 A rationally justifiable system of authority demands at least a basic level 
of rationality and mutual comprehensibility among its subjects. 
 
5. Replies to the Objections  
In this subsection I offer Gentilean replies to IO as a whole. In doing so I 
attempt to establish the extent to which GE can yield the content of Gentilean moral 
theory without infringing its form. 
It is plain that Gentile cannot endorse an education system that disregards the 
value of truth. We have already seen that his theory of truth relies on both S’s 
affirmation of a proposition and that proposition’s coherence with other beliefs. For S 
to arrive at a belief without knowing why she holds it would satisfy only the first of these 
requirements. It may be that later she comes to see why her belief is justified, but until 
that occurs – until she is able to provide a structure upon which that belief can rest – 
the proposition cannot rightly be called true. Moreover, to acquire a belief through 
indoctrination is not to act freely. Unless S can justify this belief to herself, subjecting it 
                                                          
53 This is not to suggest that the choice is between wholesale rational paternalism and out-and-out 
relativism. There is no reason to assume that people who have some rationally grounded beliefs 
and others that are arbitrary cannot live together in a stable community. What matters is that, 
unless some demands are made about what they believe, they can believe anything, including 
groundless claims about, say, a hierarchy of races. This would disable any attempt to have them 
reach agreement in moral matters. 
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to critical scrutiny through the IDP, she is unable to revise or reject it at any later time. 
It becomes an assumption, an abstract proposition with its truth-value already given. 
This reply partly addresses the Manipulation Objection. The extent to which 
persons may be legitimately ‘manipulated’ is severely limited by the requirement for 
beliefs to have the support of reasons. However, this does not counter the claim that to 
impose specific values is to use persons as means to an end.54 GE certainly has an end 
in view: namely, the unity of spirit through which the pupil can attain autonomy. Within 
the social microcosm of the classroom, the teacher does not personally stand to gain 
much from pupils’ compliance. Certainly disciplined and engaged pupils are easier to 
manage, and as such easier to instruct in the skills requisite to autonomous mastery of 
the subject at hand. There is nothing obviously sinister about making a five-year-old do 
what she is told because she is a member of the class, and all members of the class are required to 
obey the rules, provided that this dependency does not hinder her development later when 
she is better equipped to reason for herself. The teacher imposes his authority so as to 
clear away children’s undesirable tendencies (recalcitrance, laziness, unwillingness or 
inability to communicate with others, disrespect, ignorance) and replace them with 
desirable ones (including, aside from the opposites of those listed previously, sound 
judgement and self-control) before the former can become ingrained to the hindrance 
of the latter. A child with these positive qualities will make the teacher’s job easier, of 
course, but this is not the chief end at which enforced discipline is aimed. Rather, if it is 
to have any value, the teacher does it for the child’s ultimate benefit. 
Transplanted to a political context, this theory looks rather different. Rather 
than a child identifying herself as a member of the class and, by extension, one obliged 
and expected to obey the rules and respect the teacher’s authority, a citizen educated in 
                                                          
54 To elaborate: these deliberately-inculcated values are means to the state’s end of creating order. 
The problem is that what leads them to behave in an orderly fashion is a shared but initially 
externally-imposed value set whose content is ultimately arbitrary. 
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this way is expected to identify herself with the state, and to obey its laws and its 
assumed authority. Hence the citizen attains a sort of autonomy, just as the pupil does; 
but it is a special kind of autonomy, in that all members of society direct themselves 
towards compatible ends. This brings about order, social cohesion, and the greatest 
possible correlation between what citizens want and what they are positively free (able) 
to achieve. 
I doubt that we can dismiss GE as a poorly-disguised licence to dominate. 
Adrian Lyttelton writes that Gentile actively opposed the idea of ‘direct political 
indoctrination’ of the mechanical and systematic variety. What he wanted, Lyttelton 
writes, was ‘spontaneous discipline,’ with citizens submitting their wills entirely and 
voluntarily to the state while simultaneously thinking, acting, and creating the world 
around them.55 Gentile’s educated citizen is not a mindless drone, driven to hold pre-
conceived ideas and habits by the removal of alternatives and (perhaps) a lingering 
threat of state violence. Rather, she is free to do what she wants to do provided that this 
remains within carefully arranged moral and legal confines. The ability to think freely 
and critically is paramount within Gentile’s idealist system as a whole. It is only by 
applying reason carefully and correctly that a person may realise her full potential as a 
thinking being.56 
It can be objected that order, cohesion and positive liberty are only secondary 
aims, and that what Gentile really wants is a placid and compliant population over 
whom a specific political elite – the mysterious uomo fascista, or il Duce – can exercise 
                                                          
55 Adrian Lyttelton (2004) The Seizure of Power: Italian Fascism in Power, 1919-1945. (Revised 
Edition). New York: Routledge [341] 
56 Recent theorists have defended education’s powers to increase autonomy while reducing basic 
(negative) freedom. See, for example, Johannes Giesinger (2010) ‘Free Will and Autonomy,’ in 
Journal of the Philosophy of Education 44:4, pp.515-28 [525]; and, for a version concocting 
similar conclusions using more Kant and less education, Sarah Buss (2005) ‘Valuing Autonomy 
and Respecting Persons: Manipulation, Seduction and the Basis of Moral Constraints,’ in Ethics 
115:2, 195-235 [226-33] 
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total control, without the need to accommodate prior social conventions and norms. I 
cannot conclusively disprove this claim, of course, since I have no privileged access to 
Gentile’s true intentions. However, assuming a reasonable degree of correspondence 
between what he wrote and what he thought, in his defence I can say this: the central 
tenets of actual idealism are at odds with this reading. Gentile conceives of legitimate 
moral claims as those generated by free and reflective agents. As such, persons have 
responsibility for co-ordinating their own lives and assessing the laws they employ in 
doing so. Actual idealism’s starting position, set deep in the act of thinking, must rank 
highly among the possible conceptions of the person best suited to safeguarding the 
autonomy of the individual subject. In short: if Gentile really did intend his educational 
theory as a licence to dominate, he made the task needlessly difficult for himself. 
It is also clear that Gentile opposes coercive education that would obstruct the 
pupil’s ability to think, or to reconcile her thoughts with her actions.57 There is no 
reason to assume that forced compliance, whereby the pupil’s behaviour is tightly 
controlled, implies that the pupil thinks what her teacher wants her to think. Even if the 
forced compliance were so comprehensive and relentless that she lost the ability to 
think critically (an idea commonly invoked in discussions of so-called ‘brainwashing’)58  
she would be deprived of the liberty necessary for any affirmation to have moral 
significance. ‘The spontaneous life of the spirit’ would be fatally stifled.  
The practical implications of Gentile’s view can be seen in his recommendations 
for policy reform. In an early educational work, he stipulates how religion should be 
taught in school, trying to reconcile his nascent actual idealism with the Catholicism 
with which the vast majority of Italians – the audience for his desired reforms – 
                                                          
57 At least this is true of his philosophical work. It is well established that Gentile endorsed, or at 
least failed to prevent, the introduction of mandatory oaths of allegiance in the Italian education 
system. See e.g. Harris (1960) [197] 
58 E.F. O’Doherty (1963) ‘Brainwashing,’ in Studies: an Irish Quarterly Review. 52: 205, pp. 1-15 
[esp. 13-15] 
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identified themselves. Gentile acknowledged that the discipline of philosophy takes time 
and effort to understand, and for many (perhaps most) people, it will not seem 
intuitively obvious or easy to grasp. Small children, for example, are likely to lack the 
skills necessary to reason out their beliefs. A full appreciation of the moral and practical 
reasons not to steal or set light to cars, say, is beyond the child’s grasp. Some people 
may never be able or inclined to tackle such demanding ideas. But morality is not only 
for moral philosophers; we cannot wait for persons to become autonomous before 
teaching them how to exercise their autonomy. Religion offers a solution to these 
problems. Children may be taught to hold the right beliefs (for now let us confine these 
to moral convictions, such as ‘stealing is wrong’) for reasons that are at once easily 
grasped and, on further examination, potentially specious (e.g. ‘because God is watching 
you and He disapproves of theft’). For this to be legitimate, it must be assumed that 
those same conclusions can later be endorsed after rational and disciplined reflection. 
The original reasons given serve as a short-cut for those not yet able to make sense of 
the truer and more demanding ones, which may be taken up later when subjects are 
equipped for the task. On first approach, though, as Harris puts it, ‘the pupil’s liberty is 
in the teacher’s keeping.’59 
The strongest version of IO that can reasonably be mounted against GE argues 
that the early stages constitute a sort of well-intentioned indoctrination, intended to 
inculcate a set of values, commitments and/or beliefs par provision until they can be 
examined and subsequently accepted by a better-informed, self-conscious and 
autonomous subject. Obviously of great importance are the stages that follow. The 
pupil must, after this thoroughly determined beginning, be taught to take charge of her 
                                                          
59 Harris (1960) [quotation 86; see also 68-71]. I was going to draw a comparison between these 
ideas and Plato’s ‘noble lie,’ but annoyingly Harris has beaten me to it [95] 
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own thinking, in order that the re-examination and assessment of her received opinions 
can result in their vindication. 
 
6. Re-appraising Gentilean education 
The preceding objections and replies offer a clearer impression of GE and the 
moral and political theories with which it is linked. Especially striking is the conception 
of the free and autonomous subject that emerges from this discussion, as well as the 
conception of political equality that goes with it. In this subsection I draw out some of 
the implications of these ideas, showing how GE refines the Gentilean vision of morally 
authoritative political institutions. 
 
6i. Gentilean education and political theory 
Education is one area in which Gentile’s moral theory has a direct political 
application. The political state has a role to play beyond the metaphysical business of 
the IDP. Its role is explicitly practical, setting curricula and determining what is taught 
to whom. We may ask: given what we know about Gentilean moral theory, what is the 
most convincing way to characterise the role of the state in the construction of the 
circumstances of moral reasoning? Is its proper role to engage directly in ‘soulcraft,’ 
shaping individuals and imposing on them pre-conceived values and beliefs;60 or instead 
to teach people how to live alongside others while thinking and acting as autonomous 
moral agents?61 
Let us examine the case for each side. I have already cited Gentile’s claim that 
‘as a citizen, I want what I want: but, when I look more closely [quando si va a vedere], 
                                                          
60 I take the term ‘soulcraft’ from the liberal education theorist Eamonn Callan, and especially his 
book (1997) Creating Citizens. Oxford: Clarendon Press. He defines it ‘as the moulding of citizens 
according to some traditional standard of human excellence’ [4]. 
61 I am grateful to Peri Roberts for bringing these questions to my attention in June 2012. 
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what I want coincides exactly with what the state wants me to want.’62 On Gentile’s 
unusual conception of the will’s relation to knowledge, to share the state’s will is also to 
share at least some of the substantive beliefs underwriting that will. (Since the state, qua 
abstract entity, cannot strictly hold beliefs, it must be assumed that both its beliefs and 
its will are inferable from its doctrinal statements or laws.) The state’s power to change 
citizens’ wills is limited by the necessity of their thinking. Gregor has argued that while 
the Gentilean state undoubtedly holds very considerable powers to shape the 
individual’s ‘moral world,’ it  
assumes moral significance only when the individual is persuaded or persuades 
himself that the state is his state. Only then does the state become a moral reality 
for the individual [… However, ‘p]ersuasion’ and ‘consent’ are terms that can 
only be appropriately applied in contexts where intellectual freedom obtains. 
Men are persuaded to consent without coercion only by good reasons [… accessed 
via] an appeal to reason and human sentiment.63 
This is a reasonable précis of Gentile’s basic position. It does not answer our 
question, however. To illustrate, suppose for now that the state can provide persuasive 
arguments to support its substantive claims. At no point does it present as true any 
claim that is demonstrably false. There is still considerable scope for variation in how 
the state employs its ‘good reasons’ in practice. It could be that the state, citing 
marginally better reasons for preferring one end rather than another, acts against the 
wishes of people who disagree, and perhaps care very deeply that the present state of 
affairs should continue. The persons likely to be affected by a given policy cannot be 
                                                          
62 Educazione [33]. In Bigongiari’s translation [29], this passage is rendered thus: ‘as a citizen, [I] 
have […] a will of my own; but […] upon further investigation my will is found to coincide 
exactly with the will of the state, and I want anything only in so far as the state wants me to want 
it.’  
63 Gregor (1969) [225-6] 
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expected to change their minds as if by fiat whenever the state announces its position 
on some controversial issue. The state does not control its citizens’ lives directly, and 
cannot do their thinking for them. As mentioned in previous chapters, it cannot judge 
every possible point of disagreement in advance.  Indeed, if we remember that it exists 
chiefly as a metaphor, it becomes plain that the state cannot possibly hold a monopoly 
on good reasons prior to any person constructing these. That is: any appeal to the 
state’s good reasons must at some stage collapse into the good reasons of an actual 
thinking subject who is something other than a metaphor.  
Gregor’s ‘good reasons’ formulation also fails to explain what stance the state 
may legitimately take on beliefs whose content is largely arbitrary or under ordinary 
circumstances taken as true because of convention and indirect forces of socialisation. 
Beliefs – even treasured beliefs – are not always reached via the best available 
arguments. As such it is unclear what the state could legitimately cite as universally 
recognisable or otherwise objectively good reasons to make citizens identify themselves 
principally as Italians rather than Sicilians or Florentines, say. This problem is 
compounded if we consider what would make a state’s reasons in favour of this policy 
demonstrably better than reasons existing people might offer in favour of their 
Florentine or Sicilian self-conceptions. This leaves open deeply contentious questions of 
whether good reasons should be understood as those grounded in value or expediency, 
justice or the common good, and still further metaphysical questions of what reason 
entails. 
I do not propose to settle these issues here. I point them out only to show how 
deep the problems run. What matters for our purposes is that Gentile does not offer a 
substantive solution either. His theory does not give rise to a comprehensive policy 
programme, but instead a set of strictly formal considerations for any thinker engaged 
in designing one. It does us no good to follow Gentile’s rigorous strategy if we then 
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fudge more substantive conclusions than his theory allows. It is notable that he prefaces 
his comments on ‘the fundamental antinomy of education’ – that is, the clash between 
the ideas that education is supposed to augment its recipient’s freedom; and that it 
destroys its recipient’s freedom by forcing compliance – with the following proviso: 
A warning in advance: my solution does not eliminate all difficulties. It is not a 
key that opens all doors. […] Education’s value is in the problems that arise 
from it, and for these we can never hope to find a solution that would free us 
from having to think.64 
This does not mean that the state’s proper role in educating citizens is 
indeterminate or arbitrary. Another way to characterise the state’s educative role is to 
say that it should teach people how to live together, rather than imposing on them a 
comprehensive conception of value. This is a closer fit with recent liberal responses to 
the question of paternalism in education, where it is commonly assumed that there is 
value in maintaining pluralism, though not necessarily boundless pluralism, for its own 
sake. It seems that a policy designed to accommodate every possible extension of 
pluralism, including deeply irrational, internally contradictory and other-denying 
doctrines, would deprive the state of any basis on which to justify its actions. If it is 
disabled to that extent, it cannot meaningfully exist, for the idea of the state as an 
authoritative entity relies upon its members’ recognition of it as such. 
Individuals need not be iterations of the same person in order to live together. 
The state cannot control the fact that persons have different life experiences, which may 
contribute to identity-formation in ways that the state cannot predict or act against. For 
                                                          
64 Educazione [42]. Bigongiari’s translation is less literal, but maybe clearer: ‘I must at the very 
outset utter an emphatic word of warning. My solution does not remove all difficulties; it cannot 
be used as a key to open all doors. For as I have repeatedly stated, the value of education consists 
in the persistence of the problems, ever solved and yet ever clamouring for a new solution, so that 
we may never feel released from the obligation of thinking.’ [38] 
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state education to rob citizens of their ability to disagree with it, each other, or 
established conventions, would saddle the state – or rather, those persons representing 
it – with implausibly extensive responsibilities. The state would need a full array of facts 
and reasons at the point of its creation.65 To find out on what basis we might design a 
Gentilean scheme of social cooperation in which persons can live together, we must 
refer to special kinds of construction designed to produce firm outcomes despite 
constructors’ different (and not always negotiable) beliefs. That will be one of my tasks 
in the next chapter. 
 
6ii. Education and the IDP 
I now return to the IDP to see what the educational theories so far described 
can reveal about Gentile’s model of practical reason. This can be achieved at two levels. 
The first is strictly metaphysical, while the second refers to the more commonsensical 
business of what a teacher may legitimately teach. 
There can be no doubt that the teacher and the socius fulfil the same moral role. 
The pupil refers to the teacher when she wants to know what to do. At first she submits 
wholly to the teacher’s authority, as she is not yet equipped to test the coherence of the 
reasons presented to her. Later she can expect the teacher to supply an answer 
supported by reasons that she (the pupil) can understand. If she is unconvinced by the 
reasons offered, she may challenge or reject them. But integral to the relationship 
between pupil and teacher is that they recognise and respect each other as thinking 
beings; the pupil may not arbitrarily reject the teacher’s reasons, but if she can show 
those reasons to be flawed, the teacher must try to better them. Through this joint 
endeavour, together with a shared recognition of the value of truth, pupil and teacher do 
                                                          
65 This possibility has already been discussed in chapter 1.2, section 4i, where I called it the 
Regress Problem. 
Part 2: Gentilean constructivism in moral theory 
224 
not compromise their respective arguments in the sense of meeting half-way; rather, 
they both move toward a common destination, however distant this is from either’s 
starting point. They aspire to that spiritual unity in which there is only one concrete 
subject. The same applies to the way in which the autonomous subject refers to the 
socius in order to identify the best reasons for action. The difference is that the socius is 
internal rather than external. However, it can still be challenged, contradicted and 
altered, but only if S genuinely believes that she can offer better reasons for thinking or 
doing something other than what the socius prescribes. If S is to remain an active 
participant in moral life, she must ultimately satisfy the socius, coming to identify it with 
US, which represents the truth. 
For this chapter, one pressing question remains. Can Gentile coherently argue 
for a constructivist moral theory based on S’s autonomy and liberty at the same time as 
a political and educational theory whose central concern is ‘man’s formation’? On the 
evidence we have seen, and in light of the formal restrictions on the power of educators 
and states to specify the content of persons’ values, I think he can. This will not 
convince all critics, of course. The objection that existing values would be effectively 
crowded out by the externally-imposed set, and that existing values ought to be 
respected because subjects already consider them to be valuable, cannot be conclusively 
countered on its own terms. But that objection amounts to a general endorsement of 
the status quo; it only assumes that existing values are more worthy of retention than 
their alternatives. Nor does this give us reasons to think an S holding organically-arising, 
traditional values (say) is any more autonomous or free than if she held another, artificially-
devised set. They are effectively given to her in either case, although clearly much 
depends on how they are presented. Gentile’s version, premised on the IDP, accepts 
the arbitrariness of value while insisting on the subordination of any belief to reasoned 
thought. In other words, S may review and reject her values according to the reasons 
2.2 The construction of value in Gentilean education 
225 
she has for holding them; and although she can never be certain that her assessment of 
reasons does not itself rely on controversial value claims, she must try to justify her 
values using the best standards she can devise. Once again, this task can never be 
completed, but any thinker who recognises the authority of her own thought is 
compelled to engage in it. The question of how S might go about this task is one of 
those addressed in the next chapter. 
 
7. Conclusion 
I explained how Gentile reconciles two ideas: first, that values are transmitted 
between persons and through cultures, and, second, that moral subjects are 
autonomous constructors of their own values. This leaves unresolved the question of 
exactly what those values should be. Intractable conflicts of value are not wholly ruled 
out. We have not yet seen a Gentilean decision procedure for resolving problems where 
parties are at odds over what to do. While individuals continue to live their own lives, 
they cannot become iterations of the same person. Even the most extensively socialised 
individuals must retain the power to disagree with each other. Owing to their 
separateness, they cannot share a single, unified and equally transparent conception of 
value using which they make identical judgements with perfect consistency. If they did, 
moral theory would be a descriptive exercise with no power to determine what anyone 
really ought to do. But if society is to function in an orderly and stable fashion, and is to 
accommodate the possibility of internal change,66 it must have some orienting 
assumptions in place. Rationally justified laws, for example, guarantee the state’s moral 
                                                          
66 By ‘internal change’ I mean that persons’ values may alter, perhaps dramatically, over time. 
These changes may affect some people within society in different ways and/or to different extents 
than others. That I call this change ‘internal’ does not exclude the possibility of people arriving in 
society from the outside: emigration and immigration are themes that Gentile addresses rarely, 
and then without much departing from the assumption that states constitute closed societies.  
Part 2: Gentilean constructivism in moral theory 
226 
demands of its citizens against the caprices of the changing personnel charged with 
administering them. This process of rational justification is found in the IDP. 
 
 227 
2.3 Dialogical constructivism and the idea of agreement 
 
Introduction 
So far in Part 2 we have seen that Gentile endorses the Kantian conception of 
reason as a process by which the subject (S) strives to give her judgements universal and 
therefore objective status. He aims to do away with any transcendent elements in Kant’s 
ethics, modelling actual idealist moral theory instead upon the metaphor of the internal 
dialogue by which S reviews and evaluates her reasons for thought and action. We have 
also seen how Gentile’s theory of education fits together with his constructivist moral 
doctrine. S is at once a product of her society and an autonomous agent responsible for 
her own constitution. Appropriately configured, these simultaneous constructions need 
not conflict. 
This chapter explicates the IDP’s mechanism and show how it functions as a 
practicable constructivist device. To begin, I argue that the metaphor of dialogue is the 
model best suited to moral reasoning as Gentilean constructivism conceives of it (sub-
heading #1). I then explain how, even if the dialogue is strictly an internal procedure, it 
enables S to refine her subjective beliefs into objective claims. Drawing especially on the 
work of Donald Davidson, I introduce two formal principles to guide S’s conduct when 
applying the procedure (#2). Next I ask how S interacts with the socius (A). I examine 
the cases for verificationist and falsificationist versions of the IDP, finding that it is 
compatible with both, but that the latter is the most useful for drawing decisive 
conclusions (#3). In the last substantive part of the chapter I explain the relationship 
between the IDP’s interlocutors and real, ‘external’ people that S might encounter. I 
show that while Gentilean constructivism is primarily a meta-ethical doctrine, it carries 
some substantive implications for the moral status of others and, by extension, how S 
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may legitimately behave toward them (#4). I conclude with a brief summary of the 
IDP’s purpose and function as developed in this chapter and the two that preceded it 
(#5). 
 
1. Justifying dialogue 
Before elaborating the fine details of the IDP, we must first establish the status 
of the dialogical metaphor at its heart. Metaphors necessarily represent their objects in 
imperfect or incomplete ways, accentuating certain characteristics at the expense of 
others. It may be that the metaphor of dialogue is no more than an optional literary 
device by which reasoning can be depicted, and that other ways of doing so would bring 
out features that are obscured or distorted in this version. To see whether this is true, let 
us ask: How do the IDP’s specifically dialogical features affect its function and outcome? Could the 
same conception of reason be re-stated without the metaphor of dialogue? 
Here it is useful to review the main similarities and differences between the 
Gentilean and Kantian versions of constructivism. Gentile and Kant both acknowledge 
that the fact of S being a finite, particular subject, thinking particular thoughts in a 
context that she does not always fully comprehend, denies her direct access to a purely 
objective world of things in themselves. They also recognise that to abandon the idea of 
objectivity altogether, and settle instead for unanchored subjectivity, is to give up on 
serious inquiry. To make sense of objective reasons despite the impossibility of direct 
access to them, S must refer to other people, be they real or hypothetical, to find out 
what they (would) think about whatever problem she faces.1 The standards of 
                                                          
1 Compare O’Neill’s account of Kant: ‘[Kant says] a thinker “reflects upon his own judgement 
from a universal standpoint.” However, this universal standpoint is no pre[-]established 
Archimedian standpoint of reason; rather it is one that the thinker constitutes “by shifting his 
ground to the standpoint of others.” The reflexive and this-worldly character of a vindication of 
reason is here apparent: Reasoned thinking is governed not by transcendent standards but by the 
effort to orient one’s thinking in ways that do not preclude its accessibility to others.’ (1989) [26] 
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objectivity are imposed by a test of universality, which amounts to a test of whether the 
judgement would be reached by rational persons assaying the relevant issue from their 
own points of view. These other people are rational, and their reasons to that extent 
worth taking into account, if S can recognise that they have good reasons for thinking 
as they do. 
This formula – call it the anti-realist formula – is obviously circular. It appears that, 
in order to determine which persons are rational providers of reasons, S needs some 
prior standard of rationality. She needs to beg the question for the answer. It is always 
possible that she, and any or all of the other people to whom she refers, are deeply 
mistaken about reasons. A serious error at the outset could lead her astray as she tries to 
establish grounds for objective inquiry. The justificatory process is, in principle, endless. 
Kant, along with some of his constructivist interpreters, brings this to a halt by 
affirming the existence of a single external world and a plurality of persons in it, their 
thoughts structured to fit the cognitive architecture common to any and every 
conceivable rational being. Gentile does not deny outright that an external world exists, 
but argues instead that nothing about the world (or a cognitive architecture that would 
give rise to purely objective reasons) can be said, and still less known, unless it is 
mediated by S as she thinks in the continuously unfurling present. Responsibility for the 
construction of truths is shifted squarely onto S, rather than S and a plurality of other 
persons who live in and refer to the same world. If the IDP is a doctrine of inter-
subjectivity, it is one that grants a peculiarly central role to the one concrete subject.2 
However, this is ultimately an issue of terminology that need not detain us here.3 Suffice 
                                                          
2 Here it is tempting to add that S has responsibility for the construction of truths within her own 
phenomenological ambit, or the world as she understands it, or the totality of her knowledge, or 
however we style it. However, this addition would be redundant, since on Gentile’s account, 
there is no standpoint beyond S. We are all S to ourselves. 
3 If the IDP is an inter-subjective procedure, it represents an unconventional branch of inter-
subjectivity in which one concrete subject (S) has a uniquely prominent role, and the others with 
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it to say that thinking is all S has to distinguish good reasons from bad ones, so by her 
own lights she must do the very best thinking she can.  
Gentile thinks it is possible to accept the circularity of the anti-realist formula 
without surrendering the aim of objectivity. An important corollary of this view is that 
the process of construction, the work of reason, can never be finally completed; 
knowledge of the truth is something S acquires and loses on the shifting sands of doubt 
and its perpetual resolution. The metaphor of dialogue enables us to model the open-
endedness of this process. Moral reasoning, like reasoning of any kind, requires S to 
assay the merits of claims that she does not at the outset know to be true. If she always 
had unmediated, unshakeable certainty in all matters, she would have no need to apply 
reason.4 She would have certainty not as the result of having dispelled doubt through 
careful reflection, but because alternatives do not occur to her; the facts, as far as she 
can see, consistently conform to her beliefs and expectations. Such a thinker would be 
highly unusual, though not wholly inconceivable. S might live a closely regulated and 
unproblematic life in which all decisions are made by others behind the scenes. 
Circumstances in which she needs to think could be carefully limited in order to prevent 
doubt from entering her mind. But since actual and at least minimally autonomous 
subjects typically live alongside others under conditions that are not so artificially 
regulated, reason comes into play whenever S faces a number of options for belief or 
action, and acknowledges that, viewed from different points of view, there might be 
reasons in favour of each. Conscious that she occupies just one of several possible 
                                                                                                                                                                    
whom S interacts are understood as abstract entities that exist only inasmuch as S understands 
them. In this respect, to call the IDP ‘inter-subjective’ is misleading rather than straightforwardly 
inaccurate. Some other term like social subjectivism may better express its distinctiveness, but 
again this term might be thought to suggest that Gentile thinks that a social entity (e.g. a group, a 
society) is a subject. As discussed in previous chapters, he sometimes suggests this, but only as a 
metaphor. 
4 This is not to say that her beliefs would always be true. She might be deeply deluded. What 
matters is that she believes them to be true and can see no reason – or, more radically, has no 
conception of the possibility that there could be a reason – for her to doubt them. 
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points of view, S is compelled to address the alternatives in order to make sense of an 
objective world. Thus, recognising her own finitude and the role of reasoning in 
overcoming it, she is thrown into ‘dialogue’ with real or merely possible occupiers of 
those other points of view.5 
We have seen already that reasoning involves the reconciliation of two abstract 
parts of S’s extended personality. One is her ego, representing what she wants for herself, 
and what she now thinks. The other is the socius, or A, which is, or at least grants her 
access to, her conscience.6 This reconciliation does not occur without S’s conscious 
intervention. The familiar feeling of regret at having behaved selfishly or against one’s 
better judgement, or in spite of one’s better self, is testament to this. S can know what 
reason commands only if she actually, actively thinks, subjecting her own ideas to 
scrutiny as though they were presented to her by someone else, and the ideas of others 
(if only hypothetical others) to scrutiny as though they were her own. S arrives at a 
reasoned conclusion by considering and responding to a range of alternatives to the 
view she ultimately affirms. In this respect the reasoning process resembles a 
conversation. Yet it may be objected that the uncompromisingly subject-centred 
position of thought in actual idealism means that there can be no real dialogue 
whatsoever, since S must be the final arbiter in questions of truth concerning the world 
that she constructs. Even if S speaks to other empirical people, they present her with 
reasons only insofar as she recognises them to do so. Being like a conversation in some 
                                                          
5 This is well expressed by Fred D’Agostino (1993) ‘Transcendence and Conversation: Two 
Conceptions of Objectivity,’ in American Philosophical Quarterly 30:2, pp.87-108 [89]: ‘[I]t 
follows necessarily and from the bare fact of our being oriented to the world that there are a 
plurality of alternative ways in which we might have been oriented. If there is any perspective on 
the world, then there are, necessarily, a plurality of alternatives to it. This much is obvious from 
reflection alone – at least on the assumption of our (relative) finitude in relation to the world.’ 
6 In questions of theoretical reason, which are not, according to most theories apart from 
Gentile’s, morally significant, the ‘conscience’ might be substituted by ‘S’s rational self.’ 
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limited respect, we might say, is not enough to justify the use of dialogue as the basis for 
the whole procedure. 
This objection can, I think, be answered. While it seems paradoxical to claim 
that it is only by addressing the reasons of others that S can properly situate herself in 
her autonomously constructed world, careful consideration of Gentile’s theory shows 
this paradox to be specious. Unless S has a conception of what someone else would or 
might think about the judgement she is making, even if that second person is an 
imaginary version of herself and different only in that the alter-ego has settled on an 
answer to the question S is still considering, S has no standards by which to judge 
whether her current thoughts are the ones she ought to think.7 Questions of their value 
would not arise. From moment to moment, S would simply think whatever she thinks, 
unable to conceive of what another person would think (but S herself does not currently 
think) in the way necessary for her to view her thoughts from the critical distance that 
objectivity requires.8 Such distancing occurs whenever S conceives of herself both as an 
agent thinking in the present and a person with a past and a future (or several possible 
futures). As S evaluates these imagined alter-egos, herself as she once was and as she 
will (or could) be, she alters her present convictions and attitudes toward the world 
around her. Thus she effectively changes something of herself and casts moral 
judgement on the world as something to be conserved or revised, condemned or 
condoned. Recognising that this change is an act is the cornerstone of moral thought as 
Gentile conceives of it. To think otherwise is to be swept along on the outpouring of 
historical contingency, passively accepting the world as it is and declining to bear part of 
the responsibility for it. 
                                                          
7 Once again I am using ‘to think’ as a catch-all term that could be extended to beliefs, actions and 
so forth. 
8 This again reflects Gentile’s notion of the way concrete thought is ‘imprisoned’ in abstract 
thought, already cited in chapter 1.1 herein. As before, see Fabio Gorani (1995) ‘Logo concreto e 
logo astratto nel pensiero di Giovanni Gentile,’ in Idee 28-9, pp. 139-60. [152] 
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Despite these grand claims, dialogical thought is remarkably ordinary, and can 
be seen in persons’ most routine reflections. Suppose, for example, that S, writing an 
account of some historical event, notices that one of her sentences contains a word that 
could be understood in several ways. Unless she means to exploit the ambiguity for 
some other purpose – perhaps as a means to amuse or confuse the reader – she is 
moved to choose a different word, or else to alter the structure of the sentence, by the 
thought that its meaning would (or could) appear unclear to a second person, even though 
the intended meaning is perfectly obvious to her. Thus she anticipates and accommodates others’ 
ignorance of her thoughts. To do that she must also have an idea, however inexact, of 
what they do know and think, and of what she could have thought if she had read the 
same sentence without privileged knowledge of the author’s (her) intentions when 
writing it. She can estimate what they might think because she is a thinker herself, 
capable of abstracting from and thus objectifying her own thinking.9 
Dialogue can also be invoked when S does not possess privileged knowledge. 
Suppose she faces some emergency in which she does not know how to proceed; a 
friend suddenly falls ill and S is the only person to hand, but she is ignorant of medicine 
and too panic-stricken to be sure she is thinking clearly and rationally. To determine 
what she ought to do, she may ask herself how someone else would respond to this 
situation. Lacking outside help, S cannot conjure a full account of what an experienced 
paramedic would do, for example, because the relevant information is unavailable to 
her. She must work with what she has. Her imaginary alter-ego could be a relevant model 
for conduct, as specific as a trusted person who has told her how he acted in similar 
                                                          
9 The same principle applies even to mundane tasks like writing shopping lists. S might know now 
what she intends to buy, but she is aware that at some future time she may forget. She imagines 
her future self appealing to her present self for help, and in response she writes the list. She is 
using an imagined dialogue to anticipate and address possible errors other people, including 
versions of herself, might make. 
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circumstances, or as general as someone she credits with qualities like decisiveness, 
composure and common sense.10 
These examples show that, while it is a metaphor, the internal dialogue models 
the ordinary thinking of individual subjects. In some cases the dialogical exchange is 
more obvious than in others, and S may view many decisions in terms of reasons 
simpliciter without having them expounded by specific agents, imaginary or otherwise.11 
But such reasons can be cast in a suitably constructed dialogue in a way that place-
holding reasons of the kind described above – reasons that S only incompletely 
understands and assumes to be valid in the absence of more detailed information – 
cannot be cast so easily in a strictly rational procedure. Under ideal conditions, a 
dialogue between fully informed and perfectly rational interlocutors will yield the same 
conclusion as a purely rational formula applied to the same facts, but since actual 
persons are not guaranteed to be fully informed and perfectly rational (or, as actual 
idealism conceives of it, their constructor, S, is not), they cannot view the construction as 
though from the outside while it is still in progress. They must reason as well as they 
can with the resources available to them, remaining all the while sensitive to any new 
considerations that arise. In this respect the open-endedness of the dialogue is a 
                                                          
10 This would also cover people who, faced with a dilemma, turn to the Bible to see what Jesus or 
some similarly worthy figure would do. They do not seek to understand why what Jesus did is the 
right thing to do; they assume instead that if he did it, it must have been so, and must also be the 
right thing for them. (Thanks to Michael Baxter for suggesting this example in November 2012). 
Note also that in Religione, Gentile describes the role of heroic examples in moral thinking. The 
fact that somebody is known to have behaved in a certain way when faced with a certain problem 
is of no moral significance while S remains a ‘passive spectator’ on his actions. There is a reason to 
emulate that person only when S actively identifies him as a model of good conduct, and links his 
actions with her own. S must feel her heroes sharing in her struggles and anxieties, reflecting her 
actions ‘like [a] mirror of [her] own person.’ [91-92] 
11 Take crossword puzzles, for example. It is likely that, where several words could fit a clue’s 
specifications, the solver works out the most plausible answer without any kind of personification 
taking place. But the crossword solver could ask herself which of several answers the crossword 
setter would be most likely to use. Say there is an obvious solution to the crossword question in 
the solver’s esoteric regional dialect, but she knows that the setter is probably not from that 
region – or, at least, that the setter would know that much of his audience would be excluded if 
he used such an exclusive term. Hence the solver imagines herself as the crossword setter, who 
(she speculates) would not share her sense of which words most obviously match a given clue. 
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manifest strength: it is phenomenologically accurate and workable in plausibly non-ideal 
conditions. It is fully compatible with conventional rational thinking, but flexible 
enough to accommodate working assumptions, best estimates and uncertainty in both 
its workings and its outcomes. The challenge for the rest of this chapter is to show that, 
despite its open-endedness, the IDP can systematically discipline S’s thinking. 
 
2. Internalism and the real world 
My version of the IDP so far lacks a detailed account of how the procedure is to 
be concluded. It also lacks any clear explanation of how the IDP might be used to 
decide between actions jointly undertaken by persons with diverse values and 
commitments. As noted previously, Gentilean constructivism admits only one concrete 
subject, so other persons’ claims can only become concrete when enacted as pensiero 
pensante. Inter-personal or (more accurately) inter-subjective acts are strictly impossible. 
But, as Gentile’s use of the internal dialogue so vividly shows, the idea of other people 
remains a persistent feature of socialised subjects’ actual thinking. S can imagine points 
of view other than her own, and although to her these are abstract to the extent that 
they contradict her own views, they are capable of affecting her and giving her reasons 
to think something other than what she presently thinks. She feels the weight of others’ 
claims upon her, and thinks of herself as a person among other persons, situated in a 
shared reality, even if she acknowledges that she cannot truly know subjective 
experiences other than her own. 
This last point is important. It might be thought that Gentile’s theory is one of 
radical internalism, claiming that everything is thought, everything is contained in S, and 
claims about anything outside S are necessarily abstract or untenable. But the view of 
Gentile as a thoroughgoing internalist is, I think, mistaken. It presupposes his 
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endorsement of the ‘ghost in the machine’ myth attributed to Descartes and various 
other thinkers (chiefly idealists) who conceive of mind and matter in dualistic terms.12 
The IDP’s ‘internal’ location is a metaphor. Strictly there is no brain or body or mind 
inside which it can take place. While Gentile certainly identifies himself as an idealist, his 
theory does not entail the strong metaphysical claim that objects of experience are 
‘made of thought,’ nor that we can only perceive the ‘ideas’ of them. Instead he holds 
we can know the world only by thinking about it, since without thinking, we would be 
unable to know anything whatsoever, rendering truth claims not only nonsensical but 
impossible. His claim that subject and object are dialectically linked must not be 
reduced to a dubious metaphysical claim about the truth of the whole, the oneness of 
being, or similar. There is no contradiction in the idea that we think of ourselves as 
belonging to an external world while necessarily positing it in the act of thought.  
Donald Davidson has propounded a relevantly similar theory concerning the 
role of ‘triangulation,’ enacted by two speakers with reference to a single object, as the 
basis for a plausible conception of objectivity.13 In contrast to Gentile, Davidson’s 
theory is explicitly externalist. When he refers to ‘the second person’ he means a real 
second person; he does not seem to take seriously the idea that a single (empirical) 
person can speak for both sides of a conversation.14 Nor does he go so far as Gentile in 
claiming that the world does not exist except insofar as it is conceived or thought about. 
Where Gentile refers to thought or thinking, Davidson tends to refer to language and 
concepts. Of course, these are not mutually exclusive. Davidson insists that ‘languages 
[are not] separable from souls; speaking a language is not a trait a man can lose while 
                                                          
12 Again, this is covered in lucid fashion by Gilbert Ryle (1990) [13-25] 
13 Davidson wrote in the analytic tradition, and, as far as I am aware, never expressed any interest 
in or even knowledge of Gentile. Nor did he dedicate much work to moral theory. His chief 
interests were the philosophy of mind and theories of knowledge, meaning and truth. It is for his 
insights into these that I take up his work. 
14 Davidson (2004b) ‘The Second Person,’ in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp.107-21 [107 and 115n, note #11]. 
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retaining the power of thought.’15 Much depends on how we conceive of the act of 
thinking that Gentile describes. We might ask: for Gentile, what is it to think that P? Is it 
to express P as part of a sentence, with the form ‘[I think that] P’? If so – and I think 
this is at least a plausible interpretation – the difference between Gentile’s thinking and 
Davidson’s speaking becomes trivial. Acts such as willing, believing, and holding 
obligations can be re-cast as Davidson-style ‘evaluative attitudes,’16 or as general 
dispositions to think that P, where P refers to the value of certain states of affairs or 
kinds of action. 
 
2i. Triangulation and objectivity 
Davidson insists that theories like Gentile’s result from ‘run[ning] together two 
problems,’ namely, the problem of knowledge, or of how beliefs are justified; and the 
‘conceptually prior’ issue of how ‘the concept of an objective reality’ arose in the first 
instance.17 I gestured in this direction back in chapter 1.1, when I identified the Being 
There Problem.18 As I described it, the problem is one of understanding where claims’ 
contents originate, or, alternatively, why subjects think what they think, even when they 
would rather think otherwise. I noted that this problem risks exposing Gentile’s idea of 
thought’s creative and constructive capacities as ‘an amplified sort of noticing.’ In more 
formal language, this can be called a problem of indeterminacy: since an object’s position 
in thought is S’s first interaction with it, we cannot account fully for how that thought 
came to be. It makes no sense to refer to the ‘origin’ of the thought, since that 
presupposes an unknown position from which the thought may originate, and this is, by 
                                                          
15 Davidson (1984) ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,’ in Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 183-98 [185] 
16 Davidson (2004a) ‘The Emergence of Thought,’ in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.123-34 [125]; see also Gentile’s Sommario 1 [60-1] 
17 Davidson (1995) ‘The Problem of Objectivity,’ in Problems of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 3-18. [4] 
18 See chapter 1.1, section 4ii 
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definition, outside the ambit of knowledge. In his systematic works, Gentile seems 
content to accept that the problem is insoluble, since the commonsensical idea of an 
objective reality is untenable. But as Davidson points out, without an account of an 
objective reality, there are no grounds on which to say that claims are true or false. 
Correspondingly, if there were no truths that could persist and be shared by a plurality 
of possible subjects, the IDP would have no purpose. 
Davidson proposes to use the idea of ‘triangulation’ to open the way for a 
concept of objectivity in judgements. He writes that ‘the objectivity which thought and 
language demand depends on the mutual and simultaneous responses of two or more 
creatures to common distal stimuli and to one another's responses.’ Triangulation 
consists of the ‘three-way relation among two speakers and a common world.’  It is by 
this process that content is ‘bestowed’ on language.19 By speaking, the subject (first 
person) recognises a second person as party to a shared external world; these three 
components, the first person, second person and reference point, constitute the 
‘triangle.’20 Davidson’s aim here is to show how linguistic communication and the 
ascription of meaning are possible. But at the end of this essay he adds:  
Belief, intention, and the other propositional attitudes are all social in that they 
are states a creature cannot be in without having the concept of inter-subjective 
truth, and this is a concept one cannot have without sharing, and knowing that 
one shares, a world, and a way of thinking about the world, with someone else.21 
These concluding remarks do not signal a radical departure from Davidson’s 
earlier interest in language. He is simply gesturing toward some areas on which a claim 
                                                          
19 These introductory remarks come from Donald Davidson (2004) Subjective, Intersubjective, 
Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press [xv] 
20 Davidson (2004b) ‘The Second Person,’ in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp.107-21 [120] 
21 Davidson (2004b) ‘The Second Person’ [121] 
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about the inter-subjectivity of language, or meaning, could gain a purchase. While 
Gentile’s IDP, at least as I have presented it, is not about defining the concept or 
necessary conditions of language, it plainly relies on something like the triangulation 
procedure that Davidson describes. Truth claims, being claims, are linguistic constructs, 
and thinkers’ attempts to appraise them involve re-stating their contents in different 
words to see if, after review from a variety of perspectives and taking into account 
different ways of articulating or expressing the same idea, they still make sense. If the 
socius (A) were conceived as something distinct from S, and unable to refer 
meaningfully to the objects to which S refers, the whole premise of the IDP would 
come apart. A could never provide reasons for S to alter her starting assumptions, since 
A’s claims would be irrelevant to S’s object of judgement. Subject and socius would be 
mutually unintelligible. 
Davidson assumes, rather like Kant, that the world must be conceived in a 
certain way. Unlike Kant, though, he does not found this on a theory of mind, but 
instead on a theory of meaning and interpretation.  ‘[D]ifferent points of view make 
sense,’ he writes, ‘but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot 
them.’22 Full-blown conceptual relativism would make communication impossible, but, 
importantly, any ‘common co-ordinate scheme’ need be shared only in a general and 
loose way, subject to the push and pull from differences in interpretation, belief, and so 
forth.  We cannot say for certain that ‘all speakers of language’ share ‘a common scheme 
and ontology.’ What this does rule out is the idea of an ‘uninterpreted reality,’ existing 
wholly separate from anything we might say or think about it.23 
The above remarks contain points of overlap and divergence with actual 
idealism. Gentile cannot endorse Davidson’s theory in quite the way he presents it, 
                                                          
22 Davidson (1984) ‘…Conceptual Scheme’ [184] 
23 Davidson (1984) ‘…Conceptual Scheme’ [198] 
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since it assumes a readiness to speak of a single object viewed from several empirical 
persons’ subjective points of view. Davidson lacks Gentile’s metaphysical baggage, and 
of course uses different terminology to express his ideas. However, Davidson’s point 
about the impossibility of an ‘uninterpreted reality’ is close to Gentile’s about the 
absurdity of the doctrine of transcendence. For us to ‘interpret’ reality (in Davidson’s 
language) is surely for us to ‘think’ it (Gentile’s); it is in saying something about an 
object, if only to oneself, that one ‘realises’ the object as a concept. The idea that this 
claim must be comprehensible to other people is compatible with Gentile’s 
identification of truth and universality, which is, in a sense, the primary motivation for 
the IDP. To make truth claims about an object requires us to present the claim to 
another person, even if that second person is only imagined. Those (real or imagined) 
persons may disagree with our judgements, but in order to expose us as mistaken they 
must present their reasons in terms that we can understand, and which refer to what we 
must assume to be a shared, objective world. 
 
2ii. Two principles for the IDP 
Davidson’s way of drawing out the implications of the active nature of thinking 
can help us understand the workings of the dialogical process. It does us no good to be 
overly literal when conceiving of the IDP. If I am puzzling over a problem of what I 
ought to do, and ask myself, ‘How would Plato answer this question?’ I should not be 
perturbed by the fact that the real Plato would be unable to offer me any 
comprehensible answer whatever, for the very mundane reasons that I speak a language 
he could not possibly have known, and I cannot speak ancient Greek. My imaginary 
Plato, in the IDP, speaks English. I must assume that although I know his arguments 
only in the words of his translators, there is a world that, despite a two-and-a-half-
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thousand-year divide, he and I share. His ideas are not only the words in which they are 
expressed. If they were, they would be erased in the course of translation and re-
interpretation. They also have content, and refer to objects – that is, co-ordinates in a 
system, rather than objects in themselves – that I must assume I can meaningfully 
reconstruct along the same lines as they were intended. As Davidson puts it, the 
‘method’ underlying the idea of the conceptual scheme is ‘to make meaningful 
disagreement possible.’ This, he continues, ‘depends entirely on a foundation – some 
foundation – in agreement.’ Thus ‘charity is forced on us; […] if we want to understand 
others, we must count them right in most matters.’24 
Coupling this idea of charity with Davidson’s arguments about the necessity of a 
shared world, then applying both to the Gentilean IDP, we can say that the claims other 
people make of S, or otherwise present to her for inspection and assessment, must be 
assumed to have a basis in a world or set of co-ordinates that she also shares. 
Triangulation is useless to S if she fences off all beliefs contrary to her own as 
incommensurable with and therefore irrelevant to them, being matters of opinion that 
are true for their holders but not for her. This works both ways: she cannot hold firmly 
to her beliefs and censor or ignore dissenters without trying to re-articulate her ideas in 
terms that they might understand. The IDP forces S to re-state, re-assess, and either re-
affirm or modify her beliefs in light of superior reasons. Otherwise actual thinking, 
pensiero pensante, would become shackled to pensiero pensato, and its constructive capacity, 
or its capacity to make objective truth claims, would be disabled. It does not matter 
whether these interlocutors are real (external) or hypothetical, since as providers of 
reasons these groups are exactly equivalent. A reason offered by another person and 
understood by S is no different to one that occurs to her without their intervention. S’s 
awareness of the fact that another person is real may provide an additional reason for or 
                                                          
24 Davidson (1984) ‘…Conceptual Scheme’ [196-7] 
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against some course of action. What makes the reason count is not the fact that this 
person has (or has not) expressed it, but instead that it strikes S as something she 
cannot afford to ignore while maintaining her faith in her own thinking.25 
In light of the above observations, we can usefully add to the IDP’s design a 
general Charity Principle. This principle stipulates that S must grant A (or, more 
abstractly, opposing views) a degree of interpretive charity comparable with what she 
expects others to grant her. She must make a reasonable attempt to justify her claims, or 
to articulate the relevant claims of others, in terms comprehensible from points of view 
other than that of the proposing party. This is closely tied with the idea of ‘followability’ 
taken from O’Neill and discussed in chapter 2.2. No claim can be granted objective 
status unless it sustains reasonable scrutiny under the principle’s conditions. Under this 
formulation of the Charity Principle, S must decide what degree of interpretive charity is 
to be granted to interlocutors’ claims, how much she (S) expects to receive in turn, and 
what counts as ‘reasonable scrutiny.’ Plainly these cannot extend indefinitely, or the 
IDP’s intended end-point of making (tentatively) objective judgements would never be 
reached.  
One important corollary of the Charity Principle is the idea that S and A (the 
interlocutor/s) are assumed to be equals in some significant respect. Call this the 
Equality Principle. This principle is not taken as a fact about the actual persons who hold, 
or are imagined to hold, certain views. It is not a claim about any independent moral 
fact. Rather, it is an orienting assumption that subjects must make in order for the IDP 
to supply even nominally objective conclusions. As mentioned before, for S to rule out 
a range of actual or possible positions without subjecting them to rational scrutiny is anathema 
                                                          
25 This is well illustrated in Sommario 1 [131]: ‘A Chinese [person] will be able to explain clearly 
to me – I who do not speak Chinese – the most interesting points of wisdom [una sapienza] about 
the most best forms of life for my happiness; but, since our activities (our spiritual moments) do 
not coincide, her lesson is not a lesson for me, and has no value. It is not spirit.’ 
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to the idea of objective judgement. Other people are equal insofar as they attempt to 
describe the same objective world. Of course, their claims are not equally true, and their 
supporting arguments are not (necessarily) equally valid. But they must be treated 
equally at the beginning of the reasoning process. 
The Equality and Charity Principles are closely related, and each helps to clarify 
the purpose of the other and of the IDP as a whole. The IDP may be thought of as a 
procedure for the abstraction and objectification of S’s actual or concrete thinking. It 
enables S to present her own reasons and thoughts as though they belonged to 
someone else. In doing this she gives each of those others a status equal to her own and 
to each other, ignoring the necessary qualitative difference between her subjective 
concrete thought and the abstractions in whose terms she thinks. In a surprising and 
oblique way, the requirement for S to view other people as avatars of reasons actually 
drives her to grant them a substantive moral status. Now that S is made equal and 
equivalent to them – she has, as I have put it before, presented herself as a person 
among persons – she must treat them as she expects to be treated. Thus charity is, as 
Davidson put it, forced upon her; she cannot knowingly represent another person 
uncharitably because by doing so she would licence uncharitable treatment of herself. 
(These ideas owe much to the Golden Rule, to which I return at the end of the 
chapter.)26 
 
3. Agreement and the IDP 
We now have a reasonably clear picture of the IDP’s purpose and structure. The 
procedure models and formalises the reasoning process by which S refines subjective 
into objective reasons for thought and action. S may consciously employ the IDP when 
she faces any problem whose solution is not immediately obvious. Alternatively she may 
                                                          
26 This chapter, sub-section #4ii 
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use it to check claims that she already assumes to be true. The procedure’s principal aim 
is not to attain purely objective reasons, for those would rely on a false conception of 
the logos, and would not count as reasons for any actual subject. Instead the aim is to 
place S in relation to an objective world, showing her to be a person among persons 
with whom she shares common reference points. Only through the recognition of this 
commonality – obvious, perhaps, to everyone but philosophers – can S make 
meaningful truth claims about facts and values. 
I have also described the endpoint of the procedure. The IDP is (provisionally) 
completed when S identifies a set of reasons with the universal subject (US), meaning 
that she (S) thinks she has ruled out ‘the possibility that other subjects, or the same 
subject under different circumstances, would think differently’ about the judgement she 
is making.27 After this S must ‘make [her]self agree’28 with US, reconciling her concrete 
thinking with the conclusions to which her reasoning has taken her. Otherwise the 
conclusion has only abstract value, and S’s concrete thought is incoherent insofar as it 
contradicts the reasoned conclusion: she has recognised that she does not think what 
she has the most reason to think. In order to make her beliefs coherent, she must adjust 
the affected beliefs. But since S remains a thinking subject, this still occurs within a 
complex of grounding assumptions and values already held. There is no guarantee that 
any two subjects thinking through IDPs will settle on the same conclusion. It is only 
when a relevant problem or question arises that their differing assumptions need to be 
challenged.29 
This account still lacks a clear explanation of the IDP’s intermediate stages 
between S’s identification of the need for objective justification and the articulation of 
                                                          
27 Logica 1 [46]. This has been cited already in chapter 1.1, sub-section 4, herein. 
28 Logica 1 [97]. I gave a fuller version of this passage in chapter 2.1, sub-section 1i, herein. 
29 There is an obvious analogy between this thought and Rawls’ idea of ‘the burdens of 
judgement,’ described in Political Liberalism. 
2.3 Dialogical constructivism and the idea of agreement 
245 
US’s reasons. How is S to progress through the dialogue? How are interlocutors to be 
selected, and by what process does S determine that a given reason or selection of 
reasons (A) is superior to and more objectively justifiable than one that she presently 
affirms? I contend that these questions can be answered by reference to the idea of 
agreement. However, this agreement must be carefully designed if it is to be compatible 
with the IDP as I have so far presented it. The principal difficulty is that S is the only 
one of the IDP’s participants capable of changing its position while retaining a 
continuous identity. The socius, or A, represents a position that may be occupied by any 
one of an indefinite number of interlocutors. Any change to the reasons presented by A 
entails the replacement of one interlocutor with another. It is not necessary for the 
reasons presented by a series of A-interlocutors to be mutually coherent. The 
procedure’s outcome should be the same regardless of the order in which interlocutors 
are consulted; the order is determined only by the interlocutor’s reasons’ relevance to 
the position S currently holds.30 Since the content of A’s reasons is specified by S, there 
cannot be any meaningful agreement between them; indeed, the only formal criterion 
that A must meet is that its reasons are not identical to S’s, since otherwise they would 
have nothing to say to one another. Agreement between any A and S is coincidental, 
even ephemeral, to the point of meaninglessness. 
The impossibility of genuine agreement between A and S shows that IDP 
cannot be a contractarian procedure. Nonetheless it remains a constructivist procedure. The 
differences between these are not always obvious, especially since prominent advocates 
of the latter invoke contracts or contract-like procedures in their theories.31 But there 
                                                          
30 A minor clarification: A’s objections are relevant to particular positions that S may adopt. It 
does S no good to consider an objection that is unconnected to what she currently thinks. 
31 For an interesting discussion of the ways in which some authors (Rawls, Scanlon) claim to offer 
theories that are both contractarian and constructivist, see Onora O’Neill (2003b) ‘Constructivism 
vs. Contractualism,’ in Ratio 15, pp.319-31. For an example of a paper explicitly articulating a 
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are contractarian doctrines, such as John Locke’s, that rest on moral realist premises 
(e.g. that property is a natural, God-given right). There are also constructivist doctrines 
that abstract any contract-like procedures to such an extent that disagreement is 
impossible, or only one (hypothetical) participant is required. (The first stage of John 
Rawls’ constructivist doctrine, laid out in A Theory of Justice, has sometimes been 
characterised in this way.) The two differ in the relative weighting of actual and 
hypothetical agreements. Contractarians typically prioritise agreements that persons 
have or could actually have made; constructivists prioritise those that persons, or their 
idealised representatives, would have made if they had the opportunity to do so. Thus the 
constructivist can derive moral claims about persons who could never really have agreed 
– two people who are deeply, stubbornly unreasonable and prone to defining their own 
beliefs as those most opposed to each other’s, for example. 
 
3i. Hypothetical agreements and constructivism 
Constructivists very often employ the idea of agreement without any actual 
agreement taking place. One popular method is to invoke a hypothetical agreement whereby 
the legitimacy of a claim is tested against standards to which persons would agree if they 
had the opportunity to do so. If this were a case of working out to what terms actual 
persons would agree, hypothetical agreement would be, at best, an accurate replica of 
actual agreement; it would be no more determinate than that. S would need perfect 
knowledge of the real interlocutors to whom she refers, and their weaknesses (stupidity, 
ignorance, prejudice, corruption and so forth) would play out in their absence. The 
question of just which persons should be included in the dialogue would go unsolved, 
and hypothetical dialogue would yield no more agreement than the real thing. In order 
                                                                                                                                                                    
doctrine belonging to both camps, see Ronald Milo (1995) ‘Contractarian Constructivism,’ in 
Journal of Philosophy 92:4, pp.181-204. 
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that hypothetical agreements can settle upon firm conclusions, constructivists typically 
introduce artificial elements fitted to idealised choice situations so that a limited number 
of conclusions, and perhaps only one conclusion, is possible. Interlocutors, or parties to 
the agreement, might be imagined with special characteristics that real persons do not 
(necessarily) possess: perfect rationality, absence of bias, knowledge or ignorance of 
their own or other interlocutors’ circumstances, and so on.32 Thus it is possible to rule 
out certain reasons as illegitimate, and ideally to increase the likelihood of interlocutors’ 
convergence on a single conclusion – even if this is one they would never have reached 
if they had tried to reach an agreement with all their contingent characteristics in play.33 
Against such determinate kinds of hypothetical agreements is the concern that 
idealisation will ‘alienate us from the conclusions drawn from the theory.’34 I take this to 
mean that hypothetical agreements are entered not by any real person, but by persons’ 
idealised avatars, which are like real persons plus or minus problematic characteristics or 
operating in contrived and counterfactual circumstances. There can be no definitive 
account of what features should be added or excluded, and it is possible that real 
persons will object that their reasons are artificially ‘bleached out’ in order to bring 
about the appearance of unanimous agreement.35 (The procedure for obtaining 
                                                          
32 John Rawls employs such agreements in his account of Kantian constructivism, as well as his 
own theory (the original position as presented in A Theory of Justice) based on the same. He 
designs his procedure so its conclusion would be accepted by any ‘fully reasonable rational (and 
informed) person,’ even if no such person exists. See Rawls (2000) ‘Moral Constructivism,’ in 
Barbara Herman (ed.) Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, pp.235-52 [244] 
33 This is well put by O’Neill (1989) [206-10] 
34 This objection has a long pedigree, and appears under different guises in works by, among 
others, Joseph de Maistre, G.W.F. Hegel and Jean Hampton. My quotation comes from Thomas E. 
Hill Jr. (2001) ‘Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism,’ in Social Philosophy and Policy 
18, pp. 300-29. Note that Hill does not think that idealisations necessarily lead to this kind of 
alienation. He adds that ‘hypothetical consent is not merely a weak practical substitute for actual 
consent in particular cases where actual consent should be the standard.’ [305] 
35 Many critics have pointed this out, but I take the phrase from Simon Blackburn (1999) ‘Am I 
Right?’ (Review of T.M. Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other), in New York Times, 
21/02/1999, Available at http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/02/21/reviews/990221.21blact.html 
and viewed 16/07/2012 
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agreement may rely on controversial assumptions about whether it is rational to act on 
one’s own interests or in the interests of one’s family, for example. A real person who 
holds an opposing view of rationality may demur that the procedure is unduly biased 
against her.) If this is right, given their strange origins, hypothetically-derived 
agreements would lack purchase on real persons’ lives. As Thomas Hill explains, they 
‘would be arbitrary and so [their] results would have no moral force.’36 This would also 
be true of the IDP if S were entitled to select or exclude any A that she pleases. This 
would allow that the procedure’s outcome is a direct result of S’s partial preferences as 
she consciously or unconsciously forces the dialogue toward a pre-determined 
destination. Such a procedure would fail to satisfy Gentile’s test of universality. 
It seems that, if the IDP does rely on a kind of hypothetical agreement, we have 
a choice between a procedure that is (potentially) partial, and therefore unable to attain 
the universality required for judgements about reasons to hold for persons who do not 
already hold the relevant beliefs; or one that is artificially impartial, but alienated from 
the lives of real people and/or (potentially) biased toward certain outcomes as a result 
of controversial assumptions made in order to even out partial considerations.37 How to 
escape this dilemma? Given actual idealism’s conception of truth, we cannot reject 
artificiality wholesale if without it we could never attain even provisionally universal and 
objective judgements. Although Gentile’s theory hinges on a method of immanence and 
not transcendence, S remains able to use abstract thought to orient and evaluate her 
current, concrete thinking. Abstract artificiality is not ruled out. What matters is that S 
accepts that there are good reasons to refer to such abstractions rather than what she just 
happens to think.  
                                                          
36 Hill (2001) [305] 
37 Some of the latter concerns were raised in the discussion of the Universal Law Formula in 
chapter 2.1, sub-section 3, herein. 
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The need for abstraction arises whenever S acknowledges that she might be 
wrong, or that she might later change her mind. She wants her judgements to have the 
support of reasons that she expects she will still be able to endorse in the future. She 
enters a hypothetical agreement with (at least) imagined versions of herself; she agrees, 
in effect, to allow her judgement to be guided by good reasons (i.e. those best suited to 
universal recognition) and not merely the reasons that now occur to her. So while 
persons may disagree about what rationality entails, no-one would say that the best way 
to choose principles is to have an irrational person decide. While persons are in many 
respects unequal, it would be difficult to formulate a general rule to determine which 
persons ought to have more or less say in the decision procedure. This offers further 
support to the Equality Principle described earlier. Claims about the moral equality of 
interlocutors need not reflect any strong metaphysical or moral claim about real persons 
except so far as they are (potential) reason-bearing thinkers. Similarly, to argue from an 
artificially contrived position of impartiality avoids the deeply controversial problem of 
ordering persons’ partial claims in any kind of pre-determined hierarchy. 
 
3ii. Verification and the IDP 
S and A’s hypothetical agreement to submit to the commands of reason may be 
considered an extension of the agreement between S and US at the end of the IDP. But 
the procedure’s intermediate stages are still inadequately defined. What use can the idea 
of agreement have for a procedure defined by disagreement? One use, already hinted at 
in my discussion of the triangulation model of reasoning, is the assumption that other 
people agree with us about most things. Disagreement is significant only where broad and 
general agreement obtains. S distinguishes a stream of unconnected thoughts from 
reasoning by reference to what other people would think. If S believes that her 
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sequence of thoughts could be followed by other people who are sufficiently intelligent 
and informed of the relevant considerations, or by an ideally rational agent, she may 
legitimately describe the sequence as a reasoned one. This positive conception of the 
IDP’s role is analogous to the epistemological principle of verification: a claim has greater 
truth-value if it can be verified, which, with respect to constructed moral claims, entails 
its (probable) affirmation by other rational persons in like circumstances. 
Consider how the IDP might be used as a verification procedure. This 
interpretation is most useful in instances when S enters the dialogue already fairly 
confident that she has the right answer to whatever question she has asked. To bolster 
her confidence, she can present the argument to hypothetical interlocutors in order to 
confirm that, as far as she can judge, they would have good reason to accept her 
conclusion.38 She may be aware that the interlocutors she can imagine do not represent 
all the arguments there are. The best she can hope for is general coherence with the claim 
contained in her conclusion: the interlocutors cannot abandon their positions and adopt 
that of S, but at least they are broadly in agreement with her about the most relevant 
claims. That coherence test entails verification in that presenting claims to an 
interlocutor involves offering compelling reasons to accept those claims and articulating 
them in terms the interlocutor would understand. This verificationist version of the IDP 
is especially useful when S has determined that a particular A has special authority on 
some issue, perhaps because its reasons represent the consensus of acknowledged 
experts. (If my doctor tells me that my health would noticeably improve if I halved my 
intake of cigarettes, I take the fact that he is a doctor to be a reason to believe him. I 
                                                          
38 Two points. First, there is a difference between thinking that the interlocutors ‘would have 
good reason’ to accept a conclusion and thinking that those same people (if the interlocutors are 
identified with actual persons) would endorse it. Second, subjects can make judgements like this 
in a wholly self-deceptive way; they say, ‘I’m sure [such-and-such] will agree with me!’ having 
forgotten or being ignorant of some fact about the second person that weighs against this claim. 
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need not know all the relevant facts about the effects of cigarettes in order for this to 
count as a reason for me).39 
This account of the IDP leaves it vulnerable to the charge of conservative bias 
or ‘parochialism.’40 Even if S attempts to consider the reasons that persons other than 
she would offer, her ‘process of correction’ relies upon ‘a prior framework of accepted 
judgements about reasons’ – that is, an existing set of coherent beliefs that she assumes 
to be true and shared, or sharable, by other rational persons – and so leads to ‘a 
complacent re-affirmation of whatever [she] happen[s] to think.’41 The range of 
positions represented in the dialogue does not cover all the possible arguments there 
are. S can never be certain that there is not an as-yet unconsidered argument that would 
conclusively trump all those she has considered. If S is insufficiently imaginative or 
informed of the facts and possible argumentative positions relevant to the question 
under scrutiny, and is aware of only a small number of alternatives to her starting 
assumptions (if she has any), it is unlikely that her conclusions will fall far from the 
positions she considers. Lacking access to the broad range of interpretive positions 
required for the dialogue to gain its own momentum, as it were, S is for now restricted 
to a conservative range of conclusions. 
To the charge of conservative bias Gentile (or I) can reply that the IDP does 
not represent a one-off event for fixing all subsequent judgements. Rather, it represents 
                                                          
39 To elaborate upon that example: what matters is that I am not party to the considerations 
behind the doctor’s judgement. Reasons can count without me having full knowledge of all the 
relevant facts; I simply take it on faith that my doctor, whom I have no cause to doubt, knows 
more about the facts than I do. 
40 ‘Parochialism’ is D’Agostino’s word: ‘Those judgements are objective which could be justified to 
a suitably general audience. Surely, it is not enough, if we are to claim objectivity,’ merely to have 
confronted other perspectives and found common cause, in any variety of ways, with their 
advocates. […] It will not always be enough, to minimise the risk of parochialism, simply to strike 
some conversational agreement with the proponents of other perspectives.’ (1993) [101] 
41 T.M. Scanlon raises these objections to ‘coherence theor[ies] of reasons for action,’ and 
particularly John Rawls’ conception of reflective equilibrium. See Scanlon (1998) What We Owe 
to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. [70] 
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the best reasoning S can presently manage, rooting out partial, controversial and faulty 
claims as best she can, given the limits of her knowledge and understanding. The 
process can and must be re-enacted over and over in light of new considerations and 
changing events. Indeed, it is never entirely completed. We speak of separate dialogues 
for the sake of convenience, but really there is one dialogue that continuously unfolds in 
line with actual thought. S is not committed to the wholesale endorsement of any claim 
put forward at the beginning of the procedure. The dynamic of constant adjustment and 
re-appraisal, or what Fred D’Agostino calls ‘reflectivity,’ is central to the idea of the IDP 
as a dialogue, rather than the rational selection of one among several pre-conceived 
options.42 
A further difficulty emerges from the charge of conservatism. I mentioned 
before that a subject who was ill-informed, unimaginative or confused might struggle to 
give the IDP much momentum. By that I meant that if S were unable clearly to 
articulate her reasons for holding the view she means to defend, the range of possible 
conclusions would be limited by the small number of coherent and appropriately 
configured43 opposing views she considers. Under these circumstances, it may be 
plausibly objected that to ascribe objective status to any claim is absurdly premature. 
After all, S may recognise the inadequacy of her materials, and know that for now, any 
conclusion she reaches cannot be much more than her best estimate. But this is still a 
qualified estimate; and provided that it is kept available to be re-thought, re-appraised 
and adjusted in the course of pensiero pensante, it is the truest claim she can justifiably 
make. Gentilean objectivity does not presuppose correspondence with a transcendent 
realm of facts, but instead maximal coherence with the best thought S can muster. 
                                                          
42 D’Agostino (1993) [101] 
43 By ‘appropriately configured’ I mean that the opposing A-views should be designed so as to 
challenge S in the most effective ways possible. If S lacks a clear idea of what she thinks and why 
she thinks it, she will not be able to identify or articulate correspondingly detailed objections. 
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3iii. Falsification and the IDP 
The IDP’s strengths are more clearly displayed if it is understood as a procedure 
by which S tries to find persuasive reasons to think that her present beliefs are not 
justifiable. This avoids the basic problem of the necessary differences between S and A. 
What is now at issue is not whether most people would agree with S’s judgement, even 
if this agreement can be at best approximate, but instead whether any A can provide 
widely-acceptable reasons to doubt that S’s claims, and the reasons that support them, 
are justifiable. This gives greater prominence to the actual idealist conception of value 
(goodness and truth) as constructions of a self-conscious subject who at once affirms 
them and denies their opposites. In simpler, less Hegelian language, this means that for 
a claim to be actively and meaningfully recognised as true, S must also conceive of what 
its truthfulness rules out. Similarly a moral claim must be non-arbitrarily selected from a 
range of options, with S finding good reasons in favour of choosing it. Since in the IDP 
it is not possible for A to resemble S exactly, S may more fruitfully consider a range of 
reasons against selecting her presently-affirmed truth claim or presently-endorsed moral 
claim. S can have confidence in reasons that are defensible against the widest possible 
range of objections.  
Just as the positive, agreement-based conception of the IDP is analogous with 
the principle of verification, so the negative conception is analogous with falsification. A 
claim is objectively true if there are no widely-acceptable reasons for rejecting it. In 
moral theory, this negative conception is characterised by tests of whether an action 
would be wrong and not whether it would be right. Of all the recent Anglo-American 
constructivists, T.M. Scanlon is best known for advocating such a principle. He argues 
that an action is wrong ‘if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed 
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by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no-one could 
reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.’44 This principle 
differs from the kinds of hypothetical agreement described previously in that it avoids 
any appeal to kingdom-of-ends-style idealisation. The aim is to establish the absence of 
any clinching objection rather than universal agreement; this determines that an act (or 
thought, or reason) is not wrong, rather than certainly right. In terms of the IDP, all 
that is required is for some A to present S with a compelling (reasonable, followable) 
reason to think that her action should be rejected. For example, it could be that A 
identifies an instance of incoherence in S’s beliefs, meaning that what S now proposes 
to do or consider objectively justifiable is inconsistent with something she already 
recognises as true. As suggested in my discussion of Davidson, such inconsistencies 
may only become apparent after S has rehearsed a variety of different interpretations of 
the act she proposes to perform. Again she is compelled to adjust her beliefs and 
reasons to bring about the greatest possible coherence. The specific content of this 
coherent set is determined by S’s conception of what other people would think about 
her judgement. For a claim to count as a reason for S, it must compel her to act upon it. Just 
as noticing that one holds two mutually contradictory beliefs provides a reason to 
reconsider which (if either) is true and which is not, the identification of reasons as 
reasons is integral to the dynamic of self-correcting, self-conscious pensiero pensante.  
This version of the IDP once again demonstrates the procedure’s plausible 
phenomenological basis. Abstraction is required only as S surveys a range of objections 
that others might make. She distinguishes relevant from irrelevant objections using 
standards that she recognises in her own thinking: they are objections that she could 
imagine herself making if she were someone else. At no point does she abandon her 
subjective standpoint, which can, after all, encompass both concrete and abstract 
                                                          
44 Scanlon (1998) [153] 
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thought. Thus, to use another metaphor, the IDP enables S to turn over her reasons 
and examine them from a variety of different angles, seeing how they would look from 
other perspectives without changing her own position. 
 
 4. Inter-personal applications of the IDP 
There is another way in which the IDP might be used to derive some kind of 
agreement. This is as a model of inter-personal agreement, on which theme I have 
touched only in passing so far. As mentioned, the IDP cannot be called a conventional 
inter-subjective procedure because in it there is only one concrete subject who 
constructs the other interlocutors for herself. S can imagine, with good reason, that 
other persons are subject to their own IDPs, but she, as concrete subject, cannot be 
party to any IDP other than her own. This problem stands even if she thinks of herself, 
in a commonsensical way, as one subject among others. I mean to argue that, despite 
this apparent problem, the procedure may still be used to generate genuine inter-
subjective reasons. 
 
4i. ‘Stacking’ and objectivity 
While S cannot be directly party to other persons’ thoughts and subjective 
experiences, nothing in Gentile’s doctrine excludes the possibility of her referring 
indirectly to them, or to their attempts at achieving objectivity in their judgements. She 
can ask other people what they think about a given problem, and what conclusions they 
have reached after due consideration. Thus those other people can be re-admitted to S’s 
IDP, offering (presumably) stronger and more sophisticated arguments in favour of 
their chosen positions than they did when the S first considered what they might argue. 
One salient difference between these interlocutors and those conceived as personal, 
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partial and so forth, is that those who have engaged in an IDP procedure, or rigorous 
reasoning, can try to present their arguments in impersonal and (tentatively) objective 
terms. Both S and interlocutor are referring to the same abstract object, namely, an 
objective truth supported by a complex of reasons to which both have access. Both are 
trying to articulate good reasons, or reasons for both of them, rather than reasons that are 
merely theirs.45 Thus there is scope, at least, for a solution to the problem of the 
incommensurability of different subjects’ reasons. Once subjects agree on a shared (or 
sharable) conception of objective truth, grounded on good reasons, they can construct 
new features of a (shared) reality on behalf of persons to whom they have not directly 
referred, and justify its content on an impersonal basis. This kind of objectivity does not 
refer to some unattainable, transcendent object, of course. It is instead the best 
impression of objectivity that subjects can construct from the best thinking they can 
manage. It may be replaced by better reasons at some later time, but for now, in the 
ever-unfurling present, it serves as a workable model of objective truth.46 
                                                          
45 I owe this useful distinction to Peri Roberts. 
46 There is a clear parallel between this version of the IDP and Rawls’ ‘reflective equilibrium,’ 
which he describes as a way to check whether the principles or conception of justice devised at 
the first, more abstract stage of the procedure ‘[match] more accurately than other views our 
considered convictions’ [368]. So understood, reflective equilibrium amounts to a test of 
coherence; it relies on persons’ abilities to devise ways of living together that, despite their 
different convictions, are both widely acceptable and compatible with general principles drawn 
from abstract procedures. There is no guarantee that they will succeed. If the coherence test for 
reflective equilibrium scotches the proposed principles of justice, the search must start again, 
based upon different grounding assumptions. The major parallel between the IDP and reflective 
equilibrium is that although the IDP is designed to minimise the risk of subjects’ alienation from 
the results of their investigations, it does not rule out the possibility that such alienation with 
occur. It may be that S’s conception of reason in its pre-procedural comprehensive doctrine is at 
odds with the impersonal reasons that emerge from the IDP. For such a subject, the ‘burdens of 
judgement’ (Rawls’ phrase) may be unbearable. She may then struggle to reconcile herself with 
what she has demonstrably good reason to accept, or (irrationally) reject any moral or political 
demands premised on those reasons. It is even possible that many, most or all persons in society 
share this response. If this were to occur, the prospects for a persisting, stable and orderly society, 
built on coherent and widely-recognised principles, look doubtful. The claims emerging from the 
IDP would have only abstract value. See Rawls (1980) ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,’ 
in Journal of Philosophy 77:9, pp.515-72 
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Figure #4 models an inter-personal application of the IDP. Two subjects, Sa 
and Sb, each conduct the process as before (IDPs #1 and #2). Each then presents the 
other with her conclusions, viz., the reasons attached to the US as she conceives of it. 
This enables each (Sa in this diagram) to run through the procedure again, having 
‘stacked’ the other’s strongest reasons (USa and USb, respectively) as the first pair of 
interlocutors, in the positions formerly occupied by PS and A1. Thus it is possible to 
attain a higher level of objectivity than before (USc). 
 
(See diagram overleaf) 
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Figure 4: ‘stacking’ IDPs 
IDP #1: conducted by subject Sa 
 Aa1    Aa2 Aa3  
     
    USa 
     
PSa TSa1 TSa2 TSa3…  
IDP #2: conducted by subject Sb 
 Ab1 Ab2 Ab3  
     
              USb 
     
PSb TSb1 TSb2 TSb3…  
IDP #3: Sa ‘stacks’ USa and USb to achieve increased objectivity 
 USb     Ac2    Ac3  
     
    USc 
     
USa TSc1 TSc2 TSc3…  
 
As hinted in previous chapters, the idea of constructed objectivity is a major theme 
in several Kantian philosophers’ works. Most notable of these authors is John Rawls, 
who intends his original position thought experiment to generate principles of justice, 
which might be thought of as meta-ethical principles for the governance of subsequent 
agreements. On Rawls’ view, the principles do not impinge on persons’ substantive 
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beliefs or ‘comprehensive conceptions’ of the good life. The agreement taking place 
behind the veil of ignorance is meant to answer only one narrowly defined question, 
namely, what principles would best define just social institutions. If similar conclusions 
can be drawn out of the Gentilean IDP, it may be possible to wrest authority out of the 
grip of some arbitrary figure (viz. the socius as the uomo fascista) and to locate stronger 
orienting principles for the design of society. This would give rise to a distinction 
between what Rawls calls ‘the right and the good,’ or between ‘a political conception of 
justice and a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine.’ Rawls’ political 
conception of justice ‘is formulated not in terms of any comprehensive doctrine but in 
terms of certain fundamental intuitive ideas viewed as latent in the public political 
culture of a democratic society.’47 
Gentile does not address these distinctions directly, at least in the sense that he 
does not define ‘the right’ (il diritto) and ‘the good’ (il bene) in the same way as Rawls. In 
Italian the term ‘diritto’ has a broader meaning than the English term ‘right,’ and covers 
right in the various senses of propriety, entitlement (e.g. a legal right) and, less familiar 
in English, the whole gamut of legal culture.48 As such the word, when referred to as an 
abstract noun, carries a stronger legal connotation than the English words ‘right’ and 
‘justice,’ which can also be used to refer to moral entitlements or configurations of 
normative claims without any specifically judicial implications. However, there is 
enough material in his Filosofia del diritto to reconstruct a plausible account of how 
Gentile would characterise the relation between the right and the good in terms 
commensurable with the Rawlsian-Kantian version sketched above. 
                                                          
47 Rawls (1988) ‘The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good,’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs 17: 
4, pp.251-76 [252] 
48 See chapter 1.3, sub-section #1, in which I note that Harris translates Filosofia del diritto as 
Philosophy of Law. 
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Goodness, as we have seen, consists in the value assigned by S to some end or 
object. It is the product of S’s act of willing some state of affairs into existence. In order 
to be will, rather than velleity, claims underwriting it must pass coherence tests 
according to S’s conception of her own character and the beliefs she holds. The reasons 
for holding a given set of values may be wholly personal, contingent or loosely 
conceived. The right (diritto) extends this conception of goodness by subjecting it to 
more rigorous tests from an increasingly impersonal (though never completely 
objective) standpoint. Reasons given in its favour are good reasons, in the sense that 
they are strong and widely applicable, and would be judged as such by persons at a wide 
range of hypothetical standpoints.49 
On Gentile’s account, then, the right and the good are not independent 
categories of value. They are dialectically linked: one is a refined and depersonalised 
extension of the other. This does not mean that, through the IDP, S’s conception of 
goodness is replaced by a conception of right. The two exist simultaneously, just as S 
exists (abstractly) as ego and (concretely) as universal pensiero pensante. In other words, S 
remains a person among other persons, and need not permanently erase her particular 
and contingent characteristics in order to imagine what she would think without them. 
She may revise or abandon certain of her values and dispositions in light of insights 
gained from her constructed impersonal standpoint. But her powers to do so need not, 
and indeed cannot, be limitless. Otherwise she would be lost in the abstraction of the 
kingdom of ends, ‘breath[ing] the pure air of moral life’ without having any real life to 
lead. Were there no opposition, no ‘disvalue’ (disvalore) and no possibility of change, 
there could be no value and no binding moral claims. There are reasons that are good 
for S and others that are good for both S and interlocutors with other points of view. 
The range of relevant interlocutors can be extended indefinitely, but the procedure 
                                                          
49 This is a reasonably charitable interpretation of Gentile’s meaning. See Diritto [67 and 73-5] 
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cannot yield permanent foundations for all possible persons without being brought 
prematurely to a halt by means of some abstraction that disregards the contingency and 
finitude of actual thinking.  
 
4ii. Persons and principles 
A further major clarification is in order. It may yet be thought that Gentilean 
constructivism is exclusively concerned with meta-ethical problems, and particularly that 
of how it is possible for S to apply and be bound by moral claims when she is the only 
concrete subject in a universe of her own construction. We have seen that Gentile’s 
method of immanence denies him some of the more obvious answers to this allegation. 
He cannot endorse any account of transcendent, free-standing, unconstructed moral 
facts. His understanding of transcendence means that this is also true of moral claims 
based on social convention or some other process occurring independently of S’s 
thinking. Although there are good reasons to suppose that moral standards arise in this 
way – this is how a sociologist or anthropologist might account for them, for example – 
S must recognise and impose them upon herself if they are to be concrete and binding 
for her, rather than abstractions applicable only to merely possible persons. Another 
implication of the actual idealist method of immanence is that we must endorse a 
thoroughgoing constructivist theory about morality (and, for that matter, every kind of 
truth and knowledge). No other option is tenable. In that respect Gentilean 
constructivism may be thought of as a vindication of constructivism per se, and 
especially of the constructivist conception of objectivity as the product of a 
universalising procedure.  
It is not clear that Gentilean constructivism can generate substantive solutions 
to any actual problem S might face. Strikingly absent from the theory is any decisive 
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principle by which S can test whether a proposed action is justified. Kantian 
constructivism employs the categorical imperative as precisely such a test: maxims are 
either compatible with it, however its demand for universality is formulated, or not. We 
saw in chapter 2.1 that Gentile must endorse something like the categorical imperative, 
although he is unable to endorse any of Kant’s various formulations of this principle in 
quite the ways they are presented. Chapter 2.2 gave us an account of how we can make 
sense of the idea of moral claims that are at once constructed by S and some external 
source (the state, the teacher or society, which, viewed through the IDP, amount to the 
same thing), and the present chapter has extended that theory to show, if only formally, 
how S goes about distinguishing good (sharable, impartial, universal) reasons from bad 
(non-sharable, partial, particular) ones. But it is still left to S to recognise and respond to 
good reasons, so it may be objected that Gentilean constructivism cannot deliver what it 
promises. The purported universality of the IDP’s conclusion is universal only among 
people with whom S already shares a set of substantive beliefs about reasons. If we 
concede this objection, but reply that any claim to be rational must be underpinned by some such 
substantive beliefs, it may be further objected that Gentilean constructivism appears 
practically indistinguishable from, and presents no objection to, the more radical 
Kantian constructivisms, like that of Onora O’Neill.50 
Several questions arise. Does Gentilean constructivism give us such a test? What 
kinds of action, if any, does it rule out? Is there anything that S is categorically not 
permitted to do? To find an answer, let us consider Gentile’s account of good and evil in 
Genesi. Among the stranger features of actual idealism is that it gives us an account of 
goodness but no strong account of badness. Evil is not different in kind from good, but is 
                                                          
50 Note that here I single out O’Neill because, unlike Rawls, Scanlon or Hill, she purports to be a 
constructivist ‘all the way down’ (Korsgaard’s phrase) about both practical and theoretical reason. 
Although Gentile’s moral theory bears a resemblance to Korsgaard’s, especially in the central role 
it assigns to autonomy, the dialogical elements of the IDP place it closer to O’Neill, who uses the 
principle of ‘followability’ to similar effect. 
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rather its absence; the relation between them is no different from that between falsity 
and truth, error and correctness.51 Gentile sometimes equates goodness with spiritual 
activity per se, which might be thought to rule out any possibility of wrong-doing.52 If 
whatever S does is good by virtue of being done, and only the present is concretely real 
(and, by extension, available for moral evaluation), she cannot possibly do wrong.53 
This conclusion rests on a mistaken conception of what Gentile means by his 
admittedly elusive concept of spiritual activity. The logic of the theory imposes some 
formal restrictions on what S may do. In particular, she must not behave hypocritically or 
arbitrarily. To act morally, she must subject her deeds to appropriate scrutiny, attempting 
always to square them with her moral convictions, even while these convictions may 
themselves be revised to ensure maximum coherence. This is one function of the IDP. 
S must not accept convenient assumptions as permanently or indisputably true; she 
must not be intellectually dishonest, for that would undermine the very idea of truth on 
which her beliefs and her ‘faith in thinking’ are founded. What matters above all is that 
S freely and consciously chooses her actions, participates in the betterment of the world, 
and takes responsibility for what she does.54 These are all formal demands rooted in 
Gentile’s coherence theory of truth, and concern S’s orderly and systematic treatment of 
her own ideas and actions. The Equality and Charity Principles similarly urge S to treat 
                                                          
51 At this point it is worth recalling the positivity of Gentile’s doctrine, which was discussed in 
chapter 1.1.  
52 In Diritto [67], for example, he writes that ‘The good […] is the value of the spirit in its 
dialectical actuality and […] the real [maggiore] concreteness of spiritual reality. […] The 
spiritual act is moral inasmuch as [it is the] realisation of the spirit; and the negation of morality 
cannot therefore be conceived as a real moment of the life of the spirit without coming into the 
concept of spiritual development.’ 
53 In Genesi, Gentile writes that ‘The truth is that evil, sin, guilt, like any error, is that angosciosa 
root from which life, in all its manifestations, grows; [it is] that nullity that plays havoc [vaneggia, 
raves] in the depths of the human soul  when [someone] comes to a halt, pauses, and is uncertain 
of how to go on, Then, as it is well said, he loses heart, feels himself diminished, or dying inside. 
That is: his true life is diminished, and he yearns to escape this nullity and renew his grip on 
reality’ [52-3]. Note that I have altered the structure of this sentence to clarify its meaning. 
54 Genesi [51-5, but especially 52]; Harris translation [116-20, but especially 117] 
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the IDP’s interlocutors equally and charitably because they represent reasons, not because 
they, or the persons on whom they are modelled, have independent moral status. 
We have yet to answer the objection. Kantian constructivists may equally say 
that actions (or maxims) are assigned their moral value as they pass through the 
categorical imperative procedure. Gentile’s claims that, first, the procedure must be 
applied while the action is ongoing and, second, conclusions cannot be drawn with 
more than provisional certainty, are of trivial importance if the procedure yields no 
conclusions, being conducted in S’s private internal world in isolation from other real 
persons.55 It would be a disappointing outcome for this thesis if it turned out that any 
aspiring Gentilean constructivist must appeal to Kantian constructivism whenever she 
wants to know what to do. When all its superfluous features are cleared away, Gentilean 
moral theory would constitute a redundant justification of a Kantian theory – not quite 
Kant’s, admittedly, but one in the Kantian mould – that supports itself perfectly well in 
any case. 
I do not think that this sombre assessment can be right, but it is difficult to 
make confident claims about what Gentile’s theory implies for the S-independent status 
of other, actual, external persons. Any such persons are necessarily beyond the ambit of 
moral inquiry, for any such inquiry, if it is to count, is necessarily S’s. The political state 
can go some way toward solving this problem by defining the formal status of citizens 
in law, which would imply that if S identifies the political state with the transcendental 
state, she is morally committed to treating compatriots as the law requires.  But even 
this is not a satisfactory reply to the objection, since after all, the state’s laws are 
available for revision, and there is no guarantee that they will define the rights and 
responsibilities of citizens in a way that S considers rationally justifiable. Nor is there 
                                                          
55 To be clear: the problem is (colloquially) that the IDP can’t ever reliably seal the deal, which is 
not quite the same as saying that it can’t yield any conclusions at all. 
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any guarantee that the persons with whom S interacts are her compatriots. While it may 
be denied that non-compatriots have any moral status, this would be starkly at odds 
with a moral theory premised on thinking. Anyone capable of thinking or otherwise 
behaving in a rational way may be represented in the IDP. Surely if other people have 
any moral status, it is because S perceives them as rational creatures (in the sense that 
they are capable of giving S followable reasons), not because, or at least not exclusively 
because, they think they belong to some particular political community. S may find 
compatriots’ reasons more transparent and easily followable than those of non-
compatriots, and the existence of shared institutions and cultural references – their 
greater familiarity, in short – means that S is better placed to anticipate their reasons. 
But in none of these cases do we need a jointly posited political entity to generate moral 
truths. Instead the key is mutual comprehensibility. Supposing S is a recent immigrant 
to a new state, say, it would be bizarre to assume that she understands her compatriots, 
who are strangers to her, better than she understands her old friends and family 
members in her original state. The relevant commonalities straddle national 
boundaries.56 
The politicisation of the internal society takes us only so far. It is not yet a 
principle. Are any substantive demands inferable from the two principles governing S’s 
management of the IDP? Consider first the Charity Principle, which, in the IDP, 
stipulates that S must grant interlocutors or opposing views a degree of interpretive 
charity comparable with what she expects them to grant her, and attempt to justify her 
claims, or to articulate the claims of others, in terms comprehensible from points of 
view other than her own.57 This principle expresses the imperative for S to overcome 
                                                          
56 Again, this is well illustrated by Gentile’s description of Italian immigrants to the United States 
in Educazione [14]; Bigongiari translation [10]. This citation was given earlier in a footnote: see 
chapter 1.2, sub-section 2i. 
57 I have slightly altered the wording from my earlier account of the Charity Principle. 
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her partial and particular nature in order to attain an appropriately ‘impersonal’ 
standpoint from which universal judgements, to which class all true moral judgements 
belong, can be cast.58 Plainly my formulation of this principle owes much to Davidson 
and O’Neill, but it should not be forgotten that Gentile identifies the categorical 
imperative with the Christian command to ‘love thy neighbour as thyself.’59 These, he 
claims, are respectively modern and ancient expressions of the ‘supreme ethical law,’ 
and as such are mutually equivalent. The significance of both, he thinks, is in the idea 
that the moral law is imposed by S upon herself: she views herself as one among others, 
and enters a reciprocal, moral relation to each of them, even though she is the only concrete 
thinking subject. To love her neighbour as herself, she must love herself as she does her 
neighbour. The two must be treated alike if their differences are to be resolved into a 
single universal spirit, united in the empire of impersonal reason.60 This amounts to a 
further vindication of the Equality Principle. 
With the Golden Rule as a guide, we can lead Gentilean constructivism out 
from its resolutely internal starting position and into the real world. S always has reason 
to treat others (or rather, any other; each thinking person imposes a separate claim upon 
her) in a way that she would want to be treated, given her understanding of how others 
                                                          
58 Sommario 2 [31n]: ‘The true judgement (like the beautiful poem and the good action, and 
everything that expresses the life of the spirit, and for that reason [perciò] has a value) is always 
impersonal, not because it is not incarnate in a person (or rather, is not the incarnation of a 
person), but because thought in act is universal. It is true that truth has a value independent of 
the mortal man who discovers it, whereas it [truth] survives, [and is] immortal, all the more 
universally recognised so long as it is less tied to particular names [nomi] and cases; but it is also 
true that all this has a significance because it implies that the truth forever rises up again 
[rigermoglia: re-sprouts, re-grows, re-germinates] in the immortal spirit that makes itself author 
and guarantor of it.’ 
59 King James Bible [Mark 12:31]. This is arguably a version of the Golden Rule, which might be 
more simply expressed as ‘do as you would be done by’; from this point forward, whenever I refer 
to ‘the Golden Rule,’ I assume that either phrase can be understood by it. 
60 Religione [87-8] 
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think and how she differs from them.61 Through the IDP she can appeal to more 
detailed and particular reasons in order to manage the problems of conflicting interests 
that have traditionally dogged such theories. A contrived example: if S sees that she has 
the opportunity to prevent some stranger from enduring an imminent meaningless and 
painful death, she plainly ought to do so. But if S sees that she has the opportunity to 
save one (though not both) of two strangers simultaneously facing the same fate, she 
faces a problem of justification: each potential victim has an equal claim to be saved, 
and the satisfaction of either entails the dissatisfaction (painful death) of the other. 
Under such circumstances, S must weigh up further reasons – the comparative risks 
involved in saving one rather than the other, the age and health of the potential victims, 
or any of countless others – in order to justify her ultimate decision. Unlike Kantian 
constructivism, there is no expectation that all the relevant facts will be considered. 
Instead S must act; unlike philosophers contemplating abstract examples, she does not 
have the luxuries of time and privileged knowledge. 
A final point. Early in this chapter I stressed the ‘open-endedness’ of dialogical 
reasoning, and suggested, somewhat tentatively, that with regulations to keep the 
procedure from becoming hopelessly indeterminate, this could be a strength. The 
intervening discussion has revealed a further advantage of this open-ended method. 
One common objection to moral theories grounded in universality, objectivity and 
impartiality says that they stand to alienate subjects from their actual commitments. The 
levels of artifice and abstraction required to model these ideals make the relevant 
persons appear decidedly unreal. We have seen that S may run a reason through an 
indefinite number of stacked IDPs, making it progressively objective and impersonal. 
But since the IDP’s endpoint is identified as S’s considered conviction, it could be that 
                                                          
61 I include this last clause in anticipation of the objection that S may be a sadomasochist or 
suicidal. These facts do not (unless she genuinely thinks that all others share her inclinations) 
entitle her to inflict pain or kill people. 
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increased impersonality and objectivity will make it more difficult or even impossible to 
accept. The procedure for cementing considered convictions could lead in the wrong 
direction, making it harder, not easier, for S to affirm the conclusions to which she is 
led. It is also unclear where this stacking process ought to end. If it could legitimately be 
brought to a halt after any number of re-iterations, would it not also be legitimate for S 
to stop it after just one, or even a cursory reference to a weak objection? 
The former problem contains a solution to the latter. The procedure extends as 
far as is required for S to reach a considered verdict. If she reasons in isolation, making 
decisions that affect only her, she need only satisfy her own self-conscious objections. 
This does not mean that she may bring the procedure to a halt wherever she chooses. 
Indeed, by choosing to bring it to a premature conclusion with objections outstanding, 
she is consciously complicit in her own self-deception. She knows that the conclusion at 
which she has arrived is not (necessarily) the one that she ought to affirm, and she is 
not, until all the known objections are addressed, thinking as well as she can. 
Nonetheless, and as we have seen, the procedure’s endpoint is at best provisional. It is 
true that S’s deliberations with other people, modelled here on the ‘stacking’ of different 
persons’ IDPs in a higher-level procedure, may bleach out features of S’s reasons that 
made them especially attractive to her when she first considered them, and it may be 
that, if the IDP’s interlocutors, including S, have beliefs so divergent and particular that 
they cannot be followed and affirmed by all the participants, then no good reasons will 
be reached. However, this does not mean that every application of the IDP is bound to 
lead to this justificatory dead end. Even for an individual subject, the scope of 
justification is limited by the terms that the relevant persons are able to accept. Hence 
the reasons binding a large group of persons or an institution may be different to those 
binding individual members or smaller subsets of those groups when viewed 
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individually. A wider or narrower range of reasons may be taken into account as 
circumstances require. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As with construction in the real world, the assembly of a philosophical edifice 
begins dramatically. Ambitious claims are set out, old ideas are demolished, and bold 
new structures are put in place. The concluding stages are less spectacular, but of no 
less importance. As with the unglamorous but necessary tasks of sweeping up, painting 
walls and checking a building for structural integrity, this chapter has been concerned 
with fine correction and detail. 
I began by justifying the use of a dialogical metaphor in place of a more 
conventional single-subject conception of thought. I argued that the IDP has several 
features that make it particularly well suited to the kinds of justification undertaken by 
the actual, finite subjects who face moral choices. Chief among these features is the 
dialogue’s capacity to model the way in which S may draw judgements after viewing a 
set of reasons from a variety of abstract standpoints, including those of S herself, 
imagined in counterfactual circumstances or at another point in time. The dialogue also 
clearly models the way in which S conducts the reasoning process by asking herself 
questions and rehearsing prospective answers to them. This, I argued, counters the 
charge of indeterminacy that can be made against coherence theories of truth. Next I 
discussed the role of dialogue in making sense of an external world about which 
objective claims can be made. I argued that for dialogue to fulfil this role, S must 
assume that other people, including abstractly-conceived interlocutors, agree with her 
most basic beliefs about the composition of the world. This observation yielded the 
Charity Principle and, extending on themes hinted at in previous chapters, the Equality 
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Principle. Together these regulate the IDP and enable S to scrutinise candidate reasons 
in a reasonably impersonal and impartial manner.  
The chapter’s second half concerned the role of agreement in the IDP. I argued 
that it is most effective as a falsification procedure, since its participants cannot refer to 
the outside world from within the bounds of the dialogue. This gives rise to a 
conservative bias, certainly, but this is mitigated by the indefinite status of the 
procedure’s conclusion, which can only ever be the best S can currently devise, but can 
never be enshrined as a permanent and necessary feature of all subsequent thought. 
Again it is by shifting between standpoints that S can test each set of reasons in the 
coherent set she currently affirms. I showed how the IDP allows S to open the critical 
distance required for her to scrutinise her beliefs in this way without requiring – or, at 
least, reducing the need for – the kind of abstraction that would cause her to become 
alienated from her conclusions. At the end of the chapter I discussed the way in which 
the IDP can be applied by multiple thinkers in order to achieve the high level of 
objectivity required to justify political and social action. This is achieved by ‘stacking’ 
the conclusions of individual subjects’ IDPs. Thus the internal dialogue can be used to 
model the reasoning of groups or institutions that cannot think independently of the 
individual subjects that compose them. 
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3.1 Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
In chapter 0.1 I set myself three objectives. These were: 
(i) …to discover not what Gentile’s moral theory meant for him and his 
contemporaries, but what it could mean for us; 
(ii) …to describe a kind of moral constructivism that stands as an alternative 
to the dominant Kantian variety; and 
(iii) …to rehabilitate Gentile as a major moral and political philosopher 
whose ideas can be fruitfully applied to contemporary analytic normative 
theory. 
I claimed that while these aims could be achieved separately,1 they were closely 
interconnected, so I would try to meet all three over the course of the thesis. At last I 
am in a position to gauge my success in doing so. To achieve this I will need to take a 
broad view of what has gone before. This chapter begins with a summary of the main 
arguments in Parts 1 and 2 (sub-heading #1). Over the remainder of the chapter I 
discuss the merits and shortcomings of the actual idealist moral theory I have presented. 
The major points covered, in order, are: a summary assessment of actual idealism, 
comparing what it promises with what it delivers, and finding that both are more 
modest (and less disparate) than its critics have often imagined (#2); an account of what 
Gentilean moral theory, as a radical variety of constructivism, can tell us about more 
moderate varieties (#3); and a final comment on how the moral theory here presented, 
which owes much to Gentile but does not really belong to him, represents a first step 
                                                          
1 It could be that actual idealism is a distinctive variety of moral constructivism that fails on its 
own terms or relies on some historically contingent fact, such as the presence of an unusually 
efficient totalitarian administration, in order to work. In either case the theory would have 
nothing to say to us. 
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toward a selective rehabilitation of actual idealism, which, carefully interpreted, offers a 
pertinent and original perspective on the practical problems of today (#4). 
 
1. Overview of conclusions 
I have tried to develop a version of Gentilean constructivism based on the 
internal dialogue. To do this I have supplemented Gentile’s account of the dialogue 
with principles to increase the likelihood of the procedure generating consistent and 
significant results. Thus I hope to have promoted the internal dialogue from a metaphor 
into a workable constructivist device. The IDP can be understood as a tool for use in 
moral philosophy, enabling S to determine whether she has good (‘universal’) reasons to 
think some thought or perform some action. To have such reasons is to have moral 
responsibility for the thought or action. However, to think of the IDP exclusively as a 
moral device is misleading.  
Actual idealism rejects the conventional hard distinction between normative and 
factual claims. It attempts to unite the two in the act of thinking. Gentile runs factual 
and moral claims together, arguing that, as viewed by S, they are both underpinned by 
values that she must work to realise. That rational persons value truth above falsity is 
what motivates them to scrutinise their beliefs in search of errors, and in doing so to 
assess those beliefs according to the strengths of their underlying justifications. That 
they value certain states of affairs is what motivates them to articulate the momentary 
manifestations of their continuous present acts as series of separate and abstract events, 
each backed by intentions or causes and resulting in consequences. These allow agents 
to decide what actions are best and most justifiable. The construction of morality, then, 
is an extension of something that rational, truth-seeking persons do in any case. Moral 
claims will never be meaningless while S continues to think and evaluate the world and 
3.1 Conclusion 
275 
the changes to it she, by her actions, brings about. For S to think without acting is for 
her to indulge in inconsequential, abstract velleity. Action without thought, or without S 
articulating the action in terms of ends, beliefs and values, is unreal. So understood, 
thinking and acting are part of the same inherently moral enterprise.  
Gentile’s justification for this unusual view, as I understand him, would be that 
normative claims are entirely familiar components of the way subjects think about their 
choices. The question of what it means to say that S has a reason to perform one action 
rather than another is notoriously difficult to answer without circularity, and Gentile 
never answers it directly. The difficulties of explaining it are counterbalanced by the 
ease of grasping it. There is no real mystery in the thought that S might have more or 
most reason to perform certain kinds of action and to avoid others, nor in the idea that 
her intentions and dispositions can change in light of due reflection. There are bad as 
well as good reasons for action; the two are distinguishable only after they have been 
constructed (or, perhaps, deconstructed and reconstructed) using an appropriately 
designed procedure. By coupling ought-claims with truth claims Gentile makes both 
available for rational tests within the IDP. The truth of an ought-claim does not result 
only from S’s belief or will that it be true; it must also be shown to be thinkable. On 
Gentile’s account of consciousness, this requires that it cohere with other beliefs and 
can sustain rational scrutiny from the artificial standpoint of a universal subject. These 
tests are not only ideal but necessary for any thinker hoping to make justified truth claims. 
Chapter 1.2 showed that several of Gentile’s works completed before the rise of 
Fascism, most notably Fondamenti della filosofia del diritto and Sistema di logica, include hints 
about how the universal subject is to be constructed. In these he describes thinking as a 
dialogue between the S and an imaginary ‘other’ – the ‘alter [ego]’ or ‘socius.’ For the 
purposes of moral philosophy, which we can understand as the process of making 
judgements about what S ought and has most reason to do, the aim of this exercise is to 
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refine S’s personal and partial reasons into impersonal and impartial ones by examining 
claims from a range of actual and/or hypothetical perspectives different from the one 
she presently occupies. Gentile never lays out this process in a systematic fashion, and 
can, at first reading, be seen to describe a lightly rationalised theory of the conscience 
and how persons’ thoughts are affected by the claims of other thinkers. But his earlier 
insistence on the activity of thinking, as opposed to complacent passivity, suggests that 
this cannot be the whole story. The conscience sometimes makes demands of us when 
we would rather it did not. If those demands are to have any authority, they need to be 
seen to give us reasons to act on them. Those reasons are constructed (or else found to 
be flawed) only as the conscience’s demands are inspected and assigned their value in 
the course of the IDP.  
Gentile’s equation of the political state and the socius is not wholly implausible, 
but, as I argued in chapter 1.3, it is incompatible with actual idealism’s basic principle of 
the liberty of thought. In this respect I partly endorse Gennaro Sasso’s characterisation 
of the link between the systematic, pre-Fascist works of actual idealism and the Fascist 
regime. Sasso probably overstates his case, though, as Alessandro Amato has recently 
shown. Amato maintains that actual idealism was realised in Fascism, but at the same 
time served as ‘a moment of anti-Fascism,’ provoking the regime to respond to internal 
and external criticism in the endless unfurling of historical contingency.2 While there is 
merit in this view, it does not square fully with Gentile’s comments, which sometimes 
imply that the socius is simply l’uomo fascista, which is in turn a spiritualised avatar for 
Benito Mussolini. This fully Fascist rendering of the IDP proves self-defeating when we 
ask how Mussolini himself knows or determines what is the right thing to do. He 
                                                          
2 Part of this sentence is lifted from my review of Amato’s book. See James Wakefield (2012) 
‘Alessandro Amato, L’etica oltre lo Stato’ (review) in Intellectual History Review 22:4, pp.548-51 
[551]. The quoted passages are from Alessandro Amato (2011) L’etica oltre lo Stato: filosofia e 
politica in Giovanni Gentile. Milan: Mimesis [215] 
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cannot appeal to himself as though the best possible judgements were already available 
to him. We might be tempted to try a backward rationalisation for Gentile’s whole-
hearted endorsement of Mussolini, explaining it in Carl Schmitt’s terms as a kind of 
decisionism: ‘the state’ must take a stance, and Mussolini has the advantage of already 
holding the power to turn his views into action. But this too would undermine the 
actual idealist premise of thinking as a free act. It would also imply that Gentile was a 
relativist about values. This is incompatible with his constructivism, as Part 2’s more 
elaborate version of the IDP goes to show. 
Given my aims to present the IDP as a constructivist procedure that stands as 
an alternative to the dominant Kantian variety, and to show that the IDP can be 
fruitfully applied to contemporary normative analytic philosophy, I began Part 2 with a 
discussion of Gentile’s view of Kant. He maintains that Kant fails to overcome the 
problem of transcendence, although he comes closer to achieving this than any previous 
philosopher. This means that Kant’s constructivist project presupposes unconstructed 
elements that cannot be justified. These include his conception of universal reason as a 
fixed and permanent object corresponding to the cognitive architecture of rational 
beings. While Gentile refers to universal reason, he denies that this can be concretely 
conceived as a pure object. For him there is only thinking; reason itself is constructed, 
not discovered, and if we are to make sense of the idea of universal reason, we cannot 
attempt to do it a priori, having cut ourselves off from the object of our inquiries. 
Gentile finds similar fault with Kant’s moral theory, and maintains that Kant can only 
deduce substantive principles or maxims by inserting presuppositions in his a priori 
scheme. With this argument, the foundations for Kant’s categorical imperative 
procedure are undermined. 
Gentile does not deny the attractiveness of Kant’s aim to ground (moral) 
principles in universal reason. He merely disputes Kant’s method of constructing those 
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principles. In chapter 2.2 I discussed his argument that if persons are to live together in 
a shared scheme of social co-operation, they need to be educated in such a way that 
their conceptions of reason are at least mutually intelligible. Here we can see that 
Gentile is less willing than Kant to assume that principles of universal reason are 
transparent to all thinkers at all times. He thinks that substantive principles must be 
taught before they can be critically assessed. Some people may never want or be able to 
subject their reasons to rational scrutiny, so for them, education provides a 
comprehensive and reasonably stable (if not static) worldview. But for reflective and 
conscientious thinkers, education supplies the means by which claims, including those 
arising in the course of that education, can be criticised and revised. This process is, and 
must be, endless. On Gentile’s account, we can never justify the complacent acceptance 
of previous reasons as predicates of any future thought. If we were to do that, we would 
have unwittingly confused abstract pensieri pensati with concrete pensiero pensante. Of these, 
only the latter is real, necessary and binding. 
Chapter 2.3 was engaged with overlapping themes of dialogue and agreement. 
My first task was to show that a dialogical conception of reason is both useful and 
recognisable as a model of the way in which thought ordinarily occurs. To test the 
certainty of beliefs S presently holds or thinks she might have reason to hold, she 
imagines what other people would or might say about the judgement she is making and 
to the reasons given in favour of her conclusion. Thus she distinguishes beliefs 
supported by good reasons from those supported by reasons that she just happens to 
affirm. For propositions to be true or false, S must assume herself to inhabit a shared 
world to which her claims refer. For a claim to be true for S requires that it also be true 
for other people, even if they do not yet realise it.  
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Since moral judgements are often made with imperfect knowledge of the 
relevant facts, consequences and the possible interpretations of these,3 S can use the 
IDP in several different ways. One is to identify a range of reasons that other people 
might offer for and against a given judgement. This enables S to estimate, if only 
crudely, how extensive the subsequent dialogue will be. Deeply contentious questions, 
or those related to persons’ partial and particular interests, will yield wider ranges of 
different positions than those relying on fewer contested beliefs. S may base her 
judgement on the view held, or likely to be held, by all or most people that she 
considers authoritative within the relevant domain. A stronger version of the IDP 
works as a falsification device, with S rehearsing the most plausible objections to the 
claims she presents. This acts as a rigorous test of coherence, and while certain kinds of 
question cannot be answered fully by this method – empirical questions referring to 
evidence, for example – S may at least find weaknesses that call for further investigation 
to settle which answer most closely squares with the facts. Either method can be 
extended to incorporate the best conclusions reached in other persons’ dialogues, with one 
conclusion ‘stacked’ against another. Thus bias is incrementally worked out of the 
process and its conclusions, giving way to more objective reasons. 
 
2. Actual idealism assessed 
In earlier chapters I noted that actual idealism has sometimes been interpreted 
as making implausibly bold claims about the relation between thought and the world. It 
may appear at first glance – and long thereafter, if many of Gentile’s learned critics are 
                                                          
3 I say that S ‘often’ makes judgements with imperfect knowledge because it is possible that the 
judgement be deductively obvious, say, in which case its premises contain everything required for 
the inference to be made. Given actual idealism’s unusual account of what counts as a moral 
judgement, even mathematical reasoning is included in the range of morally significant actions. 
Conventional moral decisions about action are rarely made with perfect knowledge of the 
relevant considerations, though. 
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anything to go by – that the doctrine’s claims about the unconfined creative powers of 
thought lead to ‘giddy visions of human omnipotence,’4 with logic (or thinking) 
imagined to be ‘self-critical and autonomous and the lord of creation.’5 It is a theory 
that, via subjectivism and a positive (though assuredly not positivist) conception of 
truth and reality, says anything is possible. Reality is wholly ours to create, construct, 
and configure; evil is only error, and error exists only in the past. There is nothing but 
the ever-present act of thinking, and to posit anything outside that is folly. The hard 
sciences, for all they purport to have shown, have mistaken the nature of thought and 
reality itself. They offer us little but abstract conjectures. All is philosophy, for thinking 
is the engine of history, morality, life itself. 
For some students of idealism, Gentile’s great promises might prove an exciting 
and enticing prospect. So they seemed to his ‘disciples.’ His claims for actual idealism 
are more ambitious than even the wildest to appear in the works of Kant, Hegel and 
their followers, largely as a result of the doctrine’s uncompromising and 
uncompromised principles: there is nothing beyond what is thinkable; there is nothing that 
is not thought; thinking subjects are therefore the creators of reality. While other idealists 
situate thought in a system, Gentile claims that the system is subordinate to thinking. 
But for those unsympathetic to idealism, Gentile’s promises show the doctrine to be a 
hollow façade of hyperbole concealing the more modest truth about thought, the 
persons who think it and the world they inhabit. Persons are anything but omnipotent. 
We are vulnerable creatures, thrown into situations we did not choose, and with limited 
powers to determine how our lives turn out. Thinking may solve conceptual problems, 
or problems with ideas, but it can do nothing about the brute facts that arise in 
experience. Discord, unhappiness, and dissatisfaction are facts of the matter, and such 
                                                          
4 Redner attributes this view of actual idealism to Gentile’s followers. See his (1997) [33] 
5 George Boas (1926) ‘Gentile and the Hegelian Invasion of Italy,’ in Journal of Philosophy 23:7, 
pp.184-88 [185] 
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facts cannot be changed by thinking alone. By way of poor substitute it can rationalise 
these away or else ignore them. To take refuge in an ivory tower of concepts is not to 
embrace some higher reality, but instead to abandon the only one there is. For all its 
creative powers, notes Roger Holmes, even Gentile’s thought seems unable to construct 
a world in which water flows uphill. Nor can it make two plus two equal five or 
eradicate unhappiness and uncertainty. To attribute our apparent inability to achieve 
these ends to negative moments in thought’s dialectic – to say that things are bound to 
get better as a result of changes to the facts or to our dispositions toward them – is at 
best wishful thinking and at worst a meaningless collection of words. 
These contrasting accounts of actual idealism are caricatures of interpretations 
described in the preceding chapters.6 Both, in their different ways, make the doctrine 
look rather silly. One says it claims far too much, and that it dismisses what has proven 
a reliable and useful body of knowledge, namely the hard sciences, as false. The other 
emphasises the persistence of the external world and the vanity of a doctrine that tries 
to deny or do without it. Neither view can be wholly and seriously maintained, but each 
contains some truth. Gentile really does make overambitious claims for actual idealism, 
and in identifying positivism, empiricism and realism as the chief obstacles to human 
progress, he very likely misdiagnosed the historical and political problems he faced. But 
his basic assertions about the construction of reality can be made without lapsing into 
the kinds of absurdity stressed in the second account. The notion that knowledge is 
constructed is not alien to the way thought is ordinary discussed. Nor is it easily denied. 
It does not entail any further claim about the construction of the objects that are known 
or thought about. Anything that is not thought is left outside the ambit of knowledge. 
The existence of a world prior to thought is not part of a theory properly concerned 
                                                          
6 …and nowhere more so than in the discussion of the being/Being There problem in chapter 1.1 
(sub-section 4ii). 
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with thinking. Stated as simply as this, actual idealism seems far removed from the 
bombastic speculation described above. Gentile need not, as one critic has put it, try to 
‘lift himself up by his own braces’ by claiming both that there is a world and that we 
construct it.7 His real aim is to show that we cannot know or understand or say anything 
meaningful about a non-constructed world without thinking about and so creating it. 
The issue of the non-constructed world’s existence is revealed to be a canard, 
unanswerable without the intervention of a thinking subject, which would, of course, 
entail its construction.  
 
3. Constructivism writ large 
This brings me to the issue of actual idealist moral theory’s status as a distinctive 
and radical variety of constructivism. It is constructivism writ large, without concessions 
to any form of realism. Reality’s only necessary foundation is its basis in the act of 
thinking. As such, Gentile’s doctrine can be called a constructivism that runs as near to 
‘all the way down’ as is possible without becoming wholly unintelligible. His insistent 
claim that everything is constructed is not an empty exaggeration. When applied to 
nature and the empirical stuff of experience it may be thought to promise something it 
cannot deliver, but with respect to moral theory this concern may at least be bracketed. 
Moral theory is, of course, strictly theoretical; it does not describe a world of empirical 
objects. There can be no doubt that it is constructed as theory. Questions of its content’s 
status, whether there are moral facts and so forth, are more controversial, but I cannot 
see how there can be absolute facts of the matter beyond deductively certain but hollow 
platitudes such as ‘it is always immoral to perform immoral actions.’ The reasons on 
which morality hinges, and which give it its rationale and authority, are not ready-made 
                                                          
7 This idea, already cited in a footnote in chapter 1.1, sub-section 4ii, comes from George de 
Santillana (1938) [369]. 
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facts about the world. They are constructs designed to explain and order the values that 
we, as conscious agents possessing both concrete creative powers and abstract ideas of 
the past and possible futures, assign to the facts. A mechanical universe without 
consciousness would contain neither reasons nor values. 
Gentile is unusual among advocates of constructivism in that his political ideas 
are explicitly state-centric and illiberal, even authoritarian, in character. The trend 
among recent (usually Kantian) constructivists has been to talk about politics in terms 
of ‘scheme[s] of social cooperation’8 in which justice, not order or authority, is the 
highest virtue. These theorists have generally found in favour of refined versions of 
liberalism for which the state may be an agent, but one with a carefully specified 
jurisdiction. Persons are understood as free and equal fellow participants in the scheme, 
and they each possess inalienable rights and responsibilities. It is from this conception 
that the other features of political constructivism follow. Pluralism is accepted as a fact 
that must be accommodated, since claims about moral facts are so deeply contested 
that, even if they were true, to act upon any one conception at the exclusion of others 
would be a kind of dogmatism. Laws are good laws, and therefore worth following, if 
they are compatible with the outcomes of a suitably designed procedure (suitably 
designed, that is, if it accommodates the view of the person just described). This 
provides a test of legitimate authority and political obligation. Few actual social 
schemes, if any, will conform perfectly to the principles derived from this procedure, 
but constructivism nevertheless offers an ideal on which the best and most just of these 
should model their policies. 
                                                          
8 This is Rawls’s phrase. See his (1985) ‘Justice as Fairness: Political, not Metaphysical,’ in 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 14:3, pp.223-51. [229] 
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Gentile’s stated objections to liberalism are unpersuasive. This is partly because 
they respond to beliefs that few of today’s liberals, if any, still hold.9 But his underlying 
concerns about the arbitrariness of presuppositions give us better reasons to doubt 
recent constructivists’ accounts of the necessary features of any just social scheme. At 
least in the way I have presented it, Gentilean moral constructivism endorses 
conceptions of liberty, equality and autonomy (or autarchy) broadly similar to those 
found in Kantian theory, but arrives at them from a separate starting position and 
subsequent route. This means that these conceptions’ details are subtly different, and 
their political corollaries strikingly so. But Gentile’s moral theory does not lead 
inexorably to Fascist totalitarianism. In fact it is compatible with a wide range of 
political configurations. What matters, ultimately, is that an institution’s constituent 
members identify with it. Gentile’s response to the fact of pluralism is to allow the state 
or the persons representing it to set about consciously determining or at least limiting 
with which associations people identify themselves. That those associations arise 
organically or as a result of social engineering is largely irrelevant to the question of 
whether the resultant moral beliefs can impose obligations on those party to them. 
What Gentilean moral theory most starkly shows is that constructivism is not 
guaranteed to lead to any one benign conclusion. In response to the implausibility of 
substantive moral realism, constructivists offer a strictly formal alternative. But doing 
this gives them no special entitlement to specify what substantive beliefs and values may 
serve as the materials of construction, nor what conclusions a properly configured and 
applied procedure may reach. Designers of constructivist procedures must walk a 
tightrope between under- and over-determination of outcomes. If too little is assumed 
at the beginning, the procedure’s formal elements will be left in the hands of its 
                                                          
9 See Gentile’s remarks on liberalism in chapter 10 of Genesi. He equates it with atomism and 
anarchy (!) 
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protagonists. As a result it will be unable to produce firm, reliable and replicable results, 
since one person’s version need not resemble any other’s. If too much is assumed, the 
procedure will beg its own questions, issuing results that reinforce those same 
assumptions. The process of construction would eddy around a core of substantive 
presuppositions.  
Kantian theorists assume more than they are entitled to in order to generate a 
benign and universal moral order. Gentile assumes less, though not, of course, so little 
as he claims. While I have argued that there are problems with the conception of the 
total state that Gentile advocates, his moral theory does not rule out such political 
orders altogether. Instead it calls for rigorous procedural justification of the state’s 
demands, and implicitly rules out hierarchy and dogmatism. However, unless 
constructivist theory is larded with presuppositions about what is to count as valuable, 
there is no way to determine decisively and for all time what political actors, or moral 
agents of any kind, ought to do. Subjects face choices as varied as the changing 
circumstances in which they arise. If the method of immanence is the best we can hope 
to defend, moral decisions cannot be purely abstract choices between predefined sets of 
options, but between acts to which we must assign values as we go along. So value is 
something that is constructed and brought to the material – the brute facts before us – 
rather than found free-standing in the world. Procedures like the IDP are useful for 
laying bare the constructive business of thinking, but our awareness of the procedure’s 
formal elements cannot by itself tell us to what conclusions it will lead. Actual thought, 
with its constant review, self-criticism and revision, is indispensable if actions are to 
have any value whatsoever. 
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4. Final remarks 
To finish, it is worth stating again that the version of actual idealism presented 
in this thesis, and especially its second half, is Gentilean but not strictly Gentile’s. In some 
respects my method is conspicuously different from his. I view the development of 
actual idealism as a reaction to and attempted correction of earlier philosophical 
systems, not some great leap forward in any grand developmental account of the history 
of ideas. I have not tried to offer a rounded picture of Gentile himself, with reference to 
his motives, influences and biography. Nor have I presented actual idealist moral theory 
as part of the more elaborate system in which its author situated it. My largely 
ahistorical approach is evidence of this; according to Gentile’s preferred method of 
reading historical texts, any proper interpretation of his work must account for the 
complexities of his life and times. No doubt he would have disapproved of the method 
underlying this thesis. Yet this is no reason to approach his work any differently. I have 
tried not to trace his every footstep, but instead to see where he set out to arrive and to 
chart the surest course by which, given the most defensible tenets of actual idealism, he 
might have reached that destination. 
The task of philosophy is not only to understand theories as their originators 
understood them. After all, even they, like Gentile, may be susceptible to self-deception, 
confusion and similar weaknesses. There are two separate roles for readers of 
philosophical texts: one as intellectual historians, concerned with when, why and how 
ideas came about; and another as philosophers proper, concerned with identifying the 
problems faced by real thinkers and finding the best possible solutions to them. Both 
are legitimate and independently valuable approaches to the same material, but they are 
mutually distinct activities. The controversy surrounding Gentile has led previous 
commentators to restrict themselves to the first task and to remain circumspect about 
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the second. But the latter has, in Gentile’s terms, concrete value. The problems of today 
will lose none of their urgency while past ideas are treated exclusively as historical 
artefacts. Moral philosophy, in particular, must be able to offer insight into how we 
ought to live now. Otherwise it is nothing more than historical literature, made up of 
outmoded answers to questions we no longer need ask. This thesis represents a step 
toward a more perspicuous reading of actual idealism, motivated by the thought that at 
the heart of this strange and radical doctrine is something better attuned to the present 
intellectual climate of Anglo-American philosophy than has been previously 
appreciated. 
The task of rehearsing, re-appraising and refining past thought may never finally 
be finished, for the problems of philosophy manifest themselves in ever-changing ways. 
They do not arise out of nothing, but from our reflections on the real and immediate 
problems we encounter in life. Gentilean constructivism recognises the situatedness of 
thought, its ‘absolute immanence’ and the futility of trying to escape it. Yet it also 
recognises the importance of retaining a robust conception of truth as opposed to 
falsity. To embrace both these tenets requires us to occupy an uncomfortable position, 
and it is tempting to lard the theory with transcendent features to give fallible subjects 
the impression of a clear target at which to direct their thoughts. But such 
presuppositions are untenable. Constructivism, if it is to be more than well-intentioned 
guesswork, must embrace the contingent and provisional nature of the act of thinking. 
Even if that is all we take from Gentile, we have the tools to set about re-evaluating the 
foundations on which our ordinary philosophical assumptions are built. 
 
 James Wakefield 
Sunday, 23rd June 2013 
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1iii. Useful further reading not directly cited  
Croce, Benedetto (1926) La filosofia della pratica: economica e etica. Bari: Laterza. (Originally 
1909) 
 Croce, Benedetto (1913) Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic. London: 
Macmillan. (Translated by Douglas Ainslie) 
Croce, Benedetto (1909) Logica come scienza del concetto puro. Bari: Laterza. 
 Croce, Benedetto (1917) Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept. London: 
Macmillan. (Translated by Douglas Ainslie)3 
                                                          
2 Note that this article consists of extracts from Walker (1989), above, plus additional material. 
Where the two overlap I have cited the earlier version. 
3 I include two out of the three books in constituting Croce’s Filosofia dello Spirito, excluding his 
works about aesthetics. Although I have tried to avoid the already much-discussed issue of the 
link between Gentile and Croce, the latter’s works are instructive for understanding what Gentile 
set out to deny. Throughout his close collaboration with and subsequent estrangement from 
Croce, he believed that the older philosopher replicated the same problems that had existed in the 
works of previous idealists in Italy and Germany alike. Note that Douglas Ainslie’s translations are 
conspicuously dated and sometimes less clear than Croce’s original Italian. Colin Lyas produced a 
better translation of the Estetica in 1992, but unfortunately this has not been followed by those of 
the two books listed above. 
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de Ruggiero, Guido (1925) Storia del liberalismo europeo. Bari: Laterza.  
 de Ruggiero, Guido (1959) The History of European Liberalism. Boston, MA: 
Beacon Press. (Originally 1927; translated by R.G. Collingwood)4 
Gentile, Giovanni (1899) Rosmini e Gioberti. Bari: Laterza5 
 
  
                                                          
4 As mentioned in the thesis, de Ruggiero is one of the most interesting of Gentile’s critics because 
he was for a time (at least philosophically) very close to him. He does not discuss Gentile’s 
philosophy in this book, but it is nevertheless useful for its insights into the context from which 
Gentile’s thought arose, and of how someone who rejected Fascism responded to the turbulent 
historical currents prevailing in early twentieth-century Italy. Many of de Ruggiero’s direct 
criticisms of Gentile can be found in articles available in English.  
5 This is one of Gentile’s earliest published works, and demonstrates his debt – or what he 
perceived to be his debt – to the nineteenth-century Italian philosophers Antonio Rosmini and 
Vincenzo Gioberti. 
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2. Appendix: abbreviations for Gentile’s works 
Many of Gentile’s works have unwieldy titles. Given the strict word limit and 
the need for me to refer repeatedly to some of these works, I have referred to them by 
the abbreviated titles listed in the table below. (Note that years of publication refer to 
first editions. See the bibliography for which editions I have used in this study.) 
Original title Year English title Abbreviation 
Scuola e filosofia 1908 School and philosophy Scuola 
L’atto del pensare come atto puro 1911 
The Act of Thinking as 
Pure Act 
‘Pensare’ 
Il metodo dell’ immanenza 1912 
The method of 
immanence 
 ‘Immanenza’ 
Sommario di pedagogia (2 
volumes) 
1913-
14 
Summary of Pedagogy: 
General Pedagogy (vol. 
1)/Didactics (vol. 2) 
Sommario 1 / 2 
La riforma della dialettica 
Hegeliana 
1913 
Reform of the Hegelian 
Dialectic 
Hegeliana 
La teoria generale dello Spirito 
come atto puro 
1916 
General Theory of Spirit 
as Pure Act 
Atto puro 
I fondamenti della filosofia del 
diritto 
1916 
Foundations of the 
Philosophy of Right 
Diritto 
Discorsi di religione 1920 Lectures on Religion Religione 
Sistema di logica come teoria del 
conoscere (2 volumes) 
1917-
22 
System of Logic as 
Theory of Knowing 
Logica 1 / 2 
La riforma dell’educazione 1922 Reform of Education 
Educazione/ 
Education6 
Origini e dottrina del fascismo 1927 
Origins and Doctrine of 
Fascism 
Origini 
Introduzione alla filosofia 1933 
Introduction to 
Philosophy 
Introduzione 
La filosofia dell’arte 1931 The Philosophy of Art Arte 
Genesi e struttura della società: 
saggio di filosofia pratica 
1946 
Genesis and Structure of 
Society: an essay on 
practical philosophy 
Genesi/Genesis7 
 
  
                                                          
6 Note that Gentile re-wrote the first chapter of La riforma dell’educazione for Dino Bigongiari’s 
English translation. Rather than assigning the English version a separate abbreviated title, I refer 
simply to ‘Bigongiari translation’ wherever I distinguish one from the other. 
7 The English translation of Genesi contains a wealth of material (Harris’s notes and introduction) 
not included in the original. Since this is cited several times in the thesis, I assign it the separate 
abbreviation Genesis. 
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